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The Soviet Art of War: Doctrines, Strategy and Tactics
Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott.
ditors. Boulder. CO.: Westview Press, l982- 323 pp. $26.50 ($23.85) $13.00 Paper ($11.70).
Reviewed by Captain Paul Schratz, U. S. Navy (Retired)
I he readings in The Soviet Art of Vfar span the development of military thinking in the Soviet Union from the October Revolution into the 1980s. The contributors are senior military officers or their civilian equivalents; the Papers are arranged chronologically and excerpted to limit the scope to Soviet doctrine, operational art, and tactics. The editors provide on most an introduction, biographical sum- ntary, and concluding commentary.
I hey divide Soviet military theory into *lx Periods: The early development of Soviet thought, 1917-1941; the Great Patriotic War and the last years of Sta- hn, 1941-53; the revolution in military affairs, 1953-59: the strategic nuclear buildup, 1960-68; development of a controlled conflict capability. 1969-73: and the opening era of power projection. 1974-80.
In Soviet doctrine, naval forces are V|tal to protect overseas possessions and sea communications with the outside world. Only naval forces can protect their coastline from an enemy assault landing, and only they can support •heir own troops in landings on a hos- t'le shore, rendering significant aid to the army. No area of armed conflict exists in which one service can fight alone. Even in ocean theaters, other services provide needed assistance, fhe tendency to place increasing numbers of strategic nuclear forces at sea greatly complicates the navy's role. Military science has the task of finding solutions to these new problems; the strategic use of the Soviet Navy regains within the framework of a unified strategy.
Doctrine governing Soviet air operations likewise falls within a unified strategy. The Soviets reject the theories of Italian General Giulio Douhet which form the basis for U. S. strategic air doctrine and an independent role for the air force, on the grounds that “absolute air supremacy is generally unattainable .... This concept of supremacy has been transplanted to the air force from the navy with totally inadequate justification.” (This apparently refers to the fact that Doublet's “command of the air” follows almost word for word Mahan’s "command of the sea” philosophy.) Supremacy cannot be achieved by aviation alone; it is impossible to keep the enemy from flying, nor is it necessary. Some independent air operations will be conducted by long-range aviation and naval forces but air combat operations are all integrated with the ground and naval arms in missions ranging from deep interdiction or reconnaissance to close-air support. Here again, Western readers should realize that the Soviet Union has never had a strategic air command in the British or U. S. sense; they view it as uneconomical and militarily unjustified.
Nuclear weapons invalidated many former principles of war: strategy's role in achieving victory is many times greater than in the past. The increased scope of combat operations made the military art broader, richer, and more complex. Nuclear weapons will be a decisive factor in a future war by inflicting devastating strikes upon the enemy “during the initial period of the war"—but this does not include first use. A possible short conventional phase is not ruled out. The Soviet concept of nuclear weapons in a theater war differs from NATO strategy in both targeting and use, but the difference may be largely a lack of sophistication in Soviet thought.
While undoubtedly impressive, the Soviet system obviously has limitations. It is difficult to derive modern military doctrine from the archaic political-economic dogmas of Marxism- Leninism. The ruthless execution of the entire upper structure of the Soviet armed forces in the great Stalinist purges of 1937-38 included most of the authors of that era quoted in The Soviet Art of War. Such coercion tends to influence the military thought of both the survivors and the successors toward total adherence to Party views— whether of the Stalin. Khrushchev, or Brezhnev eras. When only one point of view on policy is permitted, statements by military leaders tend to be broad, bland, and noncontroversial.
The historical examples the editors use are not developed in detail; the discussion is too general. Senior Soviet officers participating in strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) were generally narrow and less sophisticated; their secretiveness in preventing their own civilian officials from looking inside the military structure was quite apparent. Notwithstanding. The Soviet Art of War will he of great value to the general reader and to the specialist who is seeking to know the enemy.
Captain Schratz graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1939 and established a distinguished record in the submarine force during his naval career. With a Ph.D. from Ohio State University, Dr. Schratz is widely known as a writer on foreign policy and national security affairs. He retired as a professor at Georgetown University in 1981 and is currently writing a book on military strategy.
Yellow Rain: A Journey Through the Terror of Chemical Warfare
Sterling Seagrave. New York: M. Evans and Company. Inc.. Distributed by E. P. Dutton and Company, 1981. 296 pp.
Bib. Ind. $11.95 ($10.75).
Reviewed bv Colonel Charles II. Bay,
U. S. Army (Chemical Corps)
Anyone interested in learning more about Soviet duplicity and the use of chemical weapons and toxins in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia will approach this book with considerable interest; they are apt to come away greatly vexed.
The author, a free-lance American journalist, was instrumental in bringing to the public's attention the Soviet-developed horror which has come to be known as “yellow rain.” Sea- grave's personal involvement literally began with a suitcase containing a leg
bone from Laos. From this highly unusual beginning, he found himself caught up in a complex enigma on which, to his credit, he refused to give up. Solving the riddle took four years, extensive foreign travel, interviews, and examination of documents, which he relates in a highly readable, journalistic style.
His well-documented conclusions should be of grave concern to all those responsible for, or simply interested in, national security. Hopefully, objective arms control advocates in particular will feel compelled to do some serious soul searching. Seagrave convincingly finds the Soviets guilty of doing what is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlaws the use of chemical, biological, and other poison weapons, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which forbids production or transfer of any biological or toxic weapons. According to his findings, the Soviets provided the chemical agents and toxins which are still being used with great effect by the Vietnamese under Soviet supervision in Laos and Cambodia. The Soviets have used the same weapons themselves in Afghanistan. While our knowledge of Soviet use of toxins may be fairly new, Seagrave documents the fact that they have been using them for years. In the 1960s. they employed them in border clashes with the
Chinese, and Soviet pilots delivered them onto royalist targets in the Egypt/ Yemen war. They have even prepositioned these weapons in Cuba and used them to assassinate defectors.
However, this damning indictment comprises less than half the book. The remainder purports to be a journey through the history of chemical weapons and chemical warfare and of related U. S. policy and actions. But caveat emptor! Seagrave lets his professionalism get away from him and his investigative and reporting skills run amok, unfortunately for the readers, because there are some interesting factual details throughout these portions of the book. However, unwitting readers will not be able to separate fact from fiction.
Seagrave relates as fact nearly every myth and false rumor that has ever been uttered about U. S. activities and even originates a number of his own. There is no evidence that he made any attempt to contact civilian or military U. S. Government officials in a position to refute his charges. However, he did seek out a number of longstanding civilian opponents of U. S. policy and programs, apparently accepting their assertions without challenge.
One wonders why Seagrave would put his name to such an unbalanced and unfactual presentation. He may have felt he had to be equally critical of the United States and the Soviet Union to give his book greater credence and wider acceptability; actually, the effect will be just the opposite with knowledgeable readers. He may have become sloppy in these portions of the book because of the availability of information on U. S. programs as compared with the exhausting and frequently dangerous legwork to unearth firsthand knowledge of events in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Much of the information published on U. S. activities is highly sensationalized, often biased, and incomplete. Seagrave seems to have formed many of his opinions from reading The New York Times from 1968 to 1980.
Another reason for his willingness to accept so much unsubstantiated nonsense may be the contempt in which he apparently holds the U. S. defense establishment, and the U. S. Army Chemical Corps in particular. He implies that they are as deceitful as their Soviet counterparts and as ready to violate law and international treaties. Sadly, such blather is typical of the emotionalism which has plagued efforts to deal with these problems.
In November 1981, Seagrave testified before a congressional subcommittee attempting to ascertain whether or not chemical and toxic weapons were being used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. In response to the reluctance of an earlier “expert” witness. Dr. Matthew Meselson, to even consider such a possibility because it had not been clinically proven beyond any doubt—Seagrave said that although he respects Meselson's intellect and scientific training, “I think I would go elsewhere.” Similarly, Seagrave's book may be consulted for answers to the question before the subcommittee, but beyond that readers should go elsewhere.
Colonel Bay is Chief. Maritime/United Nations Negotiations Division, Deputy Directorate for International Negotiations. Plans, and Policy Directorate in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back
Henry Hurt. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1981. 301 pp. $13.95 ($12.55).
Reviewed by Hunter Alexander
During the 1960s and half of the 1970s, Nick Shadrin was one of the U. S. experts on the Soviet buildup of sea power. Shadrin had been the captain of a Soviet Navy destroyer before he defected to the United States in 1959. In 1975, Shadrin vanished in Vienna, Austria. Only a few of this mysterious man's secrets are revealed in Shadrin.
After his defection, the Soviets tried Shadrin (born Nikolai Artamonov) in absentia and condemned him to death.
Shadrin entered the spy business in 1%6. He proved to be invaluable to U- S. intelligence analysts because he knew the Soviet Navy's strengths and Weaknesses. He was approached by the State Security Committee (KGB) operatives. At the request of U. S. of- hcials, he signed up as a Soviet agent and began feeding his KGB spymas- ters FBI-supplied information about “• S. intelligence methods, much of 11 true but harmless to gain the KGB's confidence, and some of it false and misleading.
On 20 December 1975, while osten- stbly on a skiing vacation in Austria with his wife, Ewa, Shadrin had a Prearranged meeting with two KGB officers on the steps of a church in Vienna. He never came back. At Ewa’s msistence, Washington repeatedly asked Moscow about Shadrin’s fate. President Gerald Ford sent an inquiry to Leonid Brezhnev, who replied vaguely that the Soviets had not kidnapped Shadrin. U. S. officials told reporters that Shadrin was probably dead or in a Soviet prison. In response to suggestions of U. S. bungling, some officials even suggested that Shadrin had been a Soviet plant, a triple agent, and his disappearance was the Soviets way of bringing him in from the cold.
Shadrin also gets into the seamy side ol the case. In 1966, a KGB agent known as Igor was posted as a diplomat to the Soviet embassy in Wash- lr>gton. In an extraordinarily direct way, he phoned the home of the CIA director. Igor offered to become a double agent who would burrow deeply into the Soviet espionage network and Pass secrets to the United States.
Igor told the Americans that he could Possibly obtain a higher post within the KGB, but only if he could recruit Shadrin as a Soviet agent. (Shadrin Was never told about Igor). Though suspicious, U. S. intelligence officials decided to help. Thus, even before the KGB got in touch with Shadrin, he had been persuaded by U. S. officials to become a double agent.
Just why U. S. intelligence allowed Shadrin to walk into an apparent KGB trap in Vienna nine years later is still a mystery. Ewa, who is now a well-established dentist in McLean. Virginia, near Washington, D. C., believes that, despite official denials, Shadrin was set up and sacrificed as part of a larger 'ntelligence operation.
Hurt’s book should have been called hhc Search for Nick Shadrin. The conclusion could have been that Nick Shadrin of McLean. Virginia, has certainly disappeared, but that Nikolai Artamonov, captain third rank, may still be with us. He may be at work in Moscow. He may be hiding in Mit- teleuropa making a good living as a buyer and seller of intelligence to the highest bidder.
Maybe Hurt has begun to unravel the mystery of Shadrin/Artamonov.
Mr. Alexander is the Washington correspondent for the telecommunications trade journals Interconnect and Regulation News.
Peter the Great, His Life and World
Robert K. Massie. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.. 1980. 928 pp. Ulus. Maps. $9.95 ($8.95). $14.95 ($13.45) (paper).
Reviewed by Commander Kenneth Levin, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Robert Massie’s extraordinary book describes Peter the Great, Tsar ot Russia during the late 17th and early 18th centuries, a time when superpowers peaked and waned as intrigues erupted into wars or settled into liaisons. England and France were flexing national muscles: Sweden and Poland were about to experience dizzying falls; the Ottoman Empire controlled the East: Holland's mercantile empire spanned the globe. And Russia, as typified by 17th century Moscow, slumbered in medieval somnolence.
Peter was born into this Old Muscovy, a fertile bed for his iconoclastic personality. Young Peter ignored the trappings of Muscovite court life. Instead, his attention focused on things military, nautical, and technical. As he succeeded to the tsardom. his interest in these areas intensified. Ignoring the xenophobic traditions of his predecessors, Peter sought the company of foreigners and set out on the Great Embassy of 1697-1698. Traveling incognito, the monarch studied the West, enlisting foreign expertise and talent.
As his new Russia entered adolescence, Peter forced a major military modernization and fought a 20-year war with Sweden. With Sweden's defeat, Russia matured into a major military power. The changes within Russia were as dramatic as those without. Medieval Old Muscovy was gone; traditionalist attempts to revert to the old ways after Peter’s death would fail.
Massie portrays Peter as the father of the Russian seafaring tradition. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, in his Red Star Rising at Sea (Naval Institute Press, 1974), gives that credit to Oleg ten centuries earlier and Ivan the Terrible. However, Peter did bring Russian seafaring into the modern age. giving birth to the powerful Soviet fleets of today. While on the Great Embassy, Peter collected the skills needed to allow expansion onto the sea. Naively combining ground and sea tactics—his best Russian admiral was an army general—Peter defeated Sweden. Using such innovative techniques as amphibious coastal hopping and a combination of large ships of the line and numerous small galleys, Peter's navy became a precursor of the U. S. Navy's high-low fleets.
If Massie's objective was to portray Peter the Great as a visionary statesman and ruler, he failed. If his objective was to portray the tsar as a human being, he has done an admirable job.
Peter the Great was an exceptionally curious and inquisitive person. Fascinated by technology, science, and crafts, he was easily bored by protocol. tradition, the arts, and literature. He was enamored with the West, especially the Dutch and English. He was obsessed with the sea and the military. As a child, he played with soldiers—not toy soldiers, but live guards and playmates that were drilled and exercised in mock combat given the realism of live shot, powder, and casualties. As a man. he played with armies and nations.
Despite his reign's magnificent accomplishments, Peter appears to have been imperious and spoiled, pursuing his fancies with little regard to the incidental consequences of his whims. For example, the oppression of the lower classes and peasants as a side effect of the taxation and conscription required to build St. Petersburg was devastating but did not merit much attention from Peter. Similarly, Massie does not devote much attention to Russian people beneath the aristocracy.
Peter's concern, if any, for the Russian people's welfare was overshadowed by his desire to satisfy his curiosity . Thegood his endeavors brought Russia may have been less the efforts of a farsighted visionary than those of a self-serving adolescent. For instance. the birth of a modern shipbuilding industry is portrayed as a re-
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suit of emulating all things Dutch and English. The development of a major navy and modern army was an extension of a child’s toy boat and playtime soldiers. The establishment of a public hospital was not out of a desire to aid the sick, but rather to provide a place to put unsightly beggars. To ascribe the changes that occurred in Russia and its military victories to Peter’s visionary expertise and political skills does not fit with the portrait that Mas- sie paints.
Peter firmly believed that the ends justified the means. He pursued his hobbies and fancies and. as a result, brought Russia out of its medieval stupor. The power that Peter wielded is often difficult for us to grasp.
Massie—best known for his work Nicholas and Alexandra (Dell Publishing Company, 1967)—has combined thoroughness and accuracy with a storyteller's flair for the dramatic to produce a readable, reliable reference that will enhance any library. For a historian, he shows a rare consideration for his readers; the times and characters come alive. He constantly reintroduces major personalities—a necessity in the morass of Russian
names and foreign rulers distinguishable only by Roman numerals. His treatment of Charles XII of Sweden, the tsar's nemesis, is exceptionally well done. ,
However, Peter the Great requires endurance. It is so thorough that a reader may find it tedious in spots. The reader may get numbed by the sheer size of the events and power of the characters. Descriptions of battles of hundreds of thousands of men, brutal hangings, and campaigns that took years to accomplish are so commonplace that their impact is lost.
If one reads Peter the Great to learn of late 17th and early 18th century Russia, its tsar, and his friends and foes, no finer work exists. If one reads Peter the Great as a student of naval and military history, one’s efforts would probably be better spent in other areas. Peter the Great has too much else to offer.
Commander Levin was commissioned in 1966 and is a graduate of Washington University, the Naval Postgraduate School, Destroyer School, and nuclear power training. Prior to his disability retirement in 1981. he served as the Special Assistant for Plans and Policies to the Commander. Naval Sea Systems Command.
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Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
Naval affairs
Aircraft of the Royal Navy
Paul EUis. London and Boston, MA.: Jane's yblishing Company, 1982. 176 pp. Ulus. Ind.
^17.95 ($16.15).
British Naval Aircraft Since 1912
Owen Thetford. London and Boston, MA.: Puinam, 1958. 1978. 480 pp. lllus. Append.
Ind. $23.95 ($21.55).
Thetford's history of the Royal Navy's air <irrn has been recognized as a standard s°urce for more than 20 years. Now in an updated fourth edition, it surveys every a,rcraft flown by the Royal Navy since the Establishment of the Navy Air Assistant to the Admiralty in 1912. The bulk of the text ls on alphabetical listing of aircraft accompanied by technical descriptions of each A/^ un illustration. Aircraft of the Royal A'ui’v covers some of the same material in a strnilar format but concentrates on 120 Particular aircraft that have made a signif- lcant contribution to aviation.
l-ast Call for HMS Edinburgh. A Story of ,he Russian Convoys
I nink Pearce. New York: Atheneum. 1982.
-°° pp. lllus. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
jn April 1942. the Royal Navy cruiser Edin- was escorting a Murmansk convoy bast the North Cape when she was torpedoed by a German submarine. Crippled, she became a target for repeated attacks hom both air and surface units. Through- °ut the battle her crew had to contend not (,nly with the enemy but with 30-foot seas and -3()° temperatures. When the Edin- >llrfth went down on 2 May, she took £45 Million in gold bullion with her. In 1981. the greater part of that shipment of Soviet gold was recovered in a highly publicized salvage operation. But this book is about VVar. not salvage. The author, a veteran of [he Soviet convoys, emphasizes the terrible conditions of the Murmansk run and 'he courage of the sailors who made it.
* he Military-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union
flavin R. Jones. Editor. Gulf Breeze. FL.: Academic International Press. 1981. $31.50 per v°lume ($28.35).
Three volumes of this ambitious undertak- lr|g have appeared. The entries are very detailed, suggesting that the final collection "'ill comprise many volumes. Some of the entries are quite lengthy, constituting a major contribution to the subject. Each entry is accompanied by a bibliography of both Soviet and English sources. Future volumes may be obtained by subscription from the publisher as they appear.
Naval Armament
Doug Richardson. London and New York: Jane's Publishing Company. 1981. 144 pp. lllus. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
The data in this reference book are updated from Jane’s Pocket Book of Naval Armament (1976). Weapons are grouped by type and country of origin. Systems covered included strategic, antiship, and surface-to-air missiles as well as naval guns, torpedoes, and antisubmarine weapons.
Soviet Naval Developments, 2nd Edition
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Annapolis. MD.: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company. 1981. 138 pp. lllus. Append. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
The text of this illustrated survey of the Soviet Navy was originally printed as a Department of Defense booklet. The publishers of this revised edition have added some new photographs and a foreword by Norman Polmar and encased il in a handsome hardcover binding.
Sill. S. Destroyers, An Illustrated Design History
Norman Friedman. Annapolis. MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 489 pp. lllus. Tables.
Ind. $46.95 ($37.56).
The subtitle of this handsome volume informs the reader that this is a design history and not an account ofv destroyer operations. But it is far more than just a design history: it focuses on the various forces— political, strategic, and bureaucratic, tts well as technological—that helped determine changes in destroyer design since the beginning of the 20th century. En route. Friedman tells us a great deal about the changing concept of the destroyer's mission and about the feuds within the Bureau of Ships (BuShips) and the Navy which are generally about sacrificing endurance for speed or hitting power for endurance. We learn a great deal about destroyers, and also about how design decisions are made.
Political scientists, as well tts historians, will find a wealth of insight in this detailed history of U. S. destroyers.
Warships of the Soviet Navy
John E. Moore. London and Boston. MA.: Jane's Publishing Company. 1981. 192 pp. lllus. Gloss. Ind. £8.95 Approx. $19.50 (S17.5 5 v).
Employing the format of the longer .lane's publications, this well-illustrated guide breaks down Soviet warships by type, describing each in a brief paragraph or two and then supplying the raw data of size, armament, propulsion, and other technical information. A brief introduction by Captain Moore surveys the history of the Rus- sian/Soviet Navy.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
Jane's Freight Containers, 1982: 14th Edition
Patrick Finlay. London and Boston, MA.: Jane's Publishing Company. 1982. M2 pp. lllus. $140.00 ($126.00).
In addition to an up-to-date survey ot ship tainer ships, this comprehensive yearbook examines developments in port facilities and inland transport as well as terminals capable of integrating air. sea. rail, and truck container transport. Convenient tabs direct the reader to sections on ports, operators. leasing, rail. air. international standards, and future trends such as ultrashallow draft cargo vessels, container silo systems, and amphibious trucks for offloading.
Jane’s Merchant Ships, 1981-1982
R. A. Streater and D. Greenman. London and Boston, MA.: Jane's Publishing Company.
1982. 1.046 pp. lllus. Append. Ind. SI40.00 ($126.00).
Since the 1930s. the standard reference guide for the identification of merchant ships has been Talbot-Booth's Merchant Ships (Nichols Publishers. 1978). With this volume. Jane's brings Talbot-Booth's work up to date, retaining the Talbot-Booth recognition system. To aid in rapid identification, ships are grouped according to their profile, the sequence of features on the superstructure. and hull form. All merchant ship types are illustrated in profile drawings.
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MILITARY AFFAIRS
A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare
Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman. New York: Hill and Wang. 1982. 274 pp. lllus. Notes. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
This well-written account of the history and current stale of the art of chemical and biological warfare is both gripping and informative. The book opens with a vivid account of the German use of chlorine gas at Ypres in 1915 and then traces the history of chemical and biological weapons through both world wars to the present. The current scope of such weapons is infinitely more sophisticated and. according to the authors, future weapons might include genetic, and even "ethnic" substances designed to kill only humans of a particular racial stock.
The Presidio Concise Guide to Soviet Military Aircraft
Bill Sweetman. Novato. CA.: The Presidio Press. 1981.207 pp. lllus. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
This well-illustrated guide examines 55 Soviet aircraft, including those developed for export. Each airplane is discussed in a brief "history and notes" section and is illustrated with both photographs and color drawings. The more important planes, like the MiG-25 “Foxbat" and Su-7 "Fitter." are also portrayed in detailed cross-sectional drawings. The text also offers an analysis of likely trends in Soviet aviation in the 1980s.
Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine:
The Quest for Superiority
Mark E. Miller. Bethesda. MD.: Advanced International Studies Institute (in conjunction with theUniversity of Miami). 1982. 298 pp. Append. Ind. $9.95 ($8.95). $14.95 ($13.45) (paper).
This study by a senior analyst at the Advanced International Studies Institute (A1S1) at the University of Miami is part of a continuing series of monographs on Soviet strategy published by A1SI. Earlier volumes concerned Soviet civil defense. Soviet strategy in the Middle East, and Soviet nuclear strategy. This study speculates about the intentions behind the Soviet arms buildup—especially in the last five years. It concludes that the Soviet buildup has been "governed by a rational plan for fighting and winning a nuclear war. . . ."
The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose & Military Means
Robert W. Clauson and Lawrence S. Kaplan. Editors. Wilmington, LJE.: Scholarly Resources. Inc.. 1982. 297 pp. Tables. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95). $9.95 ($8.95) (paper).
I he essays in this volume were originally presented as papers at a conference on the Warsaw Pact held at Kent State University in April 1981. Both the conference and this volume were intended to complement the earlier meeting on NATO After Thirty Years (Scholarly Research. Inc.. 1981). This new' volume contains essays on the questionable reliability of Warsaw Pact armies in an East-West confrontation, analyses of the armies, their weapons and doctrine, and their capabilities as well as speculations about the future.
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