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Recent articles in Morskoy Sbornik suggest that command and control and the independence of the commander are undergoing change or refinement in the Soviet Navy. The tenor °f these articles indicates that Soviet naval leadership has recognized that task force commanders and individual ship commanding officers (COs) require a great deal of autonomy to operate effectively far from the Soviet coast. For example, an article entitled, “CO’s Independence,” which appeared in the April 1981 Morskoy Sbornik, stresses the importance of teaching ship COs “to make competent decisions on their own during combat and political training.”
But there still seems to be the proclivity among many Western intelligence analysts to believe Soviet Navy ships are securely tied to Moscow's 0r the various fleet commanders’ apron strings. Perhaps it is time to consider 'he possibility that the Soviets are systematically severing these apron strings. Perhaps the Soviets recognize the strong and positive command and control exercised in the past has sti- ued the initiative and decision-making capability of their at-sea commanders.
This assessment is reinforced by Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov's article, Problems with Respect to Control of Naval Forces,” in June 1980 Morskoy Sbornik. With only a slight change in terminology, this article reads like utany of those on the reading list for the decision-making segment of the Naval War College curriculum. The concepts are identical. Two things in Particular impressed me about Gorshkov's article. The first is the recog- U'tion that computers and automated Wstems are only tools to be used by the decision-maker. The ultimate decision remains subjective, and “work- In8 out a decision is a profoundly creative process.” Second, Gorshkov acknowledges decisions being made oy the CO, thus giving a greater de- 8^ee of operational latitude to the individual CO or task force commander. 1 his philosophy will eventually be reflected in the command and control systems developed by the Soviets. It should also influence how Western intelligence analysts approach the subject of determining what occurred during a Soviet exercise.
Several factors caused this increased emphasis on decision-making. Foremost, the Soviets perceive that the nature of any future battle will be vastly different front past battles. New weapon systems and the necessity to react quickly have made old command and control systems obsolete. Decisions will need to be made quickly and by the on-scene commander. There will not be time to communicate with headquarters. A second decisive factor is that in the electronic environment of a future conflict, jamming and other electronic warfare measures may make it impossible to communicate with the shore-based commander.
There are other factors as well, but the important point is that the Soviets apparently perceive that the afloat commander will need to make more decisions in the future and that steps are being taken to prepare the COs for this responsibility. What of the U. S. Navy?
A major strength of the U. S. Navy during World War 11 was that the task force was given a mission, and it went and fulfilled it. Results were reported, but every step taken during the planning and execution phases did not have to be blessed in advance. Today, there is a major weakness developing in the U. S. Navy: the tendency for the shore- based commander to make tactical decisions. This is basically a function of having the technology that allows this degree of control, as illustrated in Lieutenant Commander Thomas E. Stuart's professional note, "Command and Control: The Two-Edged Sword” (Proceedings, December 1980). The real culprit, however, is not the existence of the technology. Rather, as Commander Stuart believes, it is our failure to define when and how these capabilities should be employed—or not employed.
We can legitimately expect, even demand, more from our command and control system in peacetime than war. The dilemma is that our peacetime practices do not reinforce what we perceive to be the wartime requirement. As a result, we are not developing commanders who instinctively make decisions. The initial impulse seems to be to make decisions at the highest level rather than at the lowest level possible.
This situation is exacerbated by the strategic planners who are building requirements for systems that will perpetuate this state of affairs. Captain Robert J. Carlin’s article, "Communicating with the Silent Service” (Proceedings, December 1981), contains a prime example. Mutual interference between submarines is a major problem in coordinating submarine operations. The solution presented by Captain Carlin is to develop hardware so the problem can be coordinated from ashore. The hardware may be needed and it may help solve the problem, but the only solution that ever seems to be presented is more and more command and control rather than less and less. Another approach might be to develop plans flexible enough to accommodate the superior capabilities of our modern day forces.
The easiest approach is to develop and apply technology: but we should not stop there. Technology is only one element in the solution. We must subject the technology to rigid analysis to determine the limits of its utility, rather than the limits of its capability. Failure to do so will soon contribute to a surprising turn of events. While the Soviets will have developed a mobile, independent navy ready for any contingency, U. S. naval operating forces will be securely tied to Washington. Norfolk, or Pearl Harbor by an umbilical cord made possible through the wonders of technology. Should we be taking lessons from the Soviets?
in 1921. Only the successful intervention of Leon Trotsky stayed Lenin's threat to scuttle the remainder of the fleet. However, throughout the remainder of Lenin’s lifetime, the navy was considered unreliable and suffered from an overabundance of political reorientation and a paucity of appropriations.
Following the suppressed rebellion, systematic purges were made of naval personnel until 70% of its manpower was filled by Komsomol members by 1924, thereby effectively eradicating much of the aviation experience previously developed under tsarist administration.
A second factor which precluded the Soviet Union from actively pursuing a carrier program was the condition of its economy, which was unable to absorb the level of outlays necessary to produce ships of this size and complexity. Neither the first five- year plan (1928-32) nor the second (1933-37) contained provisions for carrier development.
But under the influence of the “young school” strategy then in vogue, significant resources were allocated for a submarine program. The emphasis of the young school outlook endorsed light, quick, defensive forces operating in home waters and rejected the notion of sea control by capital ships. The submarine program was viewed as the personification of a cost-effective defense posture.
Evidently, requests came from within the service for the implementation of a sea-based air capability. However, the cjecision was made upon fiscal rather than doctrinal grounds.
Still, the shifts between the Mahanian and young school constructs of sea power were motivated by the necessity to rationalize shipbuilding instability on the basis of practical and political considerations, rather than on theoretical grounds.3 If Josef Stalin had possessed the ways and means required to expand the Soviet naval establishment, he would have done so; the fact remains that the Soviet Union simply did not have that capacity.
A third factor which operated against the development of aircraft carriers by the Soviet Union was the character and capabilities of its shipbuilding facilities. Despite heavy capital investments in shipyards in the Baltic and Black sea areas during the
The Moskva is one of two helicopter cruisers built during the 1960s with a primary mission of antisubmarine warfare. Although each vessel’s ten /l.S'H' torpedo tubes have been removed, they continue to carry complements of 16-18 “Hormone A” helicopters.
second five-year plan, by 1933, the Soviets were still unable to construct or service heavy battleships or aircraft carriers in their yards, or to produce large caliber naval guns and armor plate.
Finally, the early years of the interwar period saw the appreciation of sea power at its nadir. The Allies disarmed their vanquished World War I opponents and imposed rigid limitations upon their own maritime strength by concluding the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922 and similar agreements reached at the London Naval Conference in 1936. From a Soviet perspective, the greatest apparent vulnerabilities arose from continental sources rather than maritime threats, and thus any significant expansion of the Red Navy would have appeared both ill-considered and too costly in this context.
Soviet attitudes toward sea power at large—and carrier aviation in particular—underwent a transformation in the later 1930s, which reflected the expansion of Soviet foreign policy interests, increased capacity of the economy, and the growing ambitions of Josef Stalin for international prestige.
During the Spanish Civil War, which began in July 1936, the Soviet Union supported the republican
faction against Franco and the nationalists, who were *n turn aided by Hitler and Mussolini. The relative value of the Soviet supplies received by the republicans soon resulted in the blockade of Spanish ports by the Italians and coordinated attacks upon Russian merchant shipping as well as those foreign-flag freighters carrying Soviet shipments to Spain. Resizing that the Red Navy was unable to protect Soviet shipping beyond peripheral waters covered by shore-based aviation, Stalin was forced to appeal t° Britain and France to protect international trade movements in the Mediterranean.
Inasmuch as Soviet involvement in the Spanish war represented the first substantial commitment of the Soviet Union’s influence outside peripheral areas, the inability of the Red Navy to support its sealift to republican forces was intimately connected with subsequent efforts to expand naval construction. The third five-year plan (1937-42) marked the first movement toward a balanced fleet structure and reflected the gains secured by the economy during the first two plans. Large-scale expansions were effected at shipyards in the Leningrad and Nikolayev areas and comparatively generous appropriations were earmarked for naval shipbuilding and repair. As Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, Stalin’s navy commander in chief from 1939 to 1947 and 1951 to 1956, recorded in his memoirs:
“It was decided to build battleships, heavy cruisers and other classes of surface ships, that is, a big surface navy. A large number of submarines was also to be built. Not excluded either was the construction of aircraft carriers, rather they were merely postponed until the last year of the Five Year Plan because of the complexities of construction of warships of this class and of the aircraft designed especially for them.4 According to Dr. Nicholas Shadrin (a former Soviet destroyer captain) in his doctoral dissertation for George Washington University, the first carrier
Both Nikita Khrushchev and Josef Stalin said “nyet ” to naval air power. Stalin underrated the role of carriers and suspended their construction; understandably, no one objected. Khrushchev thought naval expansion was a waste of time and urged rapid development of nuclear and guided missile technology.
was to have been laid down in late 1942 or early 1943, after construction specifications had been secured and the requisite building ways had been erected. Four carriers were scheduled for completion by 1948—one flattop for each of the major fleet areas. Negotiations with the United States for access to the construction specifications of the USS Enterprise (CV-6) proved fruitless, however, and the expectations of the 1937 shipbuilding program were largely trampled by the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.
In retrospect, it is apparent that the decisions first to build and then later to suspend the construction of aircraft carriers were Stalin’s. As one appraisal of the Soviet decision-making process in defense affairs related:
“When Kuznetsov assumed his duties as People’s Commissar for the Navy, in place of the purged Smirnov, he said that 'in his ignorance,’ he took all important naval questions to Molotov .... Molotov, however, merely referred him to Stalin. Stalin, according to Kuznetsov, devoted much attention to all naval matters and no one ventured to act without his approval.”5 Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, who treated the carrier issue at length in his writings, observed:
“Stalin, who usually reckoned with the opinion of experts, tended for some reason to underrate the role of aircraft carriers. 1 had repeated proof of this during discussions on naval affairs, especially during the approval of naval construction projects in 1939 .... I think all this was due to a tendency to underestimate the danger to ships from the air.”6
Stalin probably saw in his "balanced surface navy” not the opportunity to project power at a distance from his own coastlines, but rather a confirmation of the Soviet Union’s arrival as a great power.
Even though he supported Stalin's surface construction programs, Kuznetsov worried about protecting the ships once placed in commission. His memoirs seem to support the position that land-based aviation is inadequate for the support of sustained naval operations at sea. Curiously, Admiral Gorshkov concurred with this analysis by his former commander in an anticarrier polemic published several months after Kuznetsov’s work. Writing of Stalin's
underestimation of naval aviation’s capabilities, Gorshkov wrote:
"This was one of the important reasons why no aircraft carriers which could have carried aviation for active participation in the combat operations of the navy were built for us at this time. We did not even have any fighter aviation which could provide cover for warships at sea far from our coasts .... Thus, even our big surface fleet.
which had begun to be constructed on the eve of the war, actually was doomed to operating solely in our coastal waters, protected by fighter aviation from shore.’’7
The devastation inflicted upon the Soviet Union during World War II was enormous, and the capability to construct warships suffered accordingly. Nevertheless, in 1947. Soviet shipyards were operating once again, and by 1950, a large surface fleet was again contemplated to include the Sverdlov, Chapayev and Slalingrad-c\ass cruisers and the four deferred aircraft carriers.
Mercurial Soviet appreciation of aircraft carriers had begun to rise during the early postwar years. Shadrin recalled that in mid-1951 Admiral Kuznetsov, addressing Baltic Fleet ship commanders, assured his audience that the Soviet Navy would commission aircraft carriers "before too long.”* Apparently, none of the carriers was ever laid down, and the 1951 building program ground to an abrupt halt with Stalin’s death in March 1953. Nikita S. Khrushchev, upon consolidating his own position within the Soviet leadership, took steps to curb the further expansion of the Red Navy and instead, favored the development of nuclear and guided missile technologies. When Kuznetsov continued to advocate increased naval expansion, presumably including the carrier program, Khrushchev replaced him with Sergei Gorshkov. Addressing the Central Committee on this point, the Soviet premier said:
“Let’s put off indefinitely the question of building up our navy and concentrate instead on the development of our air force and missiles. Any future war will be won in the air, not on the sea. and our potential enemies are equipped to attack us from the air. Therefore, we should think first about improving our airborne defenses and means of counter-attack.’’9
With the cancellation of the 1951 construction Program, anticarrier tracts began to appear more frequently in Soviet military journals and in pronouncements by its officials. In 1957, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, then Soviet Minister of Defense, derided strike carriers as being of only limited general use 0r for employment in local war scenarios. Since he said the Soviet Union would not engage in “aggressive first-strike missions" in the underdeveloped world, he suggested the Soviet Union would have no use for such platforms.
A second major Soviet criticism of carrier aviation was that in the age of modern guided missiles, these ships were now increasingly vulnerable to successful attack. In 1960, Marshal Andrei Eremenko pointed out that “aircraft carriers have become so vulner- uble that their use appears to be inexpedient." Two Years later, Admiral Isakov, writing in Izvestiya, described attack aircraft carriers as “floating mor- luaries.” The 1962 edition of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy’s Militcny Strategy expanded upon this theme,
“• . . these units are highly vulnerable during ocean
crossings, during refueling, at the moment they are Preparing to launch their planes, and also when the Planes are landing again on the carrier."
Vitriolic attacks on aircraft carriers continued to be common throughout the 1956-67 period; they were no doubt intimately connected with Soviet decisions made during the 1954-55 strategy reformulations to counter the U. S. carrier force rather than compete
with it.
Soviet naval treatments of carrier aviation began to show evidence of a decided shift around 1968, when both the Moskva and Leningrad had deployed to the Mediterranean and were conducting antisubmarine warfare exercises. Oles Smolansky notes in the MccGwire and McDonnell book, Soviet Naval Influence (New York: Praeger, 1977):
“The current period (1968-74) is marked by the discontinuation of the derogatory remarks about
the CVAs typical of the 1950s and the 1960s. Instead, there appeared in the Soviet literature a number of articles that contain a balanced appraisal of their strengths and weaknesses.”10 Especially noteworthy among the balanced analyses appearing at the time was the publication in 1969 of A History of the Art of Naval Warfare (Is- toriya Voyenno-Morskogo Isskustva) under the editorship of Admiral S. E. Zakharov. Written as a text for use in Soviet higher naval schools, the work contained two chapters dealing with naval operations during World War II and its aftermath, in which then-Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo offered some exceptionally positive estimations of sea-based aviation:
“During World War II, aviation and particularly carrier aviation played a role that was equal in importance to that played by submarines in combat operations .... The use of carrier aviation practically eliminated from combat operations battles involving artillery-torpedo groupings of surface forces. They were replaced by carrier forces.
“The appearance of carrier aviation enabled a country to pose an air threat almost anywhere in the world. At the same time, groupings of surface forces, covered by carrier aviation, could operate within range of the enemy’s shore-based aviation and along his shores. This, in turn, prompted the development of assault landing operations.
“Thus, aviation came into being as an independent arm of forces, possessing great striking power and high maneuverability.’’"
Admiral Gorshkov’s well-known naval series, “Navies in War and Peace," which was in 11 Mor- skoy Sbornik installments in 1972-73, was in stark contrast to the strident condemnation ot carrier air in his 1967 piece. The 1972 series offers no treatment of aircraft carriers at all, in effect highlighting the subject by omission.
The most recent—and by far the most interesting—Soviet statement on sea-based aviation appeared in the June 1978 Morskoy Sbornik, again under the authorship of Vice Admiral Stalbo. The article “Aircraft Carriers in the Postwar Period,” traces the development, construction, and deployment of U. S. carriers from the close of World War II through Korea, Vietnam, and related crisis operations. In it, Stalbo categorizes the modern mission structure of- carrier strike forces in these terms:
► Screening friendly strategic missile submarines
► Combatting the enemy’s missile platforms
► Winning sea superiority
►Providing support to ground forces and amphibious landings
►Ensuring the stability of the sea-lanes, especially when transporting troops and weapons
►Performing assorted missions in local wars
►Providing a naval presence.
Several other passages of the Stalbo article appear to reflect an appreciation of the advantages of carrier aviation, which might be just as readily applied to the current peculiarities of Soviet development concerns as they might to U. S. efforts. They include the benefits of nuclear propulsion, "special deck- based aircraft,” airborne nuclear weapons, and state- of-the-art electronics systems.
In one passage, Stalbo goes so far as to cite the November 1964 issue of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings ("British Carriers and VTOL”):
“For example, a carrier with a displacement of 50,000 tons can carry twice the aircraft of a carrier with a displacement of 35,000 tons, while her construction costs are only 25 per cent more.”
The Kiev and her sister ships Minsk. Kharkov, and Novorossiysk displace approximately 35,000 tons, while the Soviet CVN is estimated to displace 60,000 tons.
Finally, after acknowledging in a two-sentence paragraph that carriers remain vulnerable to submarine and air attack, Stalbo concludes:
“In our view, there is no basis to speak of a future reduction in the importance of carriers in armed warfare at sea. Moreover, we must speak of an increase in their role in military operations."
The virtually global extension of Soviet state interests and the consequent dispatch of the Soviet Navy onto the world ocean in support of those interests have served to highlight the inability of the Soviet Union to effectively balance its naval forces to accomplish even those missions it has already espoused. The move into air-capable ships is a step toward reversing this situation.
Earlier attacks against carrier aviation may have been prompted by either a desire to rationalize the alternative Soviet method of naval development or an attitude of sour grapes. Whatever their basis, the early vulnerabilities ascribed to carrier-type warships had to be dealt with, not only to overcome any latent opposition within the Soviet defense establishment to the allocation of resources needed to fund these classes, but to justify their later construction and use in a manner that may closely resemble that of the United States.
The tactic of justifying Soviet needs in terms of "objective historical situations" experienced elsewhere is revered throughout Soviet military literature as an accepted means of advocacy when discussing approved topics.12 Thus, one must infer that the appreciative appraisals of U. S. carrier air expressed by Stalbo, Katin, Shevstov, and Efre- menko, et al in the post-1968 period are actually arguments supporting an expanded Soviet sea-based air capability already decided upon.''
Given the certainty that the Soviets are building a large-deck aircraft carrier near Nikolayev, some thoughts on the probable mission structure of the ship are in order. Admiral Gorshkov has gone to great lengths to outline the type of missions he sees confronting the Soviet Navy, and Admiral Stalbo has offered detailed thoughts on the correct employment of carrier aviation. Thus, it would seem apparent that when this particular ship becomes operational in the late 1980s, she will be configured for use within overall wartime missions as announced by the naval leadership. It is not expected that this ship will be in any position to challenge the local air superiority established by U. S. carrier forces, nor will she attempt to.
This aircraft carrier will probably operate with other nuclear-powered surface and submarine forces in support of naval missions—SSBN screening, supporting ground forces and amphibious landings, use in local war, etc.—in either the Northern or Pacific fleet areas. The Soviet carrier would be most useful in shielding their ballistic missile submarines from NATO ASW aircraft.14
The imminent appearance of a Soviet aircraft carrier is a logical extension of the directions taken by the Soviet Navy since 1964. It will be a quantum leap forward in the continuing challenge to create a balanced fleet that will complement the stated missions of the Soviet Navy, and it will present new and difficult demands upon Western sea power.
'Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov, "Razvitie Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Is- skusstva." Morskoy Shornik. February 1967, pp. 9-21. See also: ‘'Soviet Naval Art." Soviet Military Review. July 1967. pp. 2-7. also by Gorshkov. 2Donald W. Mitchell. A History of Russian and Soviet Sen Power (New York: Macmillan, 1974) p. 355.
‘Robert W. Herrick. Soviet Naval Strategy (Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 19681. p. 28.
JAdm. N. G. Kuznetsov. Nakannne (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1966). p. 258. ■Albert Seaton. Stalin as a Military Commander (New York: Praeger. 1976). p. 86.
'’Adm. N. G. Kuznetsov, “Pered Voinoi." Okliabr . August 1965. p. 142. 7Adm. S. G. Gorshkov. Morskoy Shornik. February 1967. p. 12. “Nicholas G. Shadrin, quoted by Herrick, op. cit.. p. 64n.
‘'Strobe Talbot (ed.). Khrushchev Remembers: The Final Testament (Boston: Little. Brown. 1974). p. 26.
"'Oles Smolansky, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Aircraft Carriers." Michael MccGwire & James McDonnell (eds.). Soviet Naval Influence (New York: Praeger, 1977). p. 220.
Adm. K. A. Stalbo in Adm. S. E. Zakharov (ed.). lstoriva Vovenno- Morskogo Issknstva (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1969). p. 522. l:Bruce W. Watson. “Comments on Gorshkov's 'Sea Power of the State'," Proceedings. April 1977, p. 41.
"For divergent speculations of future deployment, see: J. S. Breemer. "The New Soviet Aircraft Carrier.” Proceedings. August 1981; Miles Libbey. “Blue Water At Last, Naval War College Review. Novembcr- December 1980; D. S. Zakheim, "A Carrier for Admiral Gorshkov," Naval War College Review. January-February 1982. •
IJThe author wishes to attribute this point to Captain Steve Kline. U. S. Navy.
Lieutenant Lynch received a master’s degree in international affairs from Georgetown University and was graduated from the U. S. Naval War College in 1981. Fie is currently working toward a doctoral degree in Russian area military studies in Georgetown.