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Contents:
Soviet Snow Job
Summer Cruise Blues
Attack Submarine: The Hidden Persuader
Attack Submarine: The Hidden Persuader
Thank God for the Sitting Ducks
A Ship as is Like a Ship
Tomahaw k: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix
“Truth” in Advertising
Lessons of the Falklands' Crisis
Sharpening the Claws of the Tomcat
The Gulf of Sidra Incident
Conventional Aerial Bombing and the Law of War
Unmarked Cars of the Fleet
Hip Boots or Blue Water? An Examination of the U. S. Coast Guard and its Future
UNITAS: Exercising a Mutual Strength
Strait Shooting
No Place for Women
FMF for the RDF
Eyewitness
Whiskey on the Rocks
The BB(V)
“Soviet Snow Job”
(See E. J. Thaubald, pp. 62-68, June 1982
Proceedings)
Andrew P. Guzowski, former lieutenant commander in the Polish Navy— Captain Thaubald correctly labels the Soviet Union as “not a true superpower.” One cannot quarrel with his statement that "a true superpower ought to be able to feed its people, open its borders, and tolerate dissi- dence.” I, for one, would like to see more articles in the same vein, not only in the American press but, and this is more important, in the West European press.
True superpower or not, the Soviet Union has an awesome array of means to cause a lot of international mischief or the ultimate catastrophe. Captain Thaubald says that much in his assessment of Soviet strengths.
But in his analysis of what constitutes a true superpower, Thaubald omitted one crucial factor: that no superpower in today’s world can stand alone. And the Soviet Union is alone in the world. It has no real friends, no willing allies. The Warsaw Pact alliance is maintained by brutal coercion.
When French President Charles de Gaulle decided to take France out of the integrated NATO command and close U. S. bases in France, no one in Washington suggested or even thought of suggesting that U. S. armor should roll on Paris. We know well what happened in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. And the Czechs, dreaming of building “communism with a human face,” were not even suggesting any weakening of the military ties with Moscow. And yet the Warsaw Pact tanks rolled on the city of Prague.
Neither has the Soviet Union any real friends in the Third World. At best, it has a few client states whose rulers, nowhere democractically elected, depend on Soviet arms to maintain themselves in power. We have witnessed the about-face of Egypt and Somalia. The drama and the danger in
many Latin American countries stem from the fact that justified popular disaffection and frustrations with the ruling oligarchies are all too often exploited and manipulated by power- hungry Soviet stooges.
Thaubald suggests a number of specific U. S. actions to advance American interests and undercut Soviet interests. All his suggestions are valid, and many can be effective if implemented with proper vigor, in particular, the ban on food and technology sales to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, as in the case of President Carter's grain embargo, Moscow was able to fill the gap by buying from Canada and Argentina, both countries refusing to follow the American lead. It will likely happen again.
At the Economic Summit in Versailles in June, President Reagan managed to extract from our allies a lukewarm, at best, promise “to handle cautiously financial relations with the Soviet Union.” No word about cancelling the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline, which involves massive transfer of Western technology to the Soviets, future large Soviet profits in hard currency, not to mention the exposure of the industrialized Western European countries to a potential power supply blackmail.
Granted, by Thaubald’s criteria, the United States is a true superpower when compared with the Soviet Union. But our weight as a superpower is also dependent on the willingness of our friends to accept and follow our leadership. No doubt, it can be done. The Soviet Union at every turn must resort to coercion and brute force to make countries in its corner toe the line with no questions asked.
For the United States, therefore, the greatest promise lies in the disintegration of the Soviet empire of enslaved nations. The depth of dissatisfaction of these nations can well be measured by events in Poland since August 1980. It is a pity that outside a small circle of Sovietologists in the academe, few people understood the importance and potential of the massive but nonvi-
olent rebellion of the Polish workers.
Moscow understood it. The ‘‘Solidarity" movement had to be crushed by any means. Moscow chose the method of “internal invasion" by Polish security forces and the army for two principal reasons. First, sending Soviet troops to Poland risked a bloody encounter not only with people but very likely with Polish troops who would fight the foreign and generally hated invader. Soviet leaders and their minions in Poland guessed correctly that insomuch as the largely conscript Polish soldiers may be unwilling to shoot down their brothers and fathers in the factories, the same is true in reverse: The workers will be unwilling to shed the blood of their sons and brothers in army uniforms. In fact, all the shooting has been and is being done by professional thugs in the security forces; the regular army is being used for general police duties or to isolate individual industrial complexes, leaving the actual onslaught to the units of the security apparatus. The second reason Soviet tanks did not roll into Poland is that it would have generated a much stronger wave of protests in the West and particularly in Western Europe, damaging, perhaps irreparably, the Moscow-inspired “peace movement" that demands nucleardis- armament, but only an American disarmament.
The initial chorus of protests against the martial law in Poland, rather weak in Western Europe and, for that matter. in the United States, is by now practically stilled. Even at its highest, it could never gather more than 25,000 people on the streets of Paris or Chicago. The nuclear arms protestors. U. S. nuclear arms, of course, could at any time whip up crowds of 250,000 or more. Moscow seems to have guessed correctly once more. It managed to defuse a most dangerous challenge to its hold over East Central Europe and, by the same token, to the existence of the Soviet empire. The Soviets were mortally afraid of "the Polish disease" spreading to other satellite countries and eventually affecting the oppressed nationalities within the Soviet Union: the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, or the Estonians who profess little love for the big brother" in Moscow.
For the United States and the West, this chance is not yet lost. For 16 months, the Poles have tasted some relative freedoms in their country for the first time in more than 40 years. They will never give up the idea of regaining them. They do not want our troops or our arms to fight the Bolshevism and possibly start a world conflagration. Their movement, as I have said, is nonviolent. It is, however, in our own interest, in the interest of the Western concepts of freedom and democracy, that these Polish workers expect us to make intelligent and effective moves to force the Soviet Union to order its stooges in Poland to cease and desist.
Total Western embargo on trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites must be the order of the day until the gains made by the “Solidarity” are restored to the Polish people and the ruling Red Junta undertakes an honest dialogue with the nation. Our pressure to obtain these aims should never slacken. This is the single best opportunity to reduce the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world to its nonsuperpower status.
Lately, we hear little about Poland. The media are preoccupied with crises that seem to erupt one after another in the world. But if our political leaders would use every occasion to speak about the rights of the Polish people, the media would report it. and the issue would again disrupt the sleep of the old men in the Kremlin.
Lieutenant Commander Michael L. Hewlett, U. S. Naval Reserve—The United States is in dire need of redefining national goals and strategy. The efforts in this direction, as initiated by the Reagan Administration, are being diluted and impeded by liberal politicians more interested in maintaining their power base than advancing the best interest of the nation. The resulting avalanche of misinformation must be countered at every opportunity by articles such as this. If sufficient numbers of people understand the true threat to world stability, perhaps these selfsame politicians will see that their own political futures can best be served by supporting the Reagan initiatives.
“Summer Cruise Blues”
(See S. J. Bannat. p. 90. June 1982
Proceedings)
Captain Robert C. Peniston, U. S. Navy (Retired)—When reading Commander Bannat's article, Alphonse
Karr's words, "The more things change, the more they remain the same," come to mind. I appreciate his frustration, having experienced midshipmen cruises as a midshipman, commanding officer, fleet scheduler, and program manager.
When the fleet was of sufficient size, a midshipman cruise squadron was a fine way to get the fledgling officers on board a ship with a chance to see the world. With the Navy close to its low water mark numerically and with a high tempo of operations, one can readily see the problem facing the cruise managers. Whether it be a time of plenty or famine, cruise success will be measured by the interest shown by the personnel of ships assigned. I have known instances in which ships hardly operated yet the midshipmen praised highly their time on board. Conversely, midshipmen assigned to ships with significant operations and several port visits came away with negative reactions. At the risk of using an old cliche, it comes down to command attention. If the captain is enthusiastic, the cruise has every chance for success. If not, forget it.
The ways to make a midshipmen cruise successful are as numerous as good commanding officers. This is what worked for me in the USS Albany (CG-10), during two Mediterranean cruises: Appoint a cruise coordinator— the best officer available; ensure that the ship’s company understands fully the command’s desire to make the midshipmen an integral and welcome part of the ship; meet the midshipmen on or shortly after their arrival; invite them to the cabin mess for dinner early in their stay on board; place each one under the tutelage of a ship's officer and give the midshipman the responsibility of a junior officer along with commensurate authority. Make them a part of the wardroom.
My pleasant experiences with midshipmen cruises notwithstanding, I have a visceral feeling that in too many instances the cruises are demotivating with the attendant downstream effects. As Commander Bannat suggests, motivation may pay dividends in retention later. And that is reason enough to bend every effort to make cruises a worthwhile and memorable experience.
Shortly before reading this article.
I chanced to meet a young man from Bannat's NROTC unit, and in the ensuing conversation, learned that he was departing the next day for a cruise on board the USS Sumter (LST-1181). He spoke of it with eager anticipation. How will he feel on his return? I would certainly like to know.
New subject: I noted Admiral Lev- erton’s remarks concerning the April Proceedings and agree with him. But, in my opinion, the June issue was even better. Well done!
“Attack Submarine: The Hidden
Persuader”
(5<'f A. Van Saun. pp. 100-103. June 1982
Proceedings)
Captain William J. Rtthe, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Van Saun seems sure that U. S. submarines should play a far more dominant role in sea warfare than has been assigned or even postulated for their use today. This seems worth arguing for. Unfortunately, he equates diesel-engine submarines (SSs) with nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) on a seemingly equal basis. Commander Van Saun bases this premise on the slim argument that “an SS is even quieter than an SSN and harder to find.” Then, with an even slimmer rationale, he relates that an SSN must use high speed and thus be noisy in carrying out her missions, and that the SSN is inefficient in shallow-water operations.
That a conventional submarine “is extremely quiet and therefore harder to find than the nuclear submarine” just isn't true as a general statement. The SS is very quiet when operating on her battery, but not so when snor- keling on her diesel engines to recharge her batteries—and this is a necessary cyclic operation while out on patrol. Moreover, the conventional submarine has far less submerged mobility than the SSN. making the SS more susceptible to being detected by active sonars used by searching ASW forces because the SS can't easily get out of the way of such searches. In addition, when the SS is operating in restrictive waters and her presence is suspected, the enemy, if trying to move through this possible area of SS operations, can use too wide a variety of effective tactical measures to negate the conventional subamarine’s usefulness.
As Commander Van Saun notes, however, the use of today's longer range torpedoes and antiship missiles can partially compensate for the low mobility of the SS—though not so much in restrictive waters as in remote ocean areas like the Indian Ocean or South Atlantic. But, when the SS commits an overt act like the torpedoing of a ship, the SS can’t readily clear the area. Thus, reactive ASW forces are likely to find the SS close to her attack position and, unlike the SSN, would be more or less trapped by modern ASW techniques. The SSN, when discovered, has the long-term, high mobility to break free of the best designed coordinated operations of present ASW forces. Nevertheless, the conventional submarine can play an important role in interdicting shipping along sea-lanes far removed from the supposedly critical ones in the North Atlantic and Pacific, and generally in shallow waters, wherever. Such effort would seriously dilute an enemy’s ASW assets and efforts, while making a contribution in a shipping attrition war. And that’s probably why the Soviets maintain a large force of SSs— and why we should chalk one up for Commander Van Saun who at least sees greater numbers of submarines as a requirement.
But to equate on a seemingly equal basis conventional SSs with SSNs and to structure force levels accordingly doesn’t appear to be very sound.
Commander Van Saun’s various arguments why submarines should now play a dominant role in naval warfare are questionable. But there are good reasons why this may be true, and these reasons need to be weighed against the possibility that, in today’s environment of naval warfare, surface ships (including aircraft carriers) are not as efficient as hoped. The “smart” antiship missile, satellites for ocean surveillance, and tactical nuclear warheads—as well as the fact that the Soviet fleet has more submarines than surface warships—are behind this possibility that the SSN has moved into a dominant position in modern naval warfare.
The SSN is acknowledged to be the best ASW platform in today’s navies. Hence to bring the major part of the Soviet’s fleet under control should fall to the U. S. SSN. As the Soviets' nuclear attack submarine force grows (and this includes their missile-armed attack submarines as well), the need for more U. S. SSNs increases. To settle for 100 SSNs as a force level makes little sense in light of the Soviets’ unremitting buildup of their submarine force. If not now, then shortly, the U. S. fleet will be overwhelmed by the mere numbers of increasingly efficient Soviet nuclear submarines.
To settle for only the ASW role for U. S. submarines lacks vision—particularly in view of the new technologies cited which tend to drive warship activity below the surface of the oceans. The introduction of long- range antiship and land-attack missiles to the submarine is a first major step in expanding the attack submarine's role beyond that of ASW—and a move towards gaining the dominant position which Commander Van Saun assumes presently exists.
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(Continued on page 74)
“Strait Shooting”
(See J. A. Hazlett. pp. 70-73. June 1982
Proceedings)
Captain James J. White, LI. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Commander Haz- lett’s article illustrates in frightening fashion the tangle of interests involved in the current ten-year-old United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS 111). The article was obviously written before the United States and three other countries (Venezuela, Turkey, and Israel) voted against the draft treaty on 30 April, leaving its fate in doubt. Seventeen nations abstained and 130 approved. Now. we have until December, while the drafting committee completes its work, to ponder the consequences of our veto.
U. S. dissatisfaction is with Section XI of the treaty, dealing with deep- ocean mining in international waters. Our objections have merit, and some have been accepted by the Conference. Deep-sea mining is important to our commercial—and some would say our strategic—interests. The question for our Navy is whether this section is worth the possible loss in contingencies of free-transit passage through the straits, 200-mile economic zones, 12-mile territorial seas, and 350-mile continental shelves where pertinent— not to mention the cooperation and understanding achieved among 150 nations. A little “give” on our part is called for if we are to have the rule of law on the high seas, particularly in the international straits.
“No Place for Women”
(See D. Evans, pp. 53-56. November 1981:
C. Mollison. F. R. Hamlett. and T. C. Nichols, pp. 10-17. February 1982: M. A. Brewer, pp. 18-21. March 1982: L. J. Korb. pp. 87-90, April 1982; J. H. Brother, p. 208. May 1982: J. E. Shea. pp. 20-21. June 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Janaleiph Hoffman, Medical Corps, Naval Reserve. Chief. Department of Orthopedic Surgery, Naval Regional Medical Center. Subic Bay. Philippines—Colonel Evans’s article did not amaze me—it honestly does seem to represent the views of the older male Marine officers I've talked to. 1 am amazed that the highly respected Proceedings would see fit to publish such a piece of unscientific drivel.
As a physician and surgeon. I’d like to know the medical basis for the statement: "a female in her third trimester of pregnancy can hardly sit at a typewriter, much less change a spare tire.” I’m sure Colonel Evans's grandma, running her Midwestern farm up to the date of delivery, would not only be amazed by such a statement but would haul him off to the woodshed for disrespect.
The U. S. Army, in the West Point study, has accumulated reams of data on the physical capabilities and performance of women in rigorous training in all phases of their "harsh biological reality.” For a start, attention could be directed to these findings.
Second, I was unaware that women were pursuing a set of “amorphous social goals." After two well-publicized decades of women's liberation, the goals should be evident, both to the military and civilian sectors.
I do agree that the women's role in the Fleet Marine Force should be examined. However. I cannot believe Colonel Evans is the one to do so.
“Attack Submarine: The Hidden Persuader”
(See A. Van Saun. pp. 100-103. June 1982
Proceedings)
“Thank God for the Sitting Ducks”
(See T. B. Hayward, pp. 22-25, June 1982 Proceedings)
Captain Peter H. Freeman, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Commander Van Saun says. “To prove the carrier task force's tactical vulnerability, one should observe the results of major fleet exercises. . . ." Right on. but you have to be careful about how you “observe.” The submariner who observes the carrier through the periscope while getting off a salvo of (simulated) torpedoes may not be aware that his boat has already received a simulated attack, and that, in reconstruction, his own attack will be (correctly) judged invalid. No, better to wait and observe by means of the exercise report. Even then it’s seldom easy to discern how the carrier made out. First, you have to read the command summary: the answer won't be there, but you'll probably see what percentage of submarines was "sunk." You may get some inkling in the main body of the report, but mostly that provides details of how this or that ASW tactic, platform, or system worked. After all. most exercises are designed to answer such questions, not the overall question of carrier vulnerability. Your best bet lies in the appendices, where you may find chronology.
If you use that chronology, you will find that ASW performance may have been good or it may have been bad, but you will very seldom find that it had been perfect. With all those beautiful concentric rings of defense, the exquisitely coordinated air-surface- subsystem sanitization and screening, some submarine(s) usually get through (and as often as not you'll find a diesel among them).
Exercise experience seems to show that—as the title of Admiral Hayward's article implies—the carrier is a “sitting duck." However, he apparently would have us believe that the Nimitz-c\ass nuclear-powered carrier would simply shrug off attacks and go right on with her business. “She was designed with survivability in mind,” he says, as though survivability were not a factor in the design of all ships. (I daresay HMS Sheffield—sunk by an Argentine Exocet missile—was designed with survivability in mind.) As evidence of this feature in CV design, he points to the
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experience of the Enterprise (CVAN- 65), which not only survived explosions of her own bombs but, according to the author, “within several hours . . . was capable of conducting flight operations.” Now, in the first place, self-inflicted explosions do not strike me as much of a plus for the carrier, but Admiral Hayward is talking about survivability, and he tells us that the explosion of those nine 500- pound bombs on the flight deck was the equivalent of being hit by “six Soviet guided missiles.” There may be a study somewhere that says something of the sort, but it appears to defy common sense. A photograph in the February 1981 Proceedings seems to show that those bombs went off all the way aft on the flight deck, well clear of elevators and catapults and all those vital antennas on and around the island. (It also shows numerous pieces of airplanes scattered about.) Moreover, the bombs were just sitting there, so that the force of their explosions was vented freely to the atmosphere. Surely that’s a different matter from missiles crashing into the side or onto the deck at close to Mach one. And, surely, it bears no relationship to a salvo of torpedoes exploding below the waterline, particularly under the keel.
In promoting the large-deck carrier, over the small-deck carrier. Admiral Hayward leans on World War II experience. He says that, “after the advent of the Zsisfor-class carriers, we lost one of our first-line carriers to enemy action; we lost ten small carriers.” I count “first-line” carriers differently than Admiral Hayward does and without the qualifications of the coming of the Essex carriers. By my count, we lost four “first-line” carriers—Lexington (CV-2), Yorktown (CV-5), Wasp (CV-7), and Hornet (C- 8). As for small carriers, my reading of S. E. Morison shows seven lost, and two of them were sunk when, virtually without escort, they were left to face a powerful Japanese force which included battleships. As I see it, we lost 18% of our large carriers and 8% of our small ones. Remember, too, that inept Japanese strategy prevented their submarine force from ever approaching its full potential.
“Even today,” Admiral Hayward asserts, “the U. S. Navy continues to operate 12 ships—i.e., the LPHs and LHAs—that meet the small carrier definition of the reformists.” I don’t know who these "reformists” are, but I doubt that many individuals who favor a relatively large number of smaller carriers have in mind an amphibious assault ship as their model of the small carrier.
Personally, I haven’t a clue on whether we ought to have large carriers or small carriers—or any at all— and it looks to me as though no one else does, either. Because vulnerability seems to be a major question, my suggestion is that there be undertaken a systematic screening and review, by competent analysts, of reports of at- sea exercises over the last ten or 15 years. Have these analysts prepare a report which, for each exercise, lists the compositions and missions of the opposing forces and then answers, without comment or caveat, the following questions:
► How many valid attacks were directed at the carrier before she completed her primary mission?
► What types of platforms delivered the attacks?
► How many and what types of weapons were simulated?
Although the results of such an effort would not provide definitive answers to the question of vulnerability, they would bring us a lot closer to answers than we seem to be now.
. .A Ship as is Like a Ship. .
{See J. L. Bardolf-Smith, p. 123, April 1982 Proceedings)
Robert E. Johnson—Readers of the poem “. . .A Ship as is Like a Ship. . .” submitted by Commander J. L. Bardolf-Smith may wish to know it was written by Cicely Fox Smith. Entitled “Pictures,” it was published in her volume Sea Songs and Ballads, 1917-22 in 1924. Miss Smith, an Englishwoman, was a prolific writer of sea prose and poetry whose works were published under the name C. Fox Smith. She died on 8 April 1954.
“Tomawhawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix”
(See P.G. Johnson, pp. 26-33, April 1982;
J.F. Bouchard, pp. 22-26, May 1982; R.P. Hansen and J.J. Tritten. pp. 18-20, June 1982; W.T. Gray, pp. 83-84, July 1982 Proceedings)
Captain Charles C. Pease, U. S. Navy—I take issue with several of Johnson’s theses. First, the cost of strategic weapons is relatively cheap. Johnson ignores the facts when he calls “strategic” weapon systems “very, very expensive.” A Trident submarine costs only 25% more than an Aegis cruiser (and about 20% less than a nuclear cruiser) to construct. Only 15% of the U. S. defense budget goes for "strategic” systems, and this percentage is artificially high at the present time because we are trying to repair 15 years of neglect in the next five years. Since the total defense budget is less than 6% of the gross national product (GNP), slightly less than 1% of the GNP is being budgeted for the ultimate means of protection for our nation. This is not a costly program relative to the money we spend for conventional military forces. It is much less than we Americans spend on recreation, which speaks volumes about our national priorities.
For Johnson to say that there have been (unspecified) “useful limits” from the SALT process, immediately after he bewailed the costly upgrade to the strategic arsenal, is inconsistent. We have delayed in modernizing our strategic systems, and thus have helped produce adverse trends in the strategic balance and the “window of vulnerability.” Those circumstances might well be termed “useful limits,” but only from the Soviet perspective.
Johnson’s reference to the “battlefield” is symptomatic of the Western disease caused by Soviet “equivalence” in long-range nuclear weaponry, and superiority in doctrine and preparations for war. The Soviets have followed the dicta of Sun Tzu by getting to the Western mind. Johnson limits the “battlefield” to our turf or the open seas, at least implicitly promising the Soviets a homeland sanctuary from which to fight the United States and its allies. It is precisely this reluctance to face the fact that we could be forced to up the ante and attack Soviet military bases in the Socialist Motherland that is the core of our dilemma. Whether or not we would choose to use nuclear weapons to attack Soviet military and naval installations would depend on our ability to defeat a Soviet attack with allied defensive forces only—such as the British did against the German Air Force in World War II. Lacking sufficient defensive power, we would have two choices, either accept defeat or go on the offensive against military forces on Soviet turf. To be an effective deterrent, allied capability to attack Soviet bases successfully must be real, and it must be credible, otherwise we are lost before the inevitable contest of wills in any crisis. Unless, or until, we build a credible conventional land attack capability—with literally tens of thousands of nonnuclear cruise missiles—we would have to depend on nuclear weapons to attack the Soviet Union in a global war.
Gray Weapons: Johnson proposes to relegate nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) to ships other than submarines, battleships, and surface combatants to satisfy a narrow U. S. view of what is “strategic,” and to establish a nonnuclear U. S. gunboat navy as a separate entity. Johnson’s recommendation for retaining old nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), and perhaps old ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), as a close- to-home strategic reserve armed with land attack cruise missiles (TLAM-N) makes sense. Another useful role for Tomahawk cruise missiles would be as SSBN reloads, packaged to be inserted in the empty SLBM tubes, for protracted war. But that should not rule out loading TLAM-N in the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines as well. We still need forward deployed weapons that are survivable and can engage the enemy immediately on either land or sea, however; limiting the SSN-688 class solely to land attack is inefficient use of a costly platform.
When we had 1,000 ships, two separate navies might have been feasible. Today, we cannot afford the luxury of a separate anti-Soviet Navy. There are in fact two missions for the U. S. Navy and for all U. S. defense forces: (1) coerce or fight the combined arms of the Soviet Union; and (2) coerce or fight forces of any other nation. The submarine force (SSN and SSBN) is the most viable naval force for the first mission: the surface navy is a viable force primarily for the second mission. However, proliferating even a few weapons in many surface platforms would increase the probability that a U. S. nuclear counteroffensive could not be preempted by a Soviet first strike. Deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on a multitude of surface platforms would thus create different qualitative problems for the Soviets and increase their risk of failure, thereby enhancing deterrence. Conversely, our SSNs are a potent sea control weapon and have a role to play in gunboat wars—witness the Royal Navy’s SSN operations around the Falklands. We cannot afford to limit a versatile platform to only one mission.
To increase the Soviet defensive “paranoia” is the essence of deterrence. The Soviets worry about damage to key forces and installations in the event of war. We want that worry to be reinforced in every way possible. by U. S. systems for which the Soviets have no effective preemption capability. We will not sacrifice any stability by deploying new systems that are survivable. It is only when whole systems become vulnerable to a surprise attack that stability is reduced. The total numbers of Tomahawk to be deployed by the United States are not sufficient to threaten any Soviet “strategic” systems with extinction. Tomahawk is even more stable than the Trident C-4 missile; both are inherently very stable “strategic” systems because they are survivable: but Tomahawk takes longer to reach its targets than the C-4; therefore it is even less of a first-strike threat to the Soviets than is the C-4.
There are no “gray weapons” in
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Soviet eyes. The distinction between strategic and tactical weapons is sharp and clear to the Muscovite hegemo- nists. A U. S. Navy Seal team with an old Davy Crockett nuclear anti-tank rocket would probably be “strategic” to a Soviet if it were to be inserted ashore in the Socialist Motherland. The range of a weapon is of some intrinsic concern to the Soviets, but what is of most concern is whether it can successfully threaten the homeland. Of great importance also to the Soviets is the time factor; witness the Soviet concern over Pershing II, which could hit Moscow in less than ten minutes after being fired from Western Europe. Certainly, the sea-launched cruise missile does not pose the same compressed time threat as Pershing II or the C-4.
The “gray weapon” problem is not new. The fact that Tomahawk missiles cannot be differentiated as to warhead is no substantial change from the fact that carrier-based aircraft motoring toward Mother Russia with their bomb loads would be ambiguous, which has been a problem for the Soviets for more than 30 years. Thus, Tomahawk becomes a new and unique “gray weapon” problem for the United States only if we are foolish enough to create one.
Surviving aircraft carriers would be just as much a “strategic reserve" in the eyes of the Soviets as SSNs or surface ships with Tomahawks. The difference is that, in a nuclear war, current Soviet technology could handle the few aircraft carriers quite easily, many surface ships perhaps less easily, while the SSN would remain a difficult problem.
Tomahawk is no more gray than are U. S. ballistic missile submarines in support of NATO. The B-52 is a "strategic” platform; its use to date has been “tactical” in South Vietnam and “strategic” in North Vietnam. By some measures the B-52 is perhaps the least cost-effective of the “strategic” “deterrent” force, but it is also the most flexible warfighting leg of the Triad. Would Lieutenant Johnson call the B- 52 a “gray weapon?” If so, to what end other than to restrict our ability to compete successfully with the Soviets? Tomahawk is not a new generic problem for the Soviets; any forward deployed U. S. system is “strategic” to the Soviets. "Infinite shades of gray” exist only for those in the West who insist on being blind.
SALT Complications: If the deployment of Tomahawk “complicates the strategic arms talks,” so be it. SALT negotiations have never been simple proceedings. In the past they have been “complicated” primarily by a lack of clear and unambiguous objectives on the part of the United States, matched against steadfast purpose on the part of the Soviet Union.
What have been the U. S. objectives in SALT?
Soviet objectives in SALT have been to gain whatever military advantage possible by negotiation, to avoid hindering any Soviet arms construction programs then in progress, and to stop or slow down any U. S. technical advantage long enough to catch up or forge ahead (e.g., SALT I). Thus, they have sought to eliminate uncertainty and control the pace of events rather than to reduce arms; they have used SALT as a means of winning the arms race. They are succeeding.
Because of our limited definition of what is “strategic,” our obsession with the theory of warfare espoused by Douhet, and our dedication to arms control as an end in itself, we have allowed the Soviets to gain so great an advantage overall that they have come close to cowing NATO into appeasement. Our alliance structure is in a shambles because we were willing to accept “parity” or “essential equivalence” (some would contend it is inferiority) in long-range offensive nuclear weaponry while our adversary has worked toward superiority in every other category of military force.
Tomahawk was dragged into the SALT II talks by the Soviets because it has the potential to hurt them in a way they currently can’t preempt, or defend, or match. Our stealthy SSN is a problem they cannot at present handle well; they need time to bring their tremendously expensive ASW and long-range cruise missile research and development programs to fruition. SALT is a process that permits the Soviets to buy time, a commodity they measure carefully and value highly. Tomahawk is no more of a SALT “stumbling block” than is the Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 threat to our ICBMs. The SS-18 is a weapon that gives the Soviets a decided advantage. Certainly in terms of the “stability,” about which Lieutenant Johnson is so concerned, the SS-18 is far more de- stablizing than the Tomahawk. Proposed deployment of Tomahawk need not be a problem for verification. Every surface ship or submarine with Tomahawk, or the Soviet equivalent, could be counted, and permitted in a future agreement. This would be "open and creative and uncomplicated.” We need only make the upper limits high enough to satisfy the shipbuilding programs of both sides. Such an agreement wouldn’t mean very much, of course, but then none of the previous agreements have either, and perhaps there would be a few naive people who would sleep better.
But if “stability” is the goal—rather than arms control for the sake of arms control—then there is another solution. As Professor Edward Luttwak has observed:
“The qualities of the cruise missile which subvert the procedures of negotiated limitations are precisely the qualities which also achieve the substantive purposes of arms control. Because cruise missiles are small, inherently mobile, and therefore easily concealed, it is a hopeless task to devise any treaty to limit them that would rest on any serious assurance of verification. But their small size is also the reason that cruise missiles are relatively cheap. Further, since these small and easily concealed weapons are not vulnerable to disarming counterforce attacks, rival cruise missile forces should be quite stable; neither side could hope to disarm the other in a surprise attack, so that both sides can be secure. This means not only the costs, but also the risks generated by these weapons, are inherently smaller than those of the fixed- site ballistic missiles now deployed. It follows that as far as cruise missiles are concerned, the best form of arms control may be no control at all.”*
*Quoted by Robert Moffet in “The Cruise Missile and SALT II.“ International Security Review, 10 April 1980.
“Truth” in Advertising
Lieutenant Commander James F. Boland, Jr., U. S. Navy—I feel compelled to point out a violation of the spirit of our nation’s “truth in advertising laws,” which appears on page 63 of the May 1982 Naval Review Issue of Proceedings. A Northrop Corporation ad states: “In 1983, there will be only two types of pilots in naval service. . .those who fly Hornets and those who wish they did." The author of this certainly can be accused of being biased, and probably was not an authorized spokesperson for naval aviators. I suspect that there are others out there who, like I, are not as anxious to turn in our Kaman, Sikorsky, Boeing, and Bell products as the folks at Northrop would have you believe. And a few of us will probably still be hanging on after 1983.
The F/A-18A sounds like a fine aircraft. but I'd wager a year’s flight pay that its handling characteristics in a hover are abysmal. In place of North- rop’s questionable quote, I think the unrestricted naval aviators out there would prefer to see: “To fly is heavenly, but to hover is divine.” “FMF for the RDF”
(See M. L. Cover. June 1982. pp. 51-55:
J. C. Miller, pp. 16-18. July 1982 Proceed inf's)
Commander John L. Byron. U. S. Navy—What are the vital interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region'? Oil? Well, yes, it’s all tied to oil, but we need to remember that only 8% of U. S. oil comes from this area. Our Western European and Japanese allies get far more of their oil from the
Persian Gulf, so perhaps our interests are more indirect and translate to a concern for the well-being of our friends. Even more likely, the concern could be that a cutoff of Persian Gulf oil would cause our “friends” to be less friendly in both their competition for oil from other world sources and in their maneuvering to achieve reaccommodation with the Persian Gulf powers. A cutoff from their oil would also skyrocket world oil prices and produce a devastated, oil-shocked economy, weakening us and our allies in a significant way.
The likelihood of such an oil cutoff in circumstances involving only the United States, our Western allies, and the Persian Gulf powers is probably quite low, however, because the sellers need buyers at least as much as the buyers need oil. The Western alliance is essentially the only customer for Persian Gulf oil. Loss of revenues through a cessation of oil sales would place the regimes of the Persian Gulf states in mortal jeopardy and reduce affluent societies of the region to poverty. Should the unlikely occur and Persian Gulf oil stop flowing, the Western Alliance clearly has the military power to conquer the region and regain access to the region’s resources, if it is free to act without Soviet interference.
In any case, it is probably impossible to prevent a long duration of oil cutoff if forces in the region decide to act. This is because of the extreme fragility and minimal defensibility of the oil production infrastructure, and the resulting ease with which this infrastructure could be destroyed. So 1 argue that the matters discussed loregoing are interests of the United States, but not vital interests to the extent that they require preparations for the immediate insertion of U. S. combat troops into the region.
Now let’s introduce the Soviet Union into the discussion. 1 suggest there are four Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf, but none of these are vital to them:
► By gaining control of Persian Gulf oil, weakening or destroying the Western Alliance and isolating the United States in the world
► Expanding Soviet hegemony to a new region
► Obtaining a warm-water port
► Eliminating Soviet oil shortages in future years.
Soviet control of Persian Gulf oil would destroy the balance of power.
Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters take off from the USS Peleliu (LHA- 5), demonstrating an existing rapidly deployable force.
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The immediate effect would be direct coercion of Japan and the Western European allies to accommodation with the Soviet Union and rejection of the United States. In the longer term, the Soviet Union would gain significant economic power in the world through ability to manipulate oil prices. Income from the oil would provide hard currency which, through access to the now-receptive industrial base of Western Europe and Japan, would quickly buy an irresistible military capability. The United States would painfully learn the darkest meaning of the phrase “island nation," as we faced alone an extraordinarily enhanced Soviet Union. In simplest terms, the vital interest of the United States in the Persian Gulf region is the prevention of Soviet control of the area. The Soviet Union could achieve control in the Persian Gulf region through subversion or invasion. The United States must prevent both modes of takeover through the clear demonstration that we have the will and the means to act militarily with the power and speed needed to thwart the Soviet Union.
Enter the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)—and exit. Something as nebulous and ill-defined as the RDF should be difficult to fault on specifics, but this particular concept is so flawed as to permit direct attack. The RDF is too little and too late to deal with Soviet invasion; it is too much and too early to counter subversion.
Discussing subversion first, the RDF is so massive, of such large logistics requirements, and so dependent on benign access as to demand early deployment to a destabilizing Persian Gulf country. But this would be doubly counterproductive, both undercutting the legitimacy of the endangered regime—a matter of extreme sensitivity in Arab nations—and establishing large provocation for direct Soviet invasion. If the RDF moved too late, its introduction into a now-hostile nation (assuming this doubtful capability) could only be seen as U. S. invasion, again producing antipathy in other regional states and directly threatening the Soviet Union with large land forces at its unbuffered and soft underbelly. Finally, the RDF mentality is the Central Europe/Korea mentality of permanent occupation: it is unclear that extraction has received any attention at all.
Repulsion of a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf by the RDF is equally troubling, but for different reasons. The RDF forces to be employed are precisely those units most vital to the reinforcement of NATO, with the strategic mobility assets, tankers, ammunition, and other materiel earmarked for the RDF being also critical to NATO. There is a fundamental problem with entering combat with Soviet forces while drawing down NATO support below viability. We might win the battle (in the Persian Gulf). but we’d lose the war (in Europe). We'd lose the battle, too—we cannot ever hope to overcome Soviet land strength and its interior lines to Southwest Asia with either marginal or mainforce units sustained by external support, arriving via the world’s longest logistics pipeline. So if the RDF won’t work, then what will?
Marines and naval forces have the ability to loiter nearby but clear of any country's borders, with a proven force capable of speed, of forcing entry, and of establishing stability, but of a nature not drawing down NATO’s strength, not threatening the Soviet Union, and not constituting the introduction of permanent U. S. presence.
Marines and naval forces represent a combat force close enough and quick enough that it can always take ground on the invasion route; continued Soviet progress southward would require them to attack the American troops. The issue is not who would win, but that the Soviet Union would have to either withdraw or deliberately start World War 111 by attacking U. S. forces.
In the case of subversion in a Persian Gulf state, sending the Marines would emplace a cohesive, integrated force whose unity of command, mobility. flexibility, and organic sustainability are precisely the characteristics needed to respond to the unexpected and quickly changing circumstances certain to prevail. (These are precisely the characteristics most lacking in the RDF.)
The strategy in the case of Soviet invasion is to provide a blocking force. For both invasion and subversion, it is speed, competence, and flexibility that are most essential—not massive force. In meeting the United States’ vital interest in the Persian Gulf region, maritime strategy is the superior approach.
Marines in amphibious warfare ships located inside a carrier battle group can do the job. Without serious impact
on NATO’s defense. Without serious threat to Soviet territory. Without the need to invent yet another land war bureaucracy permanently fixated on a specific patch of ground. And this naval force, this same basic approach, can be moved to next year’s hot spot, next decade’s vital interest. It can go into the vicinity of the region of interest without mobilization, domestic debate, or the severe international disruptions which deployment of the RDF would entail. As said, it is the superior solution. Cancel the RDF. Use the Marine Corps.
Suppose the Marine Corps is tasked with what is now the RDF mission. The question arises as to how much the Corps should be tailored to Southwest Asia. The answer follows from the basic nature of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is neither light infantry nor small army, it is the Marine Corps, a force whose history has earned it the right and the requirement to determine for itself the composition needed to meet its mission. Certainly the conditions of Southwest Asia must be considered, but it would be an error to so finely tune the Corps for this one region as to seriously diminish its flexibility and responsiveness worldwide. Imposing changes from outside the Corps is hazardous. The Marines themselves are the keepers of their fire; they know what they’re doing, and they pay for mistakes.
What of amphibious lift; do we have enough? It’s a perennial debate—and should be. If ever the Marines are satisfied with the amount of amphibious lift, we’ve probably bought too much; if the Navy is contented, we don’t have enough. Somewhere along this tension line of total lift vs. tight funds is the right answer. Picking the Marine Corps approach to the Persian Gulf problem will make finding the right answer more critical.
If the Marine Corps is given the mission now assigned to the RDF, what of the RDF? Even after dispersal of the RDF staff, problems in land warfare would remain:
► The failure of the Army and Air Force to think beyond Korea and NATO
► The failure to balance the allocation of resources so as to yield sustainability and strategic mobility commensurate with Army and Air Force combat structure
► An inordinate heaviness in land war forces
► The mismatch between cargo and air carriers for oversize and outsize loads
► The vulnerability of continental strategies to denial of basing, refueling, and overflight rights
► The fundamental disparities in doctrine, tactics, training, and command/ control/communication between Army and Air Force
► The mandatory need to invent a CinC (Commander in Chief of a Unified Command) to deal with any joint Army/ Air Force combat undertaking
► The fundamental failure of the 1947 National Security Act’s separation of land war forces into autonomous Army and Air Force.
The basic reason for selecting a maritime strategy to protect vital U. S. interests in Southwest Asia is that the strategy will work; the basic reason for cancelling the RDF is that it can never work.
“Lessons of the Falklands’
Crisis”
(See D. A. Dyer. p. 90. July 1982
Proceedings)
Captain Brent Baker, U. S. Navy— All sorts of armchair admirals and generals are pointing to so-called new lessons of the Falklands’ Crisis. I think it is important to do two things when thinking about naval lessons of the Falklands. First, review the history books. Second, see what Defense and Navy officials who have the responsibility and accountability for the nation's defense are saying on this issue.
On the review of history, I suggest that the sinking of HMS Sheffield by a French-built Exocet cruise missile on 4 May 1982 did not prove the potency of an antiship cruise missile in combat. In 1967, the U. S. Navy took note when an Egyptian patrol craft fired a Soviet “Styx” cruise missile and sank the Israeli destroyer Elath. It was during the latter part of the Vietnam War that smart weapons were first used in combat, and it was the U. S. military that used them. Looking at history, it is also no surprise that a World War Il-vintage American-built Argentine cruiser (General Belgrano), steaming “unalerted" outside a declared war zone, could be sunk by torpedoes. We have ample World War II experience of such cases.
Moreover, the issues of aluminum in naval ship construction and damage
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control are some of the "new” lessons. The U. S. Navy, along with other navies, began using aluminum in warships in the 1950s. While aluminum is less survivable, it is cheaper and lighter, thus giving ships better stability and endurance than all-steel ships. It was not in 1982, but in 1975, in the wake of the USS Belknap (CG-26) collision and fire, that the U. S. Navy moved to look at how it could make aluminum more survivable and look to use steel superstructures again. So, the U. S. Navy quietly began in fiscal year 1978 to program funds to make present superstructures, made of aluminum, more survivable. For example, refactory felt insulation is used inside aluminum superstructures to keep heat/ flames from bulkheads for 30-45 minutes more, giving damage control parties that valuable time to contain and extinguish the fire. Also, Kevlar, the material that is used in bulletproof vests and to replace steel in radial tires, is being fitted as "light armor” on selected areas of U. S. Navy ships to prevent so-called “cheap kills.” New firefighting agents and other time-tested damage control practices add to the 1940s’ to 1970s’ lessons of the U. S. Navy. In fact, before there was a Falklands’ Crisis, in 1981, the Naval Material Command designed the LSD- 41 and DDG-51 classes of new ships with steel, replacing most of the aluminum used in past generations of U. S. Navy ships.
Now that we have some of the history straight, let’s look at what those who are responsible for a strong and ready Navy have had to say about the Falklands. Rest assured that while these words were spoken, the professionals in the Navy were studying this latest combat action tor any lessons. ► Secretary of the Navy John Lehman: UPI, 5 May 1982—An Argentine plane “never would have come close enough to a U. S. battle group to fire a missile because carrier-launched F-14 fighters would have been patrolling as forward defense. U. S. frigates, which are comparable in size to the 3,500-ton Sheffield, "would never operate alone” under such circumstances. “What’s going on in the Falklands is (like) World War II.” Secretary Lehman compared the missile attack to the Japanese Kamikaze strikes against American warships in the Pacific. The disabling of the Sheffield “illustrates extremely well why we are so insistent on the big carrier instead of the small carrier. You have to have air superiority to ensure you don’t take hits like that.”
► Admiral James L. Holloway. U. S. Navy (Retired), formerChief of Naval Operations and now President of the American Shipping Lines Association: The Cleveland Press, 5 May 1982—“You've got a navy [Argentina] with some very old and secondhand equipment versus a navy [Britain] without any design capability for the job it is having to do. . . . And the fact is that if the [U. S.] Navy does get into a situation where it needs lots of ships quickly we have the Sealift concept. We provide a subsidy to the Merchant Marine to make available to us 50% of all its ships. You can bet if the situation demanded you would see U. S. troops moving in civilian aircraft and passenger liners to trouble zones.”
► Admiral George E. R. Kinnear II, U. S. Navy: Milwaukee Sentinel, 12 May 1982—The effectiveness of French-made missiles used to destroy the Sheffield “should amaze no one.” Large aircraft carriers with high-performance, fixed-wing aircraft, and airborne radar surveillance are needed to “tip the balance” in situations such as the Falklands battle. “The only way to do it is with large-deck aircraft carriers.”
► Secretary Lehman: Christian Science Monitor, 13 May 1982—“We have felt for a long time there is no longer any area of the world that is a low- threat area. So many modern missiles like the Exocet and the Sidewinder have been sold to so many countries. So whenever we send our Navy/Ma- rine Corps forces, whether it’s the South Atlantic or virtually any corner of the world, they have to be able to defend themselves against those kinds of systems. Britain's Harrier jets are very useful when you have nothing else, but they cannot do many missions necessary to insure superiority of the seas.”
► Admiral James D. Watkins, U. S. Navy (Prospective CNO): Confirmation Testimony, 19 May 1982—“The Navy a number of years ago recognized because of our excellent intelligence resources that we had to move expeditiously in our tactical fighting capability to assure that missiles could not be launched before we had the opportunity to destroy the platform. This was the objective of our long-range Navy goals, because once the missile is released it becomes a very difficult and vicious sort of a device that is hard to bringdown. . . . So, yes, ships can be hit, but all of our studies, all of our war games, the way we run our tactics, the way we operate multiple battle groups at sea, would preclude but a trickle, even in the largest projected Soviet raid coming through and we are moving aggressively to take our air battles out even further in the days ahead by the programs that are now started in the 1983 budget.”
► CNO Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, U. S. Navy: The Virginian-Pilot, 20 May 1982—The U. S. Navy uses technology and tactics that would prevent any “two-bit navy around the globe with a handful of missiles" from sinking its ships. "If an airplane is allowed to approach a ship at sea with a smart weapon, the results are going to be impressive. There’s nothing new in that.” But U. S. tactics and equipment were designed “not to allow that situation to exist.”
► Admiral Hayward: The New York Times, 22 May 1982—Asked what lessons the U. S. Navy should draw from the British experience in the South Atlantic, the admiral said, “It certainly reaffirms my conviction that we are building the right kind of Navy.”
► Secretary of Defense Weinberger: The Washington Post, 29 May 1982— “There has been a strengthening of the case for large carriers.” He added that it is necessary to have such big ships with their hundred or so warplanes as floating air power bases when naval forces are fighting in distant areas. Although saying the British battle experience in the Falklands has not provided any particular new lessons, Weinberger said, “we certainly will examine all types of things, including construction of ships" as well as defensive measures for the fleet.
Commander Sergio Costa, Italian Navy (Retired)—Rivers of ink are likely to run analyzing the Falkland/Malvi- nas contest. Strictly speaking, however, there were no particular surprises. Air power is not news: i.e., the Battle of Midway in World War II should be recognized as the first step in the decline of the super-gunned monster ship of the past navies. But a move to develop a more efficient passive defense, armor, in other words, could be recommended in view of the performance of the modern unmanned “kamikaze,” which was able to penetrate with no difficulty the few millimeters of sheet protecting billions of dollars worth of technology contained in a modern ship: alas, an extremely vulnerable jewel.
There are great expectations for electronic warfare. And really, electronic countermeasures—sometimes defined as “electromagnetic armor”—are one of the most effective defensive shields. But these measures are probably better used with the concept of counter-maneuver, or the capability to avoid the incoming threat. However, just as an excellent boxer cannot indefinitely avoid all of an opponent's punches, the key for success in and out of the ring is that certain capability to take a blow and keep on counterpunching.
But. lest we punch ourselves into a corner, shall we. instead, play out a sort of "war game,” taking the Southern Atlantic conflict as a starting point. The first word to employ is "if”—my apologies to Mr. Kipling.
If the Royal Navy would have had real naval air power, provided by conventional aircraft carriers to impose British supremacy in the Falklands' sky, the fight probably would have been over more rapidly, and it would have been even more one-sided than it was.
If, on the other hand, Argentina would have had some modern submarines available, it would have been very hazardous for the British task force to get close to the Malvinas. This observation is supported by the fact that the Argentine naval forces were confined to their bases because of the danger presented by the British underwater watch dogs which were capable of remaining for months around the islands, despite the cruelty of sea and weather.
In this case, however, the submarine's role was the equivalent to the potential check of the king in a chess game. It had no direct possibility of making the checkmate—i.e., the actual land assault.
But does this situation always have to exist? Let's look a little closer in the underwater environment. The submarine's immunity from weather conditions, the submarine's submerged speed versus the surface ship's capability in heavy seas, the submarine's practically indefinite autonomy, the submerged submarine's invisibility, and the submarine's ability to carry a variety of weapons, ranging from strategic long-range missiles to conventional torpedoes (all coexistent) and operate them all from under the water (surface-to-air missiles included), are factors likely to make the modern submarine the almost ultimate warship.
Now, what "if' the Royal Navy had also had large cargo submarines capable of carrying war materials and men and having an assault capability?
It is not difficult to imagine a fight between a submerged task force and killer submarines, in the darkness, following strategies and tactical procedures hardly recalling those typical of the old-fashioned (but not old) fleets.
So far the lesson learned from the Falkland fight (version 1982) seems to stir up major interest about aircraft, missiles, and ships. I believe, however, that the most meaningful indication comes from the submarine consideration, not so much from the actual results achieved by that kind of vessel in this occasion, but for the potential results of future submarines.
“Eyewitness”
(See R. Mason, pp. 40-45, June 1982;
Y. Kawamura, pp. 80-83. July 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander George D. Bond II, U. S. Coast Guard—While Admiral Dixon was hailed as a loyal and moral individual who spoke with candor, he did not pass on any knowledge of the incident until asked by the FBI. Then he told ”, . .the works— and I mean the works." The attitude of the article condones this action.
I would like to bring the focus of the article down from the lofty plane of national security to the human plane of normal, everyday life. Make the offended party a junior officer and the offending party a senior officer. The offense may be alcohol abuse, drug abuse, or immoral behavior. Then, should the individual follow the precepts endorsed by Mr. Mason? Do you sit quietly until the reprehensible behavior brings investigators to the scene, or do you take steps to report the behavior to senior authority? These are problems which face our personnel every day. If you report a senior, you are taking a chance. If you do not. you are compromising your integrity and possibly risking censure for withholding information. You are in a no-win situation.
If you report the situation, you risk evaluation by the offender following resolution of the problem—after his return to the unit. If you do not. the higher command levels may comment on your lack of integrity and dedication to the moral principles of the service. Whatever path is followed, the official record follows you, while the offending party may be treated as a "medical" problem, and no official record of his misdeeds may appear.
No, these mundane situations do not involve heroes, nor do they involve the material which makes for headlines. But they are common, and they occur with distressing frequency. Those in subordinate positions need the knowledge that they will be supported. not punished, for reporting incidents which indicate the improper actions of a senior. All “eyewitnesses" should be as fortunate as Admiral Dixon was.
“Sharpening the Claws of the
Tomcat”
(See A. Hanley, pp. 109-112, June 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Mac Flecnoe, U. S.Navy— Mr. Hanley states: “In the Libyan incident over the Gulf of Sidra last year, the E-2 Hawkeyes and radars never saw the incoming Su-22 'Fitters’—the first warning of their run came from the F-14s’ own radar." Not so! This inaccurate statement reflects information contained in a report published in the 7 August 1981 Aviation Week and Space Technology, which was also incorrect.
Carrier Airborne Early-Warning Squadron (VAW)-124 E-2C acquired and automatically tracked the section of Su-22s as they proceeded from Libya. The vector to intercept was under positive E-2C control, and indeed, although the F-14s held the Su-22s on their radars, they never assumed their own control of the intercept from the E-2C. The intercept was conducted from start to finish under positive E-2C control.
It is only natural to become fixated on the marvelous and awesome F-14 as a weapon system, particularly in this, its first experience in a genuine combat environment. It is important to remember, however, that the carrier air wing concept is built on teamwork. whereby the value of the whole is synergistically increased to some figure far greater than the sum of its parts by the interaction of its various aircraft.
“Whiskey on the Rocks”
(See D. W. Given and W. Cashman, pp. 11215, April 1982: R. C. Suggs, p. 84, July 1982 Proceedings)
Michael J. Clowes—One must wonder at the presence of nuclear-tipped torpedoes on such a vintage vessel as the “Whiskey”-class submarine stranded in Swedish waters. Why would nuclear topedoes be included in the armament of a non-first-line submarine?
Their presence seems to suggest that the Soviets intend to use tactical nuclear weapons at any level of conflict. They also suggest that if a U. S. major combatant came into the sights of a “Whiskey"-class submarine at any stage of a conflict, the nuclear torpedo would be used. A “Whiskey" captain is going to use his most powerful weapon to kill his target with the first shot, because with his old craft he might not get another chance.
All the arguments in favor of the big carriers and the battleships stress their survivability. But if the Soviets are prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons early, then these ships have little better survivability than any other surface ship.
More ships rather than larger ones would seem to be a better investment.
“The Gulf of Sidra Incident”
(Sef D. R. Neutze. pp. 26-31, January 1982: J. R. McFaul. p. 42. May 1982: P. E. Beck, p. 80. July 1982 Proceedings)
Barrett Tillman— Lieutenant McFaul states, “The United States cannot claim self-defense if the Libyan attack had no chance of success." While the missile shot was foolish, who is to say it had no chance of success, and who decides at what point probability theory crosses the line to become threatening? McFaul presumes to educate us upon the technological advantages enjoyed by the Tomcat crews in both aircraft and armament, implying that VF-41 somehow took unfair advantage of the Libyan “Fitters."
Instead of wringing our hands over presumed legal niceties, upon which practically nobody (except perhaps Colonel Kaddafi) can agree, let’s examine what happened. I participated in a Tailhook debrief of the second VF-41 crew, and the following scenario evolved:
On 18 August 1981, the first day of the exercise, about 40 intercepts were made on Libyan aircraft. These ranged from full-fledged air combat maneuvering (ACM) practice between F-4s, F-14s, and Libyan fighters to sedate formation-flying photo sessions. The rules of engagement permitted U. S. aircraft to shoot only under two well- defined contingencies: (I) if fired upon, and (2) if ordered to engage a specific Libyan aircraft. In the event of multiple adversaries, a two-plane element was to be considered hostile if one of the bandits fired (which is what happened). but a nearby Libyan section which did not become aggressive was to be left alone.
This only makes sense, does it not? If a hostile element leader shoots at you, it seems the height of optimistic folly to assume his wingman means you no harm. No aircrews or task force commanders of my acquaintance are inclined to be as charitable as Lieutenant McFaul would presumably have them become.
Remember, there were some 40 engagements on the first day, with no sign of hostility from the Libyans, who were within their rights to overfly the exercise area. When the two Tomcats turned southward on the morning of 19 August to meet the inbound “Fitters," the wingman’s radar intercept operator anticipated another conventional joinup with either ACM or formation-flying, and in fact was unlimbering his camera when the lead Su-22 fired. The fact that the Libyan shot a heat-seeker nose-to-nose marks him as stupid, but not as harmless.
Now comes the crunch. Nobody claims the Su-22 is a match for an F-14. But by what Olympian detachment does an American naval officer criticize U. S. pilots for defending themselves within the rules of engagement from an unprovoked attack? The Tomcat’s superiority over the Su-22 seems to me wholly irrelevant. Would it make any difference if a Libyan Mirage or MiG-23 had launched that missile? Should the F- 14s have reversed course, offering the Libyans a clear heat source for a follow-up shot? Imagine the reaction at the Indy 500 if the second-place driver pointed an accusing finger at the winner and whined, "Unfair! His car is faster than mine!" That person would be hooted out of town with the derision he deserved. In the Sidra case, the one contention is as absurd as the other.
Lieutenant McFaul contends that the U. S. task force sought to exclude
The Libyans elected not to send their best fighters up against F-14s, and instead had their Su-22 “Fitters” fire on the U. S. Navy’s best.
Libyan aircraft from using international airspace. Here again, we enter the realm of hair-splitting. By intercepting and flying formation with Libyan aircraft, were American fighters denying the Libyans their rights under international law? If the Libyans themselves made such a claim, it did not come to my attention. The U. S. practice merely seems prudent to warn other aircraft away from the potential danger of a live missile shoot. And if that’s the case, what’s all the excitement about?
“Conventional Aerial Bombing
and the Law of War”
(Str W. H. Parks, pp. 98-117. May 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John E. Jackson, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy—Colonel Parks states that “protection of the civilian population not taking a direct part in the hostilities is the responsibility of both the attacker and the defender.” It can be argued that both the Japanese and American governments failed to take this fact into consideration with regards to a little- known World War II Japanese attack on the U. S. mainland in which more than 9.000 intercontinental weapons were launched. These weapons carried a destructive payload of incendiary, anti-personnel, and high-explosive bombs; and it has been estimated that as many as 1,000 "FU-GO" weapons actually reached the North American continent during the six- month attack.
The fact that this attack is little- known nearly 40 years later can be attributed to two factors. First, during the war. a news blackout was imposed on the dissemination of any information regarding the attack, which kept the general population from knowing of the assault. Second, the delivery system used was so unusual and unbelievable that even today many people consider the attack to be more myth than fact. The unique delivery system consisted of paper-skinned hydrogen- filled balloons!
The "FU-GO" balloons were about 30 feet in diameter and contained 13.000-18,000 cubic feet of hydrogen. They used an ingenious automatic ballasting system to compensate for the changes in lift brought about by the day/night cycle during the balloons four-to-six-day transpacific flight. When heated by the sun. the balloons would rise to an altitude ot 40.000 feet; at night, the gas would cool and contract, dropping the balloon to about 30.000 feet. At the lowest point, ballast would be dropped, and the balloon would rise back to cruising altitude. Thus, the balloons hopped across the Pacific until all ballast had been dropped. At this point, the weapon would arm and drop its destructive payload, hopefully destroying military targets or starting fires in the rich forests of the Pacific Northwest.
It is clear that little concern was shown for the safety of civilian noncombatants. Parks' article discusses the unfortunate collateral damage that occurs with aerial bombing because of the bombardier's inability to control the impact of his bombs within a few feet. The "FU-GO” balloon bombs were launched against an entire continent, with no control whatsoever upon the weapons' point of impact.
And while the enemy clearly failed to protect the lives of civilian noncombatants, the U. S. Government made an unfortunate decision which resulted in the only deaths by enemy action to occur in the United States during World War II.
The "FU-GO" attacks began late in 1944, and several malfunctioning balloons were soon recovered intact in Wyoming and Montana. The War Department determined that the potential for starting massive forest fires was the most immediate threat, but of even greater concern was the possibility that the “FU-GO” balloons might deliver biological weapons. Special teams of firefighters and biologists were sent to the Pacific Northwest: they operated in secrecy. The authorities feared that a population which lay vulnerable to attack by a silent and deadly weapon might panic. Thus, while maintaining such secrecy, the government failed- to protect the lives of its civilian noncombatants.
In May 1945, a group of hikers cam upon a "FU-GO" bomb which had malfunctioned and crashed in the mountains of Oregon. Because of the information blackout, they were unaware of the threat posed by the strange-looking apparatus, and during the course of their investigations, the weapon exploded, killing a woman and five children. Following this unfortunate incident, the War Department decided that the safety of the population demanded the publication of a warning regarding the danger represented by the bombs. This was accomplished by word-of-mouth and the distribution of information bulletins that were carefully worded so as to deny the enemy information on the success of their efforts.
While the news blackout contributed indirectly to six fatalities, it also resulted in the termination of the project by the Japanese. Unable to obtain proof that any of the balloons were actually arriving on target, the "FU- GO” project was considered a failure and terminated in April 1945.
In retrospect, the balloon bombs appear to have been a rather frivolous and whimsical undertaking, but on closer analysis it can be seen that the “FU-GO" project represented the first instance in history when a nation launched weapons across thousands of miles of ocean to attack the enemy on his own territory.
“Unmarked Cars of the Fleet”
(See C. A. Abel, pp. 103-105. June 1982 Proceedings)
“Hip Boots or Blue Water? An Examination of the U. S. Coast Guard and Its Future”
(See R. G. Moore, pp. 182-197. May 1982 Proceedings)
John C. Snedeker—Lieutenant Abel’s "unmarked cars” idea is certainly a good one, and he is quite correct— there are plenty of suitable vessels under detention. However, there are some major problems that Abel did not address. First, it takes an interminable length of time for the government to get the vessel clear of the judicial process—well over a year in most cases—and during this period of dead storage, vandals and lack of maintenance take their toll. Second, many of the vessels are older wooden-hulled fishing boats that were committed to the drug trade, in part, because they were on their last legs. For example, there is a small British freighter which has been docked for almost a year at a commercial fishing pier next to the marina where I live. She is fitted out as a yacht and is loaded with avionics. While most of the shrimp boats under restraint are older wooden boats, the little freighter is steel, so at least her hull won't be riddled with borers and worms when the court finally decides her fate. But it will have been more than a year since any of her equipment has been operated. I don’t think Lieutenant Abel would be happy taking her to sea without a complete overhaul. Spare parts for the nonstandard engine and other equipment would also be a problem. Lieutenant Abel also overlooked the fact that most of these vessels are mortgaged to banks, so those liens have to be paid.
Lieutenant Abel is really saying that the Coast Guard has the law enforcement mission, but has not been given the ships, aircraft, surveillance equipment, personnel, operating funds, or enough cooperation from Congress to carry it out. Captain Moore addresses this situation very well.
Congress has made a few small and tentative moves toward greater use of Department of Defense (DoD) assets in this “war.” Two Grumman E-2Cs were deployed over the Florida Straits last year as an “experiment” to see whether they could identify and track small vessels and low-flying aircraft. They can, but interception is still required on the sea or on land. Congress also amended the Fiscal Year 1982 Defense Appropriation Act, as mentioned by Captain Moore, to remove some of the legal restraints on the use of military units. Obviously, a massive commitment of naval surface ships and aircraft could seal off the invaders from our coasts in short order, and with only a relatively small increase in operating funds. Such deployments could also serve as worthwhile training missions.
But. if we have to make do with small, inexpensive escalations of the "war,” by all means make use of the seized vessels. We must be able to use them immediately following seizure, and Congress can make that possible. If Congress will is another question.
There is another alternative: Commission suitable yachts and commercial vessels as Coast Guard Reserve units, as was done just prior to World War II. My father's high-speed 60- footer was commissioned in the summer of 1941, with my father as commanding officer and several of his friends and one regular Coast Guardsman as crew. For many months after Pearl Harbor, these yachts were virtually our only means of detecting the German submarines operating in our Atlantic coastal waters.
Today’s yachts are far better equipped than the 1941 fleet, and in most respects, would be far more reliable and efficient than an ill-maintained shrimp boat that had been tied to a pier for a year or so.
The yachts could be used in the coastal waters for both law enforcement and rescue missions. Crews could be a mix of civilians commissioned as Coast Guard reservists (including the owner), local marine police, and Coast Guard people. They should be armed and equipped with tactical communications equipment. With the owner on board, the yacht would probably be better maintained, and local knowledge would be much greater than is the case with most Coast Guard crews.
They would not all have to be highspeed boats. Many of the boats in the 1941 fleet were sailboats which were used for detection rather than attack. The ability to deploy sufficient numbers of surveillance units off coastal areas that have so many inlets, such as Georgia’s and South Carolina’s, would produce a major gain in intercepts.
Moore reflected my view of the problem when he said, “the United States has been extremely casual about its borders and the control of what and who crosses them. It would be idle to speculate upon the length of time that such casualness will continue, but it is hard to accept that we will live with the present condition indefinitely." A reexamination of our priorities is long overdue: the enemy is not only east of the Iron Curtain, he is coming ashore up and down our coasts every day and every night of the yeai\ and it’s time we went on the offensive.
“The BB(V)”
(See J. C. Antoniotti, pp. 99-100, February 1982 Proceedings)
Ensign Anthony Gurnee, U. S. Navy— When the USS New Jersey (BB-62) is recommissioned in 1983, how will she be used? In my opinion, the Iowa-class battleships have only two feasible missions: (I) as gunfire support ships for amphibious operations, in line with Tirpitz’s idea that a warship is a mobile gun platform; and (2) as propaganda tools to impress American citizens, boost Navy enlistments, and scare natives of Third World countries who don't realize their own “Osa”-class gunboats or “Foxtrot”- class submarines could severely damage the behemoth anchored in their harbor.
The New Jersey is scheduled to go on a world cruise after she is recommissioned and may develop a reputation as the showpiece of the U. S. Navy, the pride of America, much as HMS Hood enjoyed with the British between the two World Wars. If the New Jersey then emerges from overhaul as an understrength battleship/ V/ STOL-carrier/ cruise-missile ship that doesn’t do anything very well, she could very well be misused, winding up the victim of a gunboat or submarine from such notable countries as Libya or Iran. If this happened, we would have some explaining to do, as the British had when the Hood went down.
The real value of the /mva-class battleships is in their big guns. To remove any of them would be a mistake.
“UNITAS: Exercising a Mutual
Strength”
(See J. Holt and T. E. Pallas, pp. 105-107,
June 1982 Proceedings)
James P. Davis—I noted with great regret the failure to give any credit to VR-52, Detachment Detroit, the U. S. Naval Reserve Logistics Support Squadron. A combination of reserve and temporary active duty reserve personnel of this outfit have provided the UNITAS exercise with two C-l 18 Liftmaster aircraft for eight consecutive years. The support provided by the “green-tailed birds” for both the regular Navy, and reserves worldwide is legendary. For the officers and men of VR-52 Det Detroit, I feel they justly deserve a “well done.” (Editors Note: VR-52's detachment in Detroit was recently disestablished; the squadron—headquartered in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania—is still active as a Naval Reserve unit.)