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For the first time since the Vietnam War years, Con- 8fess and the administration seem determined to support a feal increase in the Navy’s strength. The evidence is in a renewed commitment to a 600-ship fleet, program and °udget submissions that are clearly aimed at reaching this target in a reasonably short time, and effective action to sell” the program to key legislators and the taxpaying Public. Although some signs of retrenchment are already aPparent because of President Ronald Reagan’s equal commitment to budgetary balance, the proposed cuts nave been moderate, carefully thought out in terms of Priority, and, above all, undertaken with what looks like genuine reluctance. In contrast to past years when force reductions were billed as increases and programs were announced only to be delayed or watered down later, a true commitment to strengthening the armed forces is welcome news indeed.
Probably the best perspective on the intended effects of the new administration’s plans will be obtained from a type-by-type review of its adjusted fiscal year 1981 shipbuilding and conversion program, its fiscal year 1982 submission, and its unofficial, but presumably authoritative five-year plan through fiscal year 1987. Data from S. L. Morison’s article entitled “The Reaganavy” (September 1981 Proceedings, pages 127-128) are reproduced in Table 1 as the best available summary of the five-year plan. The status of ships currently under construction is given in Table 2.
NEW CONSTRUCTION
TYPE | FY 81 | FY82 | FY 83 | FY 84 | FY 85 | FY 86 | FY87 |
CVN Aircraft Carrier |
| LT | LT | 1 | LT | 1 | LT |
CGN Guided Missile |
|
|
|
| LT | 1 | 2 |
Cruiser |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CG-47 Class Missile | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Cruiser |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DDGX Guided Missile |
|
|
| LT | I | LT | 3 |
Destroyer |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DD Spruance Class |
|
|
|
| 2 | 1 |
|
FFG-7 Class Frigate | 6 | 3 |
|
|
|
|
|
FFGX |
|
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
SSBN Trident Submarine | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
SSN-688 Class Submarine | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
MCM Mine |
| 1 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
|
|
Countermeasure Ship |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MSH Minesweeper/Hunter |
|
|
| 1 |
| 5 | 5 |
LHD Amphibious Assault |
|
|
| LT | 1 | LT | I |
Dock |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LPD Amphibious |
|
|
|
|
|
| LT |
Transport Dock |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LSD-41 Class Landing | 1 | LT | I | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
Ship Dock |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AD Destroyer Tender |
|
|
|
| 1 | 2 |
|
AE Ammunition Ship |
|
|
|
| 1 | 2 | 1 |
AOE Fast Combat Support |
|
|
| 1 |
| 1 | 2 |
Ship |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AO-187 Class Oiler |
| 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
AGOS Surveillance Ship | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| 2 | 3 |
|
ARC Cable Repair Ship 1
NEW CONSTRUCTION
TYPE | FY 81 | FY 82 | FY 83 | FY84 | FY 85 | FY 86 | FY^s |
ARS Salvage Ship | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
|
|
|
Total New Construction | 18 | 17 | 18 | 22 | 30 | 34 | 32 |
CONVERSION/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ACQUISITION |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OR REACTIVATION |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TYPE | FY 81 | FY 82 | FY83 | FY 84 | FY85 | FY 86 | FY^y |
CV Life Extension (SLEP) | 1 | LT | 1 | LT | 1 | LT | 1 |
CV-34 Reactivation |
|
| 1 |
|
|
|
|
BB Battleship Reactivation |
| I | 1 | I | I |
|
|
CGN Cruiser |
|
|
|
| LT | LT | 1 |
Modernization |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AFS Acquisition (Sirius |
| 2 |
|
|
|
|
|
Class) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AKR RO/RO |
| 2 | 2 |
|
|
|
|
Prepositioning Ship |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AKR SL-7 Prepositioning | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
|
|
|
Ship |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AGM Missile Range Ship |
|
|
| LT |
| 1 |
|
AGS Surveying Ship |
|
| LT | 2 |
|
|
|
AK FBM Support Ship | 1 |
|
| 1 |
| 1 |
|
Total | 4 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
Note: FY 82 program represents initial administration request aM! subject to modification by the administration and/or Congress. FV. 87 programs are estimates subject to modification by the administral>° LT = lead-time items.
CAPITAL SHIPS______________________
Since World War II, there have been many theories and arguments about the concept of the capital ship in a nuclear-age navy. Conventional thinking for the past 40 years has accepted the large-deck aircraft carrier as the successor to the capital-ship role long held by the battleship, although there are strong proponents for the view that the nuclear-powered submarine in both ballistic missile and attack versions should be recognized as the capital ship of the future, if not the present. It is therefore somewhat startling to find the battleship coming back into the picture, no longer in the humble guise of a gunfire support ship for troops ashore, but as the central ship in a new type of strike force intended to fill essentially the same strategic role as the carrier task force. After several years of debate in which the /own-class battleships were frequently ridiculed as relics, the Reagan Administration has not only asked for and received authorization to modernize and recommission the New Jersey (BB-62) and commence similar work on the Iowa (BB-61), but also intends to continue with the reactivations of the Missouri (BB-63) and Wisconsin (BB-64) at yearly intervals. (See “The Facts Behind the Thunder” by S. L. Morison, August 1981 Proceedings, pages 98-101.)
According to Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., the reactivation of these ships will restore the Navy’s offensive firepower more quickly and less expensively than any other readily available approach. He envisions using them as the cores of battle groups able to move into such troubled areas as the Persian Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and North Atlantic to counter threats of a nonnuclear or “cold war” nature. Their guns and missiles would be effective against land targets and enemy ships alike, and their speed and great resistance to damage would assure their survival against the expected kinds of attack. Lehman is obviously thinking in terms of less-than-global conflict and recognizing that even old ships and weapons can be usefully employed under appropriate circumstances. Navies have always deployed their resources this way in times of war, but in peacetime there is a tendency to insist that
only the latest ships can be counted on to meet future demands. Recent administrations have sought to meet second-line threats by designing and building second-class ships, a course guaranteed to meet strenuous resistance from the operators. The Reagan Administration’s approach is much more acceptable to the Navy’s personnel, who can take pride in coaxing superior performance out of an aging warship, whereas they would resent being assigned to a newer ship that had been deliberately designed to be less capable than others of her type.
The New Jersey is now in the Long Beach Naval Shipyard fora $326-million, 21-month overhaul and refurbishing. The initial modernization will keep all nine 16-inch guns, but add firepower in the form of 32 long-range Tomahawk missiles, 16 shorter-range Harpoons, and close-in antiair protection with four Phalanx mounts. Fire control and communications equipment and electronic sensors will be upgraded and the now-mandatory “environmental” alterations to provide distillate fuel instead of black oil and to accomplish closed-system
waste disposal will be made, along with the “habitability” improvements believed to be demanded by the modern volunteer sailor. The active fleet and reserves have been combed for men with big-gun experience to help
the 1,562-man crew, and the call for volunteers is reported to have been quite successful so far. Presumably, the commissioning crew of the New Jersey will provide a nucleus crew and training for the Iowa, and so on down the line, following the practice used successfully to expand the fleet on Previous occasions.
Plans are still tentative, but the Navy envisions further upgrading of the battleships after about four years °f service by installing additional missile systems and possibly removing the aftermost turret to provide space f°r a flight deck and hangar for V/STOL aircraft. Although the ships have more remaining service life than might be presumed from their chron- °'ogical age of 38-plus years, logistic Problems of maintaining and repairing machinery and equipment of 1940 vintage could make it unrealistic to exPect 20 more years of duty from them.
The Reagan Administration has also infused new life into the aircraft carrier program by including at least two new nuclear-powered carriers beyond the Carl Vinson (CVN-70) in the five-year projection. The keel of the CVN-71, authorized in the fiscal year 1980 program, was laid down at Newport News on 31 October 1981. 1 he ship has been named the Theodore Roosevelt, which was previously borne by the recently decommissioned submarine SSBN-600. 1 he association of this former president s name with the “big stick" power represented by the new carrier is an appropriate symbol of the administration's resolve to rebuild the fleet.
Serious consideration continues to be given to reactivating the old carriers Oriskany (CV-34) and Bon Homme Richard(C V A-31). The former was included in the proposed fiscal year 1982 program but has reportedly been deferred, at least for the time being, as a cost reduction measure. One problem with returning these ships to service would be providing them with a suitable aircraft complement, since they cannot handle the latest operational types. The ships would obviously be limited to missions in low-threat areas, but could still do a good job there. Meanwhile, plans to extend the lives of the postwar carriers through service life extension program (SLEP) conversions are going ahead as projected.
Elements in Congress are continuing efforts to push the Navy into building a smaller and less capable carrier, of which the most recent version was the CVV. An interesting outgrowth of an earlier U. S. carrier study which proposed the sea control ship (SCS), is Spain’s current construction of a ship based on the SCS design advanced for inclusion in the U. S. 1975 five-year program. This will be an austere and relatively slow 14,300- ton ship, conventionally powered, equipped to carry 19 Harrier V/STOL planes and Sea King helicopters, and armed defensively only with Gatling- type close-in antiaircraft guns. The carrier will be fitted out to serve as a command and control ship which will be escorted by three guided missile frigates of the Oliver Hazard Berry (FFG-7) type, built in Spain to modified U. S. plans. The result will be essentially a task force of low-mix U. S. ships under the Spanish flag.
SURFACE ESCORTS
Under the concept that cruisers, destroyers, and frigates are function- a'ly more or less interchangeable in the basic roles of antisubmarine or antiair escorts for the Navy’s capital ships, all three types will be discussed under a single heading. Last year, it Uoked as if the cruiser as a distinct Upe was on the way to extinction, "nth the cruiser designation being 8'ven to ships that were essentially destroyers optimized for antiair cornet. Now, however, the Reagan Administration has expressed interest 'n reviving plans for a new class of nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers with procurement to start in fiscal year 1985. This type is envisioned as a modified Virginia (CGN-38) design e9uipped with Aegis; earlier plans for vvhich were dropped in favor of the Ticonderoga (CG-47) class. An earlier yersion, the so-called strike cruiser, ^as proposed in the fiscal year 1974 shipbuilding program.
LITTON-INGALLS
The keel for the Yorktown (CG-48) was placed on the blocks at Ingalls Shipbuilding concurrently with the Victory Celebration held in Yorktown, Virginia, on 19 October 1981.
Last year’s shipbuilding plan by the Carter Administration to increase the production of 77conderoga-class cruisers to meet the perceived threat
from long-range Soviet aircraft has been advanced and expanded by the new administration. The Ticonderoga herself was christened last May by Nancy Reagan; the second Aegis cruiser, the Yorktown (CG-48), is also under construction. Two additional sisters were ordered in August along with long-lead-time procurement for the fifth cruiser of the class. Eighteen more of these ships appear in the programs for fiscal years 1982-87 at the rate of three per year, which should provide steady work for the Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi.
The only destroyer currently under construction is the Hayler (DD-997), the last tag-along member of the Spruance (DD-963) class. Three Kidd (DDG-993)-class stepsisters of the Spruance class, originally ordered by Iran, were commissioned during the past year, and the fourth, the Chandler (DDG-996), will enter service early this year. These ships continue to be greeted with great enthusiasm by the Navy. (See “The Kidd DDG: The Non-Nuclear Standard” by J. G. Morgan, July 1981 Proceedings, pages 97-101.) Commander Morgan notes that the weapons capability of the Kidds is comparable with both the U. S. Navy’s Virginia class and the Soviet Navy’s Kirov class of nuclear- powered guided missile cruisers in spite of the greater size, complement, and cost of the latter types. While complimenting the basic Spruance design as well, he expresses concern over the limited antiair capability of the DD-963 ships, a deficiency overcome in the Kidd class.
Plans as laid out in the proposed five-year program include, somewhat surprisingly, three additional Spru- tf/jce-class destroyers in fiscal year 1985-86. Apparently, these ships are intended to fill interim needs until the DDGX, whose prototype is scheduled to be funded in fiscal year 1984, proves herself. It can be anticipated that the Spruances will receive upgraded missile armaments during forthcoming yard overhauls.
As for the DDGX, the new program will advance construction by two years over the last Carter program. Six shipbuilders—Ingalls, Lockheed, Newport News Shipbuilding, General Dynamics-Quincy, Bath Iron Works, and Todd—have already been given design study contracts. The new class is intended to replace the Leahy (CG- 16) and Belknap (CG-26) classes of cruisers and the Coontz (DDG-37) class of destroyers. According to Assistant Secretary of the Navy George Sawyer, the DDGX will be designed to incorporate modular weapon system concepts in her physical arrangements and, to a lesser extent, in provisions for the central computerization and distribution of weapons control data. The class will ultimately total 49 or more ships, thus providing a highly desirable workload for the successful shipyard or shipyards.
Frigates of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class continue to join the fleet in rapid succession. Seven were commissioned during 1981, in addition to the Australian Canberra (F-FFG-18), and eight were launched. Logistically, the program has proven to be a great success. Last year, however, it looked like the entire FFG program would be prematurely terminated when the Carter Administration asked for only four ships in fiscal year 1981 and a final one in 1982. Congress raised the authorization to six in last year's bill, all of which were ordered last May. The Reagan Administration’s request for 1982 was raised to three ships, but this may be cut back to two for overall budgetary reasons.
More important, the Reagan program now calls for the production of modified FFG-7-type ships at the rate of two or three per year through fiscal year 1987. Ships of this class (FFGX) are intended to replace overage destroyers in the Naval Reserve Force. They also will replace the proposed FFX, an even less capable design that the Carter Administration sought to introduce in the fiscal year 1984 program.
After much pulling and hauling in connection with the fiscal year 1981 appropriation bill. Congress agreed to let the Navy strike nine of the obsolescent FRAM destroyers in the Naval Reserve Force and phase out the remaining eight ships. The Navy promptly announced its intention to transfer four Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates to the NRF in the current fiscal year and to shift two more per year up to a total of 12. Operational control of these ships will be taken away from the active fleet commanders and turned over to the Chief of Naval Reserve. An NRF force level of 24 ships has been established, and the proportion of active duty, regular Navy crew members required for NRF ships is being reduced from 65% to 50%—the difference is to be made up of TAR (training and administration of reserve) personnel. The changes are clearly aimed at strengthening the reserve organization, but it is questionable whether they will produce any net increase in fleet readiness.
SUBMARINES_____________
Actions taken by Congress in fiscal year 1981 and proposed by the Reagan Administration for fiscal years 198287 will add significantly to the Navy’s underwater strength. Refusing to go along with the Carter request for only one attack submarine in fiscal year 1981, Congress appropriated funds for two SSNs instead. (However, only one of these boats has been ordered so far.) For the next five fiscal years President Reagan is expected to seek 17 SSNs instead of Carter’s proposed 6 and to support new construction at a steady rate of four per year. This increase stems from a decision to raise the attack submarine force level from 90 to 100 ships. The pace for ordering Trident ballistic missile submarines has not been increased, but will build up to three every two years by fiscal year 1985. The decision to increase submarine production involved scrapping the controversial FA-SSN design, a cheaper and less-capable vessel that was being advocated strongly by the Carter team but was derogatorily dubbed “Fat Albert” within Navy circles, in favor of producing more of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) type. The demise of Fat Albert was greeted with relief by the submarine fraternity, but the decision also appears to preclude any serious work on advanced submarine designs within the current planning framework.
The past year was marked by much unfavorable publicity for the submarine program. Late in 1980, reports began to circulate that the Trident program was in trouble. Edward Hidalgo, then Secretary of the Navy, claimed that the criticism was irresponsible and implied that Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the Navy’s nu-
clear czar, was using it to create ill will between the Navy and the shipbuilder, Electric Boat. In the final days of the Carter Administration, the company was awarded a $401 million contract for the eighth Trident (SSBN-733) with an option for the ninth and tenth. However, shortly after the new administration took office, a storm broke as Vice Admiral Earl B. Fowler, Jr., Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, in testimony before Congress, blamed Electric Boat for defective work, delays, cost overruns, and poor management of the Trident program. In short order. Secretary of the Navy Lehman ruled out consideration of the company for the next increment of attack submarine orders, and the Navy sent Rear Admiral Howard L. Young to Groton, Connecticut, to take over the Navy’s end of the submarine work. Despite a spirited rebuttal of the charges by Electric Boat’s manager, P. Takis Veliotis, administration officials launched a Public barrage of suggestions that the Navy was looking for a new builder of Trident submarines, and even was considering having them built in Britain or elsewhere, or might resume submarine construction in one of the naval shipyards. The Navy also took the unusual step of cancelling its option to buy the ninth Trident.
Amid the charges and countercharges it became clear that the real issue was Electric Boat’s plan to claim reimbursement from the Navy for the cost of defective workmanship, under a novel legalistic interpretation of the provision by which the Navy protects its shipbuilders against certain construction risks. In commercial practice, the builders pay for such insurance and are protected against various losses. But since World War II, the Navy itself has been providing the coverage. If the Electric Boat claims were to be upheld in court, the Navy would be in the untenable position of paying the shipbuilder for losses caused by his own defective work or negligence. It was also obvious to anyone familiar with the submarine business that foreign procurement was out of the question, and that it would be prohibitively expensive to set up another yard (either Newport News, the only qualified private builder, or a naval shipyard) to produce the huge and complicated Tridents, not to mention the unacceptable delay in fulfilling the strategic missile program that would result if production at Electric Boat were terminated.
With matters at an impasse, the Navy proceeded to award the contract for three attack submarines, SSNs- 721-723, to Newport News, but let it be known that it really wanted to negotiate with Electric Boat for further new construction. The final outcome was that Electric Boat’s president agreed to set aside its claims “without prejudice,” the contract negotiations for the ninth Trident resumed, and it was intimated that Electric Boat would be favorably considered for the next SSN order. Despite the stated agreement, there is little likelihood that the company will revive claims to be repaid for its own poor workmanship. No doubt the Navy’s legal experts are also taking steps to ensure that its self-insurance provisions can withstand future challenges.
Political maneuvering aside, it does appear that the submarine builders have overcome their major troubles. Commissioning of the Ohio was timed to take place on II November, Veterans Day, and the attack submarine program has picked up speed with six deliveries from Electric Boat and two from Newport News during the year. With tested designs and a steady flow of new orders, construction should be much smoother from this point. There was one unusual hitch in April when protesters organized a demonstration at the launching of the Corpus Christi (SSN-705) on the religious grounds
that the name (in its original Latin meaning) was inappropriate for an instrument of war.
Among other developments, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and President Reagan succeeded in getting congressional approval for a reduced version of the extra-low frequency (ELF) system for communicating with submerged submarines, after a decade or more of obstruction and delay. For undisclosed reasons, the Navy failed to support the system this year and had to be prodded from above. Its opposition (or lack of enthusiasm) could stem either from a belief that the antenna system was being cut back so far from its original configuration as to be only marginally effective, or from promising advances in other technologies. However, no scientific breakthroughs have been reported that might be exploited to produce a reliable method of air-to- underwater communication, whereas the ELF technology is well developed, and opposition to the system was purely political.
Discussion of various options for basing the MX missile system included several suggestions for submarine installations. Although these are still officially under consideration, it would appear that such proposals have either taken insufficient note of operational limitations or look so much like the Trident system that they offer no great advantage over it.
There is little probability that the submarine program will be affected by developments in this area.
SMALL WARSHIPS_________
Aside from the progress toward completion of the missile hydrofoil (PHM) class, not much has occurred during the past year in the development or production of small combatants and other minor warship types for the U. S. Navy. With the commissioning of the Taurus (PHM-3) and Aquila (PHM-4) in 1981, hydrofoil enthusiasts are looking forward to full- scale evaluation of the type under service conditions. However, the Reagan five-year shipbuilding program indicates little if any interest in further construction of small combatant ships, and the Navy has decommissioned the last two gunboats that remained in active service.
On the other hand, the United States is presumably deriving some lessons and experience from the variety of small warships being constructed in this country for service in other navies. In the official shipbuilding program, deliveries have started of the patrol gunboats (F-PGG) and chasers (F-PCG) on order for Saudi Arabia. Other boats continue to be built by private yards for foreign navies, such as a fast patrol boat for Guatemala produced by Halter Marine. Israel, too, has ordered a patrol hydrofoil from Grumman Aerospace Co. based on the Navy's Flagstaff (PGH-I), an all-aluminum craft 84 feet in length capable of about 50 knots when foil-borne.
The Navy’s own experimentation with small high-speed craft is currently at a minimal level. Last year, it purchased a catamaran-type surface effect craft, model BH-1I0, from the Bell-Halter organization for testing by the Coast Guard and further modification and evaluation by the Navy. Assistant Secretary of the Navy George Sawyer has also referred to plans for operational application of the twin-hull SWATH concept and an air cushion (ACV) design, but no details are available. The new five-year plan includes no such ships—the 3,000-ton surface effect ship being conspicuously absent—but Congress wants to keep research and development going on a smaller prototype surface effect ship.
The one area in which definite interest is being shown is the Navy’s long-neglected minesweeping capability. In a low-key development program, Mine Squadron 12 has acquired a contraband 63-foot shrimp boat and converted her into a minesweeper of sorts dubbed MSSB-1. (See “A Minesweeping Shrimp Boat? A What?” by C. R. Christensen, July 1981 Proceedings, pages 109-111.) The principal value of this experiment is the testing of a kit for converting similar small craft to minesweepers in an emergency.
The use of fishing boats as improvised minesweepers has a long and honorable history, but such vessels are no substitute for a force of built- for-the-purpose vessels in being when needed. This has been recognized in the Reagan five-year program by the projected construction of 14 mine countermeasures ships (MCM) between fiscal years 1982 and 1985, and the introduction of a new class of minesweeper/hunters (MSH) in fiscal year 1984. The MCM design was completed more than a year ago but was returned to the drawing board by the Carter Administration to be reduced in size, cost, and capability. Work on this class can probably be started as soon as funds are made available, whereas the MSH appears to be less well developed.
The Coast Guard’s class of 270-foot medium endurance cutters, named after famous ships of the past, has run into a strange contretemps. In August 1980, Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, the lead yard and builder of the first four of the class, was awarded a contract for the second increment of nine ships, not all of which were funded immediately. However, lower bids had been submitted by two other yards and rejected by the Coast Guard on what appeared to be technicalities. The low bidder, Robert E. Derecktor, sued, and the Coast Guard voided its contract with Tacoma and awarded it to Derecktor. Tacoma, in turn, has brought suit to have the contract reversed again. There is little assurance, however, that Derecktor can deliver the ships on time and in accordance with specifications.
amphibious warfare ships
The Navy has finally been given the Steen light to move ahead with the instruction of its long-planned LSD- 41- Following the award of the con- |ract to Lockheed, the builder quickly laid the keel for the landing ship dock, named Whidbey Island. Nine more ?hips of this class are now included ln the Reagan five-year plan. A contact for detail design and long-lead- tlIT>e procurement has also been given to Bell Aerospace Textron with an option to buy six air cushion landing craft (LCAC) to go with the LSD and the Navy’s other major amphibious warfare ships. These will be 87- by 47- foot craft patterned on the successful JEFF-B prototype which underwent exhaustive testing during the last two years.
A further boost for the amphibious warfare forces is given by the appearance of two new types in the future shipbuilding program. Starting in fiscal year 1982, advance procurement is planned for a class of amphibious assault docks (LHDs), described as a reduced version of the Tarawa-c\ass LHAs, to replace the IwoJima (LPH- 2)-class of assault ships. Advance funding is also being sought to start on a group of amphibious transport docks (LPD) to replace the Raleigh (LPD-1) and Austin (LPD-4) classes. It is anticipated that these will be a variant of the LHD design.
AUXILIARIES____________
. Although this category technically mcludes the ships being procured for Rapid Deployment Joint Task r°rce, the latter are special enough to warrant discussion in a section. Among the more traditional types, Seven new fleet auxiliaries entered Service last year—a destroyer tender, three oilers, a submarine tender, and tvvo tugs. In addition, the former t'°yal Fleet Auxiliary Lyness was acquired from Britain and placed in service as the USNS Sirius (T-AFS-8). This 12-year old, 17,000-ton refriger- uted cargo ship had been laid up as SuPerfluous to the needs of the denning Royal Navy and was initially bartered by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) at $24,000 per day. Her status was changed later to bareboat charter at one-eighth of that rate when she was placed in service with a ci- V|Han crew of 116 and a naval detachment of 18 men. The MSC also acquired a sister ship, the Tarbatness, °n similar terms. She has been reamed Spica and will serve with the designation T-AFS-9 when she be- eomes operational. Both vessels will °e purchased outright when funds are available.
The former cargo ship Mormaebay has been taken from the National De- ense Reserve Fleet and is being concerted by Boland Marine and Manu- acturing Company to the fleet bal- 'stic missile support ship Vega (T-
AK-286) under the 1981 program.
In the new construction program, the keel of the cable repair ship Zeus (T-ARC-7) was laid down in June. This ship is described as being equipped to carry and lay up to 1,000 miles of cable as well as to retrieve and repair existing cables. Her specialized equipment will include acoustic locating and position-keeping gear and a cable plow. The 512-foot ship will cruise at 15 knots on a 10,000 shaft power diesel-electric plant and will be manned by a civilian crew of 120. Another ship of this class is projected for fiscal year 1986.
Production is under way finally on eight ships of the Stalwart (T-AGOS) class, which will tow long arrays of sonar surveillance hydrophones and relay the signals back to shore stations for processing. These 217- by 42-foot ships will have twin hulls for stability, diesel engines capable of a top speed of 11 knots, auxiliary electric motors for quiet cruising, and civilian crews. Fourteen to 16 more of the type are expected to follow. Finally, the first of a new class of salvage ships, the ARS-50, has been authorized and a long-lead item contract has been signed with Peterson Builders. Four more are projected as replacements for ships of the World War II Bolster (ARS-38) class.
The Reagan five-year program also includes a large infusion of new fleet auxiliaries—three destroyer tenders, four ammunition ships, three fast combat support ships (AOE), and 17 AO-I87-class oilers. Planned conversions include a missile range instrumentation ship, two surveying ships, and two cargo ships (AK[FBM]s).
The administration has also shown signs of renewed concern because of the poor condition of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, the merchant marine, and the oceanographic fleet. In a test of the nation’s ability to reactivate mothballed cargo ships in an emergency, the Catawba Victory was made ready for sailing in six days by the Norfolk Shipbuilding Company. A study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment documented the decline in oceanographic research ships, which would be useful as small naval auxiliaries. (See “The Academic Fleet as a National Defense Asset’’ by D. S. Schwartz, October 1981, Proceedings, pages 139-141.) The administration has also reorganized the Maritime Administration by transferring it from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Transportation, and has directed MSC to consolidate its passenger and cargo booking operations with the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command. The latter move may result in some savings but could weaken the MSC’s ability to function as a manager of shipping for the Navy.
^djtf and maritime prepositioning ships
Respite the expressed urgency with ^hich the Rapid Deployment Joint ask Force (RDJTF) was established, Congress has been reluctant to appropriate funds to build or acquire the
ships needed to establish the force on a permanent basis. At the same time, the Navy has used all kinds of expedients to put an interim force in place, and considerable confusion still exists about the status of the ultimate program. The Navy’s plans include the conversion of acquired ships, which involves various combinations and stages of chartering, purchasing, and
physically converting several classes of ships.
Plans have been made to acquire all four Affl/ne-class roll on/roll off (RO/ RO) ships and two other RO/ ROs—one built in Germany and one in Japan—operating for the German Hansa Line. (Ownership for these was transferred to Lykes Brothers.) Last year, the Military Sealift Command acquired two Maines (Mercury [T- AKR-10] and Jupiter [T-AKR-11]) and placed them in service with the near-term RDJTF. This year, arrangements will be made to obtain the other two Maines on a five-year MSC charters. The two Hansa Line RO/ ROs—Cygnus (ex-Rabenfels) and Lyra (ex-Reichenfels)—were acquired in 1981 and are undergoing modifications at the Bethlehem Steel Shipyard in Baltimore. One shortcoming in these ships, cited by the United States shipping interests which objected strenuously to the acquisition of foreign-built vessels, is that their watertight compartmentation does not meet U. S. standards.
Parallel with the foregoing, the Navy moved to acquire the eight fast containerships of the SL-7 class from Sea-Land Industries. These big, 33- knot ships were built only ten years ago, but they became noncompetitive for commercial service when oil prices were jacked up by the OPEC nations. MSC finally bought the first six in August 1981 and obtained an option to acquire two more. Funding for the acquisition and conversion of these vessels to vehicle cargo ships (AKR) has been spread over the fiscal years 1981-84 programs. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea) has gone out for bids on the design work preparatory to their actual conversion, which will involve adding RO/ RO capability to their existing container-handling configuration. The names assigned to these ships by the
Navy are Algol, Bellatrix, Denehola, Pollux, Altair, Regains, Capella, and Ant ares.
The Department of Defense had also planned to acquire the famous liner United States for conversion to a hospital ship for the RDJTF, and requested funds in fiscal years 1982 and 1983 for this purpose. With the recent departure of John H. Moxley, III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, this plan has been scrapped. The Naval Sea Systems Command has since asked for proposals to convert up to four existing ships to Military Sealift Command- manned hospital ships (T-AHXs) with a total capacity of 2,000 beds and 24 operating rooms.
Still another ship type that has been added to the RDJTF is a lighter- aboard-ship (LASH). Three LASH ships were acquired in October and November, and all are deployed and loaded with ammunition.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
Along with its major revision of the shipbuilding and conversion program to build up to a 600-ship Navy, and its plans to strengthen the other armed services, the Reagan Administration has instituted some significant changes in the defense organization. Soon after taking office, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced that greater authority was being delegated to the service secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff to manage the logistics and operations of the armed forces. Weinberger has concentrated on the formulation of overall policies and on the time-consuming and frustrating task of getting the administration’s proposals through the congressional maze. Any reduction in the layers of reviewing and nay-saying authority within the Department of Defense will be welcomed in the service departments. There has been a noticeable increase in public appearances by top administration officials at ceremonies such as keel layings, launchings, and commissionings. Similarly, proposals for strengthening the armed forces are being carefully backed up by studies from “think tanks” and pronouncements from authoritative individuals and groups. On the other hand, there has been no effort in Congress to streamline its overlapping and duplicative committee structure, and the power of entrenched committee satraps either to expedite or impede action remains intact. Unfortunately, strong opposition to the administration’s proposals on the part of certain committee chairmen has delayed both the authorization and the funding of the fiscal year 1982 program well past the start of the fiscal year, and the ultimate fate of future shipbuilding programs is by no means clear.
The Reagan Administration has inflated steps to accomplish a remarkable reversal of the long decline in U. S. military strength. Its plans have been well thought out in terms of Priorities needed to raise the Navy to a 600-ship force level as quickly as Possible, given budgetary limitations.
The composition of the five-year Plan appears to reflect a predominance of input from the Navy as opposed to echelons within the Department of Defense. The outstanding overall characteristics of the plan are balance as to ship types, practicality 'n concentrating on existing types, and a definite preference for capability. Although many new types appear m the program to strengthen elements that have been neglected in the past, these are generally straightforward derivatives of existing designs. Procurement in the early years is focused on increased numbers of designs already in production and the acquisition of readily available merchant ships. This course is designed to achieve rapid buildup of strength with maximum economy. Similarly, both production and economy will be fostered by maintaining a steady flow of orders for the same type of ship over a reasonable span of years. The emphasis on power is evidenced in the wholesale cancellation of less-capable designs that would have been a hallmark of the Carter shipbuilding programs. The weakest element of the
Reagan program, as far as it has been revealed to date, is the development of new ship designs, weapon systems, and equipment. This may merely reflect priority given to the immediate problem of increasing the number of available ships rather than the deliberate neglect of research. Unfortunately, there have been too many signs in recent years that the United States is being surpassed by the Soviet Union and other nations in design innovations and new technological developments. It is vital that progress be resumed in these areas if an enlarged and strengthened U. S. Navy is not to find itself outmatched in quality as well as quantity by its principal adversary.
Table 2 The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Program 1981
| V". Name | FY Program | Builder | Status | Type!Hull No. | Name | FY Program | Builder | Status |
CrAFt carriers |
|
|
| FFG-28 | Boone | 78 | Todd, Seattle | Lau. 16 Jan. 80 | |
|
|
|
|
| FFG-29 | Stephen W. Groves | 78 | Bath Iron Works | Lau. 4 Apr. 81 |
Pt, /0 CVn„7, | Carl Vinson | 74 | Newport News | Lau. 15 Mar. 80 | FFG-30 | Reid | 78 | Todd. San Pedro | Lau. 27 Jun. 81 |
| Theodore Roosevelt | 80 | Newport News | K.L. 31 Oct. 81 | FFG-31 | Stark | 78 | Todd, Seattle | Lau. 30 May 80 |
|
|
|
|
| FFG-32 | John L. Hall | 78 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. 5 Jan. 81 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Lau. 24 Jul. 81 |
U|0Ed | Fissile cruisers |
|
|
| FFG-33 | Jarrett | 78 | Todd, San Pedro | K.L. II Feb. 81 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Lau. 17 Oct. 81 |
| Ticonderoga | 78 | Ingalls | Lau. 16 May 81 | FFG-34 | Aubrey Pitch | 78 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. 10 Apr. 81 |
'■G-49 | Yorktown | 80 | Ingalls | K.L. 19 Oct. 81 |
|
|
|
| Lau. 17 Oct. 81 |
|
| 81 | Ingalls | Ord. 28 Aug. 81 | F-FFG-35 | Sydney6 | 78 | Todd, Seattle | Lau. 26 Sept. 80 |
|
| 81 | Ingalls | Ord. 28 Aug. 81 | FFG-36 | Underwood | 79 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. 3 Aug. 81 |
|
|
|
|
| FFG-37 | Crommelin | 79 | Todd, Seattle | Lau. 1 Jul. 81 |
Foyers* |
|
|
| FFG-38 | Curts | 79 | Todd, San Pedro | K.L. 1 Jul. 81 | |
^0-997 |
|
|
|
| FFG-39 | Doyle | 79 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. 16 Nov. 81 |
| Hayler | 78 | Ingalls | K.L. 20 Oct. 80 | FFG-40 | Halyburton | 79 | Bath Iron Works | Lau. 13 Oct. 81 |
|
|
|
|
| FFG-41 | McClusky | 79 | Todd, San Pedro | K.L. 21 Oct. 81 |
'CEd | Fissile destroyers' |
|
|
| FFG-42 | Klakring | 79 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 27 Apr. 79 |
|
|
|
|
| FFG-43 | Thach | 79 | Todd, San Pedro | Ord. 27 Apr. 79 |
< | Kidd | 77 | Ingalls | Comm. 27 Jun. 81 | F-FFG-44 | Darwink | 80 | Todd, Seattle | K.L. 2 Jul. 81 |
| Callaghan | 77 | Ingalls | Comm. 29 Aug. 81 | FFG-45 | Dewert | 80 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 28 Apr. 80 |
| Scott | 77 | Ingalls | Comm. 24 Oct. 81 | FFG-46 |
| 80 | Todd, San Pedro | Ord. 28 Apr. 80 |
| Chandler | 77 | Ingalls | Lau. 24 May 80 | FFG-47 |
| 80 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 28 Apr. 80 |
^Ihr- |
|
|
|
| FFG-48 | Vandegrift | 80 | Todd, Seattle | K.L. 13 Oct. 81 |
,dEd | Missile frigates4 |
|
|
| FFG-49 |
| 80 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 28 Apr. 80 |
|
|
|
|
| FFG-50 |
| 81 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 22 May 81 |
| Wadsworth | 75 | Todd, San Pedro | Comm. 2 Apr. 805 | FFG-51 |
| 81 | Todd. San Pedro | Ord. 22 May 81 |
Nu | Duncan | 75 | Todd, Seattle | Comm. 24 May 805 | FFG-52 |
| 81 | Todd. Seattle | Ord. 22 May 81 |
jjL | Clark | 76 | Bath Iron Works | Comm. 17 May 80s | FFG-53 |
| 81 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 22 May 81 |
< | George Philip | 76 | Todd, San Pedro | Comm. 15 Nov. 805 | FFG-54 |
| 81 | Todd, San Pedro | Ord. 22 May 81 |
kFC-15 | Sides | 76 | Todd, San Pedro | Comm. 30 May 81s | FFG-55 |
| 81 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 22 May 81 |
s | Estocin | 76 | Bath Iron Works | Comm. 10 Jan. 81 |
|
|
|
|
|
N-is | Clifton Sprague | 76 | Bath Iron Works | Comm. 21 Mar. 81 | fleet ballistic missile submarines |
|
| ||
| Canberra6 | 76 | Todd, Seattle | Comm. 21 Mar. 81 |
|
|
|
|
|
N | John A. Moore | 77 | Todd, San Pedro | Comm. 14 Nov. 81 | SSBN-726 | Ohio | 74 | Electric Boat | Comm. 11 Nov. 81 |
N | Antrim | 77 | Todd. Seattle | Comm. 26 Sept. 81 | SSBN-727 | Michigan | 75 | Electric Boat | Lau. 26 Apr. 80 |
i N | Flatley | 77 | Bath Iron Works | Comm. 20 Jun. 81 | SSBN-728 | Florida | 75 | Electric Boat | Lau. 14 Nov. 81 |
S | Fahrion | 77 | Todd, Seattle | Lau. 24 Aug. 79 | SSBN-729 | Georgia | 76 | Electric Boat | K. L. 7 Apr. 79 |
N | Lewis B. Puller | 77 | Todd, San Pedro | Lau. 15 Mar. 80 | SSBN-730 | Rhode Island | 77 | Electric Boat | Ord. 7 Apr. 80 |
i S | Jack Williams | 77 | Bath Iron Works | Comm. 19 Sept. 81 | SSBN-731 | Alabama | 78 | Electric Boat | Ord. 27 Feb. 78 |
i N | Copeland | 77 | Todd, San Pedro | Lau. 26 Jul. 80 | SSBN-732 |
| 78 | Electric Boat | Ord. 27 Feb. 78 |
| Gallery | 77 | Bath Iron Works | Comm. 5 Dec. 81* | SSBN-733 |
| 80 | Electric Boat | Ord. 7 Jan. 81 |
Mahlon S. Tisdale | 78 | Todd, San Pedro | Lau. 7 Feb. 81 | SSBN-734 |
| 81 | Unassigned |
|
FY
Type!Hull No. | Name | Program | Builder | Status | ||||
SUBMARINES |
|
|
|
| ||||
SSN-698 | Bremerton | 72 | Electric Boat | Comm. 14 Mar. 81* | ||||
SSN-699 | Jacksonville | 72 | Electric Boat | Comm. 16 May 81 | ||||
SSN-700 | Dallas | 73 | Electric Boat | Comm. 18 Jul. 81 | ||||
SSN-701 | La Jolla | 73 | Electric Boat | Comm. 2 Oct. 81 | ||||
SSN-702 | Phoenix | 73 | Electric Boat | Comm. 24 Oct. 81 | ||||
SSN-703 | Boston | 73 | Electric Boat | Comm. 22 Dec. 81 | ||||
SSN-704 | Baltimore | 73 | Electric Boat | Lau. 13 Dec. 80 | ||||
SSN-705 | Corpus Christi | 73 | Electric Boat | Lau. 25 Apr. 81 | ||||
SSN-706 | Albuquerque | 74 | Electric Boat | K.L. 27 Dec. 79 | ||||
SSN-707 | Portsmouth | 74 | Electric Boat | K.L. 8 May 80 | ||||
SSN-708 |
| 74 | Electric Boat | K.L. 20 Jan. 81s | ||||
SSN-709 |
| 74 | Electric Boat | K.L. 23 Jul. 81 | ||||
SSN-710 |
| 74 | Electric Boat | Ord. 31 Oct. 73 | ||||
SSN-7I1 | San Francisco | 75 | Newport News | Comm. 24 Apr. 81 | ||||
SSN-712 | Atlanta | 75 | Newport News | Comm. 25 Dec. 81’ | ||||
SSN-7I3 | Houston | 75 | Newport News | Lau. 21 Mar. 81 | ||||
SSN-714 | Norfolk | 76 | Newport News | Lau. 31 Oct. 81 | ||||
SSN-715 | Buffalo | 76 | Newport News | K.L. 25 Jan. 80 | ||||
SSN-716 | Salt Lake City | 77 | Newport News | K.L. 26 Aug. 80 | ||||
SSN-7I7 |
| 77 | Newport News | K.L. 31 Mar. 81 | ||||
SSN-718 |
| 77 | Newport News | K.L. Nov. 81* | ||||
SSN-719 |
| 78 | Electric Boat | Ord. 16 Apr. 79 | ||||
SSN-720 |
| 79 | Electric Boat | Ord. 16 Apr. 79 | ||||
SSN-721 |
| 80 | Newport News | Ord. 13 Aug. 81 | ||||
SSN-722 |
| 80 | Newport News | Ord. 13 Aug. 81 | ||||
SSN-723 |
| 81 | Newport News | Ord. 13 Aug. 81 | ||||
SSN-724 |
| 81 | Unassigned |
| ||||
DOCK LANDING SHIPS |
|
|
| |||||
LSD-41 | Whidbey Island | 81 | Lockheed | Ord. 9 Feb. 81 K.L. Aug. 81 | ||||
PATROL COMBATANT MISSILE (Hydrofoil) |
|
| ||||||
PHM-2 | 76 • | Boeing, Seattle | K.L. 12 Sept. 80 | |||||
PHM-3 | Taurus | 75 | Boeing, Seattle | Lau. 8 May 81 Comm. 7 Oct. 81 | ||||
PHM-4 | Aquila | 75 | Boeing, Seattle | Lau. 16 Sept. 81 Comm. 19 Dec. 81 | ||||
PHM-5 | Aries | 75 | Boeing, Seattle | Lau. 5 Nov. 81 | ||||
PHM-6 | Gemini | 75 | Boeing. Seattle | K.L. 13 May 80 | ||||
PATROL CHASER (Missile) (For Saudi Arabia) |
|
| ||||||
F-PCG-1 | Badr (612) | 77 | Tacoma Boat | Del. 28 Sept. 81 | ||||
F-PCG-2 | Al-Yarmook (614) | 77 | Tacoma Boat | Lau. 13 May 80 | ||||
F-PCG-3 | Hitteen (616) | 77 | Tacoma Boat | Lau. 5 Sept. 80 | ||||
F-PCG-4 | Tabuk (618) | 77 | Tacoma Boat | Lau. 18 Jun. 81 | ||||
PATROL GUNBOAT (Missile) (For Saudi Arabia) |
|
| ||||||
F-PGG-I | As-Siddiq (511) | 76 | Peterson Builders | Del. 15 Dec. 80[4] | ||||
F-PGG-2 | Al-Farouq (513) | 76 | Peterson Builders | Del. 22 Jun. 81 | ||||
F-PGG-3 | Abdul-Aziz (515) | 76 | Peterson Builders | Del. 3 Sept. 81 | ||||
F-PGG-4 | Faisal (517) | 76 | Peterson Builders | Del. 23 Nov. 81* | ||||
F-PGG-5 | Khalid( 519) | 76 | Peterson Builders | Del. 15 Dec. 81* | ||||
F-PGG-6 | AMR (521) | 76 | Peterson Builders | Lau. 13 Jun. 81 | ||||
F-PGG-7 | Tariq (523) | 76 | Peterson Builders | Lau. 19 Sept. 81 | ||||
F-PGG-8 | Oqbah (525) | 76 | Peterson Builders | K.L. 8 May 81 Lau. 19 Dec. 81* | ||||
F-PGG-9 | Abu Obaidah (527) | 76 | Peterson Builders | K.L. 4 Sept. 81 | ||||
DESTROYER TENDERS |
|
|
| |||||
AD-42 | Acadia | 76 | National Steel | Comm. 6 Jun. 81 | ||||
AD-43 | Cape Cod | 77 | National Steel | Lau. 2 Aug. 80 | ||||
AD-44 | Shenandoah | 78 | National Steel | K.L. 2 Aug. 80 | ||||
OILERS* |
|
|
|
| ||||
AO-177 | Cimarron | 76 | Avondale | Comm. 10 Jan. 81 | ||||
AO-178 | Monongahela | 76 | Avondale | Comm. 8 Aug. 81 | ||||
AO-179 | Merrimack | 77 | Avondale | Comm. 14 Nov. 81 | ||||
AO-180 | Willamette | 78 | Avondale | Lau. 18 Jul. 81 | ||||
AO-186 | Platte | 78 | Avondale | K.L. 2 Feb. 81 | ||||
Type!Hull No. Name | FY Program | Builder | Statu^__ ^ |
| ||||
SUBMARINE TENDERS |
|
|
|
| ||||
AS-41 McKee | 77 | Lockheed | Comm. 15 Aug- ** |
| ||||
FLEET OCEAN TUGS (For MSC) |
|
|
|
| ||||
ATF-171 Sioux | 78 | Marinette Marine | In Serv, I May®[5] |
| ||||
A I F-172 Apache | 78 | Marinette Marine | In Serv. 30 M |
| ||||
CABLE REPAIR SHIP (For MSC) |
|
|
|
| ||||
ARC-7 Zeus | 79 | National Steel | K.L. 1 Jun. 8' |
| ||||
SALVAGE SHIPS
ARS-50 |
| 81 | Unassigned | ) |
OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SHIPS (For MSC) |
|
| ||
AGOS-1 | Stalwart | 80 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 26 Sept- 8# |
AGOS-2 | Contender | 80 | Tacoma Boat | |
AGOS-3 | Vindicator | 80 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 26 Sept, 8# |
AGOS-4 | Triumph | 81 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 13 Feb. 81 |
AGOS-5 | Assurance | 81 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 13 Feb. [8] |
AGOS-6 | Persistent | 81 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 13 Feb. [9] |
AGOS-7 | Indomitable | 81 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 13 Feb. 8[10] |
AGOS-8 | Prevail | 81 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 13 Feb. [11] |
MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS (For U.S | Coast Guard) |
| ||
WMEC-901 | Bear | 77 | Tacoma Boat | Lau. 25 Sept- 8(1 |
WM EC-902 | Tampa | 77 | Tacoma Boat | Lau. 19 Mar. 81 |
WM EC-903 | Harriet Lane | 77 | Tacoma Boat | Lau. 14 Nov. 81 |
WM EC-904 | Northland | 77 | Tacoma Boat | K.L. 9 Apr- 81 |
WMEC-905 | Seneca | 79 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WM EC-906 | Pickering | 79 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WM EC-907 | Escanaba | 80 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WM EC-908 | Legare | 80 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WM EC-909 | Argus | 80 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WMEC-9I0 | Tahomu | 80 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WMEC-911 |
| 80 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WMEC-912 |
| 80 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
WMEC-913 |
| 80 | R.E. Derecktor | Ord.—Note 9 |
’Originally ordered by the late Shah of Iran for the Imperial Iranian Navy, originally consisted of six units. DD-995 and 997 of this class were cancel^"
Iran in Jun. 1976. DD-996 and 998 were reclassified DD-995 and 996 respecll!‘P on 23 Apr. 1978. Contracts for DD-995 and 996 were cancelled on 3 Feb. I?7' ;! the new Iranian government followed by the contracts for DD-993 and 994 bfj Mar. 1979. Acquired by the U.S. Navy on 25 Jul. 1979. DD-993/996 reclasS'P DDG-993/996 on 8 Aug. 1979.
is now suing the government over the withdrawal of the contract.
’Estimated u
'Rerated from guided missile destroyer!DDG) to guided missile cruiserfC^"
[2] Jan. 80. At the same time, DDG-47 was reclassified CG-47.
Authorized as an ''air-capable” Spruance-class destroyer with the unofficial '■ * sification of DDH. She was to have an enlarged hangar, flight deck, and a13! tenance facilities, but because of rising costs, it was decided to construct the u as a standard Spruance-class DD.
’Three units of this class are being built at Bazan Shipyard, El Ferrol, Spa'"' the Spanish Navy. No U.S. hull numbers are assigned.
■'Corrections to the 1980 Shipbuilding Program listing in the January 1980 b’3 */ ‘Ordered by the Australian Government for the Royal Australian Navy. Ausf3' pendant numbers are F-02, F-03. and F-04, respectively.
’Originally ordered under the FY 73 program along with the Pegasus—the11(( phinus—(PHM-1). Both were to be constructed with research and develop3',, funds. Keel for PHM-2 was laid on 30 May 1974. When construction costs11 \ two units continued to rise, the Hercules was cancelled in August 1975 whePji, was 40.9% completed, and remaining funds were diverted to complete the^ gasus. After stripping, the uncompleted hull was scrapped. Reordered as tl*e ship of a five-ship production contract. >
"Hull numbers 181-185 are assigned to the transport oilers(AOT) which areC
rently active with the Military Sealift Command.
The contract for the construction of WMEC-905 through 910 of this clas* ^ originally awarded to Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. on 29 August 1980. Threa11" :
by a lawsuit from the Robert E. Derecktor Corp., Middleton, RI., the co"1 ^
was withdrawn from Tacoma, and reawarded to the Derecktor Corp. despi'A fact that the Middleton company does not have a shipyard. Tacoma BoatbU'