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dangerous by the availability of Soviet military forces. As Soviet confidence increases, U. S. diplomats may reject military options as unfeasible; the President may meet increasing opposition from Congress to any military solutions for difficulties abroad.
In the early 1960s, the Soviet Navy initiated an expansion in capabilities, equipment, and personnel which has continued for the last 20 years. The Soviet Union maintains the largest number of warships in the world—more than 600 active major combatants; its air arm has about 1,100 aircraft. The Soviet am- phibioius lift includes about 100 active and preserved amphibious ships, along with about 120 short- haul landing craft for amphibious support. This capability can be augmented by ships of the merchant fleet. The actual number of naval infantry reservists is unknown but probably totals several hundred thousand.
In summary, Soviet military plans call for amphibious landings to be conducted by naval infantry transported in the amphibious assault ships of the Soviet Navy. In some cases, such operations would be supported by the merchant fleet, army, and air force. Ground forces are prepared to support and relieve naval infantry units after amphibious operations have been completed. The missions of the naval infantry involve amphibious landings against strategic targets and naval choke points. Of special priority in Soviet Naval Infantry targeting are the Straits of Denmark, the coast of Norway, and the entrances to the Black Sea and the Sea of Japan.
Amphibious landings can be conducted by the naval infantry either close to the Soviet borders in support of ground force operations, or on distant shores anywhere in the world. The naval infantry can be used also in a commando role. Naval infantry commando platoons can parachute into target areas or be landed by helicopter, motor torpedo boat, or submarine.
It is sometimes asserted that an amphibious landing by the Soviets in the Third World is impossible, since it would require extensive air support, elaborate naval gunfire, and sea superiority. The history of the naval infantry, however, indicates that its doctrine is flexible and pragmatic. Naval Infantry men have landed before without the “necessary' support, and they probably can do it again. Although the Soviets’ capabilities in this warfare area are not comparable to those of the U. S. Marine Corps, they are improving steadily and evolving into a potentially effective instrument of the Kremlin. .
'L. N. Buffardi, The Soviet Naval Infantry (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency. 1980). pp. 1-2.
:P. E. Melnikov. Soldaty Morin (Moscow: DOSAAF. 1977). pp. 65-75. 'Dietmar Jammer. "Luftkissen Fahrzenge Und Sturmgruppen. Nertes Deutschland (Berlin: Deutsche Demokratische Republik. II September 1980). pp. 1-3.
'Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy." Commentary, April 1980. PP- 32-38.
'Steven F. Kime, "A Soviet Navy for the Nuclear Age." Parameters, Vol. X. No. 1, pp. 58-70.
'ButTardi, Soviet Naval Infantry, p. 2.
Colonel Nargele has served with the 1st and 3rd U. S. Marine Corps divisions. Marine Corps Headquarters, and the Military Liaison Mission in West Germany. He currently is the defense and naval attache at the American Embassy in Santo Domingo. Dominican Republic.
Their Baltic Sea Fleet
By Captain Robert D. Wyman, U. S. Army
The missions of a military force never stand alone in the strategy of a nation. Likewise, the Soviet Union's pursuit of a unified strategy combining the operations of land and oceanic theaters must be considered. The Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet has several major missions that can be identified, and yet they are interconnected with each other and the other major Soviet commands in most of Europe. The four missions of the Baltic Sea Fleet are: control of the Baltic Sea, control of the Danish Straits, support of Soviet ground force operations, and, finally, support of Soviet Northern Fleet operations.
The quantity and type of forces that make up the Baltic Sea Fleet suggest several major capabilities that Warsaw Pact planners would consider. The fleet reflects a dual seakeeping capacity. Most of the fleet’s ships are ideal for the shallow and often restrictive waters of the Baltic. Some ships, however, are fully capable of high seas operations and would perhaps be more effectively used in such an open-ocean environment. (See page 36 for a naval order of battle listing forthe Baltic Sea Fleet.)
Finally, the Soviet Naval Air Force of the Baltic Sea Fleet deserves special attention. The Baltic Sea Fleet has •he largest number of naval aviation bombers and fighters of the four So- v,et fleets. Their range provides ample capability to go beyond the confines °f the Baltic in search of targets. All Phases of both offensive and defence naval operations can be supported by the fleet’s aviation arm.
The following three scenarios will explore the extremes of employment °Pportunities available to Soviet planners and the flexibility of action represented by the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet, •hey represent options of the highest Probability for the Soviet's northern
rhe numerous and, in many cases, fast small combatants provide the So- v'ets with an offensive capability that can readily engage NATO sea forces in the highly restricted western Baltic. Likewise, the ample number of mine countermeasure (MCM) vessels can support movements into NATO-defended waters around Denmark. The •feet’s numerous amphibious warfare ships reflect the importance of an amphibious capability in this theater. Combined with East German and Po- f'sh amphibious capabilities, the Warsaw Pact, under Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet •eadership, could land approximately •hree regiments of troops in amphibious assaults. In addition, the Soviets' -0 hovercraft provide high-speed at- •ack transport capability.
A complementary, yet significantly different, portion of the fleet is visible in the ranks of the Soviets' major surface combatants and submarines. The unproved seakeeping capability and peeper draft of the major surface combatants suggest an external Baltic Sea mission. They can provide significant shore bombardment support for amphibious operations; however, navigation restrictions can reduce this op- jion. The Baltic Sea Fleet's major surface combatants more likely match or complement the capabilities of the Soviet Red Banner Northern Fleet.
T he submarine force in the Baltic Sea Fleet is a composite of diesel- Powered submarines. The fleet ballis- •'c missile submarines (SSBs) and guided missile submarines (SSGs) could be used in a supporting role in •he Baltic, but their target options significantly increase outside the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, operational prob- ferns become paramount for submarines in the Danish Straits.
theater of operation in the near future. These scenarios are directly dependent on international political developments around the globe.
Poland, November 1982: Polish martial law continued through the spring and summer of 1982 without solving any of the problems facing Polish society. Growing dissent and public unrest became visible throughout Poland. By fall, the political reliability of the Polish armed forces necessitated the restriction of most units to garrison. Hence. Polish internal security troops had the additional burden of preparing for contingency operations directly against potentially mutinous Polish conscript units.
In October 1982, the Soviet Politburo, itself in the throes of a succession contest, provided a consensus decision on Poland's future. The Soviets would not allow a crack in the Soviet empire during the Politburo’s succession struggle. The Soviet Politburo notified Poland's Minister of National Defense, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, that regardless of the cost of direct intervention, it was prepared to do just that if the Polish armed forces could not be controlled and if civil unrest escalated to open violence. The unfortunate General Jaruzelski was tightly secured in a political vise.
The Soviet Politburo views the Polish problem as intolerable by November and thus implements the invasion plan so carefully devised since July 1980. November is a fortunate time for Soviet military readiness. Major units have completed the end-of-cycle
Should the Soviet bloc invade Poland in 1982, despite the friendliness of General Jaruzelski, left, East Germany’s Defense Minister Hoffman, center, and Soviet Marshall Kulikov during joint exercise “Friendship 82,” the Baltic Sea Fleet would have an essential role in the invasion.
training exercises. Unit readiness is at a peak for category I and II ground force division in the adjacent Soviet groups of forces and militry districts. Reservists and supplies have gradually increased readiness and prepositioning in anticipation of the Politburo’s final go-ahead. At sea, the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet has steamed into the Baltic and assumed predesignated positions under the guise of routine autumn naval maneuvers.
A limited number of Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet major combatants and submarines has joined a contingent of the Northern Fleet in the North Sea. This deployment serves as a strong statement to NATO, insisting on noninterference by NATO countries. At the same time, the nuclear powered fleet ballistic missile submarines of the Soviet Navy have maintained normal levels of deployment and operational routine, indicating Soviet unwillingness to encourage nuclear confrontation with the West over Poland. Additional Baltic Sea Fleet patrols provide a presence in the Danish Straits. Off the southern coast of Sweden, the Baltic Sea Fleet provides close surveillance of Swedish naval operations. The same surveillance is applied against Danish and West German naval units with East German and Soviet assets.
On Invasion Day in November, the
Baltic Sea Fleet executes three tasks simultaneously. First. Soviet amphibious landings are conducted at key Polish naval bases followed by the arrival in the same ports of major Soviet combatants. During this time, Soviet naval aviation provides continual overflights of the Polish port areas. Second, Soviet naval combat units notify Polish vessels at sea to accept boarding parties and neutralize those vessels that refuse. Furthermore, any Polish naval vessel departing from port is either warned to return to port prior to combat engagement or is, at least, boarded. Third, a naval picket line off the coast of Poland is activated. This picket line is responsible for seizing all vessels containing illegal Polish refugees. As a result of the Baltic Sea Fleet’s actions, the Polish northern border is sealed. (The Warsaw Pact armies seal the other borders.) Thus, the Soviet naval portion of the Politburo’s invasion plan was an essential element for success, even though the major burden of occupation rested on the shoulders of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces.
Soviet Limited Attack at North Cape: In the post-Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union may decide to test NATO’s resolve at a position where they perceive weakness in the NATO perimeter. This option would occur most likely during the summer months since operations above the Arctic Circle present their own set of challenges. The Soviets are interested in seizing the Finnmark region of Norway. Occupation by Soviet Naval Infantry landings, airborne assault, and overland advance characterize the operation. Controlling the Finnmark area would increase the Soviet defense area for their Northern Fleet bases, eliminate nearby NATO intelligence collection, increase the Soviet claim on islands in the vicinity, control oil exploration and production in the area, and, finally, directly pressure the Nordic countries into cooperation with Moscow.
At first glance, the North Cape operation does not appear to directly impact on the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. The fleet would, however, provide several valuable contributions in order to neutralize possible NATO. Swedish, or Finnish reaction.
For example, it would provide naval screening on the Swedish and Finnish coasts in order to neutralize any attempted naval actions by these countries and in order to pressure their respective governments. The Northern Fleet would be adequately reinforced by Baltic Sea Fleet major combatants and submarines. Finally, fast patrol boats (FPBs) with amphibious warfare groups would be prepared to initiate assaults against other NATO regions if necessary. Furthermore, the amphibious warfare groups would be prepared for operations against southern Sweden should Swedish resistance develop.
World War III: Political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union have intensified over a 12- month period. It has only become evident to the general public in the last two or three months that conditions were developing that suggested a refusal by either superpower to back down from the nuclear brink. Covert military preparedness has been implemented by the Soviets early in the preceding political escalations. Selected reserve units and vessels have been activated and prepared for action.
Since the impending crisis between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is a part of any U. S.-Soviet confrontation, readiness procedures are more easily concealed behind the mask of routine end-of-cycle training maneuvers. For the fleets of the Soviet Navy, the number of warships deployed to the high seas increased by 10% to 15%. Operational security required a small percentage in order to conceal the true Soviet intentions.
The Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet has provided for the permanent stationing of major surface combatants in the Kattegat and Skagerrak. Guided missile and fleet ballistic submarines have been
patrol in the Skagerrak and the North Sea in anticipation of war. Dur- '"6 the last 30 days before D-Day, the Baltic Fleet reinforced the Skagerrak units with eight to ten diesel-powered subrnarines. The diesel submarines and surface warships have been sufficiently resupplied throughout the Prepositioning phase before D-Day by uuxiliary vessels.
Twenty of the Baltic Sea Fleet’s r’PBs have been prepositioned between Bornholm Island in the western Baltic and Laeso Island in the Kattegat. The FPBs have been assigned sectors to patrol. Their number grad- ualjy increased as the months advanced until the present high count of -0 was reached.
With the exception of intelligence gatherers, mostly airborne, operating throughout the Baltic, the remainder °f the Baltic Sea Fleet has prepared ln Port for D-Day. The Baltic Sea Fleet, w'th the Polish and East German na- vul elements, has prepared several amphibious assault groups. Each group 's supported by a surface action group t^AG) consisting of major combatants und some patrol and missile vessels. Soviet naval aviation has been organized to provide support to each of (he groups.
On D-Day, the Polish 7th Landing division, the 29th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the East German 8th Motorized Rifle Division, and the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet’s Naval Infantry Regiment assault NATO shores in Warsaw Pact amphibious assault groups. The beaches have been weakened by naval bombardment and naval aviation. The Polish 7th Landing Division lands on the coast of Schleswig-Holstein in the Mecklenburg Bay. This naval action requires rapid clearing of NATO sea and air forces as well as successful mine countermeasure action in the Mecklenburg Bay. The mission of the Polish Division is twofold. First, the 7th must link up with the Soviet-Polish front advancing from the south around Lubeck, and, second, the 7th must seize Kiel. It was hoped that such a strategy would overextend the ground forces of NATO’s northern command, AF- NORTH, and provide a rapid seizure of the Kiel Canal. The Kiel Canal could later be used for access to the North Sea. If NATO should decide to flood the lowland areas in Schleswig-Holstein, the Polish 7th Landing Division would still retain its mobility.
The East German 29th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the Soviet Naval Infantry Regiment assault the main Danish island of Zealand. The Sound Strait, between Zealand and Sweden, is easily cleared of NATO mines since only one hostile shore needed to be seized. Sweden is continually pressured to remain neutral. With landings at Store Heddinge and Fakse Lade- plads, both on Zealand, a rapid advance up the coast through Copenhagen secures the Sound from the Danish shore.
All of the amphibious operations are directly dependent on the successful positioning of the FPBs in order to prevent NATO MCM operations and the direct firepower of the SAGs. In addition, the Soviet aircraft of the Baltic Sea Fleet must neutralize the NATO presence on Bornholm and Fehmarn islands. This move by Soviet aircraft helps blind NATO to the exact nature of the advancing naval threat. In addition to supporting the amphibious assaults, naval aviation must also neutralize NATO command, control, and communication (C1) facilities in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.
Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet elements operating in the Skagerrak on D-Day attempt to establish Soviet dominance by surprise attack and then move to join the Soviet Northern Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. Baltic Sea Fleet elements in the North Sea strike NATO vessels and North Sea oil fields. Ports are seized on the West German North Sea coast to support these Soviet units at a later date.
Post D-Day operations would include essentially three additional tasks. The first would be to provide direct support to Warsaw Pact ground forces, chiefly through resupply and securing of the Baltic Sea flank. The second mission would be to provide a share of air defense through the central control of the Air Defense Force for the Homeland. The final mission would involve expanding air and sea power through the Danish Straits into critical operational areas like the English Channel and adjacent waters of the United Kingdom.
These three scenarios demonstrate that a clear understanding of the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet and its missions are necessary for all NATO ground and air force commanders as well as naval commanders. This fleet can impose a serious threat to NATO air, land, and sea operations in the Central and Northern European theaters.
Soviet Marines storm ashore near Baltysk, very close to the Soviet-Polish border, as part of a military exercise— which could become the real thing at any time.