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Hiske ’ t^le refrain goes, “with
Infant^S ‘.n their ears, they'll never catch the AfQyb'^ 'n a hundred thousand years." seen ,vn°- ^Ut coast artillerymen like those did q rvin£ a 10-incher at Fort Monroe in 1918 n0]v> °f discouraging invaders. Silent
tomny. 6 h‘8 Suns of yesterday might be replaced °H’ by Tomahawks.
JOINT CRUISE MISSILES PROJECT OFFICE
In the years before World War II, shore batteries mounting massive guns were installed in various places along our coastline as a last-ditch means of defense if foreign warships approached American shores. As the U. S. role in the world has enlarged, so has the need to defend dozens of places overseas. But the technology of the naval gun is no longer adequate against Soviet warships armed with long- range, highly accurate missiles. Thus, we have to find new weapon systems to serve the purpose of the old-time shore batteries.
One weapon system which could help counter the Soviet naval threat, but which is not currently being developed, is a long-range, land-launched antiship missile. To cite an example of potential use, a missile with the approximately 280-mile range of the antiship Tomahawk could cover the entire Green- land-Iceland-United Kingdom gap from launch points in Iceland and Scotland. Land-launched antiship missiles could also perform the roles of coastal defense and defense of isolated naval bases.
Deployment of a land-launched antiship missile would greatly strengthen U. S. forces and multiply the threats to the Soviet Navy. However, development of a cruise missile, indeed any missile, is a lengthy and expensive process. Only by using programs which are already in progress could a system be developed with reasonable cost and availability in the early 1980s.
Fortunately, just such an opportunity exists by combining the Navy’s Tomahawk antiship cruise missile with the ground equipment of the Air Force Tomahawk. Both are being developed by the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office. A basis for this step has already been laid by adaptation of the Navy Tomahawk to the theater nuclear role of the ground- launched cruise missile. One of the primary reasons for joint service development is to reduce cost and acquisition cycle time by developing common hardware and software. This commonality has been accomplished by the joint project office on the Navy and Air Force programs. This is true not only in the
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before such large-scale attacks could be orSa?' and implemented. It can be readily transported > a combat zone and can move rapidly by road o on the ground. , j
Employed in a “barrier defense” mode in ic , and Scotland in the Atlantic and South Korea ^ Japan in the Pacific, the antiship cruise missile prevent, or certainly delay, the breakout of, |i0\v surface forces into the open ocean. This would a 1
3 the theif
time for the U. S. Navy to concentrate its reso1 for a fleet action or for offensive strikes agains
valuable ships in a static defense role.
missile, which is almost 100% common, but in the common weapon control system which controls and programs the missiles and launchers. As a result, the United States is capable of deploying a mobile, land-based antiship missile system as early as 1984 and at a very reasonable cost.
The ground-launched cruise missile has been designed to meet a NATO theater nuclear force role as a mobile, survivable, quick-reaction system with long-range capability. In war or periods of crisis, the missiles will be dispersed from their peacetime main operating bases as small semiautonomous flights. Each flight will consist of two launch control centers, containing the communications and weapons control systems, and four transporter erector launchers, each housing four Tomahawks. Both vehicles are tractor-trailers towed by high mobility eight-wheel-drive tractors, and transportable by C-130, C-141, and C-5 aircraft. The flights will be set up in concealed launch sites and will redeploy to new sites as often as required to avoid detection and targeting by Warsaw Pact forces.
Careful attention has been paid to suppression of signatures (visual, communications, etc.) which could lead to detection and destruction of the flights. In addition, the Air Force system is hardened to withstand the effects of both conventional and nuclear weapons. To further increase its survivability, critical components are given armor protection. The system has rapid launch response to decrease the time required to implement theater nuclear release plans. Once launched, the low flight altitude, small radar cross section, and preprogrammed defense avoidance of the Tomahawk missile will ensure that a high percentage of the warheads reach their targets. Currently announced plans are to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles to Europe, beginning in 1983.
Because the land attack and antiship Tomahawk are identical externally and have the same electrical interface, the launcher could launch either version. The primary requirement would be inertial navigation data, since the antiship Tomahawk must be given this information, whereas the land attack version derives it internally. Because the common weapon control system is being developed to handle both versions of Tomahawk, the software, with minor modifications, could program the antiship Tomahawk for ground launching.
The ground-launched cruise missile has been designed to survive in an intense European war. The methods by which it does survive (mobility, emission, suppression, and hardening) make it a very viable weapon in other theaters, and its rapid reaction times are suited for fluid tactical situations. The result is a system which is difficult to locate and difficult to destroy if located, except by large- scale attack. Its mobility may permit it to relocate
Soviet bases. If the Soviets chose to deploy ^ ships beyond the barriers before hostilities, 1 „t0 tiship cruise missile would act as a “mousetrap ^ prevent the ships from returning to home P°^oll|J replenishment or battle damage repair. This . allow the Navy to destroy them in the open sjj in their overseas bases which are not as we tected as the home ports of Russia. ,ajn
In the April 1980 Proceedings, Marine Gary Anderson proposed the use of U. S- ^ Corps forces for sea control of barrier area*- ^ would rely primarily on marine strike aircrat tack enemy ships, at least for those choke P too wide to be dominated by artillery. A Sr jVe launched antiship missile would be less exp and would not require the commitment and p° aI- loss of scarce strike aircraft. Nevertheless, ^ tide demonstrates how the Marines could as ^j, sea control. They could do it more efficient y a ground-launched antiship missile system- sys- In addition to barrier defense, the propose tern could be used to protect coastlines ofep nations such as Oman or Kenya, to restrict ^ emy’s movements by forcing him away y° ^i- coasts, and in general restricting his tactica ct bility. Antiship cruise missiles could help PrSup' amphibious landings, lessening the demand t ^ porting naval forces and allowing those fore ^ 3s tactical flexibility since they would not be j?j- tightly to the immediate vicinity of the ,a"Tbas‘s nally, the system could protect isolated naV -0g up such as the one at Diego Garcia and avoid y
----------- r----------------------------- ant#
A land-based system has the inherent a° clJrat6'
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Proceedings
/ septeI"*,er
of other antiship launch platforms: an long-range, versatile, and lethal missile. a ground-launched system does have certain ^ tages over other platforms. Most Soviet s iPg ^ aircraft are equipped with missiles which signed to be used most effectively against s ( have very limited capability against land Even if the Soviets develop a suitable g ^ method for land-attack missiles, they won have to expend considerable reconrissafJ. to locate camouflaged launch sites, andrrjve^ launchers could move before the missiles a b target. The only viable Soviet response w
and lamr 'and-based bombers or vertical takeoff
Miles of fk uccau^c ui me acu-
, 'tical c *°ca* Sovernments. Because of these 0fdicated °nstraints, it would be better to deploy 'ear an, n°nnuclear antiship units, although nu- 0rt1e niaintn0nnUC*ear unds could possibly share . The numh nanCe and tra'm'n8 facilities.
,ePend 0 °T antiship missiles deployed would lfPl°yrnent k exact use envisioned. A reasonable ights- f °ased on the projected threat would be
&! four
e'ego Gar0- ^orea and Japan, two in Italy, one i f a,es f0pCla’ and four in the continental Uniteu flights ffntin8ency dePl°yment. By providing .pjor “u \o4 missiles, plus reloads) to cover each
°t Ja^„ .“Tier.” thp Ic'flanrt.I 7 M iko Con
ted
and 1 cind * ---------------- w
Would f|lng a‘rcraE from Kiev-class carriers. They targets DCC ^ Pr°blem of locating small concealed area. AlthSSI u sPread out over a considerable land rcciuire ia °U®*1 C0ldd be accomplished, it would tirne t0rge resources and a considerable length of a8ainst °ut an air suppression campaign
Adapfr targets'
rnissile to '°n nuclear ground-launched cruise The launch !0ant's^*P mission would be minimal. l° Progra Cl Would require a simple inertial system "'ould rem. e missile. The launch control center °Ver-the-hUlre ant‘si1iP software and a tie into the required eh™2011 tarSedng network. Because the Vel°Pment dnges are minor, the research and de- •he eXpen COsts sbould be relatively small. Most of a,Kl condiSC Wou^ *3e *n procuring test hardware 'VoUldbes--{lg a test Pr°gram- Production costs ITlerit wh 'T* ar l° nuciear ground-launch equip- Per aiuish- -Jas design-to-cost goals of $953,000 Porter ere T ,mahawk> $1.41 million per trans- c°ntrol 0Cor *aancher, and $2.60 million per launch S^stem wn0)6/’ *n dollars. Since an antiship Modified a ' USC Navy Tomahawk and slightly I'lent> the *r ^orce nuclear ground-launch equip- ^eVelonm system could be operational in 1984 if
. AlthoS1- Were started now-
at1 ar|tishi 11 Would technically possible to add Intern, pg, c?Pa^iiity to the nuclear ground-launch tu sys'temltlCa* Pr°bierns would make this unwise, '^ater ,Wl11 form a substantial part of the NATO tk Cr*sis )C Car ^orce- It would be difficult in a time ^eater nu°l Wd^draw any of these units from the w°Uld ^ c ear Plan to support naval operations. It ■erv'ce0urHOSt impossible to use any flights for S l^at it nf'* if ^uroPe- An additional consideration CaPable „ !ght not be possible to deploy nuclear- C.Ven 'vithn *Se m‘ssdes to the Middle East or Japan, S,t‘yities nffr. nuc*ear weapons, because of the sen-
fr *
■ °ur to cover the Iceland-United Kingdom in apan/^rner’ the Iceland-U.K. gap, and the Sea |. "Ppdant Okhotsk, there is an allowance for aPch p . arget coverage, units moving between d'll'ng and'ntS’ and so lotth- Enemy success in lo- a0y/a the ,5ttac.k*ng a single flight would not break sl>ie|d . arrier.” The two flights in Italy furnish Protect the western flank of the Sixth
Fleet and protect against any Soviet breakout into the Western Mediterranean. (Basing in Crete or Turkey would provide better support to the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the current political situation may not support such basing.) The unit in Diego Garcia would protect the base and the prepositioned Rapid Deployment Force supply ships. A deployment of 15 flights would provide a single salvo capacity of 240 missiles, plus reloads. Reloads can be easily carried with the flights using standard military semi-trailers and loaded with cranes available on the tractors. All of the 15 flights might not be U. S. forces. An antiship ground- launched cruise missile would be a good candidate for foreign military sales since it does not involve a nuclear warhead or the sensitive terrain contour matching (TERCOM) guidance method used on the land-attack Tomahawk. Approval would obviously be a political decision, but the system would appear to fall within the guidelines for sales to NATO nations and to Japan.
A ground-launched antiship missile must first overcome a different kind of political issue, one internal to the DoD. Basically, the proposed weapon system falls into a Department of Defense roles-and- missions gap with no service responsible for developing and operating such a system. The Army has no interest in sea control and does not even have sufficient funds to procure its own top-priority systems. The Air Force does have a secondary mission of sea control, but in the past it has participated in sea control only at the Navy’s request. So the Air Force is unlikely to take the lead without Navy support. The Navy has the mission but is not organized to field a ground combat missile force. The Marine Corps would be perhaps the best service for the project since it operates other land-based mobile missiles (Hawk, Chaparral) and is familar with operating within a naval command setup. Like the Air Force, the Marine Corps is unlikely to take the lead for an antiship missile system without Navy backing. Thus, the primary stumbling block is not technical or financial but is a roles and missions problem. DoD should directly assign the task of deploying land-launched antiship cruise missiles to one of the services. Failure to do so would forfeit a unique opportunity to help counter the Soviet naval threat.
Major Rogers received a B.S. degree in aerospace engineering from North Carolina State University in 1969 and an M.S. in aeronautical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 1974. During his active duty experience, his assignments have included analysis of Soviet air-to- surface and surface-to-surface cruise missiles, mechanical systems evaluation for the B-l bomber flight test program, and his current billet as ground- launched cruise missile launcher manager assigned to the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office. He lives in Dale City, Virginia.
ln8s /
SePtember 1981
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