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The XO of an LPH knows how to use the talents of his veteran warrant officer (with binoculars). But this isn’t always the case. Too often, warrants must assume ambiguous roles that misuse their experience and skill. This practice, the author claims, has led to job dissatisfaction in the warrant community and a gradual decline in its ranks.
MANCIAS. JR- )
Warrant officers have been part of the U. S. Navy since its beginning in 1775. The program is currently maintained by selecting applicants from the chief petty officer community who have from 12 to 24 years of service. Those se'ected are promoted to the rank of chief warrant officer (CWO-2). b 9 warrant officer selectees who have served for more than two years in rate are promoted to the rank of chief warrant officer (CWO-3). The selectees must agree to remain on active duty tor thi ee years, o petition for selection is keen, averaging only 26%
over the last five years. . .. ~
Since the warrant community is built from the chief petty officer ranks, and since the competition is stiff, it follows that warrants in general are.
► Experienced professionals with at least 12 years of proven worth (Many are selected with 15-16 years experience and from the E-8 grade.)
► Highly motivated, extremely dedicated sailors ► Proven leaders and technical experts in their respective fields
► Extremely proud with a driving hunger for satisfaction and respect in their jobs
If this is a portrait of the warrant, then why ask the question, “Should the warrant officer be eliminated?” Because many, like the author, are leaving the Navy faster than they are being replaced. From a peak of 3,500 in 1976, the number in the warrant community dropped below 3,000 in 1980, and last
year things looked a little worse. In the surface community alone, 179 quotas went unfilled in six of the eight warrant specialties. In general, the attrition stems from a lack of challenge, lack of job satisfaction, and lack of respect. Each deficiency breeds cynicism and frustration.
In a brief delivered to the Chief of Naval Personnel dated 4 March 1981, the number one concern of warrants was stated to be lack of job satisfaction. As far as respect is concerned, the old cliche, “It takes a warrant to know a warrant” holds true. Embarrassingly few naval officers recognize warrant grades, much less the specialties. What is worse, they don’t care to learn. Hence, a few warrants go to the extreme of not bothering to change the striping on their dress blues or shoulder boards when promoted. Sure enough, no one notices. Even when the error is pointed out, no one cares.
But that is only symptomatic of the problem. The Navy does not clearly define how a warrant is to be used and shows only two diagrams in OpNav Instruction 3120.32 (Standard Organization and Regulations of the U. S. Navy) to infer that they are just like other officers. The Naval Military Personnel Command even reinforces this belief by assigning warrants to serve in limited duty officer (LDO) and line officer billets. Therefore, the only extant definition is the military rank structure where the warrant is junior to the ensign. This makes life convenient
Proceedings / April 1982 ^ -
for many commands by affording them unbounded latitude when assigning watches, collateral duties, and primary duties.
The 1963 Settle Study, which evaluated the LDO/ warrant community, stated:
“Complete warrant phase-out would leave a void not effectively filled by LDO(T)s and master CPOs, a void incompatible with Navy needs for more, not fewer, specialist categories and rank/rate gradations. The Navy increasingly needs warrant specialists in close supervision over machinery/ weapons and enlisted men maintaining them, bridging the gap between enlisted and commissioned officer structure, warrant officers whose specialized functions are not overly diluted with collateral generalized duties nor attenuated by advancement in rank.”
Thus, the trap is set, and the warrant voluntarily accepts the bait. By being a highly skilled personnel and equipment manager, he performs his tasks properly and in a timely manner, usually ahead of schedule. While making it look easy and not seeming to be personally busy, he generally cracks the books to improve his technical competence which makes the job look even easier. This compounds and supports the perception that he is less busy.
Another stereotype of the warrant officer is that he is out and about poking his nose here and there, seemingly unoccupied with work. He is just nosy! killing time, and swapping yarns with the crew members. Of course, the subtle use of this perceived dead time is the collection of both technical and personnel data for future reference. From these encounters, problems with hardware are spotted and a definite trust and rapport are built up with the crew. Because the warrant officer has a chief petty officer heritage, he fully understands his task to accomplish the Navy’s
mission through people.
Now that the bait has been taken, the trap springs shut. Other officers quickly recognize that the warrant has free time, because he is more visible than other junior officers. He then begins to collect duties as the XO attempts to even out the workload in the wardroom. With the desire to pull his fair share, he freely accepts the new assignments—mess treasurer/ caterer, special mast in vestigat or (usually drug and alcohol-related cases), transportation, cash audit, controlled medicinal audits, and so on.
Eventually his “snooping, yarn spinning, and general out and about dwindles into nonexistence, as does his ability to be a technical troubleshooter. Of course, while this progression is taking place, he is still expected to complete the surface warfare officer personnel qualification standards. Since warrants are so experienced, they can become proficient watch- standers without benefit of Navy schools (with the exception of the one for the Rules of the Road, now a mandatory requirement).
The warrant now finds himself being used as an administrative junior officer (JO)—standing JO watches in port and at sea, losing touch with crew and equipment, unable to plan ahead, and reacting to crises only. This is coupled with his inability to be promoted to department head or other rank where the junior officer jobs cease and he can again accomplish the Navy’s mission through people.
The potential benefits to the Navy, indeed to each command, could be created if only the warrant were used as a troubleshooter, quality assurance (QA) inspector, teacher, and personnel relations expert. More often, however, he is assigned as a division officer or assistant division officer and, in either case, working for a line lieutenant or lieutenant (junior grade). To be just, there are cases where the warrant is used as the CO’s or department head’s right-hand QA man, keeping a finger on the pulse of the organization and the hardware. In this type of assignment, the warrant is happy, challenged, and has selfworth: His input is valued. A previous department head of mine once said, “Until now, your pay was for your technical prowess. Now it is for your experience and opinion.” A retired captain put it this way: “As a chief, your job was to train a division officer and keep him out of trouble. As a warrant, you protect and train a department head.”
Does it make better sense to employ an individual with 18-22 years service—four to six of which are commissioned—to be a flunky for a jaygee with four years total service (i.e., relieve the jaygee of mundane paperwork)? Or does it seem wiser to use a warrant’s expertise to advise the commanding officer and/or department head? Of course the latter will mean some administrative paperwork, but it will produce useful things, such as a training package, complete with a plan of action and milestones, and/or lesson
Proceedings / April 1982
A
topic guides that would otherwise not have been
possible. .
Of merit, some of the larger commands with a substantial number of warrants have had warrant officers’ messes. In such an environment, interrelated problems were discussed in depth by the warrants, and plans to correct them were formulated. This process often occurred so quickly and quietly that few people ever knew that a problem even existed. But these warrant messes are being done away with; such a move has already cost many commands dearly and will continue to do so. What has been lost is a cadre of professionals who, through a collective understanding of both enlisted and commissioned service, can make things happen for the good of the
command. .
The warrant officer in today's Navy, it improperly used, is not needed. At least 51% ot the time he is abused—not used. Therefore, he could be replaced by the LDO, who in the rank structure can become senior enough to be an effective technical manager. The drawback is that the LDO loses touch with men and hardware en route to that seniority.
Present and past warrants are not ’ limited in scope” as they have been branded for the last several years. Some have limitations placed upon them by virtue of being regarded as nothing more than a junior officer. Of course, this happens in the command in which the warrant’s true worth is either not appreciated or not understood. Sadly, this seems to
be the case all too frequently. .
The suspension of the warrant program in 195966 and the simultaneous creation of the senior and master chief petty officer grades seem to have caused a subsequent loss of understanding ot the warrant’s proper role. Once it was recognized that the E-8 and E-9 could not supplant the warrant officer, the program was reinstated. Somehow, in the interim (seven years), the Navy’s commanders and captains of today forgot how to use the warrant s abilities. In fairness, perhaps many of them were never exposed
to such expertise. . ,.
Unquestionably, warrants are technical in na ■ That is the primary eligibility criterion tor selection to the program. In the warrant community, extremely few could be classified as technically limited in scope. Instead, their talents often cross departmental boundaries. This certainly does not suggest, in any sense, that the warrant’s technical expertise merits the brand, “limited in scope.'
Said another way, the Navy does not use the talents of the warrant officer to the fullest and/or to the best advantage. But what answer does the warrant receive when voicing frustration over command mismanagement of his talents? “There is a rank structure within the military that is to be followed. Anyway, this makes for a cleaner chain-of-command. But let his relief get ordered in, and the tune goes like
this, “I want you to get relieved as soon as possible, and then you can be my troubleshooter for your last two weeks on board to help me figure out where we are. You’ve got all this experience and know-how, and there just isn t anyone else on board who can do it.”
Eureka! Finally, the warrant has his role—the one he wanted his whole tour. But only two weeks to do it? What a hollow victory! Now that the problems can be identified, the departing warrant can t be part of the solution! So why try? The answer is simple— because for more than 200 years, certain habits have been followed and now isn't the time to change. Quitting isn't in the warrant vocabulary.
Neither officer nor enlisted, a warrant is somewhere in between: a limbo with all the frustrations of a junior officer and none of the benefits of a master chief. The solution seems obvious. The Navy could put an end to these frustrations either by defining the warrant role more precisely or by eliminating the warrant program entirely. If the Navy wants a watchstanding cadre of junior officers with a technical base, then stay with the LDOs, who at least have the opportunity to be promoted out of the “junior officer doldrums.” As was stated by one government official looking into military pay and benefits, “If they—the military men and women—don't like it, they can vote with their feet.” This is exactly what is happening with many members of the warrant community.
Even though the pay is not commensurate with the job, a properly used warrant would not only remain on active duty, but would also be an active recruiter for the program. But the Navy must stop assigning him to LDO and line officer billets and specifically define his role in the organization. Further, if he is not being used as specified by his orders, then eliminate the billet. Transfer him so that the talent is not squandered.
The warrant joined the Navy to serve. The writing of this article is in keeping with that premise —service to the Navy and thereby the country. That warrant, along with all others he has ever met, has a fervent hope that, through this reporting, his successors (if there are to be any) will find the job more challenging and more rewarding.
Author’s Note: It is believed the Soviets are threatening our superiority in this area by expanding their warrant program. The Soviets' apparent recognition of the program’s worth is identified by increases in job scope, allowances, and better housing.
Mr. Hart is a career chief warrant officer with 21 years of service in six seagoing commands. He holds associate degrees in mathematics and management and specializes in digital weapon systems for missile surface ships. A native of Texas, CWO-3 Hart is stationed at the Naval Amphibious School in Little Creek, Virginia.
Proceedings / April 1982