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When the United States withdrew front Vietnam and reduced its forces in Korea, the Soviet Union began to fill the resultant power vacuum. Since 1977, their naval forces in the Pacific have had a dramatic increase—the Boris Butoma refuels the Minsk and a “Kara”-class guided missile cruiser. With diplomacy revived among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing, the Kremlin is more anxious than ever to achieve a dominant naval presence in the Western Pacific.
A consistent theme in modern Soviet naval writings is the effectiveness of naval forces not only as a defender against armed aggression, but also as an instrument of peacetime state policy. In fact, the navy is credited as a means to “achieve political ends without resorting to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one's own potential might and threatening to start military operations."1 Thus defined as an instrument of state policy, it is not surprising that the composition and character of the fleet should reflect such policy and be flexible in relation to historical developments.
Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense, recognizes that the balance of the fleet is not static and notes, “The main factors determining such changes are the general political situation (new alignment of forces, presence of military blocs, change of regimes in individual countries. etc.), the potential of the economy and growth of the military-economic potential of the country, the development of science and technology at home and abroad and change in the tasks devolving on the fleet.’’2
In the late 1970s, these forces of realignment were at work in the Pacific theater, creating within three years a new environment, which necessitated a new response from the Soviet Union. This response included a significantly reconfigured naval force to restore a regional equilibrium favorable to established Soviet strategic goals of national defense, enhancement of international policy roles, development of international power, and the employment of that power in support of world socialism.
From the internationalist nature of these strategic goals and the character of regional antagonisms suggested by Lenin, four objectives of Soviet foreign policy in the Pacific area can be identified:
► Counteraction of the U. S. strategic threat both *n terms of directly counterpoised armed forces and of interrupting the U. S. power base dependent upon Pacific geopolitical and economic equations.
^ Isolation of Japan from any bilateral or trilateral relationships with the People’s Republic of China (P-R.C.) and/or the United States.
^ Prevention of P.R.C. regional domination, either singly or by Chinese coalition with other Pacific Powers or the United States. In many respects, the sudden Soviet imperative for increased naval force levels in the Pacific may be related to the restoration ot diplomatic relations between the P.R.C. and the United States following so closely in the wake of the Sino-Japanese treaty.
^ Support for the growth and development of national liberation movements and socialist revolutions by the expansion of Soviet influence in the Pacific region.
. These objectives have not been equally weighted in terms of historical activity. Clearly, the strategic Preservation of the national identity vis-a-vis the United States has and must remain the overwhelming consideration for the Soviet Union. But in this “transition” era, as Leninist theorists would describe the present day, the Soviet Union, while unswerving in defense of the socialist homeland, can afford to be flexible in approaching other objectives.
1 he historical perspective of Marxist-Leninist strategy denies the urgent relevancy of time, which the technologically oriented West is so anxious to ascribe to the motives of the Soviet Union. With firmly established ideology, the Soviets can forego precipitous ephemeral advances which might endanger the hard-fought gains of socialism in favor of chess play, ln which a tactical pawn can be expended if it envies a strategic move to the queen, ln 1982, the chessboard is set for a Soviet move in the Pacific Ocean.
With the exception of the virtually self-sufficient Soviet Union and P.R.C., the great Pacific regional Powers are island states which, historically, have been dependent upon the sea both for importing raw Materials and as the primary avenue of export for 'ntratheater and Western commerce.
. The perspective of a land state in an ocean theater 's further complicated by a geographic situation in which the Soviet Pacific maritime outlets are beset with climactic and topographic problems. For many years, this combination of unattractive features Weighed against the permanent stationing of a large nuval presence in the Pacific. In fact, as Admiral 9orshkov points out, when a Russian flotilla confronted the Japanese in 1904, the primary combatants were brought in from the Western fleets.
Reflecting on the prevailing threat to the Soviet sfate through the early post-World War II years, the fraditional role of defense of the homeland fell largely f° the ground forces in the absence of a credible strategic threat from the sea. Defending the sparsely populated pockets of civilization in the Soviet Far East required a relatively small force of general purpose destroyers and frigates, possessing only a minimal capability for sustained operations beyond the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and the shallow North Pacific.
To this coastal defense force, the Soviets applied a lesson from World War II: 52% of Soviet destroyer losses were caused by mines. Being especially vulnerable to mine warfare, the Pacific Fleet has traditionally maintained a large contingent of mine warfare ships and craft which has been consistently larger than the major surface combatant force.
ln the 1960s, as U. S. strike aircraft carriers and then U. S. ballistic missile submarines look positions in the Pacific from which they could wreak nuclear devastation on Soviet territory, the Soviets made moves to strengthen their Pacific Fleet. Soviet actions in the Pacific theater included the deployment of a ballistic missile nuclear submarine counterforce, first fielded by a “Yankee” patrol in 1971. To counter U. S. strategic long-range naval weapon delivery platforms, newer generations of nuclear attack submarines, intended for strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and nuclear cruise missile submarines. targeted against attack carriers, were transferred to the Pacific Fleet. Soviet naval airforces, which developed as a parallel arm of the Pacific Fleet, kept pace with the generally rapid evolution of the submarine force which they were intended to cover and complement.
Characteristically, then, as in the Soviet Western fleets, Pacific submarine forces were given the first priority for development, and new basing facilities were constructed at Petropavlovsk to support their operations from a less geographically vulnerable area with immediate access to the open ocean.
During this period of strategic counterforce development, Admiral Gorshkov again took a page from Soviet history to ensure that his oceangoing strategic submarine force would not suffer from the lack of surface combatant support to which he attributes the downfall of the German U-boat force. To this end, he had by 1974 assigned seven major ASW ships (two “Kresta Ils’Vfive “Kashins”) and three anticarricr rocket cruisers (one “Kresta 1 7 two “Kyndas”) to augment an existing force of two Sverdlov light cruisers, two “Kotlin"-class guided missile destroyers, and some 30 coastal frigates.
It is significant that since the early 1970s, the Soviet Union has maintained 30-34% of its active submarines in the Pacific Fleet. At the same time, the proportion of its surface combatants assigned to the Pacific has posted a much slower rate of growth: from 24% in 1972 to 30% in 1981. More important, the Soviet Pacific Fleet experienced almost nogrowth at all in its principal surface combatant forces from
late 1974 to 1978. During this period, newer “Kri- vak” guided missile frigates began to enter service, and a gradual increase in the amphibious lift forces began to unfold with the introduction of the “Ro- pucha” LSTs in 1975. But. in sum. the major surface forces of the Pacific remained at constant qualitative and quantitative levels until 1978.
From these statistics, we can infer that through the mid-1970s, the naval leadership was satisfied that the primary objectives of strategic defense of the homeland and offensive strategic counterforce projection were being met and that these strategic objectives were the primary force behind the structure of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. This force level also permitted the Soviets to maintain a relatively consistent out-of-area deployment pattern of approximately 6,700 ship-days per year from 1970 through 1978, a further indication of Soviet satisfaction with the size of its surface fleet in the Pacific.
The year 1978 was significant in the development of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Vasiliy Chapayev became the fleet’s third “Kresta IF’-class cruiser, and the first major surface combatant to join the Pacific Fleet in at least four years. The next year saw a leap in theater naval power as the Kiev-class aircraft carrier Minsk led a task group consisting of the “Kara”-class cruisers Tashkent and Petropav- lovsk, the “Krivak IF'-class frigate Letuchiy, the LPD Ivan Rogov, and the Boris Chilikin-c\ass underway replenishment ship Boris Butoma. This dramatic increase was further strengthened by the arrival of the “Kresta I”-class cruiser Sevastopol in 1980 and a third “Kara”-class cruiser in 1981. Thus, in two years, the major cruiser-class striking force in the Pacific had been increased by 50%, with more significant qualitative improvements represented by the first-line technology embodied in these new construction units.
The nature of this explosive growth suggests a major change in Soviet naval policy which was not directly related to the basic strategic survival equation. The principal Pacific Fleet strategic submarines and their supporting air and surface forces had been maintained at relatively constant levels (allowing for qualitative replacement, e.g., “Delta”/“Yan- kee,” “May”/“Mail,” etc.) as a percentage of total Soviet naval forces throughout the 1970s. But by 1978, it was evident that new requirements dictated a different balance of the fleet.
It appears that one of these primary features for balance was a multifaceted capability for establishing presence and projecting power in more distant areas. Initially, the strength of the Pacific Fleet had been in the “invisible” elements—a formidable submarine force, land-based aviation, and coastal patrol ships. But the transfer of five multi-mission, impressively equipped cruiser units, including the newest-technology aircraft carrier, increased the “visible” presence and projected a multifaceted concept of power over greater lengths.
On a smaller scale, the transfer of eight newer “Krivaks” since 1975 has provided a more impressive presence and multi-mission capability (one half of these are “Krivak 11s” with 100-mm. dual-purpose guns) than older line destroyers which they can qualitatively replace.
Similarly, the arrival of the Ivan Rogov set the capstone on a previously established anomalous six- year trend of steady growth in Pacific Fleet amphibious warfare forces. The development of this intervention capability, which had seemed aberrant in the general fleet stagnation of the mid-1970s, witnessed a force of three “Alligator" LSTs in 1975 jump to include five “Alligators," five “Ropucha" units, and the lead ship of the Ivan Rogov class by 1981. The Rogov is undergoing modification in the Baltic Area, but is expected back in the Pacific.
In assessing the primary Soviet objective of countering U. S. influence wherever possible, the period of the mid-1970s was a time of precipitous U. S. withdrawal from a predominant military presence in the Pacific region. Although U. S. strategic forces (which by then excluded carriers) remained at established levels, the general-purpose forces of all services were drawn down in the forward area following disengagement from Vietnam in 1975, withdrawal from Thailand, force reductions in Korea in 1976, and abrogation of the U. S.-Taiwan defense pact in 1978. Thus, by the end of the decade, the U. S. Seventh Fleet stabilized at 55 ships logging 18,000 out-of-area ship days in the Pacific, compared with its 200-plus ships and 62,400 out-of-area ship days in 1969.-'
This suggests that the dramatic rise in Soviet general-purpose naval forces, which began after 1977, can be attributed, in part, to a perceived opportunity to fill a naval power vacuum in the wake of American withdrawal and to establish a new, dominant Soviet naval presence in the Western Pacific. While faced with the presence of the powerful U. S. Seventh Fleet. the Soviet Pacific Fleet could not exert a dominant influence, and thus did not play a major role in state policy interests until the opposing force was withdrawn. Once reduced of its own accord, the U. S. force was countered by a sudden influx of Soviet sea power. This escalation of forces was not lost on the other two regional powers, the P.R.C. nnd Japan, which drew attention to this buildup with alarm in both state and private forums.
Because of its longstanding relationship with the United States and intense economic interest in C-hinese development, Japan plays a pivotal role in Soviet policy in the Far East. Direct Japanese technological and economic involvement has also become essential for Siberian development, which by 1^77 included seven major projects amounting to more than $1.5 billion in credits, with overall trade Projected to surpass $13 billion by the end of 1981.
1 his complex economic and political fabric suggests that Soviet efforts in dealing with Japan should be viewed beyond their bilateral appearance, because they are inextricably interwoven with other Soviet regional objectives.
Following closely upon Japanese ratification of a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
P.R.C., it is not surprising that the Soviet Pacific Fleet buildup was viewed in Japan as having real political aims which have affected the balance of power through qualitative improvements and an increased operational pace.4 According to Japanese monitors, yearly Soviet warship passages through the Sea of Japan straits (Tsushima, Tsugaru, Soya) increased from 300 in 1977 to a five-year average of 360 by 1981, reflecting a significant, growing presence in the open-ocean areas. Further, in evaluating this force in light of it's principal targets, the Japanese White Paper on Defense for 1978 concluded that the U. S. Seventh Fleet "does not have sufficient capability to protect merchant shipping; and therefore does not have the capability to completely fulfill its assigned mission of maintaining sea-lanes of communication should the Soviets attempt to sever such lanes."
Just as the United States later regretted its sale of scrap metal to the Japanese before World War II, so may Japan rue the day its industry produced this 80,000-ton floating drydock for the Soviet Navy. Capable of accommodating Kic\-class hulls, such drydocks are key support assets that can service any vessel in the Soviet naval inventory.
By 1980, the Soviets had established a significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, which provided political leverage not only against Japan but against the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well. Since emerging as a genuine regional bloc in 1975, multilateral security cooperation among the ASEAN states has increased considerably to include exchange of intelligence, regular military staff meetings, joint operations against communist insurgents, and combined training exercises. The remarkable sustained economic growth of the ASEAN states (610% per year) has been closely associated with rapid expansion of international trade and export growth, which has averaged higher than 20% per year in most countries. In the current era, when economics is increasingly a dominant factor in world affairs and a potent political weapon, Soviet economic leverage in ASEAN is minimal. The ASEAN states get less than 1% of their imports from the Soviet Union and send about 2% of ASEAN exports to the Soviet Union. As a result of this situation, the Soviet Union has sought to achieve a capability to effect its leverage in the sea lanes along which the continued growth of Japan and ASEAN depends. In fact, it has been suggested that Soviet naval power is ‘‘the only significant element of Soviet influence" in the Pacific.5
By establishing such a credible sea denial capability, the Soviet Union has created a political weapon whose potency is directly proportional to a nation's reliance on maritime commerce. For Japan, this dependence on the sea derives not only from the need to import 88% of its energy, 90% of essential raw materials, and 70% of food requirements, but also for virtually all of its foreign export trade, nearly 60% of which is within the Pacific theater. In the absence of a countering Western force, Soviet naval pressure could force Japan to accommodate the Soviet Union, which would drive a wedge in American- centered regional stability programs.
Clearly, the Soviets have viewed increasing
The visit in June 1982 of Senate majority leader Howard Baker to Beijing must have been of more than passing interest to the Kremlin. Any issue that gets in the way of U.S.-China relations—such as arms sales to Taiwan— affects Soviet aims in the Pacific arena of world power.
An abandoned gun mount from French colonial days overlooks Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Visited by the doomed Russian fleet that was destroyed at Tsushima in 1905, Cam Ranh was converted into one of the most elaborate naval facilities in the world by the United States; now it serves the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
Chinese contacts with the West as a multifaceted threat. In the economic dimension, burgeoning trade with the Pacific rim countries (including the United States) grew to 60% of China’s total in 1978. In 1980, foreign plant contracts valued at about $1 billion were signed with Pacific rim countries. This economic development may facilitate advanced technology transfer that would decrease the Soviets' qualitative lead in industrial and military sciences. As the nascent superpower thus developed, the P.R.C. could emerge to a dominant position of regional influence unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
Although it most loudly decries the increased Soviet naval presence in the Pacific, of Western Pacific countries China is the least susceptible to the pressure which could be brought to bear by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Though the importance of foreign trade is growing dramatically, China also possesses adequate resources for strategic self-sufficiency. While lacking in naval power, China has stationed 75 of its 140 army divisions along the Soviet border and this ground force can play an equal card to the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
Rather, for China, the impact of the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been to limit its foreign policy options, as was demonstrated by the 1979 Vietnam confrontation. The 29 major surface and submarine units deployed by the Soviets to that area during the crisis provided a credible deterrent to a Chinese force of ten older coastal combatants supported by armed fishing boats.
The Soviet Navy's de facto acquisition of the former U. S. naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay has had far-reaching implications for the countries of the South and Southeast Asia littoral. The Soviets have bypassed mobile logistics weaknesses to maintain 20 vessels in the Indian Ocean and more than ten others in the South China Sea. The Chinese view Vietnam as an outpost by which the permanent Soviet naval presence has been extended south by more than 2,000 miles in a single move. Not only do the Chinese view this as a further move toward Soviet naval
encirclement, blit also as a base for deeper penetration of the Third World/’
The Soviet relationship with Vietnam is particularly illustrative of the ultimate objective of Soviet Policy—the expansion of world socialism. The suc- eessful development of significant intervention-type torces with the capacity for diplomatic tasks, coupled with the display of willingness to employ these f°rces, suggests an intention on the part of the So- V|et Union to project naval power under the banner °t a new internationalism in action.
With regard to the Third World countries of the Western Pacific, a general semblance of political stability, and an apparent realization that Marxism ls not the best way to bring rapid economic growth, have engendered little potential for Soviet machinations. Although the 615,000 members of the Vietnamese armed forces (roughly equal to all ASEAN dates' armed forces combined) pose a surrogate threat to Thailand and Malaysia, it is unlikely that •he Soviet Union will be able to provide significant support, naval or otherwise, to insurgent movements in these countries.7
Indeed, in examining the trends of diplomatic port vjsits, which are often the precursors of greater So- V|et involvement, the absence of emphasis on the Pacific area states was remarkable between 1967 and 1976 with only six such visits.
However, the number of Soviet ships visiting Pacific area ports had increased to 156 by 1980. This Tend suggests that additional port visits, joint ex- Reises, and humanitarian efforts will be indicators °f Soviet tendencies for more active involvement of Pacific Fleet elements as “primary links with our brothers in class.’’8
For the United States, the development of a credible and active Soviet intervention capability in the Pacific and Indian oceans is of vital importance, both for the potential direct effects on the national economy and for the destabilizing influence which it exerts on our regional allies. In recent years, we have realized the impracticality of attempting to patrol the entire region on our own and have attempted to enlist greater support from our two principal maritime allies—Japan and Australia. Recent internal debates in these countries have recognized the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet as a genuine cause for concern which can only be countered by a new, united resolve, credibly supported by real growth in allied Pacific theater naval forces.
'Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Pow er of the State (New York: Perga- mon. 1979), p. 248.
2Ibid., p. 254.
'Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding.• Soviet Naval Developments, 4th Ed. (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 16.
4Shunjiro Ishizuka (ed.). White Papers of Japan /979-/9M (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1979). p. 30.
SU. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Pacific Region Interdependencies (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 122.
6Ji Yangfen, “Soviet Expansionist Strategy in the ‘Dumbell’ Area,” Ren- min Rihao (Beijing, 22 June 1979), p. 6.
7U. S. Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations (Washington: GPO, 1979), pp. 135 and 137. *RAdm. Giap Van Cuong, “The Naval Forces of the Vietnam People's Army on the Way to Building, Taking Shape. Struggling and Winning Gloriously,” Morskov Sbornik, March 1980, p. 9.
Commander Thomas earned his bachelor's degree at Middlebury College, Vermont, in 1972. He has held several intelligence billets in the fleet, including head of the Pacific Forward Area Support Team Detachment for the U. S. Seventh Fleet. He is currently assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C.