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All mines wait, some more patiently than others. CAPTOR \v waiting period begins when it is anchored to the sea floor and ends when it acoustically detects a passing enemy submarine. We need to improve our hardware but, more important, we can’t wait much longer to correct our most glaring mine warfare weakness— ....................................................... our failure to train and develop mine warfare officers.
r H the Navy lacks the ability to lay mines in seas t or harbors and is also short of the personnel JL and equipment needed to counter enemy mining. The Navy would find it hard to conduct even the most limited type of mining or mine countermeasures operation.—16 June 1981 General Accounting Office report to Congress.
The U. S. Navy is no better prepared for mine warfare today than it was when it lost control of the seas to Korean minefields at Wonsan. In 1951, it took ten days longer than planned to sweep an assault channel at Wonsan. At the end of the Korean War, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, reflected:
“The main lesson of the Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future. Wonsan also taught us that we can be denied freedom of movement to an enemy objective through the intelligent use of mines by an alert foe.’’ (M. W. Cagle and F. A. Manson. The Sea War in Korea, Naval Institute Press, 1957, page 151.)
One wonders how Admiral Joy would react to the mine threat we face today: the Soviet Union has several hundred thousand extremely dependable and technologically advanced mines and, with its merchant navy alone, the capability to plant these mines in NATO’s sea lines of communication. What is the logic in attempting to move convoys and battle groups into any contested area if we are to encounter well- planned and executed minefields? Is it reasonable to expect to counter these mines with 25 Korean War-vintage ocean minesweepers (MSOs) and 21 helicopters? Why have we not learned the requirements for successful mine warfare which were apparent so long ago?
The reasons for the current poor state of U. S. mine warfare go well beyond lack of funds, priorities, and ships. In-service rivalry among the “unions,” mismanagement, and lack of planning and consistency by senior U. S. naval personnel are the root causes. Unlike other NATO and Warsaw Pact navies, the U. S. Navy does not have a trained cadre of mine warfare experts. There is no officer community born and bred to the mine warfare service. Mine warfare billets, ashore and afloat, are manned by officers from “other” warfare communities.
The manning of the Navy’s ocean minesweepers clearly demonstrates the problem of not having mine warfare experts. The commanding officers of the MSOs normally view their tours as early commands, as they pass from XO of a frigate (typical previous tour) to CO of a surface combatant (typical subsequent tour). They are hard pressed to meet the normal administrative shipboard requirements associated with their first commands; they do not have enough time to acquire expertise in their ships’ warfare specialty. Today’s commanding officers of mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels are no better prepared to hunt mines than a destroyer officer is to assume command of a submarine. The MCM expert on board a U. S. minesweeper is typically a first- tour lieutenant (junior grade). When enough minesweepers operate together to comprise a division, perhaps twice a year, the division commanders— with few exceptions—have roughly the same mine warfare expertise as the MSOs’ COs—six weeks of school.
The typical billet at Mine Warfare Command, Charleston, is filled by a middle-grade officer from one of the three major parent communities: air, subsurface, or surface. Previous experience apparently has no bearing on the assignment. Thus, a helicopter pilot inspects MCM capabilities and equipment on surface ships, and a former submarine skipper leads a deployed joint task force of MCM ships and helicopters. Although these dedicated officers struggle valiantly and work diligently to discharge their duties, their lack of mine warfare experience and knowledge minimizes the outcome of their efforts. In two years, they are reassigned, and the learning curve begins anew.
Despite the U. S. Navy’s poor showing in operational mine warfare, the United States leads the Free World in mine warfare research and development. The Naval Coastal Systems Center at Panama City, Florida, is the expert on mine warfare matters. Its in-house staff of dedicated mine warfare civilian scientists, however, does not report to, or work directly for, Commander Mine Warfare Command. Instead, the mine warfare research is funded and directed by such diverse commands as Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea Systems Command. The mine warfare community has little practical input to this process. As a result, the list of promising projects, with 10-15-year lead times, is extremely long, and the list of innovations reaching the fleet is considerably shorter. Esoteric projects and dubious computer models and programs abound. They often offer great promise on paper, but are extremely detrimental to U. S. mine warfare efforts because they obscure the problems in the fleet today by offering incredible possibilities for tomorrow. Thus the leaders in Washington are briefed on what will be possible ten years from now and lose the necessary perspective on how we will implement effectively this research in the fleet.
Even when consulted. Commander Mine Warfare Command is hard pressed to offer the quality of expertise and experience necessary to shape the future of mine warfare research with fleet input. Operational requirements (ORs) are at best performed on an ad hoc basis with inexperienced personnel. Foreign exchange personnel are relied upon to work on U. S. national projects because of their MCM expertise.
The problem of fiscal constraints and its impact
on hi-low mix force structure is nowhere more apparent than in current U. S. plans for the construction of mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs). The high end of the mix may prove to be the most versatile MCMV in the world and probably come close to meeting her mission of sweeping deep- moored, short-tethered mines. But how can we possibly cope with the numerical problem posed by the Soviets’ mines with the anticipated 14 ships of this class?
The proposed conversion of some 200 shrimp boats to a minesweeping role (MSSB)* in times of tension is indeed imaginative and useful, but must be recognized for what it is: a stopgap measure of very limited applicability. At the risk of torpedoing this proposal in its infancy, how do we solve the magnetic signature problem created by the MSSBs’ undegaussed metallic hulls? Can we wrap degaussing cables around them as quickly as we mount a portable information-gathering shack. How do we man these ships? It is difficult to imagine these boats deployed overseas.
Plans also exist to construct 17 smaller minehunt- ers (MSHs). Assuming that the ships of this class are completed by the end of the decade, they will do little more than replace the nearly 30-year-old MSOs in service today. To increase the number of MSHs, consideration should be given to the following: scrapping the MSSB program and investing MSSB funds for more MSHs; making a greater commitment to the Naval Reserve by assigning more ships—i.e., MSHs—to more reserve units; and enlisting the Coast Guard’s support for the program by designing the MSHs to double as medium-endurance cutters so they could serve in a fishery protection-customs role in peacetime.
Coupled with the lack of MCMVs is the problem of disposing of the mines located by minehunting sonar. Mine disposal by divers in the U. S. Navy has been neglected to the point of ineffectiveness. The nature of mine disposal by divers is extremely difficult and requires much practice and coordination between the operations center of the MCMV ‘For a more detailed discussion of this proposal, see C. R. Christensen's "A Minesweeping Shrimp Boat? A What?." July 1981 Proceedings, pages 109-111.
and the diving crew. The U. S. Navy has no dedicated mine clearance divers. Instead, it relies upon explosive ordnance disposal divers who, burdened with various higher priority missions, accord mine warfare a tertiary role.
Mine neutralization vehicles, used successfully by most NATO countries for several years, have not been purchased for the U. S. Navy. There are two reasons. First, these vehicles are limited in diving depth. (This deficiency, however, can be fixed by rather minor modification.) Second, the United States has persisted rather chauvinistically with the development of a U. S. mine neutralization vehicle which long ago proved to be a costly lemon.
The largest single deterrent to an effective U. S. mine warfare force has been our failure to train and develop mine warfare officers. Officers from all naval communities are assigned generally on a onetime haphazard basis. There is no progression in the community because there is no community. Mine warfare staff officer training has been downgraded over the years from being a six-month course to a six-week course administered by intelligent hardworking individuals who have little theoretical knowledge and even less practical experience in mine warfare.
The first action necessary to turn things around for the U. S. Navy in mine warfare (MW) must be to remove the negative stigma of being designated as a MW specialist. We must create a community comprised of specialists drawn from the surface and air mine countermeasures communities. This can be achieved by developing a career path as exciting and as attractive as any to be found elsewhere. Such a plan is proposed in Table 1.
There is no quick fix for the problems we face. We must build new MCM ships and helicopters, “grow” instructors, and revamp the mine warfare school in Charleston. This can be accomplished by
Years in Career Surface Mine Countermeasures Specialist Air Countermeasures Specialist
Table 1: Proposed Mine Warfare Specialists Career Path
0 | Surface Warfare Officer School (Basic) Division Officer (Any surface ship) | Basic Flight Training |
2 | MCM Ops Officer MCMV | Squadron AMCM Pilot/Division Officer |
4 | MCM XO |
|
| Ashore-MW Staff Class | Ashore-MW Staff Class |
| Instructor or Staff Duty | Instructor or Staff Duty |
6 | CO MSH/MSSB | XO MCMV or Surface Ops MCM Squadron |
8 | Cross Training AMCM Squadron Ops | Department Head AMCM Squadron |
10 | Division Commander MSH/MSSB or | XO Squadron or Mobile Mine Assembly |
| Mobile Mine Assembly | Group |
12 | Project Manager | Project Manager |
14 | Postgraduate School | Postgraduate School |
16 | CO MCMV | CO AMCM Squadron |
18 | Director MW School* | Director MW School* |
20 | Commodore, Squadron of Minehunters | Major Staff Duty |
22 | Naval War College | Naval War College |
24 | CNO Staff | CNO Staff |
26 | Chief of Staff, ComMineWarCom* | Chief of Staff, ComMineWarCom* |
28 | ComMineWarCom* | ComMineWarCom* |
‘Alternates between air and surface MCM communities.
sending our first batch of newly designated mine warfare experts to the Belgium/Netherlands mine warfare school and, in addition, to the minelaying school at Eckenforde, West Germany. Graduates of these schools would then be assigned as instructors in Charleston. Within two years, we would begin to see positive results.
Shiphandling expertise can be ingrained in our young MCM officers by giving them commands of small vessels early in their careers. The training opportunities of operating several squadrons of limited-capability coastal sweepers/hunters are vast.
We can more effectively evaluate and participate in mine warfare-related NATO projects, such as the Tripartie coastal hunter program of France, Belgium. and the Netherlands. We can build minehunter and minesweeper simulators similar to those operating in European navies, and we can learn to exercise our seagoing and ashore mine warfare staffs using computer-assisted staff wargames. We can keep a hunter deployed at all times in Standing Naval Forces Channel, thereby gaining much-needed operational training with NATO navies. In addition, we should consider forming a similar force in the Far East. It would be Composed of mine warfare forces of interested Austral-Asian allies. The Tsushima Strait would probably be a good place to start such patrols, with frequent deployments to the Malacca Strait and Hormuz Strait.
We can create a new enlisted speciality for divers and assign a team of these specialists to most hunters. One young MCM specialist on each ship can be trained as the collateral duty diving officer using the European model.
As our specialists mature, they will infiltrate all levels of the naval hierarchy. Eventually, we can reverse the current situation by augmenting our mine warfare staffs with technical advisers from naval tactical air, the Air Force, and the submarine communities. The cost savings will be significant because our scientists’ efforts in mine warfare will be , better directed. The requirement for high-priced civilian consultants will be virtually eliminated.
Certainly many of these proposals will prove impossible to implement because of competing interests of the various service unions. But gone forever are the days when any warfare-qualified officer can effectively fill the shoes of the mine warfare specialist. We must recognize that in almost any naval scenario we can expect the Soviets to employ mines. And we must be able counter this threat.
__________________ i_________________________
Lieutenant Rogers was graduated from Lowell Technological Institute and commissioned at Officer Candidate School in 1974. He served as communications officer on board the USS White Plains (AFS-4) and then as main propulsion assistant on board the USS Parsons (DDG-33). He has attended the Mine Warfare Staff Officer course and is currently serving as the U. S. Navy's instructor at the Belgium/Netherlands Minewarfare School.