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When, in October 1950, South Korean minesweeper 512 was obliterated while sweeping the harbor at Wonsan, it was a Soviet mine sown by a North Korean junk or sampan, under the direction of Soviet technicians, that destroyed her.
Proxy warfare persists and so, too, does the Soviets’ century-long love affair with the mine.
A survey of U. S. capability to maintain the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) shows a heavy emphasis on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and the use of convoy tactics. Naval exercises, training, and tactical studies have concentrated on countering the Soviet submarine threat in the open ocean. These efforts have given the U. S. Navy an advantage in ASW technology. Unfortunately, only half of the problem of SLOC preservation has been addressed. While the United States has forged ahead in ASW technology, the mine countermeasures force has withered in neglect. Only three ocean minesweepers remain on the active rolls today with an additional 22 assigned to the Naval Reserve fleet. All U. S. minesweepers are assigned home ports in the continental United States which, in time of war, would leave, among others, Pearl Harbor, and the naval facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines without a minesweeping capability.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has amassed an impressive mine warfare capability. The Soviet Navy’s minesweeping force is the largest and most capable in the world, numbering about 385 ships. Soviet submarines and the great majority of their surface ships have a minelaying capability, as do their long-range attack aircraft. Their mine stockpile is estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000 mines.
Russia first used mines in warfare in the Crimean War in both the Black Sea and the Baltic. A defensive mining campaign in the Black Sea was largely ineffective, but defensive minefields damaged two British ships in the Baltic off Kronstadt. The Russian fleet, operating behind minefields and under cover of shore batteries, carried out coastal trade while keeping the British and French warships at bay, defeating the attempted blockade of Kronstadt.
In the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, the Russians found themselves at a numerical disadvantage of ten to one, a disability further aggravated by the presence of several Turkish ironclads. The Russians, engaging primarily in a land war, nevertheless required control of the Danube River to permit safe crossing and to maintain lines of supply for their advancing army. Through a vigorous mining campaign and brilliant torpedo boat tactics, a section ot the river was sealed off and the Turkish fleet nearly immobilized.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 saw extensive mining by both sides. The Japanese drew first blood by laying a minefield off Port Arthur and then luring out the Russian fleet. Two battleships hit mines. The Russians continued their campaign of offensive and defensive mining, but Japanese espionage allowed them to avoid the Russian mines. Then the Russian minelayer Amur laid a minefield to seaward. The following day, the Japanese fleet, unaware of the deviation, lost two battleships to the mines. In the final tally, the Japanese lost more ships to mines than to Russian guns and torpedoes combined—they lost ten ships displacing more than 40,000 tons and many more were damaged. The Russians lost six ships.
totaling 22,000 tons, to Japanese mines.
In addition to building surface minelayers, in 1915, the Russians launched the “Krab,” the first submarine designed specifically for minelaying. The Russian emphasis on mine warfare tactics paid off m World War 1. The Germans suffered constant losses to Russian mines in the northern seas. Mine Warfare was also central to the Russian effort in the Black Sea in which the Turks suffered heavy losses hying to resupply their armies in the Caucasus by sea.
During the civil war from 1917 to 1922, the Reds, tearing a German renewal of the war, laid a series °t minefields west of Kronstadt. The fields were renewed and enlarged after the German collapse, in response to the British sending a squadron of ships to lend support to the Baltic states and to the Whites. The British cruiser Cassandra was sunk, and in addition to several smaller ships, the Curasao was damaged. Both Reds and Whites used mines extensively on the rivers.
After the Kronstadt Revolt of 1921, the Soviet Union had few salvageable ships and experienced naval officers. The naval doctrine of the 1920s and 1930s was strictly defensive. Stalin's ideas for a more active navy had not yet been put into effect. Nevertheless, naval reconstruction which began in the first five-year plan included a few small submarines and minecraft. By 1940, the Soviet fleet boasted a large number of submarines, minelayers, some destroyers, and a number of new minesweepers in addition to a few old cruisers and battleships.
During World War II, the Germans mined the Baltic, totally immobilizing the Soviet fleet which had 38 minesweepers that could not keep up with the pace of German minefield renewal. Although the Soviets planted defensive minefields of their own, the German advances were little more than slowed.
In the Baltic, Soviet mining was also ineffective. However, it did force the Germans to expend time and logistic effort to keep the sea-lanes open.
The lack of Soviet tactical proficiency was not reflected in their technological developments. Innovations during the war produced small mines suitable for riverine warfare, shallow water mines, and mines which could be air dropped to penetrate ice, using chemical action.