The U.S. Navy: Amphibious Lift

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The Reagan Administration has spelled out its goal for Navy-Marine Corps amphibious lift. Speaking at the keel laying of the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) on 4 August, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman said, “the Reagan Administration [has] estab­lished, in a dramatic break from Carter policies, a firm policy to de­velop sufficient amphibious lift to transport simultaneously the assault ^echelon of a Marine Amphibious Force and a Marine Amphibious Bri­gade. Thus we will have the capability to undertake major amphibious op­^erations to secure our maritime se­curity simultaneously in two separate areas of the world.”

To provide this lift capability the Navy will require some 50 to 60 ships to move the assault echelon of the Marine amphibious force (MAF) and ?0 ships to carry the marine amphib­ious brigade (MAB). At this time, the Navy has a theoretical lift capability °f 1.15 MAFs: about 32,600 Marine Corps and Navy personnel, with 230 helicopters, 70 tanks, and 200 am­phibious tractors. This lift consists of C7 amphibious warfare ships.

The total number of amphibious "'arfare ships is deceiving, however. The amphibious command ship Blue h'dge (LCC-19) is the flagship of the Commander, Seventh Fleet, in the Western Pacific, and the Mount Whit­by (LCC-20) flies the flag of the Com­mander, Second Fleet, in the Atlantic. Thus, the availability of these ships *°r immediate amphibious warfare op­erations is questionable at best. Two °ther amphibs serve as flagships: the ha Salle (AGF-3, formerly LPD-3) is ⁽he flagship of the Commander, Mid­dle East Force; and while she is Undergoing a lengthy overhaul, the Coronado (LPD-U) is serving as the ha Salle's relief with the designation AGF-ll.

Six other amphibs, two tank landing ^ships (LSTs) and four amphibious ^^r8o ships (LKAs), are operated by ^lhe Naval Reserve Force (NRF) with ^c°niposite active-reserve crews.

While NRF ships have demonstrated a high degree of readiness, they do not rotate on deployments to forward areas and their availability in time of crisis without a major reserve mobi­lization is questionable.

Subtracting the 15% to 20% of the amphibious force that is normally in shipyards undergoing overhaul and modernization, the actual lift capabil­ity of the current amphibious force is less than one MAF. Coupled with this situation is the specter of “block ob­solescence” of much of the force by the end of this century.

While this may seem to be a con­siderable period to some, the length of time required to design and build modern naval ships makes the time a major issue. Twenty amphibs were completed in the 1960s. These ships and the eight LSDs completed in the 1950s must be replaced by the year 2000 just to maintain the present lift capability. The earliest that the “next” amphibious warfare ship au­thorized could be completed is about 1986. That means that the replace­ment of these 28 ships requires a building rate of at least two ships per year between now and 2000. To obtain a realistic one MAF and one MAB lift will require that more than three ships will have to be built per year.

The record for amphibious warfare ship construction since the 1960s has been dismal. Early in the Kennedy Administration, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had pushed an intensive amphibious warfare buildup to provide for increased flexible-re­sponse options. This effort provided the Navy with 2 LCCs, 5 LHAs, 5 LKAs, 12 LPDs, 5 LSDs, and 20 LSTs. (Several other ships were can­celled or deferred, including four ad­ditional LHAs.)

The last of the Kennedy-Mc- Namara amphibs was the fifth Tar­awa-class multipurpose amphibious warfare ship, the Peleliu (LHA-5).[1] The construction of two LHAs was formally authorized in fiscal year 1971, although their “package” pro­curement contract dated several years earlier. No additional amphibious warfare ships were authorized until fiscal year 1981 when, over the objections of the Carter Administra­tion, the Congress approved the LSD- 41. The Marine Corps, with some Navy support, had called for the new LSD class to replace the eight ships of the Thomaston (LSD-28) design which had joined the fleet in 1954-57.

U. S. Navy Amphibious Lift, 1981

In addition, the USS Grayback (SS-574) is configured as a transport submarine, capable of carrying approximately about 70 troops. She is officially listed as an attack submarine; she was completed as a guided missile submarine in 1958 and converted to a transport in 1967-69.

*The ship was originally named Da Nang. After the fall of South Vietnam, the ship was renamed to avoid having the ship named for a Communist city.

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ships have demonstrated an effec­tive aviation versatility. The Guam (LPH-9) was used as the test platform for the sea control ship concept in the early 1970s; other LPHs have oper­^ated mine countermeasure helicop­^ters; and the LHAs have carried AV- 8A Harrier V/STOL attack aircraft on deployments. During a recent exer­^cise, the Nassau (LHA-4) operated a squadron of 19 Harriers. In the ex­cise, the Nassau served as the op­posing Soviet carrier and her Har­pers’ successes are causing some defense analysts to take a new look ^at the possible roles of V/STOL air­craft and “light” carriers.

Current U. S. Navy planning pro- yides for funding of the first LHDX ^ln fiscal year 1985. This ship would Probably be completed in 1992-93. One or more of the LPHs would be Bone by then. There is a move afoot ^ln Congress to provide long-lead funds f°r the first LHDX in fiscal year 1982 ^and to authorize the ship in fiscal year 1983.

Absent from the Navy’s plan for ^aew amphibious ship designs is a fol­low-on LST for the 20 ships of the

Newport (LST-1179) class completed in 1969-72. Today, these are the most limiting of the amphibs because of beach gradient considerations. The great success to date of the LCAC program offers an effective alternative to investing in future LST construc­tion and, in this writer’s opinion, the next generation of amphibious trac­tors (LVT[X]). With the LCAC, much of the LST’s load can be brought ashore in more areas and at higher speeds than has been the case in the past.

A final consideration in any discus­sion of amphibious lift is the relation­ship of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) ships. In general, the RDF ships are intended to be forward deployed with equipment, vehicles, food, water, and munitions, which will be “married” at a port with troops flown into the area. The am­phibious warfare ships are designed for transit to the forward area with troops and material on board, ready to remain at sea for sustained periods (as in peacetime deployments) or rap­idly unload across a beach, possibly in the face of some opposition. This assault capability may be more limited than ever before given the relatively advanced-technology weapons now available to many Third World na­tions. However, the ability of the United States to keep a few thousand marines forward deployed in amphib­ious squadrons in the Indian Ocean, Western Pacific, and Mediterranean, and, in the future, possibly in the Ca­ribbean on a sustained basis, appears to be a most useful “tool” in U. S. foreign policy.

A continuing amphibious lift capa­bility cannot be provided by the on- again, off-again amphib construction policies of the three-and-a-half decades since World War II. A more realistic policy would be a steady, low-level construction rate. This would also contribute to controlling shipbuilding costs by announcing, funding, and maintaining a schedule that averages perhaps three new amphibious ships per year. But a schedule must be cre­ated and maintained or the situation that now confronts the amphibious force will worsen and the United States will lose a valuable and flexible military capability.