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The rebuilding of the Soviet Naval Infantry has contributed to the Soviet Navy’s evolution from a coastal defense force into a navy with global missions. The Soviet Naval Infantry is in many ways similar to the British, Dutch, or U. S. Marines. Major differences are apparent, however, in the doctrine, strategy, training, and tactics of the Soviet Naval Infantry when compared with its Western counterparts.
Lessons learned by Soviet planners from World War II have had a strong influence in the development of the naval infantry. In the beginning of the war, the Soviet Government formed a dozen naval infantry units of battalion and brigade size totaling about 100,000 personnel. These were assigned to the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets, and to respective flotillas; later, more naval ground combat forces were created. Infantrymen and sailors were sent often as reinforcements to various fronts. After personnel totals were compiled at the end of World War II, about 500,000 naval infantry and other naval troops were found to have served at many different fronts during large-scale fighting.
According to Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, the naval infantry conducted more than 100 major amphibious operations during World War II, and about 330,000 troops participated in these landings. Gorshkov asserts that naval infantry operations in support of front actions were one of the main aspects of Soviet naval warfare. By 1945, 40 various naval infantry and naval rifle brigades had been formed along with many separate battalions or detachments. Their contributions to the Soviet victory during World War II were many.
Following the war the Soviet Naval Infantry was reduced in size and lost much of its importance. Reportedly, by 1947, it had been subordinated to the coastal defense forces. However, during the early 1960s, a revival of the Soviet Naval Infantry as a separate branch of the navy took place. On 24 July 1964, reference was made to the naval infantry again in the open press. By the late 1960s, the organization had expanded to more than 20,000 men and steady improvements have continued to the present.1
In keeping with Western precedents, the new Soviet amphibious force has participated in numerous small unit and large-scale exercises in recent times. In 1968, during exercise “Sever,” naval infantry units of the Baltic Fleet conducted joint landings in East Germany with a Polish sea-landing division and East German Army motorized rifle troops. During “Okean-10", Soviet Naval Infantry deployed on a worldwide scale—simultaneously in the North, South, West, and East of the Soviet Union. “Okean-15” also used naval infantry extensively.2
According to the East German press, during exercise “Comradeship-In-Arms 1980,” large-scale amphibious landings were conducted on the island of Usedom near Peenemunde on the Baltic coast, from 4 to 12 September 1980. General Heinz Hoffman, East Germany’s National Defense Minister, directed the exercise in which Soviet Naval Infantry, Polish sea-landing troops, and East German motorized rifle units again participated. The exercise allegedly demonstrated an increased level of operational training among the amphibious forces.2
During March 1981, exercise “5oy«z-81” again
involved Soviet, East German, and Polish amphib- 1ous troops. Landings were conducted on the Baltic ^oast with air cushion vehicles and modern Mi-8 “Hip-C” helicopters. Later last year, Western fewspapers reported a joint Soviet-Syrian amphibious exercise in the Mediterranean, in which naval 'nfantry units of the Black Sea Fleet played an important part.
These demonstrations of naval power are deigned to maintain Soviet influence in the world and keep amphibious forces ready to take advantage of opportunities for expansion as they may arise. The Soviets’ quest for influence goes hand in hand with nationalism and the desire for a sense of superiority.4 Their extension of power and influence is often not territorial but involves the projection of a high- seas navy with amphibious forces, nuclear weapons which can reach any corner of the globe, a growing merchant fleet, Aeroflot, and other government agencies. The naval infantry is an ideal instrument for the extension of Soviet power. It can add even more credibility to their military arsenal. Afghanistan has provided evidence for an “external function” of the Soviet armed forces, and Soviet authors have indicated a need fora mobile, well-trained, and well-equipped force to influence the “imperialists” and to counter local reactions. The Kremlin seems to be establishing its own global security system, in
which the naval infantry will probably play an important role.5
Besides the Soviet Navy assault shipping, a large merchant fleet, transport aviation of the Soviet Air Force, and Aeroflot can all be rapidly pressed into service to move personnel and equipment. According to some sources, the Soviet Naval Infantry is the second-largest marine force in the world with about 12,000 personnel. But the estimate of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)— which claims that figure—is probably too low.
First, support for the numerous amphibious exercises which have been observed in the recent past can hardly be provided on a global scale by 12,000 men. Second, the Soviet Navy does not reveal its true order of battle to the public and practices deception or disinformation to a great degree, often concealing units, training facilities, and installations. Third, additional units have been reported in the Soviet Union, which increase overall strength figures. Finally, large manpower reserves in the Soviet Union are often—and rapidly—called to active duty. Therefore, a figure of at least 20-30,000 active duty naval infantrymen is much more realistic.
Some 93 amphibious ships are also listed by the IISS. They include the large Ivan Rogov landing ship dock (LPD), which can carry a battalion of naval infantry, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and air cushion vehicles. The current inventory of landing ship tank (LST) types includes 14 “Alligator” and 17 “Ropucha” amphibious ships. They also have 45 “Polnocny” landing ship medium (LSM) types and six “MP-4’ ’landing craft tank (LCT) vessels. An additional Ivan Rogov-class ship is fitting out and more will likely be provided to the Soviet Navy. In many exercises, the naval infantry uses air cushion vehicles or hovercraft, of which they have 52. These consist of ten “Aist” class, H “Lebed” class, and 33 “Gus”-class air cushion vehicles. The “Aist” class reportedly can carry two medium tanks, and the “Lebed” class can carry one. The “Gus” class is designed to land troops, and each can carry about 35 naval infantrymen.
The naval infantry organization reported by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) includes one brigade apiece in the Northern and Baltic Sea Fleets, and one regiment in the Black Sea Fleet, plus two deployed with the Pacific Fleet.
pf about 2,000 men, is believed to be organized similarly to a Soviet Army motorized rifle regiment. The internal structure can be called triadic since it has three battalions; each battalion has three companies; and each company has three platoons. In addition, each regiment has a tank battalion made up °t three companies equipped with amphibious “PT- light tanks, and one company with medium tanks which use snorkels to drive through as much as 5.5 meters of water/’ The organization presented by D1A leaves unanswered the relationship the two regiments of the Pacific Fleet have to each other. It is likely that they belong to a naval infantry division stationed with Soviet naval forces in the area, and lhat the overall strength figures are higher than estimated. It is also probable that naval infantry regiments in other parts of the world are actually brigades , with some supporting units which have not been identified.
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A study of recent Soviet exercises, tactics, and eqmpmerit indicates that the naval infantry is not made up of merely a few ships and regiments unable jo project power. Instead, it appears that it is a highly mobile, modern, and well-trained force which can be employed by the Kremlin effectively in the Baltic and Black seas, against the coast of China, and very probably against countries in the Third ^orld. The Soviet Union no doubt is still discovering aspects of its superpower status, and it is prob- lng for opportunities to extend its influence. Amphibious forces can play a vital part in that regard, jmd Soviet planners probably understand that now potter than ever. If the Kremlin is allowed a clear hold in some parts of the world, it will be more likely intervene, and resistance will probably decline. I he United States is challenged in varied parts of the world, and its interventions are now made more
dangerous by the availability of Soviet military forces. As Soviet confidence increases, U. S. diplomats may reject military options as unfeasible; the President may meet increasing opposition from Congress to any military solutions for difficulties abroad.
In the early 1960s, the Soviet Navy initiated an expansion in capabilities, equipment, and personnel which has continued for the last 20 years. The Soviet Union maintains the largest number of warships in the world—more than 600 active major combatants; its air arm has about 1,100 aircraft. The Soviet am- phibioius lift includes about 100 active and preserved amphibious ships, along with about 120 short- haul landing craft for amphibious support. This capability can be augmented by ships of the merchant fleet. The actual number of naval infantry reservists is unknown but probably totals several hundred thousand.
In summary, Soviet military plans call for amphibious landings to be conducted by naval infantry transported in the amphibious assault ships of the Soviet Navy. In some cases, such operations would be supported by the merchant fleet, army, and air force. Ground forces are prepared to support and relieve naval infantry units after amphibious operations have been completed. The missions of the naval infantry involve amphibious landings against strategic targets and naval choke points. Of special priority in Soviet Naval Infantry targeting are the Straits of Denmark, the coast of Norway, and the entrances to the Black Sea and the Sea of Japan.
Amphibious landings can be conducted by the naval infantry either close to the Soviet borders in support of ground force operations, or on distant shores anywhere in the world. The naval infantry can be used also in a commando role. Naval infantry commando platoons can parachute into target areas or be landed by helicopter, motor torpedo boat, or submarine.
It is sometimes asserted that an amphibious landing by the Soviets in the Third World is impossible, since it would require extensive air support, elaborate naval gunfire, and sea superiority. The history of the naval infantry, however, indicates that its doctrine is flexible and pragmatic. Naval Infantry men have landed before without the “necessary' support, and they probably can do it again. Although the Soviets’ capabilities in this warfare area are not comparable to those of the U. S. Marine Corps, they are improving steadily and evolving into a potentially effective instrument of the Kremlin. .
'L. N. Buffardi, The Soviet Naval Infantry (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency. 1980). pp. 1-2.
:P. E. Melnikov. Soldaty Morin (Moscow: DOSAAF. 1977). pp. 65-75. 'Dietmar Jammer. "Luftkissen Fahrzenge Und Sturmgruppen. Nertes Deutschland (Berlin: Deutsche Demokratische Republik. II September 1980). pp. 1-3.
'Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy." Commentary, April 1980. PP- 32-38.
'Steven F. Kime, "A Soviet Navy for the Nuclear Age." Parameters, Vol. X. No. 1, pp. 58-70.
'ButTardi, Soviet Naval Infantry, p. 2.
Colonel Nargele has served with the 1st and 3rd U. S. Marine Corps divisions. Marine Corps Headquarters, and the Military Liaison Mission in West Germany. He currently is the defense and naval attache at the American Embassy in Santo Domingo. Dominican Republic.
Their Baltic Sea Fleet
By Captain Robert D. Wyman, U. S. Army
The missions of a military force never stand alone in the strategy of a nation. Likewise, the Soviet Union's pursuit of a unified strategy combining the operations of land and oceanic theaters must be considered. The Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet has several major missions that can be identified, and yet they are interconnected with each other and the other major Soviet commands in most of Europe. The four missions of the Baltic Sea Fleet are: control of the Baltic Sea, control of the Danish Straits, support of Soviet ground force operations, and, finally, support of Soviet Northern Fleet operations.
The quantity and type of forces that make up the Baltic Sea Fleet suggest several major capabilities that Warsaw Pact planners would consider. The fleet reflects a dual seakeeping capacity. Most of the fleet’s ships are ideal for the shallow and often restrictive waters of the Baltic. Some ships, however, are fully capable of high seas operations and would perhaps be more effectively used in such an open-ocean environment. (See page 36 for a naval order of battle listing forthe Baltic Sea Fleet.)