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Contents:
Is Technology the Culprit?
Strategic Choice and Maritime Capabilities
FMF for the RDF
The Gulf of Sidra Incident
On the Road to Mandalay Pride in Her Name
Tomahawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix
Fighters That Never Got to the Fight
Stages of Memogenesis
Combat Readiness: Naval Air vs.
Air Force
Forgotten Lessons of Riverine Warfare
The Inner Leadership of West Germany’s Military
Warrant Officers: Use Them or Lose Them
A Chaplain Speaks to Commanding Officers
The Facts Behind the Thunder
The U. S. Navy: State of the Fleet
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Eyewitness
Whiskey on the Rocks
Battle at Hue City Jellicoe
March 1982 Issue
“Is Technology the Culprit?”
(See J. R. Seesholtz, pp. 46-50, June 1982
Proceedings)
Commander J. L. MacMichael, U. S. Navy—Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci’s memorandum of 30 April 1981 recognized that misuses of technology exist. This memorandum, which addressed “improving the acquisition process,” included as an acquisition management principle the examination of “evolutionary alternatives which use a lower risk approach to technology than solutions at the frontier of technology.” So it would seem that OSD leadership realizes the potential pitfalls of total reliance on technology and is committed, on paper at least, to a balanced approach. The wide range of this approach can be seen by two recent proposals: one, to modernize mothballed battleships and send them to sea carrying cruise missiles, and two, to use drone missiles as antisubmarine warfare weapons. In the second proposal, the missile would fly out to the enemy submarine, drop sonobuoys, and—based on information from them—drop a weapon which would destroy the ship. The first proposal has been adopted while the second has not; the point is that someone, somewhere, had to evaluate and judge both proposals.
I do not agree with the author’s contention that financially based analysis mortgages our future; fiscal constraints are a fact of life (as they were in the past decade) and mortgaging the future is a part of the national political process. The criticism of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) should be viewed in the context in which that body operates; it deals with fewer than 50 acquisition programs of all the services. As might be expected, cost is a major factor in the selection of programs, and, given the size of the programs, is a fact of life. (Churchill reputedly remarked that democracies are inefficient.) I do not agree with the statement that “many of the reviewers hold only vague knowledge . . . and are swayed by the most glib advocates.” While glibness is an obvious attribute to any presen
ter, many more reviewers do have quite broad and detailed knowledge in their area of expertise. It takes more than mere glibness to “tap dance” past these individuals; it takes homework and a solid program.
Other “culprits” exist as well. The systems analysis approach and fiscal realities tend to limit available resources. It would be better if those major projects which are started were given enough personnel and funding resources to provide a high degree of confidence that the project can be completed (or at least reach the next milestone) without extra funding—remembering that additional funds take two years to get in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) process. This implies having enough cash reserves, which has not always been the case.
The Navy has been overhauling destroyers since the turn of the century, and the uninformed might think with this much experience in a repetitive process that the costs of each overhaul could be identified in advance. However, it has been usual to reserve 15-25% of the overall budgeted funds for “unknowns” which will appear later in the overhaul process. With this experience, it would seem logical that a weapons acquisition program, which is often a first-time process, would have proportionally higher funding reserves to deal with “unknown unknowns.” Logical, yes, but not always true; funding reserves rarely reach 15%. The options open to a program manager who meets an expensive “unknown unknown” after the limited funds are used are: (1) stretch out the program to operate within funds, (2) reduce the capability of the systems, or (3) end the program. Under the circumstances, the first choice is usually the least damaging, and it lengthens the process.
Establishing consistent priorities in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations is a sine qua non if procurement activities, including acquisition project managers, are to spend their time overseeing acquisition processes. Yet, there are many examples of programs which have been can-
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celled after expending significant personnel resources at various systems commands. In short, identify the projects most desired early and focus the technical talent and available resources on seeing them through.
Definite priorities and enough resources would permit decentralized execution and reduce management layering. A program manager in the Naval Sea Systems Command will normally go through a number of formal reviews before a DSARC. Each review has the power to stop further reviews until the desired changes take place. The average time to complete these reviews, which accompany the milestones of major weapons systems, is six months. In short, the program manager spends much of his time explaining what he is doing rather than doing it. There is no evidence these reviews have done anything but lengthen the process. And each management layer uses scarce personnel resources which could be “doing” rather than “reviewing.” Implied in the proposed solutions are strengthening the manager’s authority and responsibility, and a recognition of possible failure. A certain percentage will fail. This risk exists throughout the country; ships sink, planes crash, and cars collide. But, we do not replace captains, pilots, or drivers with committees to weigh each decision because, among other reasons, it is wasteful to do so. The analogy appears to be transferable to the weapons system acquisition process.
Last, we should be aware of our national fixation with “wonder weapons.” The McNamara line (electronic sensors across the Vietnamese boundary) is but one example; we elected to try to lower personnel casualties with an electronic sensor network. Given a choice between incurring personnel casualties or procuring more expensive systems, we Americans seem to choose the latter. This tendency drives our systems toward increased sophistication and technology.
“Strategic Choice and Maritime Capabilities”
(See J. Eberle, pp. 64-72, April 1982; V.
Wolf, pp. 79-80, June 1982 Proceedings)
Edward J. Bender, Jr., National Security Planning Officer, U. S. Maritime Administration—Admiral
Eberle’s article is both a superb explanation of the dilemma that is facing NATO maritime planners today and an eye-opening description of the hard choices our leaders must make in the future.
As I read the article, I thought how incredible Eberle’s timing was when he said, “Western countries must not be blind to the military contribution of merchant shipping in war.” At that very moment, the British cruise ship Canberra was sailing for the South Atlantic with 2.000 Royal Marines on board, and a British containership was being outfitted in the United Kingdom as a makeshift aircraft carrier, complete with ski-jump ramp and 20 Harrier aircraft—the same configuration that is depicted in the advertisement on page 124 of the April issue.
The Navy and the Maritime Administration have a program to make modifications to U. S. merchant ships to allow them to be quickly converted to transport or supply vessels in time of war. The program, known as the National Defense Features (NDF) Program, allows the U. S. Government to enhance our merchant vessels in the ways that Admiral Eberle suggests. Unfortunately, funding has not been available to implement the NDF Program on a fleet-wide basis. If the funding does materialize, the United States would be able to stand tall and declare that it did its part to achieve the goals that Admiral Eberle and others would like to see accomplished.
“FMF for the RDF”
(See M. L. Cover, pp. 51-55, June 1982
Proceedings)
Colonel John G. Miller, U. S. Marine Corps—While advancing his proposals for the enhancement of the credibility of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) Commander Cover correctly points to the requirement for a bedrock of forcible entry capability represented by amphibious forces. If the necessary doors are not held open by host nations, they might have to be kicked open. Aside from the specialized potential of the airborne forces, the amphibs and their embarked Marines constitute our sole means of projecting combat power overseas against opposition.
Nevertheless, in the process of suggesting reallocation of resources and alteration of roles and missions, force structures, and command relation-
ships, the article tosses out a number of healthy babies in a cascade of murky bathwater, then goes on to refill the tub with neither babies nor fresh water. How will the proposed deactivations offset the severe shortfalls (especially in strategic mobility and amphibious lift assets) that have largely caused the RDF and prepositioning options to be considered in the first place? And how will such a diminishment of capabilities serve to make the RDF a more credible force?
The water has been further muddied by a number of apparent misperceptions. Foremost among these is the notion that the RDF and its associated strategic mobility enhancement programs are focused exclusively on Southwest Asia. To be sure, recent events have brought the region to the forefront of concern, but the need to safeguard U. S. interests overseas remains a global one. As mobility enhancement programs mature, for example, the stationing of multiple Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Forces becomes more of a possibility.
The notion that Marine Corps “light infantry” should be restructured into a “mobile, mechanized ground force” and “should have no other role except in the RDF” reemerges like the Ghost of Christmas Past, echoing the call of the 1970s for everyone to beef up and play NATO. It also resurrects old roles- and-missions issues that have long since been put to bed (to the general relief of all concerned). It also sows the seeds of contradiction within the article itself, by attempting to blur the statutory responsibility of the Marine Corps for development and conduct of amphibious warfare, which the author later highlights as a necessary adjunct to the RDF concept. It also misrepresents both the current capabilities of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs)—which in their Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) and Marine amphibious force (MAF) configurations tend to match the total combat power of mechanized units—and all the programmed enhancements (e.g., M-198 howitzer, light armored vehicle, mobile protected weapon system) to both firepower and mobility. Worst of all, perhaps, the “light infantry” assertion also fails to show awareness of the long-time practice of task organizing MAGTFs for anticipated contingencies. For example, the 7th MAB, linked with the Expanded Near Term Prepositioning Force, is armor and mechanized heavy as compared with a notional MAB.
The proposal for the deactivation of “all Marine Corps aviation units” except “helicopter squadrons and the A-4/AV-8 close support squadrons” is similarly ill-conceived. It appears to disregard the extensive role of the air control and logistic support infrastructure of Marine aviation, as well as the capability that would be lost by the deactivation of flying units. Since no one has, for years, demonstrated that a surfeit of national tactical air (TacAir) assets exists, it could only be expected that a capabilities gap would result—unless, of course, “U. S. NAVY” were to be painted on the sides of the deactivated Marine aircraft. If so, where is the savings? All we see here is the arbitrary dismantling of a unique and combat-tested air/ground package, which has for decades been the envy of the world's armed forces. Further, the notion that the Marine infantryman competes directly with the aviator for funding is off base. Marine Corps aviation is funded with “blue” dollars, as part of the total naval aviation package. The “grunt,” funded with “green” dollars, competes in a separate arena.
The proposal to deactivate the 82nd Airborne Division is also specious, focusing on limitations instead of the full range of capabilities such a unit has. Amphibious and airborne forces represent our only means of forcible entry and can create a synergistic effect when they work in tandem. Airborne forces have a strong developmental impact, through their continuous work with the Air Force on air transportability and air delivery means for both men and materiel. They widen the range of options of a joint task force commander. There is a nonquantitative value associated with airborne units—which serve as magnets for the hard-chargers sought by both the Army and the Marines—as well. With tongue only partially in cheek, one could readily rue the day when the paratroopers’ lament (“Just think about all them other miserable sum- bitches in this world, walking around day after day with nothin’ to jump out of!”) finally came to apply to the paratroopers themselves.
This may all boil down to a matter of perception. Rather than attribute strategic mobility enhancement options solely to myopic “best-case” thinking, it might be fairer to award
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credit for attempting to make a virtue of necessity, wherever possible. Under ideal conditions, a large, self-contained amphibious presence in a threatened area—backed up by a formidable sea and air pipeline capability that could be turned on like a fire hose—would cover a lot of our bets. Since we are at best years away from attaining such a capability, we must try to make do with forward deployments of smaller forces and try to provide whatever hedges we can through prepositioning. Under the right conditions, the combination of amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces shows great potential for rapid force buildup in distant areas. If, in the objective area, the door has to be kicked open through forcible entry, a single marine amphibious unit (MAU) will probably lack the resources and sustainability to seize and hold a port/ airfield complex of any size against opposition of any significance. Thus, the argument for a continuous MAU presence in any theater of operations has no absolute basis. A better approach is to rely on the inherent flexibility of naval forces to enable for- ward/deployed MAGTFs of MAU and MAB size to converge in timely fashion at a scene of crisis to prepare, in conjunction with naval forces, for the introduction of follow-on forces.
By enhancing our amphibious capability to create openings for follow- on forces, we can increase our overseas deployment options without being forever tied to benign environments. Conversely, by allowing even more erosion of that capability, we narrow our crisis-response options. The erosion has spread to related areas, such as medical, mine countermeasures, and naval gunfire support, as well.
(Continued on page 80)
The formidable expense of rebuilding and modernizing a degraded national amphibious capability cannot be met by attempts to juggle a declining inventory of assets already in hand, no matter how adroit the anticipated use of blue lights and mirrors. (“Ya wanna blue suit? . . . Step under the blue light.”) Ultimately, a real commitment and a higher sense of priority are required.
“The Gulf of Sidra Incident”
(See D. R. Neutze. pp. 26-31. January 1982;
J. R. McFaul. p. 42. May 1982 Proceedings)
Preston E. Beck—My knowledge of international law is too limited to debate the legal aspects of the presence of a U. S. fleet in or near the Gulf of Sidra. However, showing the flag has been a long-standing form of diplomacy. In any event. Lieutenant McFaul is in error about the reality of that situation. A major factor which faced the F-14 pilots was time. Decisions had to be made in seconds, and there was no time available to ask advice from higher authority at each step of the events.
The mission of fighter cover is to protect the fleet. A lack of such cover has proved costly to the British recently. The F-14 pilots regarded the attack on them at the Gulf of Sidra as a serious threat and took the correct course of action.
The logic behind McFaul’s statement, “In a peacetime incident, there is no justification for shooting down the second plane,” completely escapes me. The F-14 pilots saw at least two targets and were fired upon by at least one of them. Any assumption that the other target would not also attack would have been a risk and, in my opinion, downright stupid.
“On the Road to Mandalay Where the Old ISIC Lay . .
{See T. L. Jacobs, p. 98. April 1982 Proceedings)
“Pride in Her Name”
(See S. L. Morison, pp. 115-118. June 1982 Proceedings)
Captain B. D. Dunn, U. S. Navy—1 would like to add my wholehearted support to that of Captain Jacobs for a return to traditional naval terminology, a language understood in the world of seafarers.
1 would go further than Captain Jacobs, however. A battle group would again be called a carrier task force or an amphibious task force as applicable.
and the mobile logistic support force would again become a service squadron. The new designation of unaccompanied personnel housing (enlisted) (UPH [E]) and UPH (O) for officers for bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQs) and Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQs) respectively would go right out the window.
In the same vein, for as long as I can remember, until the introduction of the fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarines, it has been traditional that the relationship of the ship type and its name had meaning. As a boy growing up in a Navy town, when someone talked about the USS New Jersey (BB- 62) I knew it was a battleship. By the same token. I knew the Essex (CVA- 9) was an aircraft carrier, the Archerfish (SS-311) was a submarine, and so on. We should return to that tradition.
Samuel L. Morison states the case well for returning to this tradition and cleaning up the mess we now find ourselves in. Mr. Morison points out two interesting facts: In May 1898. an act of Congress established as law the criteria for naming ships; in 1938, the Secretary of the Navy, with presidential approval, announced that "a definitive policy has been formulated to supplement existing law and established customs for the naming of certain type ships." This policy supplemented the Act of 1898.
Isn't it interesting that in 1898 order was given to the naming of naval ships and that it only was modified once— in 1938—until chaos struck in the 1960s. It should also be noted that in the 14th edition of the Bluejackets' Manual battleships are named for states by act of Congress.
Recognizing that during the past 20 years we have had many changes in the inventory of ships commissioned in the Navy, there are still basic types and still a need for order in the naming of new ships. I don't believe that a wholesale renaming of existing ships should be undertaken; it would only create more confusion. I would, however. propose returning to the rules for selection of ships’ names that appear on pages 313-315 of the 18th edition of the Bluejackets’ Manual. State names would be authorized only for battleships. Names selected for new battleships would be in alphabetical order, Arizona excepted.
New classes of ships would either be categorized into one of the existing groups, or if it was a totally new class, name selection would be from a category not then in use. One such category could be Medal of Honor winners regardless of service. Under no circumstances would ships be named after a living person.
Captain Jacobs, Mr. Morison. and I are seeking the same thing: a return to tradition in areas that have been arbitrarily changed and when such a return will have no adverse effect on the operation of the Navy. Some things can be changed by the stroke of a pen. Just as battle groups can be changed to carrier task forces by a notice, the method of naming ships can be changed immediately to bring order out of chaos. While it will be some years before all the names are back on track, at least the procedure will be as it should be.
During the last decade, many people have asked the question, “Where have all the heroes gone?” I ask “Where have all our customs and traditions gone?” Did they all go with the advent of the Z-grams? I’ll bet when the ship's cook left Captain Jacob's ship he even took "Charlie Noble” with him. As for the issue raised by Mr. Morison on naming ships, the recent Corpus Cliristi flap is a good example of the mess we have gotten ourselves into.
“Eyewitness”
(See R. Mason, pp.40-45. June 1982 Proceedings
Yoya Kawamura —Although it is a well-known fact that throughout World War II the Japanese Imperial Navy was engaging in intelligence-gathering activities in neutral countries, such as Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden, the Chicago Tribune article in question obviously escaped the notice of Jap-
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anese Naval Intelligence. So far as could be ascertained, no attempt was ever made by the Imperial Navy’s signal branch to change its top-secret code under the designation of ha-ango (Code—C), in spite of the debacle of the Battle of Midway. The statement in “Eyewitness” that “the Japanese Navy was continuing to use the cracked code (after the Battle of Midway). . . ” appears to be correct.
Code-C seems to have been in use without any modification till the beginning of April 1943. The Imperial Navy began to suspect early in 1943 that the code might have fallen into enemy hands, as a result of the loss of the two submarines, “1-1" and “1-3,” in waters around Guadalcanal. The code was changed simultaneously with the launching of i-go sakusen (Operation- A), in which about 200 aircraft with crack pilots, normally based on the carriers belonging to the Third Fleet, were flown to Rabaul to undertake large-scale air offensives against Allied bases in the Solomons and eastern New Guinea, a last-ditch attempt by the Japanese to regain the long-lost air superiority in those areas.
On 18 April 1943, in connection with Operation-A, the Betty bomber carrying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, was waylaid and shot down by U. S. Army fighters over the island of Bougainville. All the historical dates 1 have used are Tokyo dates; it was the Japanese Imperial Navy’s practice to disregard totally the International Date Line. The message, informing the Japanese forward bases of the Admiral’s inspection trip, had been transmitted on 13 April, using the CodeC which had been changed barely two weeks before. Now it is believed that this was the message cracked by U. S. Naval Intelligence, leading to the success of the U. S. operation and the death of Admiral Yamamoto. Some Japanese still refuse to believe this, citing the short messages using a lower- level code exchanged between the commanding officers of the two seaplane bases on 14 April, in regard to the admiral’s itinerary.
The Japanese were staggered, and still are, by this code-breaking incident. However, as far as the outcome of the Battle of Midway is concerned, they tend to belittle the role of American cryptanalysis in the U. S. victory. The focal point of the debate in the Japanese Naval High Command on whether to undertake capturing
Midway was: Would the U. S. Navy respond to the Japanese challenge and send out its precious carriers against the Japanese task force? Even nowadays, most Japanese Navymen strongly and steadfastly insist that the battle was lost to them not because of the superiority of U. S. tactics and fighting spirit but because of the inexplicable stupidity and indecision of their own admirals and staff officers. The scene on board the Japanese flagship Ycimato, tagging along 100 miles (!) behind Admiral Nagumo’s carrier task force, on the morning of 5 June 1942, has been described by many witnesses as officers and men literally dancing with joy at the news of the sighting of U. S. aircraft carriers. To them, U. S. carriers were nothing but choice prizes served on a platter, and their victory was a foregone conclusion. Japanese arrogance could be well attested to by the fact that they left behind in the home port one of their most powerful and modern aircraft carriers, the Zuikaku, simply because her sister ship Shokaku had sustained moderate damage in the Battle of Coral Sea the month before and was in no condition to form a battle group. This presented a striking contrast to the Americans who worked day and night to put the Yorktown (CV- 5), damaged in the same battle, back into fighting order in record time. The Japanese Navy should have paid greater heed to the saying of the famous Chinese strategist Sun-tzu: “Pride goes before a fall.”
“Tomahawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix”
(See P. G. Johnson, pp. 26-33. April 1982;
J. F. Bouchard, pp. 22-26. May 1982; R. P. Hansen and J. J. Tritten, pp. 18-20. June 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William T. Gray IV, U. S. Naval Reserve—One problem mentioned in Lieutenant Johnson’s article is the possibility that a ship with mixed Tomahawk tacti- cal/strategic capability may be suddenly detached from her normal naval task force and sent on a strategic mission, leaving a possible tactical weakness in the force left behind. It is highly unlikely that such an event would occur. The Tomahawk unit and the rest of the task force would be mutually supportive. A single Tomahawk unit strategically detached on a mission close to hostile shores would be in great danger, because her missile load and mission capability requirement conflict. A commander steaming to a launch position should expect an attack on his ship by hostile naval units. If he readied for firing Tomahawks all having strategic nuclear capability, he would have no appropriate defense from naval attack. If, on the other hand, he readied his ship completely with tactical Tomahawks for defense, he would not be prepared to pursue his land attack mission. A mix of tactical and strategic loading would weaken both of his capabilities. The commander would find himself in a worse predicament than the Japanese carrier commanders at Midway trying to ready themselves for land attack and naval defense at the same time. Trying to switch loads with the rapidly changing situation would likely be just as catastrophic now as it was in 1942.
The obvious solution would be to arm the Tomahawk unit for her strategic mission and protect her tacti-
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cally with the rest of the task force. Hence, I regard the decision as not being whether to detach specific Tomahawk units for a strategic mission, but whether to send the entire task force.
I fully agree that the mixed capability of the Tomahawk cruise missile provides severe problems in arms limitation negotiations. However, the advantage, this time, is on our side. We should use the Tomahawk's mixed mission ability to achieve strong leverage in negotiations. Before we take such steps as segregating platform types to ease our political enemy’s fears, let us achieve appropriate concessions from him in return. Too often we have given unilateral advantage too soon. Let's not give away our Tomahawk mission mix until we at least use it in negotiating!
“Whiskey on the Rocks”
(See D. W. Given and W. Cashman. pp. 112115, April 1982 Proceedings)
Robert C. Suggs—The presence of the senior authority on board the Soviet submarine “W-137” is not necessarily indicative of non-routine activity, in view of standard Soviet Navy training and operational practices.
According to Soviet Navy Regulations, a major responsibility of the Force CO is to personally train the COs of subordinate units. The Force CO. or a deputy designated as the senior officer on board, is obligated to regularly embark in all ships of the force to evaluate combat readiness. The Force CO. or his deputy, is fully responsible for the ship’s safety, and can assume command at any time he believes an action of the CO will endanger the ship.
tive areas of expertise. The nearly constant presence of these specialists is more easily understood if one considers that according to Soviet open sources some Soviet COs are lacking skills in areas such as navigation, considered to be fundamental in Western navies. Thus, they require support both prior to and during deployment.
In November 1978, Admiral A. P. Mikhailovsky, former CO of the Leningrad Naval Base and now Commander, Northern Fleet, published a very revealing article in Morskoy Sbornik, calling for the establishment of an extended six-step qualification process for COs. According to Mikhailovsky’s scheme—which is probably a statement of accepted policy— COs would only be able to operate independent of control of senior authorities after having held command for a minimum of three years, in addition to completing requisite examinations and a series of supervised voyages. During the supervised voyages, a CO would be accompanied by a captain-instructor who had demonstrated capability for the assumption of duties as the senior officer on board or deputy of the formation CO.
The bridge of a Soviet warship under way might appear crowded and chaotic to an uninitiated foreign observer, with CO, XO, formation CO or deputy, and staff specialists all present, prompting the question: “Who’s in charge?”
Therefore, it appears likely that the senior officer embarked in the “W-137”was either conducting normal training and supervision of the submarine’s CO, or was a staff specialist overseeing some particular technical aspect of the submarine’s operation along the Swedish coast. In the latter case, he may have had some direct responsibility for the submarine’s mission. The non-routine nature of the mission is clearly indicated by the submarine’s course, the location of the incident, the submarine’s obvious importance to the Soviets, and the severe punishment meted out to her skipper. The skipper. Captain 2nd Pyotr Gushin, received a sentence of three years under a “mild regimen.” for “failing to give the alarm when the submarine’s navigation instruments ceased to function correctly." The fate of the senior authority, who must certainly have shared responsibility for the incident, has not been reported as of this writing.
Staff specialists also routinely sail in Soviet warships, particularly on prolonged or non-routine deployments. Staff specialists are experts in the technical and administrative matters of specific shipboard departments. They have considerable authority in the Soviet Navy, issuing orders directly to department heads without prior approval of the ship’s CO. They exercise direct control over combat training, organization, maintenance, the rational use of supplies, spares and tools, and ensure that a shipboard department or service maintains a complete, current collection of all training, maintenance, and technical publications in their respec
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“Fighters That Never Got to the
Fight: Part Two”
(See J. O'Rourke, pp. 75-79. April 1982
Proceedings
R. H. Scheppler, Service Manager, Litton Industries —I enjoyed Captain O’Rourke’s article, but I would like to correct a few minor points. He makes the statement that some of the original F3Hs were barged down the Mississippi for scrap, and that this day still lingers in infamy and embarrassment for the McDonnell builders. This is not quite true. The planes were used for mechanic training because of their lack of power and poor engine choice. The engine choice was the Navy’s, not McDonnell's. McDonnell was on record as originally wanting to provide a twin-engine fighter rather than a single engine one and not wanting to use the inadequate Westinghouse engine.
I was associated with this project and also with the fuel controls designed for many of the engines of that period. First of all, the J-40 engine was a poor design, and second, the fuel control was inadequate and unreliable. The air inlet system on the original F3H was poorly designed as O’Rourke mentioned.
In defense of the Demon, it should be stated that in the late 1940s, this airplane pioneered many new items which have since been accepted on almost all other aircraft, such as the tail flying completely horizontal, an automatic missile firing system which brought the missiles out from the forward portion of the fuselage, aligned them, fired them, and retracted the missile firing platform within a few seconds, and the use of Hydrolube in a very high pressure hydraulic system.
O’Rourke also compared the J-71 engine in the original F3H-2 with the Pratt and Whitney J-57 used in F-8s, F-lOOs, F-4Ds, F-lOls, and F-102s. All these aircraft were later developments, as was the J-57. They were not flying or even close to flying at the time that the Demon was designed. The Allison J-71 was the best engine available at that time.
He did hit it right on the nose when he said that the J-71 had a lot of compressor problems which Allison blamed on the McDonnell air inlets and McDonnell blamed on the Allison engine characteristics. Both were right to some extent.
Stages of Memogenesis
FROM: Memorandum Control Officer
TO: Distribution
SUBJ: Stages of Memogenesis
(1) Memo Formulation Alert Area (MFAA): This is a region of executive/ managerial turbulence within which conditions are extremely unstable and formation of a major bureaucratic SNAFU is judged to be likely. A Memo Formulation Alert is issued at this time.
(2) Memo Depression: Tail-chasing and circular logic have created a primitive circulation pattern (clockwise for 0-5 and above, counterclockwise for 0-4 and below), and the central pressure of the logical chain of thought is decreasing. The incipient memo is barely developed at this stage.
(3) Memo Storm: A definite pattern now exists, and the environmentally acute observer will note the signs of an approaching memo, clouds of obscuring effort and an increase in draft (copies) in the vicinity of the memo- genitor. The final draft copy usually precipitates at this stage.
(4) Memopltoon: No evasion possible, you’re in it now. A full-blown memo is in distribution, and the only course of action is to attempt to minimize its effect. (Memo Havens will be the subject of a later memo). In the memophoon stage, the memogenitor is temporarily out of danger from the memo since it is now doing damage to others. This condition is referred to as being in the “eye of the memo.”
Note: It should be realized that, if conditions are propitious, events may get entirely out of hand and a Mega- Memophoon may result. These catastrophic events are uncommon but are noted for their wide region of effect and extreme instability.
(5) Memo-recurvative: This is not really a stage, per se, since not all memos recurve; however, in some respects, this can be the most dangerous stage of the memo’s existence. At this point, spin-off memos (SOMs) form, and the danger exists that either these or the original memo may impact upon the memogenitor unless he has taken proper precautions. This is known in staff parlance as feedback.
(6) Memolysis: The memo is no longer a threat and becomes of climatological interest only. At this stage, the conditions which led to formation of the original memo are forgotten, leaving you wide open for . . . you guessed it ... a MFAA.
Submitted by Cdr. J. G. Bodie, USN.
“Combat Readiness: Naval Air vs. Air Force”
(See S. W. Smith, pp. 41-45. February 1982; D. J. Kiely, pp. 200-203, May 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William A. Weronko, U. S. Navy—Having been assigned to an aircraft carrier’s engineering department, I gained some firsthand knowledge of the rigors of the life of the naval aviator. My fellow engineers and I felt that the Navy flyer did have too many extra duties that affected his ability to perform his most important warfare missions. The Navy’s emphasis weighed too heavily on the aviator being an officer rather than a competent pilot.
The Navy should form a new enlisted rating designated “naval aviator.” All present pilots and naval flight officers would be assigned a rate commensurate with their experience. The rate should then be opened to all qualified high school graduates, thereby using the superior reaction times of these younger men.
Such a program would undoubtedly expand the pool of aviators and save the Navy considerable cost. Also, the aviator could do what he is trained for without being burdened by the many unrelated jobs expected of a naval officer. Finally, such a conversion would give the surface line community expanded opportunities to do what they do best—lead, manage, and operate the surface ships of the fleet.
Colonel Donald F. Brackett, U. S.Air Force, Deputy Director, Personnel Proprams, Headquarters U. S. Air Force—Several of the statements in Lieutenant Smith’s article relating to Air Force training and policy are not totally accurate. Granted, holding back an Air Force undergraduate pilot training (UPT) student to a subsequent class is a more detailed administrative procedure than that used in the Navy, but such holdovers are easily accomplished and are in no way a “black mark” against a student “for practically his entire career." Holdovers are often necessary because of illness, injury, or emergency leave (as well as for training difficulties), and no stigma is attached to such actions.
“Pilots are sometimes rolled along with their class and get the rubber stamp as qualified at the end.” Air Force UPT students are subject to rigorous quality control procedures throughout training. These include frequent, mandatory proficiency milestones, six formal check flights, and the prerogative of supervisors to direct additional spot “progress check flights” at any time. In addition, grading any UPT sortie “unsatisfactory” automatically restricts a student’s training to that weak area until the deficiency is corrected or the student is dropped from the program. This procedure may or may not result in a holdover action, but no one is ever “rubber stamped” or graduated at a performance level below the required course training standard.
“The Navy emphasizes much more strongly than the Air Force that one is an officer first and an aviator second.” One of the three major purposes of UPT as stated on the syllabus is to conduct “officer development training to strengthen the graduates' leadership skills, officer qualities and understanding of the role of the Air Force pilot as an officer and supervisor.” The syllabus contains 27 hours of formal academics devoted specifically to subjects emphasizing the “officer first, aviator second” philosophy. As for the Navy officer fitness report having only one block devoted to airmanship, that’s one more than the Air Force officer effectiveness report has. The Air Force believes—as does the Navy—that one is an officer first and an aviator second.
Apart from these minor discrepancies, Lieutenant Smith's article was enjoyable, timely, and an effective catalyst for thought on an important military issue. Proceedings continues to publish some of the finest articles in this field.
“Forgotten Lessons of Riverine Warfare”
(See C. A. Abel, pp. 64-68, January 1982; R. Enrione, p. 20, April 1982; F. Steiner, p. 208. May 1982 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. F. McCauley, U. S. Navy, Commander, Cruiser- Destroyer Group Eight—Lieutenant Abel makes a number of impressive points concerning the "strategic importance” of maintaining a credible riverine force. However, there are some important gaps in his argument. First, I was puzzled as to why there was no mention of where or how riverine forces might be employed in the future. In practical terms (i.e., finite budgets, competing programs, etc.), our Navy must maintain the primacy of blue-water forces, those ships that will allow us to approach the enemy’s coast and eventually his waterways. Second, to cite a fictional account of the command and control architecture of the Mobile Riverine Force to support a proposed organization is fallacious. Having been an active player of the Mobile Riverine Force (at the same time as the Army major whom Abel quotes) both as a river assault squadron commander and as an operational staff member to the commander, I found Lieutenant Abel’s comments clearly off the mark. That this type of casual analysis is found in a professional magazine makes me wonder if the “institutional amnesia” is as universal as the article claims.
“Battle at Hue City”
(Sff K. W. Nolan, pp. 51-58, April 1982
Proceedings)
Frank Koch—I am impressed with the diligent and professional report of this battle by Mr. Nolan. The depth of his investigation and easy writing style should make the parents of this young man very proud. This effort also speaks well for the interviewees and their ability to recall events that occurred 14 years ago.
“Jellicoe”
(See J. O. Coote, pp. 99-100. April 1982
Proceedings)
Samuel B. Hughes—I take exception to several of Captain Coote’s statements in his review. He states that the High Seas Fleet “ventured out only nine times ...” I refer him to Marder and his Dreadnought Series, Volume III in which three appearances are cited.
In his final paragraph, he states that “the question was not answered until 24 May 1941.” The cause of the sinking of the Hood has not been totally resolved, even today. Some say it was because of ammunition stored on the decks exploding, others that it was because of penetration by AP shells from the German ship through the Hood's three decks to the magazine below. Jackie Fisher's statement, "less ammo, more speed, means greater protection,” should be borne in mind.
The answer to Beatty’s implied question—"What is the matter with our bloody ships today?”—lies in part with the British Admiralty adopting the Dreyer system of gun control before World War I rather than the Pollen system. This matter has long been covered up by the Admiralty.
The final quote in the final paragraph of the review and not credited by the reviewer to the author, belongs to Winston Churchill.
“The Inner Leadership of West
Germany’s Military”
(See C. K. Dalgleish. pp. 78-79. February
1982 Proceedings)
Commander Dieter Stockfisch, Federal German Navy—Innere Fiihrung (inner leadership) is the all-embracing basic concept of the Bundeswehr, which has its roots in the defense mission of our armed forces and in our democratic state. It contains the entire range of fundamental guidelines and rules of behavior for the relations between the serviceman and society at large, and for the shaping of the armed forces’ internal order—including leadership, training, and education in the services.
This makes Innere Fiihrung a dynamic principle which penetrates all General Staff functional areas. By flexibly adapting to the continual evolution of the social, political, scientific, economic, and legal environment, Innere Fiihrung allows a form of leadership and management that is able to meet the challenges of our era.
There are, by the way, no specialists for Innere Fiihrung, since all servicemen—superiors and subordinates alike—both practice and subject themselves to this form of leadership.
“Warrant Officers: Use Them or Lose Them”
{See J. B. Hart. pp. 59-61. April 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Richard W. Pliillipson Jr., U. S. Navy—Mr. Hart cites "lack of challenge, lack of job satisfaction, and lack of respect” as being prime factors behind the exodus of warrant officers from the naval service. A closer look reveals that all three of these items are individually determined traits of behavior, items that even the best leadership cannot often overcome. Most men who say there is no challenge to their billet have not taken a good look at their immediate surroundings, as ream after ream of inspection results and assist team visit outlines reveal. Job satisfaction is, primarily, a much misused term. If the person enters into a billet he considers below his tenure and station, no matter how unrealistic he may be, there is no possible way to positively motivate him to excel in that position. Respect is most definitely a two-way street, something not automatically based on rank, but earned through constant demonstration of leadership and technical competence on a continuing basis. This is true of all who lead others.
Any warrant officer who becomes an administrative "flunky” deserves such a fate. The thing that Mr. Hart seems to have lost sight of is that the volume of correspondence regarding personal and professional matters is quite often too much for the division officer alone to handle. No matter the warrant officer’s title—assistant division officer/technical assistant—the workload must be shared.
The complaint that those who are good at their assignments seem to have more piled on is well taken and recognized by all. Any man who is proficient at his tasks earns the trust and consideration of superiors and finds himself in the limelight whenever a tough situation arises. If the stereotype of the warrant who has multitudes of time to tell jokes to the crew and leisurely wander through spaces exists, then I have yet to meet one in more than 20 years of service. Warrant officers I have encountered were sweat streaked, tired, overworked, and irritable—but secure in the knowledge that they were the only men available who knew how to make the situation "right” again.
For some of my warrant brethren, one of the biggest shocks of their naval careers was the realization that they had just stepped from the top of the enlisted authority structure to the lower military levels of the officer corps. Even though most of them had been extensively briefed on this fact prior to acceptance of their broken bars, the actual realization of such a situation resulted in short-term disillusionment followed by gradual acceptance of their position. Technical professionalism is beyond dispute in the warrant community; warrant officers are the epitome of their craft. But, as in all promotional systems, accommodation to new responsibilities and expectations that result from advancement is not painless. To let this adjustment become bitter means that the selection boards did not closely review the potential of its candidates in the area of continued maturation.
“A Chaplain Speaks to
Commanding Officers”
(See J. M. Doyle, pp. 58-61. February 1982;
J. M. Doyle, pp. 58-61. February 1982: J. D.
Ferguson, p. 206. May 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John W. Fer- rill, U. S. Navy (Retired)—During World War II, I was extremely fortunate to have a chaplain serving in the same ship. His very presence gave me reassurance that God was with us at all times and that somehow we would all come out of this mess alive. As a small boat officer assigned to an attack transport in the Pacific Theater. I witnessed the exemplary work done not only by the ship’s chaplain but also the chaplains serving with the assault troops. Invariably, these selfless men made themselves available whenever we wished to discuss spiritual or other pertinent problems. It brings tears to my eyes whenever I recall the edifying way these dedicated men worked round the clock, often without regard for their own personal safety, to bring comfort as well as the last rites to the wounded and dying in the nine major assault actions our ships participated in.
I could go on and on singing the praises of Navy chaplains. In my book, the chaplains are the unsung heroes of the Navy.
March 1982 Issue
Chief Boatswain’s Mate Charles W. Bond, U. S. Naval Reserve—Although I have frequently found myself in the role of devil’s advocate vis-avis Proceedings articles, this time I would simply like to express my appreciation for the March 1982 issue. It’s a superb job. Especially impressive is the work of Professor William Dowdy on Middle Eastern navies, of which I know a little something.
Well done to all hands!
“The Facts Behind the Thunder”
(See S. L. Morison, pp. 97-101. August 1981;
J. W. Grace, pp. 86-88, September 1981; G.
Glines, p. 91, October 1981; E. J. Grove, p.
20, December 1981; W. J. Ruhe. p. 20.
February 1982; D. Moore, pp. 73-76, March
1982 Proceedings)
“The U. S. Navy: State of the Fleet”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 105-108, February 1981;
H. W. Serig, pp. 82-83, June 1981; N.
Polmar, pp. 103-105, August 1981; J. W.
Grace, pp. 86-88. September 1981; G.
Glines, p. 91, October 1981; J. G. Miller, p.
17, November 1981; E. J. Grove, p. 20,
December 1981; D. Moore, pp. 73-76, March
1982 Proceedings)
Captain R. A. Bowling, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Eric Grove’s historical parallel between the construction of British battleships in the 1930s and reactivation of the four /oira-class battleships in the 1980s is a bit askew. For the Iowas are being recommissioned not as battleships per se, but as radically modified warships to fight •n an entirely different manner and environment than originally intended.
It is not because of “instinctive and emotional advocacy” related to their 16-inch main batteries that the Iowa- class battleships are being recommissioned; it is being done primarily because of their combat-proven air defense superiority and high-speed capability that permitted them to keep pace with the fast carriers during World War II. And contrary to the belief in some quarters that their resurrection ignores “modern naval realities,” it is precisely because of those realities that they can still play a vital role.
Antiship missiles probably pose the greatest conventional threat ever faced in history by navies, including ours. Indeed, we need additional surface protection against that threat to our battle groups as a matter of high priority. or risk losing our arguably thin edge of maritime superiority shortly after the first enemy antiship missiles are fired.
This vital requirement can be met either through new construction or by upgrading existing hulls. However, the long-lead construction time and high cost of modern warships, even in the modest 8,000-10,000-ton range, with their paper-thin hulls and superstructures—to say nothing of the time and cost for an entirely new, larger, and more damage-resistant class of surface antiair escort—provide strong ar-
guments against new construction as a viable option. On the other hand, the 60,000-ton displacement of the /owa-class battleships, with their unequalled damage-resistant hulls and superstructures, make them highly sur- vivable platforms for an impressive array of air defense weapon systems and offensive weapon systems as well. Furthermore, such modifications can be made in much less time and at about the same cost as an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. And finally, manning requirements will be far less than when serving as battleships. All of the new weapon systems will be fully or semi-automated while most of the manpower-demanding weapon systems will be removed.
The economies of size indicate that the total manning requirement for each modified battleship will be less than if all of her offensive and defensive weapon systems were distributed in two or more smaller hulls. Thus, another major military advantage, concentration of fire, can be realized with less manpower. In short, far from being liabilities, the /oven-class battleship hulls represent an invaluable naval and financial asset with much greater potential than three Invincibles.
By giving too much emphasis to their historic role as battleships, the Navy has given support to the cry of opponents that their recommissioning simply reflects the resurrection of “battleship mentality.” If the Navy does not rectify this situation, reactivation of the three follow-on hulls might never happen. To prevent such a reversal, the Navy must change the /ow’a-class image by stressing its future roles and capabilities with modernized equipment and arms;
► Change the class designation to bat-
M. FREDEEN
The New Jersey is on her way back to the fleet, but the return of her sisters may require them to drop their BB designations.
tie cruiser (CBAA) to reflect the primary missions of air defense when attached to a battle group and offensive strike warfare against sea or land targets when serving as the main unit in a surface action group (SAG).
► Divert Aegis systems to the battleship conversion program starting with the Iowa (BB-61). Install Aegis in the New Jersey (BB-62) during the second phase of her conversion.
► Remove two of the three main battery turrets, starting with the New Jersey in phase one if possible, but no later than in phase two. Accomplish this mod in phase one for the Iowa and follow-on hulls.
► Make the decision now to include a ski-ramp flight deck as a major part of all the conversions. Then proceed as a matter of high priority to do at least the foundation modification to the Iowa during phase one and complete the mod in phase two. For the New Jersey, make the complete modification in phase two. And for the third hull, install Aegis and a ski-ramp flight deck, in addition to the scheduled offensive and defensive armament, during phase one. That is, when the third hull returns to sea, it should represent a truly modern warship, not a battleship with superficial modifications.
There are no alternative programs to proyide the invaluable surface air defense that those properly reconfigured and tactically employed battleship hulls will provide. So we had better go fast for complete modernization or risk losing all by a policy of slow and partial modifications in phases.