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The Matched Pair: A Tactical Concept
By Commander P. T. Deutermann, U. S. Navy
The Charles F. Adams (DDG-2)- class guided-missile destroyer has long been recognized as an excellent short-range, antiair warfare platform. The Knox (FF-1052)-class frigate, on the other hand, enjoys a fine reputation in antisubmarine warfare. This article proposes matching one DDG-2 class and one FF-1052 class as a permanent tactical unit.
The two ships selected for this matched pair duty should be identified while they are both in overhauls. Ideally, they would be ships from the . same home port. If it is not possible to pick the ships while they are in overhauls, they must be designated as a matched pair in time to enter the refresher training cycle together. The ships would then work up together, beginning with the training readiness examination (TRE) and progressing through all aspects of refresher training, the combat systems qualifications and certifications (SQT, CSQT, WSAT, NGFS, FORACS, etc.), until both are ready to enter the fleet exercise cycle.
Operating together is, of course, the basis of this concept. The two ships would be scheduled to be in the same evolutions and employed as a pair. For example, if the next step in their workup meant participating in a composite training unit exercise (COMP- TUEX), both ships would be assigned to that exercise. They would plan for it together, do the pier-side workups in fleet training center mockups together, and then proceed to the actual exercise wjth each other. Once in the exercise, they would be employed by screen and surface warfare commanders as a single tactical unit. This means that when an exercise submarine is detected during ASW training, both ships of the matched pair would be detached to prosecute her. If either of the two surface combatants were
designated to become part of a surface action group (SAG), both would respond to any SAG mission assigned.
Following the workup, the ships would proceed through preparations for overseas movement together and deploy to the same area. Again, the employment pattern would be repeated: the ships would operate in the same battle group screen, call at the same liberty ports, go into upkeep at the same place, and return to the United States at the same time. Fleet schedulers would have to treat the ships as one scheduling unit and not as two ships. The cycle would continue until both ships were ready for overhaul, or, if on the extended operating cycle, ready for restricted availability.
There are five major advantages to the matched pair concept:
► Complementary capabilities
► Mutual logistic support
► Technical synergism
► Schedule stability
► Tactical integrity
A comparison of the DDG-2’s and FF-1052’s major warfare equipment (see Table 1) clearly demonstrates the complementary tactical capabilities of the matched pair. The FF-1052 class has the bow-mounted SQS-26CX sonar, which is capable of convergence zone and other long-range acquisition and tracking techniques. In addition, a number of the ships of the FF-1052 class carry the SQR-18A tactical towed array sonar system. The ship’s ASW capability is further enhanced by her LAMPS aircraft, which extends both sensors’ and weapons’ capabilities. Now add to this ASW capability the DDG-2’s SQS-23 sonar, which is a good, short- to medium- range active sonar, of different frequency than the SQS-26, and the combinations of sonar plans and stationing patterns expand. In addition to contributing its weapons delivery capability to the control of either ship, the LAMPS offers the advantage of having three units available to triangulate fixes on contacts. The additional command and control facilities in the matched pair also open up even greater combinations if an S-3 and/or P-3 aircraft are added to the picture.
While the FF-1052 has the lead in ASW, the DDG-2 has the edge in AAW capability. The DDG-2’s standard surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, 2-D and 3-D radars, missile directors (and in some cases NTDS suites), and a strong point defense gun system, make this ship a good medium-range air defense weapon system. Add another search radar, a second electronic support measure (ESM) system, a second tactical air navigation (TACAN) system, a few more air controllers, an effective short-range SAM system (Basic Point Defense Missile System [BPDMS]/ NATO Sea Sparrow), and the matched pair once again demonstrates the premise that their combined tactical sum is greater than the sum of their individual systems’ capabilities. Add in the LAMPS with airborne electronic support measure (ESM) capabilities, targeting maneuverability, and airborne threat warning, and the fleet concept of AAW defense in depth is strengthened.
The enhanced capability of the matched pair in surface warfare becomes evident immediately because there are now three units available to serve as a tactical team to perform long-range, over-the-horizon targeting with the added capability of being able to conduct simultaneous surface- to-surface missile strikes by using the targeting and coordination direction of the LAMPS—and all of it, if required, in a passive mode.
Paralleling the advantages of the
Table 1 DDG-2 and FF-1052 Capabilities
------------ Capability___________________ DDG-2
pfpa Surface-to-Air Missiles Yes
oint Defense Missiles No
27-mm. Guns (5754DP) Yes (2)
ASROC Yes
Torpedoes Yes
PSW/SUW Aircraft No
Long-Range Sonar No
hip Quieting No
7!r Search Radars (2-D) Yes (1)
^,r Search Radars (3-D) Yes (1)
YSW Towed Arrays No
FF-1052
No
Yes
Yes (1)
Yes*
Yes*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (1)
No
Yes
Pp-1052 carries more of these weapons than the DDG.
-Capabilit
Guns
torpedoes ^'ssiles (AS fussiles (PI "hssiles (S/ ^'ssiles (SS !recoy Systi r'D Air Sea 'T* Sfc Sea Air Sea ,fACAN iFp
Gun FCS team plant GHF Comms Comms SathJav
Table 2 DDG-2 and FF-1052 Commonality
DDG-2 FF-1052_____ Commonality
5754 | 5754 | Yes |
Mk-46 (Sfc) | Mk-46 (Sfc & air) | Yes |
ASROC | ASROC | Yes |
NA | BPDMS | No |
Standard | NA | No |
Harpoon | Harpoon | Yes |
ULQ-6B | RBOC | Yes |
SPS-40 | SPS-40 | Yes |
SPS-10 | SPS-10 | Yes |
SPS-39/52 | NA | No |
SRN-6/9/25 | SRN-6/9/25 | Yes |
Mk-XIl | Mk-XII | Yes |
Mk-68 | Mk-68 | Yes |
1,200 PSI | 1,200 PSI | Yes |
SRC-20/WSC-3 | SRC-20/WSC-3 | Yes |
URT-23/24 | URT-24 | Yes |
Some | Yes | Yes |
The AAW capabilities of the Charles F. Adams -class DDG—Waddell (DDG-24) foreground—and the ASW capabilities of the Knox-class FF—Barbey (FF-1088)—combine to create a powerful team when they operate together—so why not permanently team them?
warfighting capabilities of the matched pair is the advantage of mutual logistics support. Table 2 shows some of the commonality that exists between the DDG-2s and FF-1052s.
A part not in stock in one of the ships of the matched pair could well be in stock in the other, and thus a material casualty could be overcome quickly. The consolidated ships’ allowance lists could be tailored to include both the basic range and depth of parts needed for each ship and an incremental allowance of parts for the other half of the matched pair.
This idea could be carried one step further by using the same approach in the manning area. In the matched pair concept, one ship could be manned with a TACAN technician, while the other could have a Mk-XIl IFF technician. Both would have to have a basic battery of Navy enlisted classification (NEC) codes, but NECs now in acute shortage in the fleet could be detailed into a matched pair to cover both ships.
As mentioned, a requirement of the
I
matched pair concept is that the two ships would have to have identical schedules. While this is a novel and perhaps unsettling concept to fleet schedulers, it would introduce an element of stability into the ships’ lives. The operating cycle would be more stable than what we have today because the planning for a two-ship unit would have to be longer range to ensure that both ships went to the same exercises, ports, upkeep periods, and deployments. In-port evolutions would also have to match up pretty closely. Naval technical proficiency inspections, operational propulsion examining boards, inspections and surveys (InSurvs), and command inspections would have to come together to ensure that the ships would be ready to operate together, instead of having one ready for an exercise and the other torn apart for a short- notice InSurv.
There would, of course, be costs associated with adopting this concept. But these are contained mainly in the area of planning at levels far above individual ships. First and foremost, there would have to be a hard and fast rule that the matched pair would always remain a pair—i.e., never separated in terms of the operational schedule. This does not preclude schedule changes, but it does mean that if one ship had to pick up the “commitment” of another to participate in a fleet exercise, then both would go. Concomitantly, if one of the pair fell out of an exercise for a few days because of a material casualty, the other would stay in port until her partner was fixed, and under this concept, there would be people from the partner on board the ship with the casualty helping to fix the problem.
On a deployment, the fleet commander would not be able to spread his ships all over the Mediterranean littoral, for instance, answering the State Department's requests for ship visits to various cities. The integrity of the ships’ operating schedule when deployed would have to be as rigidly maintained as it would when the ships are operating in the home fleets. At a tactical level, the screen or surface warfare commander would not dispatch just one of the ships on a mission—he would send the pair together no matter what they were doing.
In sum, the concept would mean a loss of flexibility for the fleet scheduler and, to a lesser degree, for the local tactical commander. But, in wartime, the matched pair’s tactical integrity—the fifth and final of the previously listed advantages to the concept—would far outweigh the peacetime scheduling and employment inconveniences described above. The matched pair would yield a tactical dividend in wartime that could not be gained any other way. Two ships (and one airplane) which would always work together, would think tactically the same, have combat systems teams who know the strengths and weaknesses of the other, and have commanding officers who know in advance what the other captain is going to do in most situations would make a powerful team. Not only would standard fleet tactics be smoothly meshed.
made perfect by long practice and association with the partner ship, but locally developed tactics would spring up, making silent attacks and precision timing possible for many dualship evolutions. With the LAMPS available to spread the sensor net at five times the speed of the ships, the horizons for rapid detection, classification, and targeting of enemy surface and subsurface units would expand in direct proportion to how well the two combatant ships’ captains could indeed “match” the pair.
During World War II, the destroyer divisions of Arleigh Burke and Frederick Moosbrugger demonstrated that when naval combatant teams are formed and remain together, they will develop and employ team tactics successfully. It should be noted also that these tactics were developed when ships were really scarce and operating schedules were influenced significantly by a formidable enemy. The U. S. Navy is currently pushing hard in the area of multi-ship offensive tactics; the matched pair concept offers the ideal development team with which to perfect our offensive punch at sea.
Author s Note: There is no good reason to confine this employment and tactical concept to DDG-2/FF- 1052-class ships. The FFG-7IDD-963 ships offer another opportunity to form matched pairs.
Commander Deutermann is the commanding officer of the Charles F. Adams-class guided missile destroyer Tattnall (DDG-19).
Building the Guided Missile Frigates in the Todd Shipyards
By Carl R. Meurk
It should be a matter of interest, especially to those who will eventually serve in or command an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided missile frigate, to learn about the construction techniques used by the two Todd yards building these ships and how they differ not only from Bath Iron Works, but also from each other.
Although Todd has probably been better known as the largest independent shipbuilding and ship-repair company in the United States, it is also experienced at building destroyers, frigates, and cruisers. Todd did not burst upon the Navy’s new construction scene with the FFG-7 program or with the FF-1052 program.
Todd, tracing its beginnings from a Manhattan foundry during the Civil War, owned and operated many warship building yards during World War II. In fact, Todd’s Seattle yard built 46 destroyers of four classes. Some 60 escort aircraft carriers were built by the Tacoma yard. Todd’s yards, at that time, included many on the West Coast, several in partnership with Kaiser, and many on the East Coast, including a Todd-Bath yard in Portland, Maine.
Since World War II, Todd has built several of the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2)-class ships in the Seattle yard in the 1950s and 1960s, and the guided missile cruisers England (CG- 22) and Fox (CG-33) in the Los Angeles yard in the early- and mid-1960s. These ships were followed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by 14 Knox (DE-1052, now FF-1052) escorts, of which 7 ships were built at the Seattle yard and 7 at the Los Angeles yard.
This discussion will not describe the Navy’s acquisition policy which ulti-
By capitalizing on the strengths of its two Pacific shipyards building FFG-7s, Todd has been able to have each yard specialize in some areas. The Todd- Seattle yard is responsible for the specification materials for both yards. Clockwise from the top, are the Seattle yard’s building ways, digitizer in use, and the Pac-45 plasma arc mechanized cutting machine.
The Todd-Los Angeles yard generally provides the bulk materials for all Todd-built FFGs. The platen assembly of FFG hull sections, facing page, demonstrates the Los Angeles yard’s use of permanent jigs. This yard’s capabilities include two 175-ton capacity whirley cranes, pictured lowering the forward section of the Reid’s deck house, and a lightweight plate welding facility, below.
Individual yard strengths ns interde- \C Pendently as possible. At the same
jC hme, however, to ensure maximum
C effectiveness, Todd required the
Vards to compete with each other with cl Aspect to a spectrum of preset cor- 0' Porate objectives.
v The following two examples illus- rr Irate this use of each yard’s strengths: * Todd decided that the Seattle yard V "[ould be responsible for all the spe-
:f c'fication materials for both yards,
o- ^hile the Los Angeles yard would
fS handle all the bulk material. (There
g- Were exceptions, such as Seattle or-
Bering its own steel and aluminum from different suppliers than Los AnT Seles because of geographical freight
o' rate advantages.) This decision was
fl' Piade for two reasons. First, the Los
31 Angeles yard material procurement
fl1 and specification people were still
11 very busy with a previous commercial
contract, and because the specifica- If’ h°n material had to be ordered first,
;if it was more efficient for the Seattle
0' yard to take cognizance of the new
orders. Second, the Los Angeles yard’s more effective computers (at that time) could more efficiently store, keep track of, and automatically report status on the many more items comprising the bulk material list. This decision has proven to be a cost-effective one permitting minimum staffing in the material personnel at each yard with a minimum of duplication of functions.
► The second example of using a yard’s strengths is the decision on the best way to use the steel-cutting information available from the lead yard. Since Bath Iron Works did not at that time have numerically controlled contour cutters while both Todd yards did, the one-tenth scale negatives were to be furnished by Bath Iron Works and run through a digitizer which Seattle had recently procured to make two identical tapes for use at Seattle and at Los Angeles in their respective numerically controlled cutters. This decision also proved to be cost-effective. It also saved the Los Angeles yard from buying and installing a digitizer and hiring additional loftsmen or numerically controlled programmers which would have been the case because the ones on board were already fully occupied with the commercial contract.
Todd realized that the maximum interchange of ideas and plans between the two yards would allow each yard to choose its procedures and methodologies from a larger spectrum, while not dictating standardization between yards. Thus, there was intensive interchange between the yards in such areas as the development of management information systems expressly designed to meet the contract-imposed Department of Defense criteria and the organizational typologies for a quality assurance program, also expressly tailored to the contractual requirements. After countless exchanges of information, each yard developed its own system and organization in each area.
Again, in the method chosen to build the ship hull units and to load and join them on the ways, the two yards decided to make use of their
strong points. Los Angeles, having on board many trained shipfitters and welders just coming off a commercial contract and obviously not wishing to run the risk of not having them available after a layoff of undetermined length, started the steel work for as many ships as possible at the earliest time. This required the investment in multiple sets of hull jigs—no small investment of money—and the gamble that the yard would obtain the necessary subsequent follow-on contracts to help spread the costs over many hulls. This procedure fit with the Los Angeles yard’s larger lay-down and platen area and “blue-sky” construction method, wherein most of the steel assembly work is done out in the open, taking advantage of Southern California's climate. This method can seldom be used in more intemperate climates where full shelter is required.
Seattle, on the other hand, not having a heavy steel-oriented contract in the yard at the time, proceeded slowly with the hull work to permit it to hire and train shipfitters and welders in a steady, absorbable rate. Furthermore, the Seattle yard had an excellent facility housing its steel preparation and assembly procedures, and the orderly growth of series ship work, based on one set of hull unit jigs, was admirably suited to this facility.
A final, more substantive difference was Seattle’s decision to do as much as possible of its work at the piers rather than on the ways. This decision followed because Seattle’s pier space and attendant facilities are superior to those at the Los Angeles yard; Seattle also has the availability of a heavy-lift capability. Further, because of facility difference on the ways and extreme tide variances, the people in Seattle decided to build the ship for a bow- first launch and to create more horizontal subunits of their ship, requiring additional hull seams, but no additional butts. (This is where the pro- ducibility studies of the original design team paid dividends.) Similarly, they decided to accomplish a minimum of pre-outfitting, even waiting until after launch to load and align the reduction gears. Los Angeles, on the other hand, followed a more typical plan, having better facilities on the ways than at the piers. In fact, to maximize the time on the ways, and as soon as material deliveries began to catch up with the steel work completion dates, Los Angeles began to accomplish increasing amounts of preoutfitting—i.e., piping, ventilation, cabling, installation of specification equipment, and painting.
Neither of these methods was or is considered the “right” way. Each yard decided to make optimum use of its facilities, people, and available area. The on-time ship completions in each yard and similar cost performances show that these decisions were correct.
There were, of course, other differences. Each yard had different unions representing its employees. Therefore, plans for employee training were dissimilar, and, in some cases, there were different production plans because of differing union work rules. Similarly, each yard made its own make-or-buy decisions based on its own in-house economic studies, resulting in some work being done inhouse in one yard and being subcon- | tracted to an outside concern by the ’ other yard.
Differences notwithstanding, the final products from both yards have ■ been completely acceptable to their customers in the U. S. and Australian navies. A welcome example of the feedback to Todd is a letter to Todd’s , chairman from the commanding officer of the USS Wadsworth (FFG-9), the first ship completed at Los Angeles, from which the following is quoted:
“Throughout the new construction cycle, and continuing through the Post Shakedown Availability, my crew and I have been uniformly impressed with the craftsmanship and skill exhibited at all levels by your firm ... as the ultimate consumer of your product, - I want you to know that Wadsworth , is a fine ship. Todd can take great pride in having produced such a quality vessel.”
Mr. .... .it. is the Executive Vice President of Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation.
FFG-7 Class Pre-Commissioning
By Commander Alan W. Swinger, U. S. Navy
The first thing that 1 thought when I received orders to be the prospective and commissioning commanding officer of the John A. Moore (FFG-19) was that 1 was finally going to serve in a new ship. But getting a new Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class ship commissioned and on her first deployment is a long, involved process—one which many Navy professionals are going to experience as the Navy grows to meet new challenges.
Officer tours vary in length from 16 to 36 months. Typical officer assignments are shown in Table 1. Add to these the pre-commissioning time/ training pipeline (6-12 months) and you have a picture of true tour lengths.
Pipeline training is governed by the Navy training plan for the ship class, and is tailored to specific officer assignments and to the various enlisted specialties. Each training pipeline—with an emphasis on unique courses—is summarized in Table 2.
The pre-commissioning (pre-corn) period overlaps the pipeline period, but is designed to commence approximately four months prior to the ship’s delivery date. A fleet introduction team (FIT) is assigned to each building yard—Bath, Todd-Seattle, and Todd- Los Angeles. Each FIT operates under a similar charter and reports to its respective type commander (TyCom). In addition to acting as the TyCom’s representative with the respective su
pervisor of shipbuilding, the FIT controls and implements, in coordination with the PCO and PXO, the four- month training syllabus for the pre- -
Tour Length
Billet________________ (months)
Table 1 FFG-7 Tour Lengths
Commanding Officer | 24 |
|
Executive Officer | 18 |
|
Ship Control Officer | 16 |
|
Combat Systems Officer | 32 | 0 |
Engineer | 36 | * |
Support | 24 | (! |
Division Officers | 22-36 | sl |
EL . | .A — |
1 | 1:1= |
COURTESY JOHN A. MOORE
Building a modern combatant is a long and complicated task which is matched by the effort required to get the ship and her crew ready to fight. Crew members of the John A. Moore get their ship and themselves prepared to join the operating Jleet.
Table 2 FFG-7 Training Pipelines
0fnntanding Officerl J~fecutive Officer
Line Department Heads
Engineering Division Officers
Enlisted*
Combat System Division Officers
"-2-
or 4-week tactical
°te: No unique training is provided for support department personnel.)
Hoisted ratings are as follows: engineman (EN), gas turbine systems technician (GS), s'^rG), gunner’s mate (GMG), electronic technician (ET), data systems technician (DS) Pecialist (OS), and fire control technician (FT).
-7-week damage control school. Treasure Island, CA. (damage control assistant [DCA] only)
—same 14-week and 4- week engineering and hot plant courses as for engineers -3-week PCO/PXO gas turbine course, SWOS Newport
—Engineering Schools —FFG-7-class auxiliary and ship service diesel generator course. Great Lakes (EN); FFG-7 main propulsion school, Great Lakes (GS); gas turbine operator/ maintenance schools, Philadelphia —Combat Systems Schools—Mk-92 fire control system (FTMs); SQS-56 maintenance (STGs); Mk-75 76-mm. gun (GMGs); unique subsystem training (ETs, DSs, and ICs); combat system team training (OSs and FTs)
—Combat Systems Maintenance Management School (senior enlisted ETs, DSs, OSs, FTs, and ICs assigned to SERT team.)
missile fire control technician (FTM), sonar technician , interior communications electrician (ICs), operations
'6-Week PCO/PXO c°urse and 3-week ®as turbine engineer- 'a8 course at Surface Warfare Officers ^chool/Newport, RI. '14-week engineering ^°urse at Surface Of- jjCer Ship Material jwadiness Course at daho Falls, ID.
(pCO only)
"'-Week FFG-7 com- ,at system orienta- l|on and 4-week c°mbat system team gaining at Dam Meek, VA.
^2-week leadership ar|d management Gaining course
fanning course at P°int Loma, CA. or °am Neck (PCO °nly)
'3-week TyCom ori- er|tation
.(to
—6-month department head course at SWOS Newport —4-week combat system team training, Dam Neck (combat system officer [CSO] and ship’s control office/ [SCO]) —3-week PCO/PXO gas turbine course, SWOS Newport —4-week electronic warfare (EW) officer course (CSO)
—2-week surface missile system (SMS) officer course. Dam Neck (CSO)
—14-week FFG-7 engineering course,
Great Lakes, IL. (engineering officer [ENG])
—4-week hot plant course, Philadelphia, PA. (ENG)
—2-week SMS officer course, Dam Neck (electronic readiness and ordnance officers)
—6-week combat system maintenance management. Dam Neck or Mare Island, CA. (electronic readiness officer)
—4-week combat system team training. Dam Neck —4-week EW officer course (CIC Officer) —6-week ASW officer course (ASW officer)
Proceedings / January 1982
Table 3 FFG-7 Pre-Corn Training*
Phase Time to Delivery_________ Action
4 months Nucleus crew (PCO and approximately 45 personnel) reports to FIT for Phase I ship training; XO and remainder of crew study Navy training plan requirements at the fleet training center (FTC San Diego or Norfolk).
2 months Supplement of approximately 12 more personnel (mostly from combat systems department) report to FIT and PCO from the FTC.
2 weeks XO and the balance of the crew (approximately
130) report to FIT for Phase III training, outfitting of ship, space and equipment turnover, and ship familiarization.
These descriptions are specific to Todd-Los Angeles FFG-7s, yet similar to the other two yards.
II
III com period. This period is broken down into three phases. Each is outlined in Table 3.
This four-month period is provided primarily to accomplish the ship-specific training provided by the FITs, to put the crew through the various (more than 1,000) general team and individual schools and courses offered at the fleet training centers (FTCs), and to implement crew and ship organization. In addition, this period also permits the ship’s officers and leading petty officers to get to know the ship through training tours, a “mock” inspection and survey, builder’s trials, and acceptance trials (ATs). Although these last two are primarily designed to identify construction problems, work out bugs, and provide the vehicle (the AT) for the Board of Inspection and Survey to accept or reject the ship, they include invaluable underway periods for some of the key personnel to see the ship in operation prior to operating her themselves.
After AT and overlapping Phases II and III training, the crew is also very much involved in loadout of all operating space items and parts. Approximately three weeks is allotted for the various work centers to accomplish this evolution, as this task is quite large and extremely important to subsequent operations. Prior to the actual loadout, considerable time is spent inventorying the material by key work center personnel.
On the ship’s delivery date, the crew moves on board, commences normal ship routine, and conducts intensive watch team training in preparation for crew certification and examinations. The formal commissioning ceremony takes place one to five weeks after delivery, depending on the post-delivery availability arrangements with the particular building yard.
Once commissioned, the operational pace approaches a sprint. The order of events will vary with each ship, but within the five- to six-month period between commissioning and post-shakedown availability the following post-delivery tests and trials will be accomplished:
► Propulsion Examining Board light off exam
► Fast cruise and crew certification by squadron commander
► First independent underway period (approximately one week)
► Aviation readiness evaluation
► Ship’s electromagnetic compatibility improvement program phases (one week in port and one week under way)
► Refresher training (two weeks)
► First port call and dependents’ cruise
► Weapon system accuracy trials (two weeks)
► Combat system ship qualification trial (six weeks)
► Harpoon certification
► Acoustic trials
► Final contractor trials with Board of Inspection and Survey (one week).
After these tasks, the ship goes into post-shakedown availability (PSA) for three to four months to discover any outstanding contractor discrepancies and to make required modifications. This event is an intensive industrial work period that, to date, has been accomplished in the building shipyard or naval shipyard. Upon completion of PSA, the ship pursues a fairly standard training package in preparation for deployment. As an approximate gauge, the first deployment is generally scheduled for 18 months after commissioning.
New construction offers the unusual challenge of matching an amorphous mass of semi-trained Navy- men with a new, untested vessel. The reward for all hands in meeting this challenge is the satisfaction in knowing that each person played a part in breathing life into a new combat-ready ship.
Commander Swinger, formerly a member of the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board, is the CO of the USS John A. Moore FFG-19.
The SH-60B Seahawk: A Pilot’s Report.
By Dan Manningham
The single most visible element of the total LAMPS III system is the SH- 60B Seahawk air vehicle. Its silhouette dominates the official LAMPS III insignia, and its reliability and performance are critical to the success of the entire program. That crucial component, the Seahawk helicopter, is the latest of several generations of technology in airframe, engines, sensors, data processing, and displays. And fleet pilots and air crewmen are going to like this aircraft.
While the SH-60B Seahawk is only one element in the composite LAMPS III ship/air system, it is the most significant element for fleet aviators who will be flying it for more than the next two decades. The total LAMPS III system is, in fact, so sophisticated and so loaded with electronic hardware and software that a major computer manufacturer, International Business Machines (IBM)
Corporation, is the system prime contactor—an unprecedented arrangement in the history of naval aviation. Sikorsky Aircraft supplies the air- tame, but IBM is responsible for integration and total performance of the entire ship/air system. In short, IBM must make hundreds of separate Parts, including the helicopter, play together as a whole.
The basic airframe shape, size, and dynamic components are virtually identical to the Army’s UH-60A Black Hawk which has consistently exceeded specifications of the original HTTAS contract. The Seahawk aircraft has a different tail landing gear as well as folding systems for the main r°tor and pylon, but otherwise it does effectively capitalize on the excellent, Proven technology of its Army predecessor. When LAMPS III becomes operational in 1984, the H-60 air vehicle will have accumulated more than 350,000 hours of flight experience. Seahawk pilots will have a new aircraft which is both modern and Proven, tailored for naval service.
Design: Helicopter performance is largely a function of rotor design. Composite materials, advanced airfoil shapes, and elastomeric bearings have allowed designers new freedom in the quest for increased helicopter speed and hover performance. Some of these advanced rotor designs have a radically different appearance. The Seahawk’s does not, although in this case, appearance is deceiving.
Each of the four main rotor blades is built up from a hollow titanium spar which is plasma-arc welded and then formed while hot to its final, oval shape. The BIM (basic industrial raa- terials)-pressurized spar carries the dynamic loads. Nomex honeycomb, with a fiberglass skin, is used to establish the blade’s precise aerodynamic shape.
Rotor blade design is always a compromise between hover performance and high speed. The H-60 blade employs nonlinear twist to load the blade uniformly along its span. Swept blade tips dynamically modify that twist for
The SH-60B Seahawk helicopter is a key element of the LAMPS Mk-Ill ASW system. Built by Sikorsky, the SH-60B will give warships over-the- horizon surveillance and attack capabilities.
optimum performance in a hover and at cruising speeds.
Swept rotor tips are a common feature of modern rotor design, although their function is more complex than swept wings, which simply delay the onset of shock waves near Mach 1. The Seahawk’s swept rotor tips do reduce Mach effects, but they also shift the entire blade's aerodynamic center to provide more twist in a hover and less at high speed. These aerodynamic changes to blade geometry are a significant contributing factor in overall rotor performance. Tip sweep makes the rotor system work
effectively in hover and cruise conditions. Blade tip sweep also minimizes noise and vibration.
The four rotor blades are attached to a fully articulated rotor head which allows all lead-lag, flap, and feathering motions in a conventional helicopter manner but with a minimum of parts or required maintenance. The central component of this hub is a titanium forging which incorporates integral attachments for blades, dampers, and scissors. The blade is attached to the hub through two elastomeric bearings which accommodate all blade motions. The blade end passes through the elastomeric bearing to be secured from behind, so that centrifugal force induces compression loads on the bearing. Because compression failures are rare with this type of bearing, and because it is readily inspectable, there is no need to set a limiting service life. Early deterioration is easily detected and is not critical. This rotor system also requires no lubrication.
Immediately above the main rotor- hub, and fastened to it, is the Bifilar vibration absorber, a separate, cruciform forging with pendular counterweights. Bifilar is Sikorsky’s approach to vibration control.
The dynamics of rotating airfoils are very complex. One unique, but predictable, result is a vibration pattern which includes N + 1 and N — 1 beats. In a four-bladed system, for instance, the rotor system will generate three per revolution (N - 1) pulses and five per revolution (N + 1) pulses, which are transmitted in a complex fashion as a single four per revolution pulse to the fuselage. Traditional vibration control would seek to dampen the four per revolution pulse at the point where the transmission attaches to the fuselage. Seahawk’s Bifilar is tuned to absorb the dominant N — 1 vibrations, at the source, so that the resultant four per revolution pulse is minimized. Bifilar works very well in the Sea- hawk, generally reducing perceived vibration levels below .1G, except in translational lift, where buffeting can be pronounced.
Control of that main rotor is through redundant hydraulic servos powered by dual transmission-driven pumps or, when necessary, by an electrically powered emergency/utility pump. Individual control servos employ a unique jam-proof design.
Each pilot valve is really a two- spool element. Control inputs are applied to the inner spool and transmitted through a compressed spring to the outer spool, which actually controls the flow of hydraulic fluid. If the outer spool jams for any reason, normal control reactions by the pilot will override the spring tension, moving the inner spool within the outer and opening a bypass valve to relieve the jam. Any such split operation is indicated on the annunciator panel for appropriate maintenance action, but safety of flight is not jeopardized.
The H-60’s cross-beam tail rotor is a true rigid-rotor design composed of two two-bladed elements clamped between flat titanium plates. Each of the blade pairs is built up from a single graphite composite spar which is flexible enough to allow all necessary
Although the Sealiawk’s rotor head, left, does not appear to be radically different from other helicopters, it really is. Its rotor tip, below left, shifts the blade's aerodynamic center for increased twist in a hover and decreased twist at high speed; and its tail rotor, below, has few moving parts and no hinges.
feathering and flapping motions. There are no hinges or potential hinge Problems in this tail rotor. Tail rotor stiffness is precisely tuned by the layUP of the composite fibers.
, One unusual feature of this tail rotor ls its canted placement on the vertical Pylon. That slant provides a small amount of lift—about 400 pounds—to extend this helicopter’s center of gravity limits. That small amount of fail rotor lift also helps to keep the nose down, particularly at ship-apProach speeds where visibility angles are critical.
Power for the Seahawk is provided by a pair of GE T700-GE 401 turboshafts rated at 1,700 shaft horsepower (s.h.p.) each. The T700 is built from •ndividual modules which can be field- replaced using nine common tools. Engine operation is similar to other helicopter turboshafts, although the T700 is pneumatically started. That low-pressure air normally comes from the on-board auxiliary power unit (APU) but can be provided by other- engine bleed air or an external source.
Overhead T-handles in the cockpit allow for single-handed, single-motion engine shutdown and isolation in the event of fire.
Each engine normally delivers a maximum of 1,500 s.h.p. to the main and tail rotors through a 3,000-s.h.p. main transmission which is dry-rated for 30 minutes. Main bearings are designed to entrap enough lubricating oil to sustain half an hour of flight, even after catastrophic failure of the transmission lubrication system.
Transmission inputs are designed to accept the full 1,700-s.h.p. output of either engine in the event that one engine fails. Also, a “contingency power” toggle switch on the collective lever trips all air bleeds and allows maximum rated power from the remaining engine in the event of engine failure so that almost 60% of normal power is available with one engine out.
In the event of a water landing, an emergency flotation system is installed to keep the aircraft afloat long enough to allow the crew to escape.
Fuel is supplied to each engine and to the APU, from interconnected main fuel tanks. The engine and APU high- pressure pumps suck fuel from the tanks. No electric boost pumps are used. In this fashion, the fuel system is completely independent of other aircraft subsystems. Also, this simple suction system prevents fuel leakage in the event of a loose connection or line failure. All fuel connections are self-sealing, break-away types that prevent fuel leakage in case of crash damage.
Fuel management could not be simpler. In normal operation, each engine draws from its own tank without any pilot action. When desired, fuel can be crossfed from opposite tanks by moving the respective overhead flow control valve. A fuel dump system is located in the right fuel cell.
The Seahawk’s fuel capacity is sufficient to allow two hours on station at a point 100 nautical miles from the ship.
Primary electrical power is provided by two transmission-driven al-
ternating current (AC) generators rated at 30/45 kilovolt amperes (KVA). Either one can power the entire aircraft. A third AC generator, driven by the APU, can produce 20/ 30 KVA. Two 200 ampere converters supply 28 volts of direct current (DC) power.
Part of the aircraft’s generous electrical supply is used to anti-ice the windshields and de-ice rotor blades. Both main and tail rotors are pulse- heated through slip-ring contractors. Individual blades are alternately heated, enough to break the bond between ice and blade surfaces so that the ice can be thrown off by centrifugal force.
One of the Seahawk’s really pleasant surprises is an environmental control system (ECS) which heats, cools, and dehumidifies cabin and cockpit air. LAMPS III pilots and crew members are going to be far more comfortable and, therefore, more efficient than their predecessors.
In operation, the Seahawk lives up to its name. It is at once powerful.
fast, smooth, and nimble.
Engine starting is automatic and designed to get the helicopter airborne in as little as 60 seconds. The sequence is normally initiated by starting the APU. Both engines can then be gang-started if necessary. The rotor blade remains engaged until both engines are at ground idle to allow rapid rotor acceleration through the critical droop range.
Flying Qualities: Lift-off is smooth and crisp, particularly with the automatic flight control system (AFCS) operating. The Seahawk’s AFCS reflects the significant advances in helicopter stabilization which have taken place in the past ten years. When that entire system is functioning, this helicopter flies with unprecedented stability and precision.
Actually, the AFCS is built up in block fashion beginning with stability augmentation systems (SAS):
SAS 1 is an analog system which provides short-term rate damping. Alone, it will not maintain a preset attitude, but it will dampen, or softer)' the rates of roll and pitch over the very short term to alleviate the effects of gusts of wind and to minimize smaf attitude excursions. SAS 1 has ±5$ authority. It does considerably tame the Seahawk’s basic handling quali' ties, but it does not allow hands-off flight.
SAS 2 uses a digital computer to also provide short-term rate damping and a minimum amount of attitude retention. In smooth air, SAS 2 will al' low brief periods of hands-off flight During normal operation, this system combines its ± 10%. Together, these two stability augmentation system5 subdue the Seahawk’s basic handling qualities to make it a docile aircraft'
An autopilot function fully automates flight path control in several modes. It will fly the helicopter on any preset attitude, altitude, heading, of speed in completely hands-off operation, although the pilot can alway5 override it. In its coupled mode, it win fly from nearly any flight regime to a 40-foot hover and back out again-
Proceedings / January 19S______________________________________________________________________________________ -J
The SH-60B’s cockpit engine and transmission instrumentation, facing page, is presented in vertical scale format with automatic color changes to indicate caution or warning limits. The aircraft’s stabilator is feathered to the main rotor downwash to reduce pitch. During hover and air taxi, the Seahawk remains nearly level for maximum forward and downward visibility.
Sensitive accelerometers assist the basic Doppler reference for inertial stability.
The Seahawk’s AFCS is absolutely state of the art in performance and ?>niplicity of operation. It is assisted !*! 'ts work by a unique variable sta- bilator which functions independently °f any other flight control system. It rotates automatically through its lim- 't'ng range of 8° trailing edge up and -400 trailing edge down to enhance handling qualities in three ways:
At low indicated airspeeds the sta- bilator is nearly feathered to the main r°tor downwash to reduce pitch attitude. In a hover, or at minimum forward airspeeds, this helicopter maintains a nearly level attitude with ^tcellent forward visibility.
. During acceleration, the stabilator ls Programmed to provide a positive stick gradient, which is progressively u>°re forward stick with airspeed. Positive stick gradient is an important uietnent for precise, predictable hand- *'n8 qualities.
* At higher speeds, the stabilator modulates automatically to alleviate gusts and to create short-term pitch stability.
In normal operation, the stabilator, SAS 1, SAS 2, and the autopilot work together as coordinated building blocks to create defined levels of stability throughout the flight envelope. When any single element is inoperative, the Seahawk retains nearly all of its normal handling and operational ability. Even when all four of these building blocks are inoperative, this helicopter is fully controllable. It is not a pleasure to fly under that improbable condition, but it brings you home, even to a rolling deck.
With nothing more than the stabilator operating, the SH-60B is easier to handle than many civilian training helicopters. When the complete AFCS package is working, the Sea- hawk is maneuverable and responsive enough to make small ship operations safe even in difficult sea states. In short, this AFCS resolves that classic aerodynamic conflict between solid stability and sensitive, precise control response. The Seahawk has both in abundance.
In a hover, the powerful tail rotor allows quick, precise turns in either direction. Army field requirements for the original H-60 included an extraordinary amount of tail rotor power for close maneuvering, and that capability will serve Navy pilots well. Seahawk pilots will have all the left rudder they need for hover turns and sideward flight.
At the ASW mission gross weight of 20,244 pounds, the Seahawk is 1,640 pounds lighter than its maximum standard-day takeoff gross weight. On a standard day, this helicopter should easily lift from the fan- tail of a destroyer with about 75% torque. During normal takeoffs, the efficient main rotor converts excess power to enough thrust for rapid acceleration through translational lift. There is little noticeable buffet when accelerating through that speed range from zero airspeed hover because the time exposure is so brief. Approaches are not so pleasant.
At the minimum airspeeds associated with shipboard recoveries, the Seahawk develops considerable translational buffet. At between 20 and 30 knots of indicated airspeed (KIAS), that buffet is pronounced enough to burden recoveries, particularly at night when critical cockpit instruments may be blurred by panel vibrations. A second Bifilar to dampen the N + 1 could make a significant difference at the expense of an additional 100 pounds. Still, that flight regime is so critical to the overall welfare of Seahawk operations that a simple test program would seem appropriate. A second Bifilar works very well on Sikorsky's civil S-76 helicopter and might do the job for Seahawk.
In a hover and elsewhere, the engine and transmission instruments are easy to read. Each instrument is a vertical-scale illuminated display which changes color for caution or warning. When any function is within normal limits, its indication glows bright green. When that indication falls or rises to a cautionary zone the entire vertical line changes color to yellow. If the temperature or pressure exceeds an actual limit, the entire line turns bright red. In operation, all power instruments can be scanned in a glance. Seahawk pilots will be able to concentrate their attention on other, more important elements of flight and tactics, while having immediate access to all necessary power information.
Other cockpit lighting in the SH- 60B is primarily white, a proven improvement to red and used in all commercial transports for nearly 20 years.
At all speeds from 30 KIAS to more than 150 KIAS, the Seahawk is smooth, stable, and responsive, partly because this Navy variant cannot fly fast enough to encounter main rotor speed limits. The basic UH-60 has been flown at speeds in excess of 200 KIAS, but the Seahawk is slowed by considerable parasite drag from its many external antennas and fittings. Dash speeds will be limited only by power, but the ride quality and handling at those maximum speeds are excellent—again, an important consideration for crew efficiency.
Approaches to a hover are enhanced by the crisp main rotor response, even at minimum airspeeds, and the powerful tail rotor. The Seahawk is nearly identical to the SH-3 in size and weight, but it handles with the quick, positive response of a much smaller helicopter.
Landings are softened by the enormous main landing gear which has been tested to more than nine feet per second at maximum gross weights. It is really difficult to make a bad landing in the Seahawk from a hover or with forward speed. ■
LAMPS III can only be as effective as its weakest link. The SH-60B has already proven that it can perform at or above every program specification- The Seahawk air vehicle will carry LAMPS III into a new dimension in antisubmarine warfare.
As a naval aviator, Mr. Manningham participated in the development of the Navy’s first all-weather ASW helicopter tactics. He is now a captain with United Airlines and Special Features Editor for Business and Commercial Aviation.
RAST Helps Get LAMPS III On Small Combatants
By Lieutenant Commander John M. Cody, Canadian Forces
The introduction of the LAMPS Mk-III weapon system as a main battery of our small, previously non-aviation combatant ships will have a major impact on many operational aspects of the employment of these ships. Support for this system on board our ships will also require fundamental changes. The major ship impacts are in structural modifications, personnel requirements, and logistic support.
The most drastic structural changes will result from the installation of the recovery assist securing and traversing (RAST) system. RAST will enable the helicopter component of the LAMPS III system to be used during rougher sea conditions than has been possible in the past. The system will be maintained by ship personnel. This new capability, however, will add weight to and require space in the ships receiving the system. Since RAST is new to the U. S. Navy, it raises many questions.
When it was established that the LAMPS III system was required to operate in sea state 5, it became evident that this entailed conducting flying operations on board LAMPS III candidate ships rolling as much as about 30°, pitching 5°, and heaving up to 15 feet per second. The requirement for a mechanical handling system for the helicopter therefore became fundamental, and, in 1976, the functional priorities for such a system were established. The system must be able to traverse the helicopter between the hangars and the flight deck, provide a rapid-securing function, and provide a recovery assist function.
Concurrent with the definition of the LAMPS III system, the U. S. Navy evaluated Canadian, British, and French helicopter recovery devices. When none of these was able to meet the U. S. Navy’s cost, capability, compatibility, installation, and other prerequisites, U. S. industry was requested to offer proposals for a suitable system. A prototype system from this competition was selected, developed, and tested. As developed, this system proved to be unsatisfactory and would have required a major redesign to meet the performance goals dictated by the size and weight of the LAMPS III helicopter. This turn of events caused the system development concept to be reevaluated against a potential modification of the existing Canadian helicopter haul-down and rapid securing device (HHRSD) or Beartrap system. The decision was made to realign the helicopter handling development program to that of modifying this known and proven system. This development is now known as the RAST system.
The RAST system consists of helicopter- and ship-mounted components. The components unique to the helicopter are as follows:
► A cable or “messenger” hoist, which is mounted on a retractable main probe assembly, is employed to reel in the recovery assist cable. The end fitting of the recovery assist cable, which is connected to a constant-tension winch in the ship, is locked into the aircraft main probe assembly. Upon landing, the main probe also provides the securing function when engaged by the restraining mechanism, which is part of the shipboard- mounted rapid-securing device.
A tail probe, which is also retractable, is incorporated in the tail wheel strut to provide lateral aircraft restraint when engaged in a deck- bunted slot.
. A cockpit-mounted control probe* visual indications of the system’s status and allows the pilot to °Perate the messenger cable hoist and activate the probe.
The shipboard part of the RAST Ostein is an assembly of electrical, rllechanical, electronic, and hydraulic Cc1U'Pment which operates three hydraulic winch systems and two rapid- souring devices. The primary hard- bre components are as follows:
The landing signal officer (LSO) c°ntrol station is the single control Point for aircraft launch, recovery, Curing, and traversing functions. It ls 'ocated in a recessed position on the ^arboard side of the flight deck.
Rapid-securing devices, one for ®ach helicopter, provide a capability to secure the helicopter rapidly after tQUchdown. The design of the devices Provides for lateral, fore and aft, and vertical restraint. The devices are mounted in and ride on deck track plates and are attached to traverse winch cables which can move them along the length of the track to and
from the hangar. , „T
► Two traverse winches in the KAj 1 machinery space provide traversing movement to the helicopter when it is locked in the rapid-securing device.
► The hydraulic winch and haul-down
power unit, also located in the RAST machinery space, assists aircraft recovery by maintaining constant tension on the recovery cable. That tension applies a centering force through the cable to the aircraft mam probe, drawing it into the rapid-securing device. .
► A tail-guide winch system is used to align the helicopter with the RAST system track so that the helicopter can be traversed into and out of the hangar.
► Other associated RAST system equipment is used to control the system, to position the recovery cable end fitting under the required port or
The RAST equipment provides the means for launching and recovering the SH-60B Sealiawk on a ship taking a 28° roll or a 5° pitch.
starboard rapid-securing device, to dampen recovery cable tension variations, and to control electric cable payout to the rapid-securing device.
A typical RAST system launch commences with the helicopter secured in the hangar. After power is supplied to the RAST system, the hangar door is opened and aircraft tiedowns are removed. The helicopter is then moved by operation of a traverse control lever on the RAST system operator’s console. With the exception of the control console operator, a brake rider in the aircraft, and an aircraft director on deck, no other personnel are required to move the ten-ton helicopter to and from the takeoff position. While the aircraft is being traversed, it is constantly se-
cured by the rapid-securing device, which is designed to handle loads associated with 28° of ship roll, 5° of pitch, and a 15-feet-per-second heave. After the aircraft is readied for launch and the deck is relatively stable, the LSO signals the pilot to raise the tail probe, then the LSO releases the jaws of the rapid-securing device and signals the pilot to launch the aircraft.
The recovery operation is more complex than the launch. Before the aircraft’s return for a landing, the rapid-securing device is positioned in the touch-down area. About 30 feet of recovery assist cable are reeled from the haul-down winch drum and faked out. Upon the helicopter’s arrival over the deck in a 15 to 20 foot high hover, the pilot, having extended the main probe, lowers the messenger cable through the main probe’s hollow core. Static electricity is discharged from the messenger cable to the ship by flight deck personnel, and the messenger is manually attached to the haul-down cable end fitting, whereupon all flight deck personnel clear the flight deck. Meanwhile, the pilot hauls in the messenger cable and recovery assist cable end fitting until the end fitting automatically locks into the main probe and the messenger cable disconnects from the recovery assist cable.
At this point, the pilot signals the LSO that he is ready for recovery assist cable to be put under hovering tension, which is usually set at 1,500 pounds. Hovering tension provides a significant centering force to assist the pilot in maintaining a hover over the probe capture area of the rapid-securing device. During a lull in ship motion, the pilot, having positioned the probe as accurately as he is able, lowers the hover altitude to six feet and indicates to the LSO his readiness to land. The LSO then selects haul- down tension. This tension (approximately 4,000 pounds) guides and assists the helicopter probe into the securing device.
When the helicopter lands in the probe capture area of the rapid-securing device, the recovery assist function of the system is virtually complete. The secure function is initiated by the LSO when he activates the jaws of the rapid-securing device to lock onto the aircraft main probe. This takes less than two seconds. Up to the time of entrapment, the pilot is able to wave off by releasing the cable end fitting either electrically or manually, or by overpowering the tension in the recovery assist cable. The aircraft is trapped when the tail probe is lowered to engage a tail probe grid to enhance the helicopter’s directional security.
Following post-landing checks and engine shutdown, the helicopter is ready to be straightened. Straightening is necessary to align the helicopter with the traverse track. When the tail- guide winch cables have been attached to the helicopter and the tail probe is raised, the LSO aligns the helicopter with the traverse track by using the traverse and tail-guide winches. Once aligned with the track, the tail probe is lowered again into the track, and the helicopter is ready to
be moved into the hangar as soon as the rotor blades are folded.
The first RAST system installed on hoard a Navy ship went to the USS Mclnerney (FFG-8). Technical and °Perational evaluations were successfully conducted on board her in 1981.
The Search for the FFX_
By Norman Polmar
“The FFX is a concept designed sPecifically for the open ocean antisubmarine warfare problem. In a Worldwide war with the Soviets, it will augment the ASW escort capability of 0Ur allies and also augment our own 9°ast Guard contribution. We environ that this ship would be employed ulrnost entirely by the Naval Reserve, to be called up in a major war.” This Was how Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, Ascribed the planned FFX program.
The program’s design objectives are to produce the ship in “affordable” numbers, using off-the-shelf components, and suitable for reserve manning. Affordable generally means °ne-half the cost of a frigate of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class. A Navy FFX study in 1980-81 listed the following performance objectives for fhe ship:
^ Sustained speed of 20 knots i Maximum speed of more than 25 knots
^ Passive search capability beyond 'he first convergence zone (approximately 35 miles)
* Active sonar
* Quiet ship to reduce sonar interference and detection
^ LAMPS helicopter capability Mk-32 torpedo tubes Self-defense against aircraft C3 facilities for ASW _ Endurance of 5,000 nautical miles at 16-18 knots
* Supportable by the Naval Reserve There are several possible platforms that could be adopted for the EEX: a modification of the FFG-7 de- ^8n; a modification of the U. S. Coast Guard’s 270-foot Bear (WMEC-901)- class design; or a new ship design. A new design would probably displace j'Orne 2,000 to 2,400 tons full '°ad—j.e., a ship slightly smaller than fhe two Bronstein (FF-1037)-class ships which were completed in 1963. Although the Bronsteins carry the arge ASROC and AN/SQS-26 bow
The SH-60B/RAST combination has demonstrated the capability to launch and recover in sea states up to 28° of roll and 5° of pitch. Production contracts for the first RASTs were awarded on 10 April 1981. The system is scheduled for installation in sonar that would not be required in the FFX, their design is too small to accommodate a LAMPS helicopter and they fall short of the endurance requirement for the FFX. (Their maximum speed is about 24 knots, but deletion of the bow sonar could increase their speed, while reducing displacement several hundred tons.)
The difficulties of meeting the FFX criteria are obvious. And, the design of the FFX will occur as the Navy is struggling with new designs and the accompanying start-up problems for advanced classes of destroyers (DDGXs), amphibious ships (LHDXs) and LPDXs, mine countermeasure ships (MCMs), possibly aircraft carriers (VSSs, or CVs/CVSs), and several auxiliary classes. Thus, at the outset, there appear to be valid reasons for adopting an existing design for the FFX.
The Bear, however, does not appear to be a viable candidate. As with previous major classes of Coast Guard the FFG-7, CG-47, DD-963, DD-993 classes of ships.
Commander Cody is serving with the U. S. Navy to facilitate the development and installation of the RAST system.
cutters, the Bear is intended to serve in an ASW role in wartime. However, the ship does not have a hull-mounted sonar, ASW processing equipment, or ship-launched weapons. In wartime, the Bear is designed to be fitted with a towed array sonar and to embark a LAMPS helicopter. While those systems could probably be fitted, it seems unlikely that the ship could also accommodate the planned Phalanx gun system for missile defense, the AN/ SLQ-32(V) 2 electronic warfare suite, and Harpoon antiship missiles. Even if all of those systems could be fitted, the additional personnel needed to operate them might swamp the ship.
Finally, while the lead ship was scheduled to be commissioned by now, she remained under construction with three others of the class through the end of 1981. Contracts for nine additional ships that have been authorized were delayed because of legal problems, adding another dimension to the question of adopting
| Nominal FFX | Bear WMEC | Perry FFG-7 | Knox FF-1052 |
Displacement (tons) | 2,000-2,400 | 1,630 | 3,710 | 4,100 |
Length (feet) | 9 | 270 | 445 | 438 |
Propulsion | 7 | diesel | gas turbine | steam |
Horsepower | 7 | 7,000 | 40,000 | 35,000 |
Shaft(s) | 7 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
Speed (knots) | 25 | 19.5 | 28 | 27 + |
Range (nautical miles) | 5,000 at 16-18 knots | 2,500 at 19 knots | 4,500 at 20 knots | 4,500 at 20 knots |
Manning | 120 | 100 + | 180 | 270 |
Helicopters | 1 LAMPS | 1 (LAMPS) | 2 LAMPS | 1 LAMPS |
ASW | Mk-32 TT | (helicopter) | Mk-32 TT | Mk-32 TT ASROC |
AAW | 7 | 1 x 76-mm. gun | 1 x 76-mm. gun 1 Mk-13 GMLS w/40 missiles | 1 x 5-in./54 gun |
ASUW (Antiship) | 7 | (Harpoon?) | Harpoon | Harpoon |
ASMD | 7 | (Phalanx CIWS) (SLQ-32(V)2) | Phalanx CIWS SLQ-32(V)2 | Sea Sparrow SLQ-32(V)1 |
Radar | 7 | SPS-64 | SPS-49 SPS-55 | SPS-10 SPS-40 SPS-58 |
Sonar | towed array | (towed array) | SQS-56 towed array | SQS-26 SQS-35 IVDS towed array |
Fire control | 7 | Mk-92 | Mk-92 SPG-60 | Mk-68 Mk-115 |
SPG-53
Notes: FF-1052 shown fully equipped: planned WMEC wartime systems shown in parenthesis.
the Bear design for the FFX.
The third alternative is to adopt the FFG-7 design or some modification of that ship, which was specifically designed as a “low-mix” ASW escort ship. The first few FFG-7s are now at sea with production under way at three shipyards. There are many advantages to adopting the FFG-7: the design exists; the ship and systems are now operational; the training, logistics, and maintenance infrastructures exist; and with more than 50 ships planned for the active fleet by 1990, the assignment of active personnel to the reserve FFG-7s in peacetime, or reserve personnel to active ships in wartime, will be greatly simplified.
The FFG-7 meets all of the FFX’s performance criteria in addition to having a more capable antiaircraft/an- tiship capability with the Mk-13 missile launcher (with 40 Standard-MR/ Harpoon missiles), and an enhanced ASW capability with facilities for two SH-60B (LAMPS III) helicopters.
At the same time, the FFG-7 suffers from costing twice as much as the FFX program's cost goal and requiring a crew of some 180 men, compared with an FFX goal of some 120. However, life-cycle costs for an add-on of FFG-7/FFX units to the current buy of FFG-7s could compensate for part of the dollar difference. In this respect, the Mk-13 launcher could be deleted from the FFG-7/FFX as built, to be added at a later date.
With respect to personnel, the Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates now being assigned to the Naval Reserve require crews of some 270 officers and enlisted men. At the same time, their large AN/SQS-26 sonars, ASROC, and complex steam plants will make greater demands on the crew than the FFG-7 would, with that ship’s gas turbines and smaller AN/SQS-56 hull- mounted sonar.
Beyond cost and manning, some minimum ASW capability must be considered. The FFG-7 is superior in
ASW capability to the Bear, while meeting or exceeding all of the FFX’s design criteria. At the same time, the FFG-7 is superior in self-defense, antiaircraft, and antiship capabilities, all of which would probably be highly significant in the “major war" described by Admiral Hayward.
A final consideration is the potential for employing the FFG-7 design as a Coast Guard cutter, to succeed the Bear class in that service. The procurement problems with the Bear and dissatisfaction expressed with her capabilities, especially the limited ASW effectiveness, plus changing Soviet and Third World threats, and the increasing peacetime missions of the Coast Guard that are demanding more-capable ships all tend to make the FFG-7 design highly attractive for Coast Guard service.
Again, Coast Guard procurement costs could be reduced through deferral of the Mk-13 missile launcher and some other wartime-only equip-
ment (e.g., the electronic warfare suite). This space could probably be used by the Coast Guard to enhance Peacetime mission capabilities without degrading the potential for wartime updating. The FFG-7’s speed, range, and helicopter capability being greater than the Bear's should also result in increased peacetime mission effectiveness.
Still, the FFG-7 would cost more
and require more people than the Bear class. The equipment deletions suggested above coupled with the “buy- in” to a major Navy program, the multiple shipyard involvement, and other factors argue for at least an indepth analysis of the concept. And most important, the FFG-7/WHEC provides a significantly better wartime platform.
The problems and uncertainties of
Navy ship procurement, the need for more capable ASW ships, and the nature of the threat at sea make the FFG-7 an attractive candidate for the Naval Reserve as well as the Coast Guard.
Mr. Polmar writes “The U. S. Navy” column for the Proceedings and is the author of the 12th edition of The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet (Naval Institute Press, 1981).
Fuel Savers: Hull Treatment
% James H. Cunningham
Editor’s Note: With this issue, Proceedings begins the Fuel Savers’ series. Each feature will offer specific energy-efficient options available to Vessel operators worldwide.
The series is based on the recently leleased research study prepared by the Argonne National Laboratory’s Center for Transportation Research f°r the International Marine Fuel Conservation Program of the Department of Energy. The purpose of the study was to identify and evaluate fuel c°nservation measures. More than 40 Sl<ch options have been reviewed and eftdorsed by maritime authorities.
Two separate but related factors have focused attention on the requirement for vessel operators to do some- •hing about fuel costs as a percentage °f overall operating costs. The first is the escalating price of marine fuel. For eXample, since 1973 marine fuel costs have increased 800%. Second, and of an even more serious nature, is the ability of oil refineries to squeeze greater amounts of distillates out of a barrel of crude. The result is less residual oil, the historic vessel fuel. *h addition, the quality of the residual °'l is rapidly deteriorating.
A positive aspect of this worldwide marine fuel crisis has been the stimulation of research and development mto ways of making vessels more energy efficient. With marine fuel now accounting for more than 50% of the average merchant vessel’s operating c°sts, conservation of residual oil is Necessary to permit an orderly transition to alternative fuels for maritime use. One area which offers an immediate improvement in fuel savings is (he antifouling treatment of hulls.
A ship’s hull is probably never smoother than it is on the day the ship is launched. If her underwater hull remained unchanged throughout the vessel’s lifetime, her fuel consumption would be as predictable as the passage of time. Unfortunately, the instant the vessel slides down the ways and hits the water, fouling starts. Barnacles and other marine life attach themselves to the surface of the steel plates. The slime that eventually forms becomes a veritable garden of vegetation and a zoo of marine animal life. In just a few months, the turbulence-induced drag caused by this slime will require a ship to apply 20% more power—i.e., fuel—to maintain a given speed than was required when the ship was new.
An unchecked and improperly maintained underwater hull could be the hidden cause for an under-powered vessel with abnormally high fuel costs. Those who operate or charter such vessels would stand to waste large sums of money for fuel that could be conserved. Therefore, hull corrosion protection must be recognized as a basic operational procedure for merchant and naval ships.
A hull treatment is a complex and relatively costly procedure. It requires special materials and experienced applicators. However, the results that can be achieved with the new and sophisticated chemical coatings systems more than justify the initial outlay of funds by providing a prompt and substantial return on the investment.
The cost might run as high as $500,000 for one of the newer selfpolishing, multi-coat systems. The procedure requires about seven days in a dry dock. It provides work for about 150 men at the shipyard, in addition to the crews of applicators. It starts with sandblasting the hull to bare metal. Then priming coats and a series of thin film layers are applied. Some treatments will be effective for as long as 48 months.
The vessel operators who employ the use of hull treatments know that it is a good business practice. They get their investment back in about 13 months and continue to save 7-10% on fuel costs for an additional 35 months.
The superior chemical coatings that are available are formulated taking into account the speed of the vessel, her planned routing and scheduling (both seasonal and geographic) for three to five years, and any scheduled drydockings. The coatings systems are so sophisticated they can even consider the barnacle mating season in the Gulf of Hormuz.
Because barnacles cannot be washed or scrubbed off and instead must be blasted off, it is best not to let them get attached in the first place. Self-polishing coatings accomplish this feat by leaching a toxic chemical that repels the cyprides, which if permitted to metamorphose, would become barnacles.
Strategic warship operations and profitable merchant ship operations demand energy efficiency. Hull corrosion protection has proven to be a contribution in both cases.
James H. Cunningham is President of the Marine Energy Institute, Inc., a clearinghouse for plans and programs to encourage marine energy efficiency and conserve petroleum oil marine fuels.