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In the conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the Royal Navy’s strategy and operations provide an excellent example of a maneuver-oriented naval doctrine. While successful in the South Atlantic and very popular with armchair strategists and military reformers, maneuver warfare’s place in the U. S. Navy—if it has one—has yet to be defined.
Attracted by a view of history that provides many examples of victorious land campaigns by smaller and presumably cheaper armies, a growing number of influential defense critics advocate a combat doctrine oriented toward maneuver warfare.1 Some of the critics have expressed the concern that, since U. S. military power is no longer supreme, doctrine cultivated around “attrition warfare” is no longer realistic. Overwhelming the Soviets in men, material, and weapon systems is not affordable in resource or social costs. Moreover, many defense analysts argue that more seems to be spent for less capability. Fears are heightened by the assessment that deterrence is being undermined, and that “if war came tomorrow, the United States would lose.”-
Most of the attention devoted to the debate over doctrine has been focused upon the land battle in Europe. But now that the U. S. Navy no longer holds a clear margin of superiority, naval strategy has been included in this doctrinal debate. What are attrition and maneuver warfares; does either concept have relevance to naval doctrine? Is maneuver-oriented doctrine a path to naval superiority?
Attrition Warfare: Dr. Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow in strategic studies at Georgetown University CSIS, describes attrition as war “in which the important command decisions are in fact logistic decisions .... The enemy is treated as a mere inventory of targets and warfare is a matter of mustering superior resources to destroy his forces by sheer firepower and weight of material.”1 The aim is to
destroy an enemy’s will to fight by directly destroy- ln8 his means. The essence of attrition warfare is to create and exploit:
^ Destructive power
' Protection to minimize the destruction suffered from enemy power
Mobility to rapidly focus destructive power or avoid {he enemy’s power.4
' he doctrine can be summarized as strength against strength. The payoff, according to critics, is widespread destruction as a basis to break the enemy’s VVl|l and, in land warfare, to seize and hold terrain objectives. In attrition warfare, exchange ratios and residual capacity become measures of success.
The trench warfare of World War I is a definitive Sample of pure attrition warfare. Offensive actions were conducted on wide fronts against points of strong resistance. Defenses were organized into depth °y successive belts of fortified terrain. The result was stagnation and enormous expenditure of resources since advances were along paths of hardened resistance. Huge armies, massed firepower, ar>d enormous logistics needs, supported through a farrow network, suppressed mobility and surprise. Success in World War I depended directly upon the amount of resources available and the ability to bring these resources to bear.
World War II also had examples of attrition war- tare. Indeed, the success of the Allies is often argued to have depended directly upon the industrial might— Production capability and technology base—of the United States. Success in the Atlantic campaign, for Sample, was measured in the number of men and aniounts of weapons and supplies that reached Eu- ,0pe. The best example of attrition warfare, how- cveri was Russian campaign; the vastness of niilitary resources committed to the war in the West and the losses suffered pale in comparison to that e*pended on the Eastern Front. Given adequate time to mobilize today, the United States could probably achieve the required industrial output to support attrition doctrine against the Soviet Union. The acCePtance of the resultant losses, however, would be another issue.
^ Critique of Attrition Doctrine and Models: The slaughter associated with modern attrition warfare 's often the primary criticism of attrition doctrine, “tit the enormous losses to be suffered are the result °f doctrinal problems that modern technology amplifies. According to Colonel John Boyd, U. S. Air force (Retired), a maneuver warfare proponent, the concept of attrition warfare is in accord with and suffers from some of the same problems as Clau- sewitzian doctrine. Karl von Clausewitz’s strategy tor war was to “render the enemy powerless’’ by: * Exhausting the enemy by influencing him to inCrease his expenditure of effort
►Seeking out “centers of gravity"—points upon which all power and movement depend—and, if possible, tracing them back to a single one
► Compressing all effort against those centers into the fewest possible actions
► Subordinating all secondary actions as much as possible
► Moving with the utmost speed
► Seeking the decisive battle (with superiority of numbers and conditions) that will promise victory.5
Colonel Boyd criticizes this strategy as overemphasizing “decisive battle” and underemphasizing strategic maneuver. While Clausewitz would exhaust an adversary by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort, his strategy ignores the idea of paralyzing an adversary by denying him the opportunity to expend effort. Clausewitz concluded that since “a center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely, . . . this is the place where force must be concentrated and where the decision should be reached.” This focus upon the adversary’s points of strength ignores the possibility that vulnerable centers of gravity can be found. It also ignores the idea of generating many noncooperative centers of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yet critical, connections that permit a center of gravity to exist.h
Clausewitzian strategy and attrition doctrine also emphasize method and routine at the tactical level. Clausewitz was concerned with reducing the “fog"— uncertainty—and “friction”—interaction of many factors which impede activity—of war. However, he failed to sufficiently address the idea of magnifying the adversary’s fog and friction.
Clausewitz did, however, consider friction to be the central factor that distinguished real war from theoretical analyses. The existence of friction meant war is not a deterministic process: "no otheractivity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance.” In contrast, campaign analysis, which emphasizes exchange ratios (attrition doctrine) treats war as an inanimate interaction between mechanical forces that act and react predictably—precise lethality, survivability, and patterns of combat interactions. The starting size of the opposing forces and their weapons’ lethality determine the outcome.
The usefulness of attrition models is limited by the unpredictable, thus unquantifiable, elements of human behavior and chance. The impact of surprise, confusion, ambiguity, and fear are ignored. Some critics caution against the influence such models have on our perceptions and decisions. Weapons of increasing complexity and cost can be easily justified by predicting high lethality and survivability.
Apart from its shortcomings, attrition doctrine can enhance deterrence. If sufficient forces exist to successfully support attrition warfare, a perceived capability exists to inflict unacceptable cost on an adversary regardless of how inefficiently that capacity
is employed. Without sufficient forces, however, deterrence becomes less credible; the outcome according to campaign analysis is unfavorable.
Maneuver Warfare: To some, maneuver warfare is simply flanking actions which hit an adversary at a point where he is not optimally deployed. Then, while the enemy is maneuvering to respond, overwhelming pressure is applied to successive elements of his force until he is destroyed. “Crossing-the- tee” and Nelson's destruction of the French Fleet at Trafalgar are often offered as two naval examples.7 This, however, is just a maneuver tactic to increase attrition capability. Maneuver warfare is more than maneuverability. Maneuver warfare involves maneuvering the enemy rather than just maneuvering to the enemy.
The aim of the maneuver warfare, according to Colonel Boyd, is to “generate many noncooperative centers of gravity and magnify an adversary's friction (in a mental as well as a physical sense) as a basis to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse.’’8 His maneuver doctrine depends on the ability to create, exploit, and magnify ambiguity, ambivalence, deception, fast transient maneuvers, and strength against those features that permit an organization to exist as a warfighting entity. Ambiguity, ambivalence, deception, and mobility are used to generate surprise and shock. Firepower and movement are used to divert an adversary’s attention and drain his strength, in order to expose as well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses elsewhere. Paralysis, not annihilation, is the goal.
The focus of maneuver warfare is on the adversary’s organization as a whole (the man and the machine) and his ability to conduct war. rather than “head-to-head” capability, as in attrition warfare. Shock and surprise are critical. Colonel Boyd's concept emphasizes the ability to “operate inside the adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops ... to create a tangle of threatening events as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events an adversary observes, or anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive.’"’' An adversary is thereby pushed beyond his ability to adapt or endure; he can neither divine true intentions, nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive maneuver as it paralyzes and fragments him. Indications of success tend to
As the most vocal proponent of maneuver warfare, retired Colonel John Boyd, U. S. Air Force, offers an alternative to the slaughterhouse mentality of attrition warfare.
be qualitative and are related to the widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent envelopments, high prisoner counts, or any other phenomena that suggest inability to adapt to change.
In the history of land warfare, skillful maneuver strategy has frequently overcome superior numbers. The German blitzkriegs of World War II and the Israeli encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War are modern examples.
A Critique of Maneuver Doetrine: Maneuver warfare is a theoretically low-cost, high-payoff strategy; but, if it fails, combat inferiority can be magnified. If the maneuver becomes stalled, sufficient attention is not diverted, or centers of gravity prove more durable than anticipated, the result is attrition without the benefit of attrition defense, in other words, a rout!
Because maneuver doctrine is both high payoff and high risk, its effect upon deterrence is also uncertain. If an adversary is unsure of his ability to protect his weak points or counter the ambiguity, ambivalence, and deception of a small force structured for maneuver, deterrence is enhanced. If. however, an adversary feels his surveillance and cohesion are sufficiently reliable and durable, deterrence can be weakened by maneuver doctrine. In real life, the latter perception usually holds. Indeed, the concept of maneuver seems to assume that the adversary overestimates his capabilities.
to
War at sea is not as clear-cut.
A defensive posture based on maneuver must al- °w tor initial loss of territory while diverting an at vcrsary’s attention and holding against his strength, s° that the main effort can be focused through his ^akness. The political constraints of a defensive cl llance, however, may run counter to this doctrine. CsPccially if loss of territory is certain and success Is not. Accepting the initial loss of allied territory er|ds to undermine alliance solidarity.
Measuring the demand for forces required to sup- P?rt maneuver strategy may lead to another risk. Maneuver doctrine stresses the qualitative effects warfare, which arc difficult to measure in cam- f^'gn analyses. Programming resources to match • la*egy depends more directly upon subjective A'dgment. In a political situation in which resources J'c c°nstrained and competing social demands comP 'cate the ability to match the military threat, overly pptirnistic judgments may be made, resulting in force CVe,s which, in the crucible of war, support neither Maneuver nor attrition warfare.
Although these criticisms of maneuver doctrine re generally recognized. Colonel Boyd’s narrow c°ncept has even greater limitations. Destruction of ‘,n adversary’s ability to organize could result from actions that do not depend upon generating ambi- ®Ulty. ambivalence, and deception to increase fric- t'°n. For example, the Spanish decision to configure c'r Armada for infantry battles at sea (high forc- Castles and poop decks with short-range guns to 1 low embarked troops to fire down onto an enemy’s Ccks once alongside) led to their demise. The Eng 'sh countered this plan by not going alongside and ; anding off with long-range cannon. The Spanish 'nubility to engage the English in their preferred Combat mode forced their fateful decision to evade oo English fleet by sailing north.
Another limitation is that the opportunity to gen- Ctite many noncooperative centers of gravity, by "king at vulnerable links, might not always be Possible. Moreover, many centers of gravity are found note mass is concentrated (though maybe not all tls Clausewitz concluded). Strength against strength niay be the only option. Indeed, if a single node l!P°n which all power and movement depend can be '^covered, its destruction may require less effort and cause greater paralysis.10
Maneuver Doctrine and Naval Warfare: Maneuver warfare is often synonymous with amphibious ^Airfare. Inchon in the Korean War is one example.
_ e sea was used as an “extension of land” to by- pJss strength and strike weakness at an unexpected P°mt, while the attention of the adversary was diverted elsewhere. Beyond amphibious warfare, owever, applying the concept of maneuver warfare
Some of the aspects of the Reformist maneuver- oriented doctrine are integral elements of current principles of naval warfare. Ambiguity, ambivalence, and deception facilitate the application of the principles of mass, the offensive, surprise, and economy of force. Centers of gravity can be made less cooperative, and friction and fog can be increased. On the tactical level, however, paralysis can at most be temporary. In the end, destructive force must be brought to bear on individual platforms to destroy the group’s capacity to function.
There are basically five reasons why maneuver warfare does not fully apply to a naval battle:
► Naval platforms are relatively independent centers of gravity. Destroying the links between them can degrade force effectiveness through loss of mutual support, but it cannot destroy their individual ability to exist or function for the engagement.
► Unit cohesion is not as fragile. Requirements for cohesion are less and the conditions which foster cohesion are greater on board a ship than in an army unit on land.
► Strength and weakness are essentially colocated. Defenses are not as fixed to a geographical front as in land battle; defenses arc more all-aspect. Paths of least resistance do not necessarily exist.
► A naval engagement is more variable than a land battle aligned along a geographical front. Naval groups are not “tied" to protecting territory while advancing to gain more. Envelopment does not hold the same decisive advantage.
► The aim of naval engagement is not to occupy, but to control territory. Success is achieved when the adversary is sunk or withdraws.
■ On an expanded view beyond the tactical level, maneuver warfare as defined by Colonel Boyd may have some application for naval doctrine. Within a theater of operations, individual naval groups are each dependent to a certain extent on a number of external connections, e.g., command and control, surveillance, and logistics. Each link is potentially vulnerable to capture or destruction. If the loss of one, or a combination of these links, would negate the usefulness of a naval group for a time, the opportunity exists for maneuver warfare. This opportunity is even more realistic if the adversary has a penchant for highly centralized control and attrition warfare, as does the Soviet Union.
The focus is on the whole of an adversary’s naval power in a theater—“the organization.” If by creating ambiguity, ambivalence, and deception, mal- deployment is the result, and, if by striking unexpectedly at links, noncooperative centers of gravity are created and friction is magnified, then the cohesion of the organization may be shattered and paralysis may ensue. The Soviet theater commander and his superiors may be pushed beyond their ability to adapt or endure, so that they can neither perceive nor focus their forces in time to cope with the decisive strike. The application of maneuver warfare, however, would be wider if the concept was more robust.
guished. The history of war contains a number of examples of both attrition and maneuver. Many battles and campaigns, however, do not neatly fit either definition. In fact, some battles can only be analyzed as far as doctrine is concerned in an historical perspective: one side employs a tactic and the other side responds. The result will be defined as either maneuver or attrition warfare depending upon the response. Does the tactic paralyze the enemy or did the battle have to be carried through a total destruc-
The Distinction between Maneuver and Attrition '. The debate over doctrine has been conducted in such a manner as to imply that attrition and maneuver concepts are mutually exclusive. As they are defined—one aims for paralysis and the other destruction—they are. But war is not so easily distin-
|'0n ■ Moreover, types of warfare can be either. 'Tombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail was attrition, but he Pacific submarine campaign against the Japanese sea lines of communication was strategically maneuver. What is mine warfare? To be successful, doctrine must be robust enough to incorporate all ^filiations—to paralyze an enemy when the option ls available or destroy him when it is not.
^ Where attrition strives to break an adversary by exhaustion through influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort (i.e., wear him down), maneuver strives to break an adversary by denying him he opportunity to expend effort (i.e., control him), he distinction is one of intent. In other words, vvhich doctrine pertains rests more on how forces arP used rather than how they are constructed. If fififics, for example, are used to slow an adversary 01 to focus or block his movement in order to achieve suPeriority, mine warfare is maneuver. If mines are fixed to wear down an enemy, it is attrition. In the °rmer, mine warfare is a means; in the latter it is an end.
Naval doctrine is best designed to attain the war- 'ghting capabilities suitable for exploiting a strategy 'V'hch aims to deny an adversary the opportunity to eXpend effort—a more robust concept than the nar- lovvly defined maneuver doctrine. TTo do this, we Jfist be able to defeat an enemy’s navy. We can efeat the enemy by containing, controlling, or decoying him, depending upon how the situation de- v°lops. The ability to control an adversary’s use of naval forces involves a broader concept of maneu- Vcr'—generating noncooperative centers of gravity, lncreasing his friction, attacking his plans and alliances and/or destroying his key node. But where fiocessary, we must still be able to bring the required fipce to bear to destroy an adversary. By having a Nnvy sufficiently flexible to employ the best or a c°mbination of the above options, deterrence is greatly enhanced.
To support this broader concept of a warfighting 1 octrine requires a force that has the characteristics 'fiherent today in naval combatants; e.g., flexibility, Mobility, the ability to perform reconnaissance, con- eeal movements, hit and run, and focus massive "epower. Above all, the ability to deny the adverSary sufficient surveillance is key.
Comparing attrition warfare with maneuver war- fire may seem analogous to comparing a “toe-to- °e slugger” with a boxer who “floats like a butterfly fifiil stings like a bee.” While the slugger defends Wlth his left, he pounds with his right. The boxer, °n Ihe other hand, dances and jabs to confuse and ^fifir down his opponent; when the guard is dropped. fie bloodies his adversary with a stinging blow. But Vvfihout a knockout punch, all the floating and sting- Jng in the world may not achieve a quick end. The °Xer may wear his opponent down, but he cannot be assured that his opponent’s will will be broken; he must rely on points to win.
War is not decided on points; this is key to a broader concept of maneuver warfare, especially at the tactical level. Few commanders in history have surrendered without some knockout blows. Maneuver is a means to optimize economy of force and mass; it is a method to achieve combat superiority over a larger total force. But that smaller force must be capable of deploying the decisive blow, which may involve strength against localized strength. Maneuver warfare can involve some annihilation; the paralysis generated creates an environment to efficiently destroy an adversary’s means.
Navy Doctrine and the Future: Although our present naval doctrine is not limited to the narrow concepts of either attrition or maneuver, as advocated by some critics, we have the inherent flexibility to employ forces in support of either concept. However, the point that should be stressed is since the “litmus test” of maneuver versus attrition doctrine is intent, the type of forces involved is not the key. In one situation, a force using maneuver doctrine might consist of a single submarine. In another, a space platform might be the central element. In still another, it might be a force of multiple battle groups. Obviously, the appropriate force composition depends on the nature of the center(s) of gravity to be opposed. But structuring a Navy to fit too narrow a doctrine can be dangerous.
Maintaining those characteristics necessary to support a broad concept for war requires continuous attention. A reasoned view of the future indicates the current emphasis on new ideas, in addition to increasing force levels, will ensure that the Navy maintains its capability to support a flexible warfare doctrine. Some of the concepts now receiving emphasis include;
► A broadened distribution of offensive power, including wide adaptation of cruise missile and follow- on technologies
►A coordinated and integrated air and ocean surveillance system incorporating a range of platforms, vehicles, and sensors
►An expanded use of offensive and defensive electronic warfare with more emphasis on soft-kill mechanisms
►An integration of space capabilities into future naval warfare concepts
► Innovation in future platform design to include a vigorous evaluation of advanced hull forms, air frames, and propulsion systems to find ways to enhance weapon system employment.
These are just a few of the innovations that are under continuous evaluation by organizations such as the CNO’s Long Range Planning Group. Evolution has always been a hallmark of the Navy, and maintaining a Navy capable of supporting a broad maneuver doctrine is a long-term goal.
Conclusion: Maneuver warfare is the classical strategy of successful smaller land forces, hence it is attractive to some defense critics. As an efficient utilization of warfighting capability, it can be a naval strength. But it is also a high-risk strategy, which, if unsuccessful, can lead to total disaster. Deterrence and a warfighting strategy based solely on a narrow concept of maneuver may not be compatible. Moreover, it could potentially become an excuse to forego regaining a clear margin of naval superiority (or even maintaining parity), if accepted only for its positive aspects while its faults are ignored. The risks are even greater if the concept of maneuver is too narrow.
To be successful, doctrine must be robust enough to incorporate all situations—to paralyze an enemy when the option is available or destroy him when it is not.
By having a Navy sufficiently flexible to employ a broad concept of war, deterrence will be enhanced. The Navy does not require a radical new force structure, nor must it abandon its view of the future. The risk we must avoid is that generated by procuring or tailoring forces to fit too narrow a doctrine just as the Spanish Armada did four centuries ago.
'Most of these critics refer to themselves as members of the "Reformist Group.”
’Congressman Newt Gingrich. "We Must Meet the Soviet Challenge." 11 September. 1981. Congressional Record. 97th Congress, House of ReP" resentatives.
’Dr. Edward N. Luttwak. “The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance.” Air Force Journal. August. 1980.
JColonel John Boyd. USAF (Ret.), in his brief. "Patterns of Conflict. Boyd has become one of the military theorists of the Reformist Group. 'To link Clausewitz with the concept of attrition may seem to be an example of gross misinterpretation. Clausewitz eschewed doctrines which presume to provide a manual for action: principles are useful to bear in mind as supports but are not to be dogmatically applied. Some students of Clausewitz. however, have been practitioners of attrition warfare (as well as maneuver). Moreover. Clausewitz set one precept above all. "unity of conception, concentration of aim and force." His preference fora single concentrated attack is clear.
'’Since Clausewitz considered centers of gravity only at the highest level, i.e.. the Army, the Capital, or a principal ally, this criticism may be a little unfair. On a more limited tactical level, however, centers of gravity also exist within an army and its subordinate parts.
’Commander Linton Wells II, USN. "Maneuver in Naval Warfare.” Proceedings, December 1980.
“Colonel John Boyd. “Patterns of Conflict."
“Ibid.
"'Clausewitz observed that if the center of gravity was destroyed, other "actions" were a waste.
Commander Kelsey received his commission through the NROTC regular program, having been graduated from Oklahoma University in 1967. As a CNO Scholar, he received his master of arts degree from New College. Oxford, in 1976. His tours of duty include three light attack aviation squadrons (VA-23. VA-146, and VA-105), Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Five (VX-5). and the military faculty. National Defense University. He is currently serving as the political/military planner on the CNO’s Long Range Planning Group (OP-OOX).
Maneuvering in the Falklands
By Commander Robert J. Kelsey, U. S. Navy
While the military campaign in the Falklands offers much to study about the technologies of war and the future utility of surface navies, it also affords a good contrast in the maneuver and attrition warfighting doctrines, which are central to the debate generated by the congressional "military reform caucus.” The British strategy and operations provide an excellent example of a maneuver-oriented naval doctrine. They also illuminate some of the deficiencies of maneuver warfare.
The Argentine strategy, on the other hand, appears to have been basically attrition.
A naval doctrine which is oriented toward maneuver warfare, but which is also sufficiently robust when maneuver is not appropriate, is one which aims to destroy an adversary’s will by denying him the opportunity to expend effort. Depending upon how the situation develops, denying an adversary the opportunity to expend effort is accomplished by containing, controlling, or when necessary, destroying his means. Control is based upon maneuver warfare that aims to destroy an enemy’s ability to organize. Control is achieved by generating noncooperative centers of gravity (points upon which power and movement depend), increasing the enemy’s friction, attacking his plans/alliances, and/or destroying his key node(s).
Each of these elements—contain, control, and destroy—of a maneuver-oriented naval doctrine is interrelated. The ability to accomplish one can depend upon the success of another. Hence, matching specific British actions in the Falklands campaign to these elements implies a distinctness that does not clearly exist. Moreover, the distinction between attrition and maneuver doctrine is one of intent. As a result, one must often rely on circumstantial evidence to decide which concept was operative in the commander’s mind. An examination of the Falklands War, however, is useful to understanding a broad maneuver concept for war.
Contain: The British declaration of a 200-mile