No argument can deny the Soviet Union’s clear lead over the United States in the ability to marshal maritime resources in support of foreign policy objectives worldwide. The Soviet definition of sea power encompasses more than the traditional combatant vessels. As expressed by Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, it also includes the means . . to study the ocean and harness its wealth, the status of the merchant and fishing fleets and their ability to meet the needs of the state. . .
Gorshkov further defines the role of the merchant fleet as “an important reserve of the navy in the event of war.” To illustrate this point, he cites U. S. steps to ensure the rapid adaptation of the merchant marine to wartime use and discusses the military features of several types of modern merchantmen. He concludes that, “In light of this the merchant fleet must be regarded as a universal component of the sea power of a country which has a most important role in war and peacetime.”
Merchant shipping was vital in making up the deficiencies in the Soviet Navy in 1941. The merchant fleet’s primary mission was to transport cargo and personnel—an especially crucial factor when internal lines of communication were cut. Soviet sources generally agree that 100 million tons of cargo and ten million troops and civilians were moved in merchant hulls during the war. The large number of personnel transported is indicative of the fleet's role in evacuating coastal areas under the threat of German attack. For example, from July to mid-October 1941,350,000 civilians and 86,000 troops were evacuated from Odessa. Even oil tankers were pressed into service as personnel carriers.
Offensively, civilian vessels were used in minelaying and amphibious landing operations. In fact, the Black Sea Fleet did not own any special landing craft, thus having to rely on fishing vessels, launches, and other small craft. Typical of these operations was the landing on the Kerch Peninsula in late December 1941, which was carried out with a variety of fishing craft and barges. This operation won praise from the Germans, who cited in their after-action report the “. . . talent for improvisation, shown by collecting and using non-naval craft,” as one of the Soviets’ strong points.2 Merchant ships were also used by the Soviet Northern Fleet in helping to land 250,000 troops on the coasts of northern Norway and the Pechenga Oblast.
Ships of the Soviet merchant fleet serve in naval auxiliary roles by either augmenting or substituting for the regular navy auxiliaries as needed. Although Soviet writings on civil-military cooperation at sea concentrate on the practices of the West, especially the United States, the principles remain the same, and in this context merit review.
A 1973 Soviet publication pointed out that the U. S. merchant fleet is actually considered a fourth branch of the armed forces. Its value as an auxiliary goes beyond the transport of cargo to include support of the fleet at sea and participation in amphibious operations. No less than 90% of U. S. cargo ships and tankers are allegedly built to military specifications of speed (not less than 20 knots), long range, and the ability to load and off-load cargo without the aid of equipment on the shore.3 A 1979 article in Morskoy Flat explained that all roll-on/ roll-off ships (RO/ROs) must be designed to accommodate M-60 tanks and that U. S. shipowners received a subsidy if they permitted “defensive characteristics” to be included in their ships.4
The Soviets believe that the RO-RO ship best exemplifies those characteristics which make merchantmen useful in military operations. The RO- RO's ability to load and off-load her cargo without shore facilities is just one of her militarily significant features. She can transport equipment whose size and weight does not lend itself to efficient air delivery. Once combat vehicles arc driven off the ship, they can be driven to the area of operations with a minimum of preparation. The speed of off-loading means a quicker turnaround time and less time to be vulnerable as a target in port.
The Soviet merchant fleet has 45 RO-ROs, plus a number of smaller vehicle/train ferries. Many of these vessels are also equipped to carry cargo in containers. The standard Soviet RO-RO employs a large stern ramp which supposedly can be extended through the use of pontoon bridge sections. The decks and ramps are built to support tanks. The newest Soviet RO-ROs can attain speeds greater than 20 knots with ranges up to 20,000 nautical miles. The largest Soviet RO-RO, the 21,000-ton Magnito-Gorsk type, has a range of 30,000 nautical miles. The 1980-85 five-year plan projected the doubling of RO-RO tonnage. Large numbers of small RO-ROs are being planned and are believed to be designed for supplying remote bases.
Another of the inter-modal type vessels with tremendous military applications is the barge carrier. She not only can off-load without shore support, but can accomplish her mission from an offshore position, presenting less of a target to coastal defenses when engaged in amphibious landing operations. She is ideally suited to supply areas where modern port facilities are nonexistent and, through the use of inland waterways, can ferry her cargo directly to the intended recipient.
The Soviets possess five barge carriers of two types, all Finnish built. The lighter aboard ship (LASH) type carries 26 barges which arc loaded by an elevator mounted in the stern, and towed to shore by the two shipboard tugs. Up to 25,000 tons of cargo can be off-loaded in 13 hours. The smaller Stakhanovets type can flood her cargo well to accept floating cargo, e.g., patrol craft or cargo loaded onto barges. These ships are also designed as RO- ROs and are equipped with two 350-ton capacity gantry cranes. Both types have a range of 12,000 nautical miles.
The third type of inter-modal vessel is the containership, designed to carry boxed dry cargo which is placed on tractors for movement from the port. According to Gorshkov, the military applicability of this form of transport was validated by the United States: “It should be noted that the bulk of military cargoes may also be carried in containers, which is confirmed by the experiences of supplying U. S. troops in Vietnam.” Containerships offer a rapid turnaround time and the ability to deliver a large volume of bulky military cargo. Their ability to offload without the benefit of port facilities, however, depends on the cargo handling equipment organic to the ship. The Soviet merchant fleet includes about 125 containerships. This figure does not include RO- ROs which may be used as containerships or any other ship which may be adapted to carry containers. The majority of these ships do not require extensive port facilities to off-load.
Contrary to the trend toward containerization witnessed in most Western fleets, the Soviets continue to maintain a large quantity of conventional dry cargo, or break-bulk, ships. These ships are equipped with their own cargo-handling equipment, lessening their dependence on port facilities and, through the use of barges, can also transfer cargo from offshore. Any of the 2,000-odd Soviet break-bulk ships could, theoretically, be diverted to support military operations. Some members of a particular type have been assigned to the navy. Others possess special characteristics which enhance their military usefulness. The latter group includes the “K” and Poltava types, each of which contains an extra long cargo hatch (98 feet in the ”K,” 72 feet in the Poltava). These can accommodate missiles and aircraft.
As passenger ship fleets of the West dwindle in size, the Soviets have stepped in to take advantage of this opportunity to earn hard currency. Their fleet currently numbers 58 ships built over the past 30 years, with passenger capacities ranging from 94 to 1,024. Some of these are also designed to carry cargo and vehicles. When employed as troop transports, the troop capacity is significantly greater than the passenger capacity. Gorshkov reminds us that the liner United States, ”... with 2,000 passenger berths, could be rapidly adapted for transporting a 14,000- strong division.”
The Soviets also have developed a fleet of hydrofoils and air cushion vehicles which can serve as military transports. One of the newest hydrofoils is the 143-ton Kolkhida, which carries 120 passengers at speeds up to 35 knots with a range of 250 nautical miles. But these craft are not intended for use on the open ocean.
Almost any tanker could be diverted to support military operations. Many of the tankers assigned to the navy were transferred from the civilian fleet. Several types are used routinely to replenish the fishing fleet. The navy's Boris Chilikin-class replenishment tankers are based on the Velikiy Oktyabr-type oiler. Besides supporting ships at sea, tankers can deliver their cargo ashore with improvised connections to support ground forces’ operations.
A recent article in Morskoy Sbornik listed four major roles for merchant auxiliaries:
Deliver raw materials, fuel, and manufactured goods essential to the military economy
Transport expeditionary forces, weapons, ammunition, and all military and technical support for military operations
Support naval forces at sea, in maneuver areas, and in port
Allocate part of the merchant fleet to reinforce the navy
The author of this piece included a footnote to the last item, explaining that other civilian fleets—such as fishing, special, and scientific research—must also be included in these calculations.5
These four broad missions can be refined to produce a list of seven specific missions:
Provide logistic support for fleet and ground force operations
Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection
Provide assistance to client states
Serve as a component of naval diplomacy
Support the wartime economy
Conduct deception operations
Provide auxiliary cruisers to the navy
Fleet operations are supported by the replenishment of dry and liquid cargoes by tankers and break- bulk ships. Merchant tankers formerly provided more than 75% of the fuel transferred to Soviet warships at sea, but in recent years this has dropped to below 40%. Their principal function now is to keep the naval oilers topped off with fuel from Black Sea depots, except in the western Mediterranean, where they deploy in support of the navy for three or four weeks/’ In addition to supplying fuel, tankers have a secondary mission of providing fresh water to Soviet warships, because of their inadequate water distillation equipment. Special water carriers assigned to the navy could be augmented by wine and vegetable oil tankers of the merchant fleet.
The Soviets make extensive use of protected anchorages to conduct resupply and repair operations, which means heavy reliance on both naval and civilian auxiliaries to service worldwide out-of-area deployments. Merchant tankers have also played an important role in the procurement of perishables. Because they can easily disguise their naval association, they are able to enter foreign ports more easily than naval ships.
Soviet merchantmen can provide logistical support to the ground forces anywhere in the world regardless of the availability of port facilities or harbors. After the United States mined Haiphong harbor, the Soviets continued to deliver supplies to the North Vietnamese coast. In some cases, cargo was transferred to barges for the final run to shore. Troops and liquid and dry cargo, to include missiles and aircraft, can be delivered. Soviet naval exercises have revealed that merchant ships can be expected to participate in amphibious operations. During “Okean-75", at least seven merchant ships were observed with amphibious warships in the Norwegian Sea.7 Barge carriers and RO-ROs are well suited to land the follow-on combat vehicles and troops to support the breakout from the beachhead. The “T- 4” class landing craft is small enough to be carried as deck cargo on freighters.
The Soviet Navy possesses a fleet of about 50 intelligence collectors (AGIs). This represents, however, only a small portion of the overall maritime reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence effort. Many merchant ships and civilian-manned survey, research, and space-associated ships can carry sensors capable of assisting in the areas of communications and electronic and signal intelligence collection. Naval personnel are assigned to operate the most sophisticated equipment. These efforts are augmented by the contribution of the world's largest fishing fleet (more than 2,700 vessels). Specific intelligence missions include charting the ocean floor for submarine navigators, placing sensors to monitor the movements of U. S. submarines, laying mooring buoys in remote areas to mark rendezvous and replenishment points, probing U. S. detection and defensive systems, monitoring Western ship and submarine movements, and compiling an oceanographic data base to support deployments in any part of the world.
Any merchant ship could be equipped to engage in electronic intelligence-gathering at sea and in port. Once in port, another dimension is added to the collection effort. Soviet sailors can obtain visas for travel in the United States. Among their number are probably KGB personnel with specific intelligence missions.
The merchant marine is the primary method of providing economic and military assistance to Soviet client states in peace and in war; sea transport is the most efficient means of conveying bulky, heavy military cargo. Overall responsibility for arms sales is held by the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which coordinates with the Ministry of Maritime Fleet for arms shipments and assistance in establishing shore facilities.
Related to this task is the merchant fleet’s role as an arm of naval diplomacy. Many countries find it more politically feasible to accept visits from Soviet merchantmen than from warships. In 1975, Soviet merchant ships visited 1,228 ports in 118 foreign countries.8 Such visits sometimes lead to access to port facilities and possibly to naval access. These actions are accompanied by Soviet commercial and diplomatic penetration and intelligence collection efforts. Thus, the merchant fleet opens up areas of the world inaccessible by other means.
The Soviet Union is prepared to go to war self- sufficient in essential raw materials. Geographic vastness and the lack of reliable and extensive road and rail networks, however, may require parts of the country to rely on sea transport for military and civilian resupply. Exercise “Okean-15" featured convoy operations in the North Atlantic and the Pacific which may indicate that the Soviets have sensed the need to ensure that the sea-lanes can serve as alternate lines of communication for national defense.
Gorshkov points out that, “The role of seaborne shipments is particularly great in the life of the Far East and the North, where the merchant fleet is practically the only form of transport ensuring the conveyance of the most varied cargoes to numerous points of the coast." The shortest route to these points is the northern route, the use of which requires icebreaker support. The merchant fleet operates 43 icebreakers, including three with nuclear power; a fourth is under construction. In addition to opening the passage for cargo vessels, icebreakers can facilitate the inter-fleet transfer of warships.
Possession of a large quantity of merchant ships allows the Soviets the luxury of fulfilling both military and civilian requirements with one resource. This also affords them the means to conduct deception operations in time of war.
The traditional auxiliary cruiser, or raider, best exemplified by the German experience in World War II, is anachronistic. This does not mean, however, that merchant ships no longer have offensive applications. In an apparent reference to Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt’s proposals to equip containerships with aircraft and defensive equipment, a Soviet author in Morskoy Flat described NATO's design for equipping merchant ships with antiaircraft rockets, helicopters, and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.9 He also noted the use of merchantmen to lay and sweep mines, a role in which the merchant ship could best serve as an auxiliary combatant. Merchant vessels could lay mines in neutral harbors and sea-lanes where enemy ships are most likely to frequent and transit. Vital choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca could be closed to tanker traffic with minimal effort. Unescorted tankers could also fall prey to lightly armed merchantmen on the open sea.
The most dramatic evidence of the Soviet merchant fleet’s auxiliary role is its use in supporting client states during crises and conducting naval diplomacy. The Poltava-class cargo ship, equipped with an extra long hatch, carried intermediate range ballistic missiles and 11-28 bombers to Cuba in 1962. An average of 100 Soviet merchantmen were on the regular run to Haiphong during the Vietnam War. In 1967, this figure increased to more than 400.
Merchant ships made the initial Soviet penetration into the Middle East, carrying materials for the Aswan Dam to Egypt and taking on cotton. Arms shipments were sent by sea to Arab states throughout the 1960sand 1970s.The 1973 sealift began months before the Arab-Israeli war, and at its peak carried 63,000 tons, as opposed to 22,500 tons delivered by air.10 Arms shipments to Angola began in the mid- 1960s, but received worldwide attention in 1976 during that country’s civil war. Most of the weapons went by sea, protected by a Soviet naval squadron from the Black Sea Fleet based at Conakry, Guinea. Soviet ships also delivered Cuban expeditionary forces and equipment to Ethiopia in 1977-78.
In May 1976, the Soviet Union signed trade and fishing agreements with Angola and Mozambique, clearing the way for unlimited access by Soviet ships of all types. Soviet assistance in developing port facilities in Yugoslavia was a prelude to Soviet submarine repairs in Yugoslavian shipyards. Greece has been repairing unarmed Soviet naval vessels and merchant ships in its shipyards for several years; the French started this practice last year.
The Soviet Union obviously possesses a large, modern, and versatile merchant fleet which has demonstrated its ability to conduct a variety of naval auxiliary missions in all parts of the world. This capability, however, is not unique to the Soviet Union. Any country’s merchant marine can be pressed into military service if needed. There are other factors bearing on the use of the Soviet civilian fleets which are unique and must be considered in order to assess their employment potential. These factors cover the areas of resource management, personnel, and equipment procurement.
Shipbuilding is supervised by the Military-Industrial Commission, which is accountable to the Ministry of Defense. Military representatives are at all levels of research, planning, and construction to ensure that military requirements are met. This does not mean that the military dominates all aspects of shipbuilding. The Soviet merchant marine plays a key economic role, and higher authorities do not always arbitrate in the military’s favor. Military involvement does mean standardization of parts, thus simplifying maintenance and supply problems, strengthening of decks and ramps to accommodate armored vehicles, protection against radiological, chemical, and biological hazards, and compatible communications systems. Military participation in the planning process also ensures a proper mix of ships to support effectively both military and commercial missions.
As world trends in merchant shipping go the way of the supertanker, bulk carrier, and containership, the Soviet Union continues to maintain a large inventory of self-unloading, break-bulk ships. The newest ships delivered include barge carriers and heavy-lift roll-on/roll-off, float-on/float-off (RO-FLOW) ships. RO-RO tonnage is expected to increase significantly. The passenger ship fleet has also received new tonnage in recent years.
No merchant crews are better prepared to conduct military operations than those of the Soviet Union. Naval officers are assigned to each shipping company office, and active duty naval personnel are assigned as either permanent or temporary members of the complements of many ships. This is especially true when sophisticated communications or intelligence-gathering equipment is employed. The civilian crew members receive at least basic military training and those with prior naval service are now members of the naval reserve.
An extensive educational system (13 one-year schools) ensures well-trained crews. Soviet seamen are graduates of these schools, and officers undergo a four-year course of instruction at one of 15 marine schools. There are also four five-year higher engineering schools for those with better educational backgrounds. The Soviet system produces approximately 9,000 full- and part-time officers per year. By contrast, the U. S. graduates fewer than 800 officers per year, a reflection of declining employment opportunities in a total force less than half (55,000) of the Soviet total. U. S. crews average 50 years of age while Soviet crews are much younger. Two- thirds of Soviet ship captains are now younger than 35; most other positions of responsibility are held by men under 30.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Soviet marine organization is its ability to marshal maritime resources. In the transition to a wartime economy, all vessels are subject to military recall. Centralized control also has its peacetime advantages. The 24 shipping companies provide operational data to the Central Computing Department of Ministry of Maritime Fleet, thus enabling the state to divert resources to satisfy military requirements without sacrificing in the economic sector. It should be noted that this centralized control extends to the fleets of the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which must be considered in assessment of Soviet sealift capability.
The Soviet merchant marine has been very successful in conducting military operations and supporting foreign policy goals while simultaneously carrying out its commercial mission. It has so far operated unopposed, which makes an assessment of its effectiveness in a shooting war at sea difficult. The Soviet merchant marine's peacetime organization, manning, and numbers and types of ships provide the Soviet Navy with an auxiliary capability unequalled by any other maritime nation.
1. S. G. Gorshkov. The Sea Power of the State. 2nd ed.. trans. (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd.. 1979), p.1. All subsequent references to Gorshkov are from this source.
2. Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941-1945. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 1979). p. 76.
3. A. O. Smukul and A. S. Fedurin. Tyl Voyenno-Morskikh Sil (Moscow: Military Press. 1973), pp. 186-206.
4. A. Romanen, “Torgovyy Flot V Planakh NATO.” Morskoy Flot 9 (September 1979), pp. 40-3.
5. V Solov'yev, “Morskoy Transportnyy Flot V Strategii Imperializma.” Morskoy Flot 4 (April 1981), p. 80.
6. Charles C. Petersen, “Trends in Soviet Naval Operations.” in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, cd. Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell (New York; Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 63-4.
7. Bruce W. Watson and Margurite A. Walton. “Okean-15.” July 1976. Proceedings, p. 93.
8. N. Kozhevnikov, “Razvitiye Morskogo Transporta V Dcsyatoy Pyatiletke,” Morskoy Shornik 2 (February 1977). p. II.
9. Romanen, p. 43.
10. Stephen S. Roberts, ed., “Superpower Naval Confrontation.” in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, p. 200.