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The principal mission of the Soviet Navy— os well as of the other armed services—is the defense of the homeland. This has led to a tactical style that tends to pervade all naval missions. Similarly, although the navy has gone through a series of radical changes in organization and leadership, as well as some changes in mission, the consistency of tactical style in the Soviet Navy « remarkable.
It would appear in 1982—as it did 50 years earlier—that the basic tactical concept of the Soviet Navy is to attack any hostile ship attempting to aPproach within striking range of the Soviet land- mass or sensitive sea-air space. The concepts of concentration of force and of all-arms strike that wcre developed during the post-Rcvolution decade a*so remain in force today. These concepts, of course, have been transmuted considerably, so that the attack may now be mounted far from the Soviet coast and the target may now be a U. S. strategic missile submarine rather than a hostile battleship approaches the coast. However, the similarities and the consequences remain.
Profound differences between Soviet and Western naval “style” have important analytical consequences. Soviet warships with characteristics somewhat similar to Western types often have very different roles and should not be counted as analogous to those Western ships. Perhaps the most S'gnificant point here is that the fundamental Soviet [rnssion has been, and remains, the defense of the homeland, with the perimeter of that defense con- l|nuously expanding outward.
In the early 1960s, strategic strike by submarines was added as a primary Soviet naval mission. In lurn, the defense of those missile submarines and, ^ith deployment of the “SS-N-8” missile in "Delta” SSBNs, the “sanctuaries” within which missile submarines might operate became an additional mis- s,on. The defensive mission—“pro-submarine” operations—is alien to American naval thought. U. S. attack submarines as well as strategic missile submarines operate independently, depending upon health and communications silence for their survivability and hence their effectiveness.
The Soviets think differently. This is due in sig- mficant part to geography. Soviet attack submarines must reach the open seas through straits or "choke Points” where they could be vulnerable to interdiction. But there is also a historical precedent. Admiral Gorshkov has written of the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic during World War 11 that “despite the exceptional threat to submarines by ASW forces, the German naval command did not conduct a single operation or other specially organized combat action directed at destroying these forces, which doubtlessly reduced the intensity of the (German U- boat] communications battle.”1 And one of the main reasons why the U-boats did not achieve victory “was that the submarines did not receive support from other forces, and above all from the Air Force, which would have been able both to carry out the reconnaissance for the submarines and destroy ASW forces. . . .”2
Also, there appears to be no strain of Soviet naval thought parallel to Western concepts of sea control. This is true on both the mission and tactical levels. From a mission viewpoint, the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov has rejected the Mahanist theories which form the basis of U. S. naval thought. Admiral Gorshkov has written, “The Mahan theory of‘control of the sea,' considered indisputable, according to which only a general engagement of major line forces could lead to victory . . . did not at all take into account not only the near-future prospects, but even the notable trends in the development of naval technology.”3
Rather, Gorshkov prefers a Russian naval strategist and historian, Rear Admiral V. A. Belli, who wrote:
“To achieve superiority of forces over the enemy in the main sector and to pin him down in the secondary sectors at the time of the operation means to achieve control of the sen in a theater or a sector of a theater, i.e., to create such a situation that the enemy will be paralyzed or constrained in his operations, or weakened and thereby hampered from interfering with our execution of a given operation. . . ,”4 (Gorshkov’s emphasis.) In reality, Mahan’s concepts had little practical application to the U.S.S.R. during the 1920s and 1930s because of the lack of capital ships and the limited nature of Soviet maritime activities. By the 1950s, the availability of radar, effective communications, long-range aircraft, advanced submarines, guided missiles, and even nuclear weapons for the war at sea made Mahan's concepts even more questionable. Coupled with geographic considerations and other factors applicable to considerations of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet fleet, these technology factors have given Mahan little if any relevance to the Soviet Navy of the Gorshkov era.
On a tactical level of sea control, the Soviets certainly wish to protect their own coastal shipping and their ocean going units from Western naval attack. But in general the Soviets appear to view the sea in wartime as a “jungle,” with all or most warships at sea subject to rapid destruction. Recent decisions to build relatively large and expensive surface com-
Soviet Naval Order of Battle by Fleet | Northern | Baltic' | Black. Sea2 | Pacific |
Submarines | 186 | 34 | 26 | 124 |
Aircraft Carriers | I | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Helicopter Carriers | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
Cruisers | 9 | 4 | 10 | 13 |
Destroyers | 16 | 11 | 22 | 20 |
Frigates | 47 | 32 | 41 | 50 |
Amphibious Ships | 11 | 25 | 25 | 20 |
Patrol Combatants | 30 | 35 | 25 | 55 |
Mine Warfare Ships | 30 | 35 | 40 | 40 |
Mine Warfare Craft | 40 | 95 | 55 | 50 |
Coastal/Patrol/River Craft | 35 | 120 | 120 | 150 |
Auxiliaries | 605 | 551 | 541 | 748 |
Aircraft | 395 | 280 | 380 | 440 |
Personnel | 118,000 | 106,000 | 100,000 | 128,000 |
'Includes Leningrad Naval Base -’Includes Caspian Sea Flotilla
batants, such as aircraft carriers and the nuclear- powered battle cruiser Kirov, may cause a rethinking of this tactical issue, but most of the current Soviet fleet reflects earlier tactical concepts.
Indeed, the development of these ships fits more with a new Soviet naval mission, first espoused during the 1960s when Soviet naval forces began regular, and in some cases sustained, deployments in noncontiguous seas—the Mediterranean, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and most recently, the eastern Pacific. These are missions of “political presence” and “force projection” in the Third World. To again quote Admiral Gorshkov, speaking of forward operations in peacetime:
“Friendly visits by Soviet seamen offer the opportunity to the people of the countries visited to see for themselves the creativity of socialist principles in our country, the genuine parity of the peoples of the Soviet Union and their high cultural level. In our ships they see the achievements of Soviet science, technology and industry. Soviet mariners, from rating to admiral, bring to the peoples of other countries the truth about our socialist country, our Soviet ideology and culture and our Soviet way of life.”5
Only polemics? Unlikely. The Soviet Union, with approximate strategic and conventional weapons “parity” with the United States, is seeking to gain advances in the Third World and, as Oliver Cromwell remarked, “A man-of-war is the best ambassador.” Now the Soviets have gone a step further than sending sailors as ambassadors. In a less-publicized exposition on naval cruises, Admiral Gorshkov has been more pointed:
“Further growth in the power of our navy will be characterized by an intensification of its inter-
national mission. While appearing within our armed forces as an imposing factor in regard to restraining imperialist aggression and ventures, at the same time the Soviet Navy is a consolidator of international relations. . . .”6 For several years, the Soviet Union has used proxy troops in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, armed with Soviet weapons and sometimes directed by Soviet advisors. The naval and merchant fleets now being built will permit—in Western terms—“force projection" into the Third World. According to Gorshkov. “The Soviet navy, in the policy of our Party and state, acts as a factor for stabilizing the situation in different areas of the world, promoting the strengthening of Peace and friendship between the peoples and restraining the aggressive strivings of the imperialist states.”7 Thus, new missions have been added to the Soviet Navy. In probable order of their development, the Soviet Navy’s missions are: Early 1950s Coastal Defense/Anti-Amphibious* 1950s Anti-Carrier* 1960s Anti-Western Sea-lanes* Anti-Polaris* Strategic Strike Pro-SSBN 1960s-1970s Forward Deployments lor Political Considerations 1980s “Force Projection"—Support to Third World Extensions of the defense of the homeland. Tactics: Given defense of the homeland as the Primary Soviet tactical concept, the primary naval operation becomes the destruction of enemy warships as they attempt to enter the defensive area. This, in turn, requires a combination of (1) reconnaissance and surveillance, to detect the intruder, (2) command and control, to bring superior forces to attack at the proper time and location, and (3) effective strikes against the target ship or group of ships. These elements have been developed to a high degree by the Soviet Navy. An important concept in centralized targeting by Soviet forces is the “circle of uncertainty." Target data are generally fleeting: an enemy ship or force is at a specific point for a brief period. Its movement after that may well be unknown and may be random. *n this situation there is an expanding circle of uncertainty around the original datum in which the target may be found. The longer the delay in reaching the target area, the larger the circle and the more difficult the subsequent search and reacquisition. The Soviets have often emphasized high speed in their attack platforms as well as in their missiles Precisely because of this problem. There is a great difference in the circle of uncertainty at, for ex- | ample, 200 miles (320 km) by a Mach 2 missile compared to a Mach 0.8 cruise missile, and the need for the high speed (with all its design penalties) testifies to continued reliance on centralized targeting and an attempt to avoid the need for mid-course guidance, which may be difficult or impossible in a combat environment. Rigid centralized tactical control has several advantages. First, in earlier periods, it enhanced political control of military units, which for many years appeared to come before military effectiveness in priority. Second, a centralized commander could, at least in theory, make the most effective use of the weapons available. Initially, small attack craft, submarines, and land-based aircraft were the main striking force of the Soviet Navy; individually they would not be effective against capital ships, but under centralized control, their potential effectiveness was enhanced considerably. Centralized control also permitted a reduction in the search and targeting requirements for the individual units (radar, sonar), allowing more units to be provided for a given cost. Soviet naval tactics have thus become statistical in character; an alternative description, to use the Soviet term, is “scientific” in contrast to traditional naval tactics. The combination of centrally collected intelligence and centrally controlled attack forces continues as the basis of Soviet naval practice, although a trend toward decentralization has become apparent in the past few years. In virtually every tactical context, the attack is delivered simultaneously, often along several different axes, in an effort to overwhelm the defenses of the target ship or group of ships. Also, the strike is delivered at almost maximum weapon range. Increased standoff weapon range permits attacks to be made sooner than if the attacking ships or aircraft had to close with the target, facilitates strikes by several ships or aircraft, and helps preserve the firing platform from enemy weapons. The longer weapon range also contributes to another key Soviet tactical concept, that of surprise or, in Gorshkov’s words, "the battle for the first salvo.” This concept is a favorite topic ot Soviet tactical discussions. One military writer recently used this definition: “Surprise is one of the most important principles of military art. This principle consists in choosing the time, means and methods of combat actions allowing to deliver a surprise blow at the enemy and thus to a certain extent to paralyse his will to resist. Surprise gives the possibility to achieve maximum result with the minimum spending of manpower, equipment and time.”8 Addressing this concept. Admiral Gorshkov has written: “ ‘The battle for the first salvo’—is taking on a special meaning in naval battle under present- |
Proceeding / o, tnh. r I0X’ | 37 |
day conditions (conditions including the possible employment of combat means of colossal power [nuclear weapons]). Delay in the employment of weapons in a naval battle or operation inevitably will be fraught with the most serious and even fatal consequences, regardless of where the fleet is located, at sea or in port.”9 These combat concepts are applicable to almost all phases of Soviet naval tactics. In airborne strikes, the missile-carrying aircraft must fly high enough for their leader to acquire the intended target with its own missile control radar. All aircraft in a wave then lock their missiles onto the target, and all launch together in an effort to overwhelm the defenses. In some situations, the bombers may also attack from several directions, either simultaneously or in series, and there could even be coordinated flights from different bases. (The strike aircraft do not make the initial detection of the target. Rather, they are launched toward the predetermined datum, under centralized control.)
Surface torpedo and missile boat tactics are analogous to those of bombers. Attacks are controlled either from a shore position or from a larger surface ship, as a destroyer. The small torpedo or missile craft are merely attack platforms acting under the directions of a central commander.
Missile and torpedo boat groups often operate together, generally with one grouping of missile boats and two of torpedo boats. At times, these craft also attack in coordination with gunboats, destroyers, coastal missile-artillery batteries, and land-based aircraft. Soviet doctrine indicates that the “Osa”- type missile craft will attack by groups, with each “Osa” firing a two-missile salvo at ranges often to 13 nautical miles (18 to 24 km), or about one-half maximum missile range. Similarly, the torpedo boats will launch two-torpedo salvos after closing to a
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During the 1960s, the Soviet Navy began making regular deployments to noncontiguous seas, and they continue the practice today. These ventures fulfill “political presence ” and ‘force projection” missions and include port visits.
range of about three nautical miles (5.5 km).
With respect to submarines, at least through the 1950s, Soviet submarines acting in the coastal defense role were closely controlled by commanders ashore. This was a continuation of prewar Soviet practices. In a related manner, the Soviets appear to have developed the “flying torpedoes”—antiship missiles—to provide these submarines with greater stand-off range against intruders. These submarines are best employed with off-board sensors and centralized control to coordinate strikes. While these more recent submarine weapons and tactics were developed for “defensive” purposes, they are ob-
viously intended for the anticarrier role in that the Soviets continue to consider U. S. aircraft carriers as a nuclear threat to their homeland.
(The older, surface-launched “SS-N-3" submarine missile was developed for strategic attack against fhe United States; however, in the tactical role, it js conceptually similar to the later “SS-N-7" and SS-N-9” submarine missile systems, being best served by sensors other than those on the submarines, i.e., “off-board” sensors, such as satellites and aircraft, and centralized command.)
Antisubmarine Warfare: Contemporary Soviet ASW has developed along similar tactical concepts. At least into the 1970s, most ASW forces were organized into brigades controlled by commanders ashore. In search-and-attack operations, all of the ships defending an area would transmit their sonar data to a shore-based computer that would assign them attack courses and speeds, which would determine the appropriate point for attack. Finally, the computers went to sea on board cruisers and destroyers, which were designated Bol'shoy Protivo- lodochnyy Korabl’ (BPK) or large antisubmarine ships. These ships became command ships for ASW groups.
. Systematic airborne ASW tactics were developed ’n the late 1960s as new ASW aircraft became operational, beginning with the 11-38 “May.” The tactics were analogous with air antiship tactics: the land-based ASW aircraft would fly to a datum, release sonobuoys to reacquire and localize the target.
and then attack. Limitations in the technique included the short range of Soviet sonobuoys, meaning that aircraft could rarely reacquire the target. Nor could the 11-38 carry enough weapons to achieve the “saturation” effect of surface ships firing antisubmarine rockets.
The later and larger land-based Tu-142 “Bear-F” aircraft may have been developed to overcome this limitation. The turboprop bomber carries large numbers of sonobuoys to reacquire and hold contact on a submarine plus a large weapons payload.
Whereas the U. S. Navy considers its nuclear- powered attack submarines (SSNs) as primarily antisubmarine platforms, the first Soviet SSN class (“November”) appears to have been intended for other purposes. The high-performance “Alfa” SSN, developed shortly afterwards, may have been originally intended as an antisubmarine craft, with the high speed for rapidly closing to within torpedo range of intruders. The “Victor”-class SSNs (completed from 1967 onward) are generally considered ASW craft in the Western sense—i.e., for trailing enemy submarines and possibly serving in antisubmarine barriers. The Soviets also use diesel-electric attack submarines in this role.
Soviet submarines have been observed in ASW exercises with surface warships. While the U. S. Navy has put forward the direct support concept of surface combatants for the high-speed Los Angeles (SSN-688) class, the Soviets appear to have employed this tactic for a longer period. The SSN, in coordination with surface ASW ships or aircraft, provides a deep, relatively quiet sonar platform. Once a target submarine is detected, the submarine would probably withdraw to permit surface or air attack without risk to the Soviet submarine.
All three ASW platforms—aircraft, surface ships, and submarines—can be employed to help Soviet submarines “break out” through NATO ASW barriers and to "defend the homeland” against Western
strategic missile submarines. With the advent of the “Delta”-class SSBN, which could target the United States from Soviet home waters, a new tactical problem evolved for the United States. Soviet missile submarines from the Northern Fleet would no longer have to transit through narrow, and hence potentially dangerous, passages into the Atlantic. Instead, “sanctuaries” would be established in home waters where the missile submarines would be safe from U. S. SSNs, defended by a combination of surface ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft. The A7<?v-class aircraft carriers may have been justified from a political viewpoint in full or in part for this role. Also, the redesignation of the “Krivak”- class “frigates” from large ASW ships (BPK) to guard ships (Storozhevoy Korabl’, SKR) may have reflected the Soviet view that the ASW designation applied to components of submarine hunter-killer groups rather then ASW pickets.
The development of the Moskva-class helicopter carriers in the early 1960s was in line with the abovedescribed ASW tactics, to bring many attack units (helicopters) into an area to attack a U. S. Polaris submarine initially detected by long-range, surface ship sonar or possibly by other means. This concept was abandoned, with the Moskva class being halted at two ships because of the increasing range of Polaris missiles and the large number of submarines.
However, the Moskvas and their “Hormone-A” antisubmarine helicopters did provide the Soviet fleet with its first experience with ship-based aircraft while taking to sea a significant ASW capability. The experience with the Moskvas was essential for the development of the subsequent Kiev-class carriers.
Also in 1967, the first “Kresta I” missile cruiser went to sea, carrying a single “Hormone-B” helicopter for missile targeting. This was the first Soviet surface combatant (other than the helicopter ship Moskva) to have a full helicopter support capability. The ship design was altered to make an ASW ship, the "Kresta II,” which appeared in 1970. carrying a “Hormone-A” ASW helicopter and antisubmarine instead of antiship cruise missiles and demonstrating a significant advance in Soviet ASW doctrine for surface forces.
The Soviets have shown considerable interest in helicopter ASW, operating helicopters in this role from ashore as well as afloat as their principal means of attacking submarines at “medium” ranges, i.e., 30-40 nautical miles (55-74 km.). The Soviet enthusiasm for helicopters is evidenced in the Mi-14 “Haze,” an ASW variant of the widely used Mi-8 “Hip” developed specifically for land-based operation, and in the multiple helicopter capacities of the new surface combatants Kirov and Udaloy- Writing on ASW tactics, a Soviet specialist explained the enthusiasm:
“The participation of helicopters in the search for submarines ... not only widens the field of 'visibility' of the warship carrying it but also substantially increases the ship’s capability for conducting protracted tracking of a detected enemy. [Also] it increases the reliability of the employment of ASW weapons. And if it presents no great problem to a submarine to avoid a surface ship, the situation changes radically when a shipborne helicopter comes into the picture. Having a significantly greater speed than a submarine, [the helicopter] puts the submarine in a far more difficult situation. . . .”‘°
The U. S. Navy has identified five potential categories of Soviet submarine detection methods; these are acoustics, thermohydrodynamics, magnetics, chemical contaminants, and direct observables. There are periodic reports of Soviet emphasis on the other, nonacoustic means of submarine detection. The systems used for nonacoustic detection other than magnetic are not readily observed and identified. While some of the ASW tactics employed by the Soviet Navy are obviously oriented toward acoustics as the principal means of detection, some maneuvers that cannot be readily explained, or at least differ significantly from Western activities, could be related to nonacoustic ASW.
V
The Soviet Navy lias developed a large antisubmarine warfare force to help its submarines break through Western ASW barriers and to defend the homeland against strategic missile submarines. Part of that force are a “Kresta II,'' facing page, a Mi-14 “Haze," trailing a dipping sonar, and an “Alfa" SSN.
Tactical Nuclear and Chemical Warfare: Any discussion of Soviet tactics must include theater/tac- tical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, which aPpear to be fully integrated into all levels of Soviet naval forces and planning. Soviet naval forces are armed with a variety of nuclear weapons and regularly conduct offensive and defensive exercises. While there is less information available on a public basis concerning the potential employment of chemical weapons by the Soviet Navy, the massive chemical warfare capability of Soviet Ground Forces; the apparent use of Soviet-provided chemical agents in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Yemen; and the Soviet Navy’s extensive chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) defense training indicate a significant capability in this field as well. (There are also indications °f continued Soviet activity in the biological warfare area, but information here is severely limited, and there is some overlap between chemical and biological agents.)
The Soviet armed forces began development ot their nuclear doctrine in the mid-1950s after the death °f Stalin. Previously, Stalin had believed that the geographic expanse and manpower reserves of the U.S.S.R. would more than compensate for Western superiority in nuclear weapons. Although he directed the development of nuclear weapons, his attitude inhibited military leaders from realistically considering how to use or even defend against nuclear weapons.
The initial Soviet nuclear doctrine postulated that any war with the West would inevitably escalate to a strategic nuclear exchange. This concept was in line with the Khrushchev defense policies, which sought to reduce large (expensive) conventional forces in favor of a minimal strategic force, primarily ICBMs, and “unconventional” efforts against the West, e.g., wars of national liberation and foreign trade.
In the post-Khrushchev period this attitude has been modified considerably. Writing in Krasnaya Zvezda, the daily newspaper of the Ministry ot Defense, a Soviet general officer in 1976 warned that a conventional conflict in Europe “carries with it the constant danger of being escalated into a nuclear war.” This appears to be the central theme of contemporary Soviet views on theater/tactical nuclear weapons: (1) war in Europe is the principal factor in Soviet nonstrategic planning and (2) there is a distinct danger of escalation of conventional conflict to nuclear conflict. But the same article also implies that should a NATO conflict reach a nuclear phase, it need not necessarily reach an all-out, intercontinental nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States.
An American analysis of Soviet military writings in this field concludes:
“One of the striking aspects of Soviet military literature is the heavy emphasis given to nuclear war fighting and the minute detail with which certain of its combat aspects are addressed. This is particularly true in those writings dealing with the ground-air campaign in the continental land theatre, but it also carries over into the Soviet naval professional literature. The net impression is that the Soviet military has faced up to the reality ot nuclear warfare, focused on it in their military schools and academies, and at least worked out the theory of how it should be fought and won. There is abundant evidence that the Soviets have designed and structured their forces in accordance with their theoretical writings, giving the impression that these writings have rationalized concepts which were later incorporated in doctrine.”"
This attitude is reflected in the Soviet Navy by the relatively large number and variety of tactical nuclear weapons in the fleet. These include “offensive” antiship weapons and “defensive” antiaircraft and antisubmarine weapons, apparently deployed in ships ranging in size from the “Nanuchka" and “Tarantul” classes of missile corvettes to the large Kiev-class aircraft carriers. Tactical nuclear weapons of various types are also carried in Soviet attack/cruise-missile submarines and aircraft.
Nuclear weapons appear to provide two major offensive advantages over conventional weapons in war at sea. First, whereas multiple hits with conventional weapons would probably be required to destroy a cruiser or carrier, a single nuclear weapon, of even small size, would suffice. Second, a defense against nuclear weapons would require a 100% effectiveness, since a single penetrating missile or “leaker” could destroy the target.
In the antiair warfare role the nuclear weapon, from the Soviet perspective, would deter concentrated U. S. air attacks against ships, while in ASW operations a nuclear weapon could compensate for the target submarine’s area of uncertainty or the limited effectiveness of conventional weapons. Another consideration is the potential use of high-altitude bursts of nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects that could seriously degrade electronic and optical systems of ships and aircraft over large ocean areas. Underwater nuclear bursts could similarly degrade sonar effectiveness, creating a condition known as “blue out.” Soviet writings demonstrate a familiarity with all of these aspects of nuclear weapons.
Soviet naval readiness for nuclear warfare also includes significant defensive measures. The design of Soviet warships incorporates CBR defensive measures. Warships of all size down to the small “Osa” missile craft have protective “citadels” which are areas that can be sealed to provide a safe, controlled atmosphere, with overpressure to keep out contaminants. Naval ships are also provided with periscopes and other equipment for conning from sealed bridges, CBR washdown devices, and other features to facilitate survival in a nuclear or chemical environment. Observations of Soviet ships also indicate some hardening features such as protection of radar wave guides (cables) from the EMP effects of nuclear explosions as well as blast damage.
A third area indicative of Soviet preparedness for nuclear conflict is training and fleet exercises. Soviet naval personnel carry out CBR defense training on a regular basis, and nuclear defensive and offensive maneuvers are a regular part of fleet exercises.
Thus, Soviet naval weapons, warship configuration, and training and exercises point to a major capability for fighting a theater/tactical nuclear conflict at sea. Almost all of these defensive features apply equally to the chemical warfare capability of the Soviet Navy. Again, the Soviet ground forces have a considerable chemical warfare capability in terms of munitions and protective measures. An official U. S. Government evaluation states:
“The armed forces of the Soviet Union in particular and the Warsaw Pact forces in general are better equipped, structured and trained than any other military force in the world to conduct offensive and defensive chemical warfare opera
tions. Their capabilities are steadily improving.
“The Soviets have deployed a variety of modern agents and multiple delivery systems, and have the tactical doctrine for large-scale employment of chemical weapons. A significant portion of all Soviet delivery systems—including missile and rocket systems, aerial bombs and artillery—are chemical-weapon capable. Warsaw Pact forces are well-trained, organized and equipped for offensive CW [chemical warfare] operations.
“In Soviet military doctrine, toxic chemicals are associated primarly with theater warfare. The basic principle is to achieve surprise by using massive quantities of chemical agents against unprotected troops or against equipment or on terrain to deny its use.”12
Chemical munitions can inflict considerably more casualties per weapon than can conventional, high- explosive munitions. This means that chemical weapons offer the opportunity of very high effectiveness per hit without escalation to the nuclear weapons threshold.
The Soviet Navy can be considered prepared for the use ot theater/tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, while the U. S. Navy's surface forces are highly vulnerable to their use.
Soviet Ocean Surveillance: All Soviet naval operations are centrally controlled, a concept that demands that the commander of a fleet or force or theater have all possible information on the disposition and status of his own forces and enemy forces. The Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) makes use of a variety of means for surveillance and reconnaissance. among them the navy’s operating forces (aircraft, surface ships, and submarines) and the specialized collection activities to provide this information.
The principal intelligence collection components of SOSS are: aircraft, radio intercept, satellites, surface ships, and “spies.”
Aircraft: The Soviet Navy employs specially configured An-12 “Cub,” 11-18 “Coot,” Tu-16 “Badger,” and Tu-20 “Bear-D” aircraft for reconnaissance and surveillance.
The most notable aircraft are the long-range, four- turboprop “Bear-D” aircraft, which conduct radar and electronic intelligence (ELINT) reconnaissance missions and have the ability to transmit radarscope data to missile-launching platforms through a video data link (VDL). Although the approximately 45 “Bear-D” aircraft in service would be highly vulnerable in wartime, their range (enhanced by inflight refueling and overseas basing) makes them an invaluable component of SOSS during “peacetime” and crisis periods.
The Tu-16 “Badger” flies in Soviet naval markings in several reconnaissance configurations, again
using radar and ELINT collection systems. While lacking the "Bear’s” range, these aircraft can also be refueled in flight and have a higher speed. (These reconnaissance aircraft are separate from the
Badger” electronic countermeasure aircraft that support strikes against surface forces.)
Reconnaissance-ELINT variants of the An-12 “Cub” and 11-18 "Coot” transports are also employed in seeking out surface naval forces, mainly for the purposes of collecting data on electromagnetic emissions from Western ships.
Radio Intercept: The Soviets operated a network of land-based radio intercept stations prior to World War II. After the conflict, employing captured German technology, the Soviets built an elaborate high- frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) network.
This system along the land and sea borders of the U.S.S.R. seeks to intercept transmissions from surface ships and submarines and to triangulate their Positions. Some overseas HF/DF stations have also been established, notably in Egypt during the period °f close cooperation between the armed forces ot the two nations (1956 to 1973) and in Cuba. The Soviets provided the Egyptians with special equipment and personnel to help intercept and monitor the communications of the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Satellites: The Soviets employ two types of satellites for ocean surveillance: ELINT or electronic intercept “ferreting” vehicles that can detect and
lock on” electronic signals from ships, providing location and, possibly from radar signals, information on the type of ship; and radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (RORSAT) vehicles that use active radar to detect ships.
Although specific details of these satellites are lacking in the unclassified literature, it is evident that there are several operating modes. Sometimes the satellites are operated in pairs of one or both types to enhance coverage or to permit the passive ELINT satellite to "key” the RORSAT to areas of interest.
These and other satellites are in extensive use by the Soviet armed forces for tactical and strategic (e.g., early warning) reconnaissance and surveillance. The Soviets apparently employed reconnaissance satellites to keep track of the 1973 War in the Middle East. Four reconnaissance satellites were orbited during a 12-day period in early October, apparently related to the Arab-Israeli conflict that erupted on 6 October 1973. Similarly, the Soviets increased their satellite collection during the Iranian and Afghan crises that began in 1979, and during the Anglo-Argentine war in the South Atlantic and the massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which occurred in 1982. With respect to the last period, beginning 2 April 1982, the day Argentina seized the Falklands, the Soviet Union orbited a record number of reconnaissance and strategic early warning satellites. At least eight of the strategic warning satellites were put up through early June. (The Israelis invaded Lebanon in early June.) One reconnaissance satellite was kept in orbit for 50 days, a Soviet record at the time.
The Soviets have also orbited photographic satellites, but details of their ability to track warships have not been detailed in public forums.
The antisatellite program of the U. S. Department of Defense has Soviet ocean surveillance satellites as its primary target. According to a U. S. Defense official, "The principal motivation for our ASAT [antisatellite] program is to put us in a position to negate Soviet satellites that control Soviet weapon systems that could attack our fleet.”13
The Soviet Navy also makes use of satellites tor communication and navigation purposes.
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Conveyor. The presence of an AEW aircraft would have also given a greater period of warning for the air attacks by Skyhawk and Mirage aircraft on the ships anchored in San Carlos Bay. The vessels usually had only a few seconds notice because the skillful Argentine pilots often flew just above the wavetops to avoid detection by the warships’ radars.
It must be noted that the British Government had recognized the need for an AEW aircraft in the early stages of the conflict. ■
The fact that the Nimrod Mk-3 was not yet in Royal Air Force (RAF) service reportedly caused the Thatcher Government to request the use of an E-3A from the U. S. Air Force. This request was reportedly denied by President Reagan because American service personnel would have been required to operate the aircraft and its systems, which would be in defiance of his pledge to keep American forces from directly participating in the conflict over the Falkland Islands.
If the Nimrod Mk-3 had been in service at the time of the Falklands conflict, it probably would have been used to monitor the airspace around the task force, warning of impending attacks by Argentine aircraft and vectoring Sea Harriers to intercept them. The Nim- rods would had to have been based at Ascension Island, along with the Vulcan B Mk-2s and Victor K Mk-2s that took part in the raids on the Port Stanley airstrip. The fact that Ascension Island is more than 3,000 miles away would have meant that the amount of time that a Nimrod Mk-3 could have spent on station monitoring the airspace over the Royal Navy warships and the Falkland Islands would have been inadequate. Assuming that a Nimrod Mk-3’s endurance is 20 hours and it would take seven hours to reach the Falklands from Ascension Island, then only six hours would be spent on station. In other words, the presence of the Nimrod Mk-3s would have probably had a negligible effect in averting the loss of Her Majesty’s Ships Sheffield, Ardent, Coventry, and Antelope, plus the containership Atlantic Conveyor, because of the limited time available in each flight to carry out its designed task.
The conflict over the Falkland Islands may now be history, but the need
for a carrier-based AEW aircraft still exists in the Royal Navy. The acquisition of such an aircraft should be paramount in the minds of naval planners, regardless of the tight financial constraints placed on the navy.
Ship Survivability vs. Comfort
Sonar Technician G (Surface) Seaman William H. Johnson, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Havingjust retired from 30 years of naval service, I must plead guilty to aiding and abetting a problem as old as sailing ships and as new as the Falklands War. This problem is the introduction and the growth of various flammable materials in interior spaces of combat ships. In The Two Ocean War, S. E. Morison stated that the interior paint, linoleum, and wardroom upholstered furniture contributed greatly to the loss of the
If Britain was to act as it should and equip its fleet with carrier-based AEW aircraft, its choice in aircraft readily available or ready for service in the near future is indeed limited. The layout of the Invincible class, which lacks fixed-wing facilities, makes the deployment of aircraft such as the E-2 Hawkeye impossible. As a result of this fact, the Royal Navy will either have to use a helicopter or a V/STOL aircraft in the AEW role. A helicopter, because of its limited performance when compared with a V/STOL aircraft, makes its employment in this task somewhat dubious, so the task must fall to a V/STOL aircraft. The fact that the Grumman Type ‘A’ V/STOL will probably not be operational until the mid-1990s means the only aircraft that could assume the AEW role for the Royal Navy before the end of this decade would be the Bell XV-15. The acquisition of enough aircraft to equip one squadron with XV-15s would provide the Royal Navy’s ASW carriers with an effective AEW umbrella wherever they may be operating. This would free the Nimrod Mk-3s, the acquisition of which totals only 11 aircraft anyway, to operate almost exclusively with the RAF and other air contingents of NATO. Granted, the XV-15 is not an ideal AEW aircraft for the Royal Navy, particularly when one considers the hangar arrangements of the lnvinci- ble%\ but the XV-15 would provide a service that would be invaluable to the British fleet.
Surface ships: More than 50 specialized “intelligence collectors,” designated AGIs by Western intelligence, are in Soviet naval service. While they are sometimes depicted in the press as disguised fishing trawlers, the Soviet AGIs are naval units, readily identified by their naval ensigns and electronic antennae, and are manned by naval personnel. The latest and largest AG I class is also armed. (Most earlier AGIs have been backfitted to launch SA-7 “Grail” heat-seeking missiles.)
Soviet AGI-type ships normally keep watch off the U. S. strategic submarine base at Holy Loch, Scotland, and off the southeastern coast of the United States—a position that permits surveillance of the submarine base at Charleston, South Carolina, or Kings Bay, Georgia, or the missile activity off Cape Kennedy, Florida. AGIs also operate in important international waterways, such as the Strait of Gibraltar, Sicilian Straits, and the Strait of Hormuz. And AGIs regularly keep watch on U. S. and other NATO exercises.
Of course, Soviet warships also conducted surveillance of Western forces, with those Soviet ships engaged in close trailing operations referred to as “tattletales.”
Beyond naval ships, SOSS can also be expected to make use of information obtained from the state- owned and centrally controlled merchant and fishing fleets and, especially, the large Soviet research fleets. The last consist of ships and aircraft engaged in academic oceanographic and polar research, as well as in support of the nation's civilian and military space and atmospheric research programs.
Spies: The Soviet national intelligence service, the KGB, and the military intelligence organization, the GRU, also gather information on Western naval movements and activities. Their activities appear to range from agents in Western defense organizations to simply reading newspapers and magazines that discuss naval deployment, exercises, and port visits.
The information garnered by the various components of SOSS are collected and collated at command centers in the four fleet headquarters and at naval headquarters in Moscow. These command centers have hardened, highly survivable communications facilities associated with them, with alternative emergency facilities ready to serve as a backup, to ensure rapid intake of intelligence data and rapid directions to fleet and tactical commanders. Although Soviet tactics are highly communications dependent, once hostilities start it is possible that Soviet forces may be less dependent on command direction than our Western naval forces because of the Soviets' rigid doctrine and tactics.
In addition to these fixed facilities, the command ship-cruisers Admiral Senyavin and Zhdanov, and the AT/Vov-class battle cruisers, probably are fitted with sufficient C3 systems to process and employ the products of SOSS.
These products are essential to Soviet naval forces successfully carrying out their assigned missions.
Like its hardware and personnel, the Soviet Navy s missions and the tactics for carrying out those missions are considerably different than Those of the U. S. Navy. While many senior officers of the U. S. Navy see their primary role as confronting and, in time of war, fighting the Soviet fleet, there is a lack of widespread knowledge in the U. S. Navy of how the Soviet Navy operates and fights. Hopefully, this discussion and the others in this issue will be expanded through readers' comments and contribute to a more knowledgeable and capable U. S. Navy.
'Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea (Annapolis. MD.: Naval Institute Press. 1974). p. 100.
-Ibid., p. 103.
'Ibid., p. 40.
JIbid.. p. 71.
Adm. Gorshkov. Tile Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1979). p. 252.
hAdm. Gorshkov. “Naval Cruises Play Role in Training, International Relations." Bloknot Agitatora, No. 8. April 1973, pp. 3-6.
'Adm. Gorshkov. The Sea Power of the Slate, p. 277. kCol. B. Frolov, Ph.D. Candidate of Sciences (History). “Surprise." Soviet Military Review. No. 9, 1980. pp. 27-29.
‘'Adm. Gorshkov. Red Star Rising, pp. 131-32.
1 Capt. 1/Rank N. Vo yuncnko. Doctor of Naval Science. "Concerning Some Trends in the Development of Naval Tactics." Morskov Shornik. No. 10. October 1975. pp. 21-26.
"BDM Corp., “The Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine for Theater Nuclear Warfare (Washington. D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency 1977). pp- 21-22.
‘-’Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger. "Soviet Military Power" (Washington. D C.: Department of Defense, n.d. [1981]). pp. 37-38. "Testimony of Dr. Seymour Zeiberg. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) for strategic and space systems before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 27 March 1979.
Editor s Note: This article is an abridged chapter of the Third Edition of Guide to the Soviet Navy, which will be published by the Naval Institute Press in 1983. In addition to abridgements, changes to Proceedings’ style have been made.
Authors Note: Dr. Milan Vego and Captain Thomas Brooks, U. S. Navy, assisted in the writing of this chapter.
Mr. Polmar and Dr. Friedman are analysts and authors in the defense and naval fields. Mr. Polmar is a private consultant, while Dr. Friedman is deputy director of National Securities Studies at the Hudson Institute. Both have written several books, Mr. Polmar being coauthor of the recently published biography Rick- over. He is editor of the Naval Institute's reference works Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet and Guide to the Soviet Navy. Dr. Friedman's most recent works are Naval Radar and U. S. Destroyers—An Illustrated Design History, both published in 1982 by the Naval Institute Press.