This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
“^mphibious Warfare: he Decade of Decision”
p ' J- G. Miller, pp. 74-79, September 1981 rr°ceedings)
Colonel James B. Soper, U. S. Ma- Jl( Corps (Retired), Senior Research c|''" —I find Colonel Miller's arti-
entt0 a hne analysis of past, pres- SQ ’ and future problems—albeit niewhat negative. My major conn >s what it fails to state, itv u ear'y discussion of lift capabil- . should have reflected that the fund- b'8 0r the LHAs was accomplished the C'et'ng ten LSTs, thus creating Sqlrl1balance among personnel, pa. a.re. dotage, and cubic footage cas, 1 'ties that now exists. And the ext ^Cquisition of the LSD-41 only 8ard S Pro','em- especially in re- an . to the ship-to-shore movement support requirements, cur 6 art'c'e refers to an “8-knot" ** capability from ship-to-shore tm ements 'n several places. This is e in regard to the LVTs (P7s), but
f-CL°rreCt 'n re8arc* to LCM-8s or ■f thS’anc^ ^ar ^rom true f°r *he future cUr ? Proposed LCM-9 were pro- kn<« ' .^ he LCM-9 is designed for 26 and Vf 1 's a'so 38% smaller externally Plies*i!S more equipment or sup- dem, han the LCAC, thus reducing the Tbnt^ f°r space in landing ships. gre, e article correctly points out the ^‘^ operational advantages of the Sree h S P°tential and to a limited deshin ^CAC’s severe impact upon dcessPace- It does not. however, ad- studS,the fact that several excellent trem'eS ^aYe revealed the LCAC’s exmine 'imitations to transport even quir'nUrn e9uipment and supply re- stU(jCrTlents from ship-to-shore. The Sj t'es referred to address various sjti10ns’ force structures, compo- and n °'.'anding craft types (current C0] pr°jected), and distances. As stuane' Miller well points out—such ana|les have only caused some DoD are ^Sts to ignore them because they t°o hard” to deal with properly.
The article has great strength at the end. Operational concepts must precede hardware acquisition. Many study efforts have attempted to dojust that, but they have been discarded by hardware experts who fail to grasp the operational potential or the fundamental purpose of the item in amphibious warfare—especially forcible entry.
The conclusion of the article states that we must start building amphibious ships. What it does not say is how to have that accomplished. It must start with “one voice and one statement” of the operational requirements, the physical lift requirements, the ship-to-shore requirements, and a detailed display of how current and projected means might accomplish the task. This is how the 1963/64/65 program was designed and approved for $3.1618 billion. 1 know exactly how it was done, because I happened to be the program's “architect, in General Leonard Chapman's words. I was also the only other marine in the room with General Wallace Greene when Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth signed the document. He said that he was signing it because it was the only “clear, one-voice program on his desk.”
“A Return to Military Smartness and Discipline”
(See R. A. Bowling, pp. 46-50. June 1981;
R C Peniston, p. 108, August 1981; T. E. Lahey, p. 21. September 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Harry O. Smith, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired) —Captain Peniston’s comment reminding readers that commanding officers (even today) have all the authority needed to have smart ships without a Navywide campaign is excellent.
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Amphibious Warfare: The Decade of Decision
A Return to Military Smartness and Discipline
Countering Tomorrow's Terrorism Good Fiction
Maritime Administration Has New Home
Neither Rapid—Nor a Force
The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
The Facts Behind The Thunder
The U. S. Navy: State of the Fleet
A Case for the Coast Guard
The Kidd DDG: The Non-Nuclear Standard
There is no doubt that "Pride and Professionalism will mean more personnel inspections—their first objective seems to be to effect the removal
cards, and their first targets are
and C our most 'mP°rtant officers ‘ 0l|r most junior enlisted men. The ,LC°n^ steP, I guess, is the return of ne ''berty card.
reut ^ cannot join the legion of ca- jnr, ^Pcs who seem to be caught up thi -S nevv” movement. After all, Nav'S ^et s be realistic; the Pet' ^ ant^ otber services are com- „ jng for a limited number of quali- the recru'ts- While we may wish for nul,elUrn of the draft and adequate ^ ers of quality personnel, we fore rria*<e do with a volunteer tr. wiH probably be with us for entire decade.
aCf erefore, we must take courses of Unte ° Wtl'cb make the typical vol- paver.a Navy careerist. The recent ancj ra'ses which Admiral Hayward f°r “mers have suceeded in securing •hei*6 serv'ceman have helped. But the mecbanic works his magic for like e®r satisfaction of it. He doesn't “cl- j^bat can be referred to as mi|j.C 5n . regulations. It would be does'11-' y '^ea* be did- but he just Whont' bhe pool of professionals bear()Vant more inspections, don't like s °n non-rated sailors, etc., is, in reality, quite small.
If we are to marry the 600-ship Navy of national policy and the volunteer (citizen) force we are stuck with, it seems to me that we should consider junking Navywide "chicken suggestions" and take Captain Pen- iston’s obvious truth for what it is by cautiously but positively forgetting a policy that will get a fine shoe shine from the jet mechanic at more inspections while his jet wrench is idled permanently when he abandons the Navy at the soonest available opportunity. A better policy would be to can those directives which most distract today s COs. By adopting this policy, the CNO—and the nation—mightget more loyal Navymen shipping over than anyone ever thought possible.
“Countering Tomorrow’s Terrorism”
(See J. H. Alexander, pp. 44-50, July 1981;
V. Wolf, p. 21. September 1981 Proceedings)
Edward J. Bender, Jr., National Security Planning Officer, U. S. Maritime Administration—Although Colo-
BATTLE OF BRITAIN — RAF pilots in Spitfires —their finest hour. How a handful ol brave lliers changed the course ol history over England
DECEMBER 7th — The definitive record ol the attack on Pearl Harbor — history's lirst carrier attack An Academy Award lor director John Ford Special oiler — both films — I1 ? hours, only $89.95 plus shipping
ORDER TOLL-FREE ON OUR HOT-LiNE
(800) 854-0561. ext. 925
In Calif. |800) 432-7257. ext. 925
U S and Canada, add $2 50 shipping. Other foreign orders, add $3.50. CA res. add 6°□ Sales Tax.
SPECIFY BETA or VHS. v,Sa 4 Master - met no. & exp
Send to: FEROE GROFE FILMS. Dept. N. 702Washinglon SI.. Suile 168. Marina delRey.CA 90291
Worthington...
The Marine Pump Source.
Worldwide source for pumps, parts and service.
• vertical turbine pumps
• centrifugal pumps
• reciprocating power pumps
• submersible pumps
• Vac Strip cargo unloading systems
lUICGRAW-EDISOlU
• condensate pumps • screw pumps
• engine cooling pumps • cyrogenic pumps
• cargo pumps
• self priming (Prima-Vac) barge unloading pumps
• ballast pumps
• boiler-feed pumps
PH Worthington
Worthington Group
For genuine factory renewal marine pump parts, contact Worthington.
A. Conhagen Co. or Argo Marine Co.
Worthington Group McGraw-Edison Company 270 Sheffield Street, Dept. 21-f 6 Mountainside, NJ 07092
c Alexander’s article is a good evePend'um of recent terrorist arents’ has overlooked one critical emtv mar't'me terrorism. Admittedly, ror. assV- airplane, and political ter- ,errSmhave been in the majority since the°nSt act'v*ty became popular in thatearl.y 1970s. It seems, however, Ihr,. ^^h a supertanker passing 21 u8h the Strait of Hormuz every attm'nutes of every day, a terrorist est . .a8a'nst U. S. maritime inter- _ ls just waiting to happen.
Mia n tllreat is not isolated to the
owned fEaSt- U'S--fla8 and U. S.- n,0su 'oreign-flag vessels call at al-
every deep-water port in the
any ,. -—* u6v.iviv,j5iy^
• naication of wanting to take sp0n^e,°i\a coordinated effort to re-
Char8e of
I f.1,0 lbe problem.
Seas in
ships, as well as for those who
World ■ . *
e|ern ’ tttany of which contain political
Uni, E?ts f^at are openly hostile to the Y'ed States.
is ® resPonse to maritime terrorism enib- 3S c*ear as that for attacks on or aircraft- For example, neCg believe that the military is unto a ,SSar‘iy restricted in its response by ^rror'st act on the world’s oceans Ac; '-e so-called “Posse Comitatus miiij. which forbids the use of the A|SQary 'n a peacetime police action, spon’ L-^re *s no delineation of re- DeDaSlbl^t'es ‘n this area. The State ]w rtajent> Department of Defense, Enter C°aSt Guard- FBI, and Federal (PE tfcv Management Agency f0rm ah have certain duties to per- ■- ’ ut none of those agencies gives
AlexaU^rn*t’ therefore, as Colonel t° aat1der suggests, that we do need PersD?Ulre •t*le Pr°Per international isjp. ^ctive in our approach to terror- na'ion-T We must also get our own equal house in order quickly to ad- threa.e r resP°nd to the increasing itirn^L ■ attack to our vulnerable mar- me 'uterests.
‘°°d Fiction
%v[n‘,''dcr Albert W. Vittek, U. S. thank f'e,<red)—Congratulations and ti°n V°u for now including good fic- of l uiong your monthly selections forSa| s °f other publishers offered JUstQ to Institute members. Having Se(l gashed Final Harbor and Silent "'eeks^ Harfy Homewood, my past joyab;°f fading have been most en- ^°oksf ^ highly recommend these : 0r those who went down to the didn’t, but who enjoy great stories of life and action at sea. I found it hard to put these books down.
Maritime Administration Has New Home
James H. Cunningham—The Maritime Administration has been transferred from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Transportation. This important shift was accomplished with little fanfare and almost no press coverage. The logic of the move is not in question. It is a significant step and makes good sense from a number of viewpoints. However, there is reason for uneasiness until we know more about the policy and programs that will be pursued at MarAd under the new setup. Which programs will be continued and which are slated to be curtailed or terminated? What new and different programs are to be initiated? These qqes- tions must be answered promptly. The maritime industry and its international merchant fleets are the heart of America’s industrial might.
One program that MarAd must give high priority and must vigorously pursue is the matter of alternative fuels for maritime use. This is an immediate and pressing international problem. Ships are “going dead in the water because of the deteriorating quality and decreasing quantity of petroleum oil marine fuels. This is a crisis situation according to maritime fuel authorities. Petroleum oil refining has become so sophisticated it leaves little residual oil (vessel fuel) and what is left contains all of the contaminates. Coal and shale oils have been identified as marine fuels of the future. However, many obstacles must be overcome before an orderly transition to the alternative fuels can be made.
Conservation of marine fuel ought to be a first order priority at MarAd. Conservation is not just a propulsion problem; it involves the whole management operation of its fleets. It starts with trained manpower and goes the gamut to propeller condition. According to a recent study, there are some 40 energy-saving options available to vessel operators. Each option is a money-saver and a conservator of marine fuel. Conservation is needed to bridge the gap between petroleum oil marine fuels and coal.
This beautiful book traces the history of the Yokosuka naval base from its use by Imperial Japan,through the centuries, to the transfer of custody to the U.S. from the Japanese Navy Admiral Totsuka, and the building of the base with which countless men of the American navy are familiar.
$12.95 ISBN: 0-89141-088-0
.OXwhi:*
Navy!
Then and Now!
VICTORY AT GUADALCANAL
Robert Edward Lee
“. . .avigorous shoot-’em-up retelling of the crucial World War II Pacific campaign.”
Library Journal
From the time the Marines landed on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, until victory was achieved on February 9, 1943, “the author, a veteran of the battle, has provided a wide-angle look at the long battle from both American and Japanese viewpoints.”
Publishers Weekly $14.95 ISBN: 0-89141-105-4
YOKOSUKA,
Base of an Empire
Tom Tompkins
At your local bookstore or order from: PKKSIDIO PRKSS
P.O. BOX 892P • NOVATO, CA 94948 Please send to:
Name_______________________________
Address_____________________________
City/State/Zip________________________
___ Victory @ $14.95 _________
___ Yokosuka @ $12.95
TOTAL ________________________
SHIPPING/HANDLING $1.25/bk. ________
TOTAL______________________________
□ Payment Enclosed DmC Dvisa DAmExp.
No.________________ Exp.____________
Signature ____________________________
(Continued on page 87)
Neither Rapid—Nor a Force
“The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force”
(See T. M. Johnson and R. T. Barrett, pp. 95-98, November 1980; R. A. Best, p. 15, January 1981 Proceedings)
Mark Littwin—As a citizen of a dem- °cra'ic country surrounded by dictatorships sworn to eliminate us, I have a vested interest in seeing not only a strong Israeli Army, but also a pow- ®J™1 U. S. presence in the region (and 116 political will to use force when necessary).
My service in the Israeli Defence , 0rces and the U. S. Marine Corps ln the Republic of Vietnam has made 016 leery of excess gadgetry in lieu of strong forces and innovative thought, find the Rapid Deployment Joint ask Force (RDJTF) to be nothing J^0re than excess gadgetry which ust not be allowed to draw attention Way from war-fighting methods and nke forces on the spot in an area of e world that is of prime importance (° Free World. Therefore. I want .? see in the Proceedings more Taught about the RDJTF and what °uld be done instead. And I vol- n,eer to kick off that dialogue now. j n essence, the note by Colonel inf nS°n anc* Commander Barrett is an °rniative exposition of a force con- IVed in humiliation (the takeover of C. s. Embassy in Teheran on 4 n^Vember 1979) and shown to be ge- r ically defective (by the abortive t0 ^ree l^e fi°sta8es on 25 April th ^ j°ng before being stillborn by J midwifery of a Navy too small to
Sio 1 m°re l^an a fract'on °f 'he m's' ans. assigned to it by an apathetic p fiFinformed nation that has had pr civilian and military leadership. en- 0r decades, the United States has pg 0Ved an almost unbelievable su- ar _'0r'ty over potential enemies in all ^as of technology and production. S, 100 often happens, the United vaes has confused one type of ad- a8e (technical-productive) with fie-1 er~~'n 'his case, a presumed tac- advantage that does not exist. op^re were and are exceptions, but necd only recall the way in which
the war in Vietnam was “fought” to realize that for a variety of reasons the U. S. military has come to depend, far too much, upon technical (i.e., equipment) superiority to win wars.
As a result, the RDJTF is dependent upon fast airborne delivery of men and supplies, upon quickly overwhelming any potential foe, and upon orchestrating the affair from far out at sea. All of this demands complete control of the air, the sea, and the radio waves. Today, the armed forces of the United States can guarantee none of these requirements.
In the air, as on (and below) the sea, the problem is one of scarcity. Many Third-World air forces can put up to 200 sophisticated combat aircraft in the sky. This is particularly the case in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf areas. No army moves today without its own tracked
umbrella of surface-to-air missiles, as well as highly effective antiaircraft artillery. From the Communist bloc, the SA-3, SA-6, and ZSU-23 are probably the best-known examples. The various types of antiair weapons that the countries of Western Europe will sell to almost anyone are too numerous to mention. When planning an air- superiority-dependent force such as the RDJTF, it would be well to remember that in the 1973 Yom Kippur War the Israeli Air Force gained freedom of the skies over the Suez Canal only after Major General Ariel Sharon’s tank division crossed that canal and destroyed a number of Egyptian missile units, thereby opening gaps in a previously solid air defense cover. Who will open gaps in a hostile missile blanket to enable the RDJTF to even begin operations?
This photo was taken during a heavy snow storm on a cargo ship's run from Seattle to Alaska. The window on the left is unheated. The window on the right is a KearTott de-icing and defogging heated window that was free of ice and snow throughout the storm.
KEARFOTT HEATED WINDOWS and rugged HEATED ARM WINDOW WIPERS are unsurpassed for year ’round use. Kearfott's electrically heated windows are manufactured in complete assemblies, ready for installation in a ship’s structure or portable sub-frames in existing windows. Window frames may be of corrosion- resistant steel, bronze, or aluminum, and the glass is glazed within the frame by special rubber channel gaskets which are fully sealed against water penetration. Complete assemblies meet the requirements of MIL-W-18445A.
WRITE FOR CATALOG
550 S. Fulton Ave., Mt. Vernon, N.Y. 10550 914-664-6033
a division of The SINC E R Company
Weather conditions:
Heavy Snow
Pilot visibility:
Maximum
with KEARFOTT HEATED WINDOW
KEARFOTT DE-ICING AND DEFOGGING
HEATED WINDOWS
The authors are quite correct in as-
suming that the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region is a likely place where the United States will have to stand firm and defend its rights. However, the authors accept defense analyses pointing toward deployment of a brigade-size force by air in less than a week; of an airborne division (one division) in 12 to 15 days; and a sea deployment of an infantry division (again, one single division) from the East Coast of the United States in 30 to 35 days. The joker in the deck is that it took the Soviet Union only a week to cover Afghanistan with more than 80,000 troops, most of them tankers or heavily armed and protected troops mounted on armored fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers. By the time the RDJTF's brigade-size unit or airborne division got to the theater of operations, there would be no place for the C-5A Galaxies or “new large cargo CX aircraft” to land in the attacked country. An airborne division could conceivably jump in—and then be cut to ribbons by tanks and armored fighting vehicles.
The only alternative is for troops and equipment to be mated-up in a nearby friendly country (if any exist that would permit such a move) and to make a forcible amphibious landing. The United States already has a crew—the Navy/Marine Corps team—for just such unpleasant but necessary jobs. The Marine Corps would have to greatly expand its tank strength (probably at the expense of air power and/or infantry), and the Navy will have to do the same with its amphibious lift capacity to handle the extra tanks and related gear. Only troops trained and equipped for heavily opposed landings, however, will have the capability of making any headway against a well-trained, armored enemy. Airborne or regular infantry units would be out-maneuvered and out-gunned. The Navy/Marine Corps team is the proper combination for such a forced landing, not because of its experience at making amphibious landings, not because it wrote the book on the subject, and not because of the National Security Act of 1947, but simply because it is the best team
for the job. No other kind of military unit is able to force its way into an enemy-occupied country from the sea. No other kind of military unit can fight a well-armed foe while approaching the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). No other kind of military unit can go where it wants, when it wants, over almost 70% of the earth s surface before it has to engage in combat. No other kind of military unit can be poised at all times on the edge ot any world tension-spot—thereby
bringing the FEBA up to the bows ot the landing ships.
Contact a friend north of the border
Davie Shipbuilding, the Canadian with the track record in meeting the highest U.S. MIL SPEC, and commercial standards.
Davie is uniquely qualified with a Master Contract tor Ship Repair and Conversion by Military Sealift Command.
Being involved in the Canada/U.S. Defense Production Sharing Program, Davie has completed the on-time habitation conversion and general repairs to MSC's underway replenishment vessel U.S.N.S. WACCAMAW. Within the program, Davie has constructed aluminum elevators for the Nimitz Class nuclear carriers and is involved in the series production of sonar domes.
For aver 60 years Davie has been a prime and subcontractor for all Canadian classes of military vessels- Most notably, the DDH 280 Class destroyer escort. Davie
Despite its recent success in one dogfight, in the Middle East as well as in the Persian Gulf area, the United States has a reputation for being easy to push around. Most countries in these areas (including the feudal Sau- dia Arabia) do not, and will not. desire an active U. S. military presence on their lands for fear of offending l^e U.S.S.R., which today is seen as the dominant world power. Therefore' talk of using country A's ports, 0 country B's airfields, or of storing supplies in country C merely indicates
DAVIE
SHIPBUILDING
LIMITED
PO BOX 130. LEVIS, QUEBEC G6V 6N7 tELEPHONE (418) 837-5841 TELEX: 051-2254
IS Qlcp.
Con 0ne of finalists in competition for Canada's new nadian Patrol Frigate.
wa"°da's largest shipyard, Davie's experience includes A*n extensive|v with U.S. Mil Spec., U.S. Coast Guard *, ^ “ standards for marine vessels.
So,,, 'ine of vessel inspection services includes in-house teori ment such as the "D-Meter" for direct digital This ~°Ut me^ Sickness.
inw!2lal|y Qualified shipyard is a phone call near. You are ^ ®d to call Captain Alan E. Brian at Davie Shipbuilding.
Voutf' The north-of-the-border facility with the experience CQn rely on.
a disturbing lack of understanding of mental processes in the area. Both Pdlars of the RDJTF—using infantry l er hostile armored thrusts and using °cal facilities—are unrealistic, because they have no points of contact ^Jth regional reality. As a result, the DJTF merely adds another contend layer—no muscle, only tactical Organization slots—to the undermanned armed forces of the United Mates.
Only a “tanked up" Marine Corps j 1 * be able to get the United States nt° h0t spots, and only if operations v-art immediately after the Soviet di- IS|ons begin to roll. Playing games .. bghtly armed paratroopers in that ^ n“ of tactical situation is a waste of ,ave men; assuming that other coun- c'es> none with any kind of demo- Ta!lc tradition, will support the pted States is sheer folly. Expanding the Marine Corps’ arc0r and the Navy’s amphibious lift SjPacity to at least three tank divi- ns and having enough support ship- tj ®to keep the divisions at sea at all es will cost a lot of money. Nonetheless, the United States is going to have to decide if it wants to be Number One, with all the pain and effort inherent in maintaining that station, or if it wants a fancily staffed and impressively structured RDJTF that, when the chips are down, will prove to be useless.
“The Facts Behind The Thunder”
(See S. L. Morison, pp. 97-101, August 1981: J. W. Grace, pp. 86-88, September 1981 Proceedings)
“The U. S. Navy: State of the Fleet”
(See N. Polmar, 103-108. February 1981:
H. W. Serig. pp. 83-83. June 1981: N.
Polmar. pp. 103-105. August 1981: J. W. Grace, pp. 86-88. September 1981 Proceedings)
G. Clines—As a warship buff and a Navy veteran of World War II and the Korean War, I have just seen the New Jersey (BB-62) in Long Beach. As I viewed her, the tanker Ogden Yukon was leaving the harbor. A CV and an LPD were tied up near the New Jersey. They all dwarfed the New Jersey. I quickly realized the advances that had been made in shipbuilding and weapons technology since the Korean War. To spend millions of dollars to modernize the New Jersey is sheer lunacy. What person in his right mind in the middle of World War II (1943) would have suggested getting a 1905 battleship ready to fight in the Pacific?
Editor s Note: Mr. Glines’ comment, which started out typed and ended in longhand, contained the following postscript: “Sorry about the typing; my 1943 typewriter broke down. I need to get it modernized, but the cost is $1,000."
A Case for the Coast Guard
John C. Carrothers—The recent Priii- sendam fire at sea once again draws into focus a serious flaw in our judicial system. While the fire raged and sue-
DAVIE
\
The sole surviving Squadron 6 Airdale of the glorious WWII USS Enterprise shares the incredible feats and stirring events of one of the greatest ships in US Naval history.
MY SHIP,
■MY NAVY, AND ME
by Edward L White
| This newly published 2-cassette audio
■ album dramatically traces the history of | ships USS Enterprise from 1775 to now.
j “Makes me proud to be Navy.”
| To order just clip this ad and mail with m your name and address, and a check or J money order for $19.95 plus $1.00 for I handling and postage. Or charge to your | credit card (American Express. Master
■ Card, VISA, or Diners Club) by enclosing ! your card number, expiration date, and ® signature. (New York State residents add I applicable tax.)
| No risk guarantees! You may return this
■ purchase any time within 3 weeks of j receipt for a full refund.
I aUDIChf CIRUfrf Dept M67
| 145 East 49th Street New York, N Y. 10017 ^(212) 753-1783 { cessful rescue efforts by the Coast Guard and others were made, the word came that because this disaster involved a foreign ship in international waters there would be no Coast Guard investigation into the cause of the fire. Thus, the majority of the 320 passengers. many of whom were U. S. citizens, probably will be denied the right to know the circumstances under which their lives were placed in jeopardy.
Before the burning hulk sank and before the survivors were out of the lifeboats, the Prinsendam' s lawyers were in the federal court petitioning for limitation of liability. Roughly, limitation of liability, as applied in U. S. admiralty law, states that a steamship company may not be liable for any amount of money greater than the actual cash value of its ship and cargo. If the ship is a total loss, the liability is held to the revenue the ship was earning on the final voyage.
There is one provision in this law, however, which is a thorn in the side of all steamship operators. This provision dictates that if the court decides a ship’s owner had knowledge of defects in the seaworthiness or was negligent in the operation of its ship, lim' itation of liability most probably will be denied.
This raises a vital question: Where does the court obtain the information to make its decision to allow or deny limitation of liability?
In cases involving U. S. ships. or if a casualty occurs within the territorial boundaries of the United States- the primary investigation is conducte by the Coast Guard, which acts f°r the National Transportation Safety Board. From these findings the cour renders its decision in passing out a fair and equitable settlement of tne civil claims.
In litigation involving foreign ship* in international waters, however, tn survivors and other plaintiffs are n afforded this Coast Guard protectio in federal court procedures. .
With the possibility of civil lit'j^ tion, the Prinsendam's lawyers 6£ a petition with the Federal Distrl Court in New York seeking. “• • ' judgment exonerating it from aN.P tential liability or. in the alternate ’ to limit liability to the current va of the Prinsendam and its carg •
which is estimated at $350,000.”
The final outcome? The Prinsen- dam is at the bottom of the ocean, and the value of the cargo, which in this case was the passengers’ fare, has been refunded. Thus, if limitation of liability is sustained, the case is closed w'th the survivors having no recourse for punitive damages.
As far as I can determine, the only rePort of what happened appeared in the 20 October 1980 issue of Time [^agazine. Here, James Kelly writes: Preliminary accounts indicate that a fuel line may have broken causing jhesel oil to spurt on hot pipes and ourst into flames. The fire knocked out the electrical system, shutting down the fire-fighting pumps.”
I do not believe that the Coast Cuard would accept such an expiation. (Marine engineers, familiar J'uth the operation of diesel engines, elieve that for a fire of such magnitude to rage out of control practically at the start was most probably the result of a crankcase explosion. A primary cause for such a casualty is imProper upkeep and maintenance.)
The ideal solution to this problem w°uld be the elimination of the century-old limitation of liability statute which was written into law in the mid- 19th century to protect shipowners of that era. A few years ago. Congress was petitioned to rescind this archaic law. The petition died in committee and has not been mentioned since.
An alternative in the process of handling civil suits involving foreign ships in international waters would be the requirement of a full Coast Guard investigation before the matter is placed before the federal court for adjudication. This may not eliminate attempts to cover up the truth, but it certainly would reduce the possibility that a coverup would go unchallenged.
The investigation to determine the cause of the Prinsendam disaster was conducted by three representatives of the Dutch Shipping Inspectorate, who arrived from Holland while the burning hulk was still under tow. Instead of a public hearing, the investigation was conducted behind closed doors in a motel room near the Newark, New Jersey, airport. The Coast Guard was permitted to have one representative attend provided that he would not publicly discuss what he heard! It would be difficult, if not impossible.
to believe that these men from Holland would not be biased, and therefore prejudiced, in any information released for public information.
After refunding the survivors’ fares, the company requested a list containing the value of personal effects lost in the fire that were not insured. Restoration for these items has been made to the satisfaction of some survivors. Others are far from happy and plan court action. Their lawyers do not hold out much hope for an appreciable settlement because of the owner’s petition with the federal court for limitation of liability. They also point out that any defects in the seaworthiness of the ship are at the bottom of the ocean and proving negligence in the operation of the ship could be difficult to sustain. Although the evacuation was complete, there were many bitter reports by survivors about the handling of lifeboats by crew members and other evidences of assumed negligence in the ship's operation. They have also been advised of the terms printed in their tickets that the line’s liability for personal effects was limited to $500.
This new, updated edition of Byrne's classic guide to military law has been completely revised to suit the special needs of the non-lawyer requiring familiarity with the military legal system. Included is a complete overview of the military justice system, with discussion centered on some of history's most significant military decisions. New to this edition is updated course material and expanded treatment of current Coast Guard law.
After the SS Morro Castle fire at
CA. DD. DE.
than
The latest hull, DD-997, has more
•Mid'
ance destroyers when they are
sea in which 125 persons perished in 1934, the limitation of liability statute was amended to include $60 per gross ton of the ship if loss of life or personal injury resulted from the accident. If and when any suits for punitive damages are filed in the federal court over the Prinsendam matter, there will be a long wait for the facts to become available, if they ever do.
More than five months after the disaster, The Seattle Times reported: “The Dutch Shipping Inspectorate will complete its investigation of the October fire in about two weeks. The investigation is taking this long because it’s a complicated affair and especially since the ship sank. But the Dutch officials said the investigation findings will remain secret at least until after a second probe by the government of Curasao in The Netherlands Antilles, where the ship was registered. Under Dutch law, the result of the second investigation, including determination of fault, must be made public, said Robert Haslach, a spokesman for the Dutch embassy in Washington D. C.”
If the Time magazine report of the preliminary investigation is any indication of things to come, we will probably learn that the fire and ultimate loss of the ship were “Acts of God.” In the event of civil litigation for punitive damages, the court must have the facts to pass a fair and equitable settlement to all concerned. With full respect to the Dutch Shipping Inspectorate and the forthcoming probe in The Netherlands Antilles, the fact still remains that these organizations unofficially represent the defendants. To protect the rights of the plaintiffs, the court, I believe, has the right to order a Coast Guard investigation before it considers listening to the case. The Coast Guard personnel assigned to such investigation are highly qualified and unbiased, and have the faculty and ability to ferret out the facts and circumstances whether or not they have the corpus delicti. If the defendants in matters such as this do not wish to abide by the court’s wish, then limitation of liability should automatically be denied.
The facts are crystal clear that legislation is required that would give the Coast Guard the same investigatory power over foreign operators using our courts as it has over U. S. operators. Until the time that such legislation is enacted into law, U. S. citizens who travel on foreign ships in international waters will continue to be denied their constitutional rights to due process of law.
“The Kidd DDG: The NonNuclear Standard”
(Ste i. G. Morgan, pp. 97-101. July 1981;
M. M. Bonnot, p. 26, September 1981 Proceedings)
Inspector Thomas S. Hoback, U. S. Customs Service—Commander Morgan has bravely opened one of the Navy’s biggest can of worms: its need for an effective medium-sized surface combatant. Unfortunately, he did not compare the DDG-993s with the two ships which really matter, CG-47 and DDGX. He also fails to address the political realities of the FFG-7 program. This successful class of frigates keeps a large number of congressional constituents gainfully employed. More important, these frigates are preserving a large part of this nation’s shipbuilding base as more are built.
Two questions arise from his proposal to build more DDG-993s: (1) Can it be done? (2) Should it be done?
Museum quality miniatures of your own ship. Hand crafted of brass and basswood to your specifications. Spray painted and mounted on a hand rubbed mahogany base.
PRAM I and II Auxiliaries PGM, LST PHM
SS. SC. PT. YMS
Fmliy Road. P 0 Box 1598 Orleans. Mass 02653 (formerly Easmam. Mass.)
The answer to the first is yes. The answer to the second is not exactly. The first major aspect to be considered is the ship’s missions. As currently configured, the Kidd (DDG- 993) class cannot handle the DDGX’s profile—but neither can the FFG-7s which Congress keeps ordering. However, the DDG-993 can outperform the FFG-7 in any of her missions. It would also be more useful to have a DDG-993 in a battle group’s screen than an FFG-7.
The Navy remains committed to the Aegis weapon system and its SPY-1 radar. Any other system seems to be viewed with great suspicion. In fact, the DDGX did not make good progress within the Navy until it became an improved derivative of the Aegis combat system. The major hangup with DDGX design is that it will not be ready for series production until fiscal year 1987.
In the DDG-993’s favor, the class will receive some major changes fairly soon. A major portion of this will be the new threat upgrade (NTU) Pr0' gram which includes a new transmit' ter and a larger antenna for the SPb' 48E configuration, an SPS-49 search radar, and the SYS-2 integrated track' ing system. The result is an SM-2 ca' pable ship. Even so, this ship will not match either the CG-47’s or DDGX s antiair warfare capability. However, the Kidd class has some features which DDGX does not have, such as a second gun mount, a hangar, and th space to carry a large missile load-
Availability for immediate produc tion is the DDG-993’s chief advantage. Another major benefit is that fuf ther improvements to the basic ship are available from the continued Pr° duction of the Spruance hull series'
250 significant alterations, including some which were developed after t Kidd-class ships were laid down. other study is under way to enhanc the capability of the 30 existing SPrU,
lifed.” Elements of these develop ments can be incorporated into t° low-on, modified repeat ships. In ‘aC ’ there is no reason that the enti DDGX combat system could n°l. fitted on board new DD-963 derivat'v hulls. The response to this ar8u^ehe is that the DDGX layout would ^ wasteful and inefficient in a Sprut>n hull. t0
At this point, the Navy appear^r. have two viable options. One is to
minate the DDGX program and substitute a Spruance derivative. I predict this effort will fail to be even considered by the Navy because it is too committed to this next-generation destroyer to simply drop it. The second choice is complicated, but may actually solve several of the Navy’s problems at once. This compromise program would be to build between 9 and 15 DDG-993 derivatives, ordered between fiscal years 1983 and 1986. Such a program would not conflict with the CG-47 and DDGX schedules and would be in lieu of building more FFG-7s. For this discussion, this new ship will be called DDG-998.
The important point is that this DDG-993 Spruance hull derivative can be reproduced with enough improvements to make the follow-on ships worth having. Fortunately, much of the equipment from the FFG-7 program can be used in the DDG-998s. This new class would represent a merging of the best features from all the Spruance variants (DD- 963, CG-47, DDG-993, and DD-997) and the FFG-7 programs.
The DDG-998 would retain the basic Spruance configuration modified to the DD-997 revised layout with the large SPS-49 radar on the mainmast and the enlarged hangar for two Seahawk LAMPS-III helicopters. The gun mounts would remain, but two new vertical launcher systems (VLS) would replace the various existing missile launchers. Each VLS can hold 61 missiles of various kinds. The reason that vertical launching can be used is that an upgraded version of the Mk- 92 Mod-2 fire control system (FCS) will be substituted for the currently used Mk-86 gun fire control system. The Mk-92’s two antenna director assemblies will be fitted on the platforms now used by the Mk-86s. The original Mk-73 directors will be replaced with the newer, lighter Mk-79 director groups (also used on the CG-47 and DDGX). Around the directors are the “snow-plow” faces of the Mk-92’s new phased array. The Tartar-D Mk- 74 FCS could be retained as a backup tracking capability. The rest of the ship is similar to DD-997 with her revisions.
Of course, alternative layouts are available, offering either increased capabilities or a more conservative approach. For example, Litton’s Ingalls yard has a DDGX model of the Spruance. It has all of the DDGX combat system's features, including the improved SPY-ID radar, and could carry a large weapon load. A more conservative approach could be to construct at least the first few DDG- 998s with Mk-26 Mod-4 launchers. This could permit them to use SM-1 missiles which are not now scheduled for a vertical launch configuration.
Besides affordability, the CG-47 effort suffers from an Aegis system production limitation that would also affect any attempt for an earlier start ot Aegis-derivative DDGXs. It is currently possible to produce no more than four SPY-1 radar systems Per year. On the other hand, Mk-92 FCSs are being produced for six ships Per year. The large numbers of FFG-7S have ensured a large production base which now can be switched to a DDG- 998 program. In fact, the amount o equipment common to both DD-9"' and FFG-7 is rather significant. ThlS commonality will minimize the disruption of contracts, keeping botn vendors and Congress happy.
WIN $1,500
General Prize Essay Contest
Deadline 1 December 1981
Three prize-winning essays will be selected in the U. S. Naval Institute's Annual General Prize Essay Contest. Your constructive thoughts and ideas for a professional sea service audience could make you a winner.
Topics selected must relate to the U. S. Naval Institute's mission...
"the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific Entry Rules
1. Essays must be original, not to exceed 4,000 words. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Secretary-Treasurer (GPEC). U. S. Naval Institute. Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
3. Essays must be received on or before 1 December 1981 at the U. S. Naval Institute.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name and address of the essayist, the title of the essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Editorial Board has made its selections.
5. The awards will be presented to the successful competitors at the annual meeting of the U. S. Naval Institute in April 1982.
knowledge in the naval and maritime services, and the advancement of the knowledge of seapower."
Essays will be judged for their analytical and interpretive qualities by the Editorial Board of the U. S. Naval Institute.
Alfred Thayer Mahan's third place entry in the 1879 contest was the start of his 35-year professional writing career. Start working on your essay today. Anyone is eligible to enter ano win First Prize—S1,500, a Gold Medal, and Life Membership in the U. S. Naval Institute; First Honorable Mention—$1 and a Silver Medal; or Second Honorable Mention—$750 ana a Bronze Metal.
The Editorial Board normally purchases, at its standard rata, a number of essays that are not among the prize-winners for publication in the Proceedings.
Letters notifying the award winners will be mailed on or abou* 1 February 1982, and the unsuccessful essays will be returnea to their authors on that date. The winning essay will be Pu°' lished in the April issue of Proceedings together with th names of the honorable mention essayists.
6. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on pap® approximately 8 1/2* x 11”. Submit two complete copies-
7. Essays awarded "First Prize" or “Honorable Mention’ w
be published in the Proceedings. Essays not awarded a PnZ may be selected for publication in the Proceedings. The wr' ers of such essays shall be compensated at the rate esta lished for purchase of articles. .
8. Essays entered in this contest must be analytical or1 * * * * 6 7 8 terpretive, not merely an exposition, a personal narrative, a report. Caution: DO NOT EXCEED 4,000 WORDS!
Ten prize-winning photos will be chosen and awarded $100 each in the U. S. Naval Institute's 20th Annual Naval and Maritime Photo Contest. The winning photos will be published in a 1982 issue of the Proceedings.
Entry Rules
[2] Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest.)
[3] Entries must be either black-and-white prints, color prints, or color transparencies.
[4] Minimum print size is 5" x 7".
[5] Minimum transparency size is 35 mm. (No glass-mounted transparencies, please.)
[6] Full captions and the photographer's name and address must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print, or printed on the transparency mount. (No staples, please.)
[7] Entries must arrive at the U. S. Naval Institute no later than 31 December 1981.
Photographs not awarded prizes may be purchased by the U. S. Naval Institute. Those photographs not purchased will be returned to the owner if accompanied by a stamped self- addressed envelope.