Professional Notes

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The Marines: Out in the Cold

By Dr. Paul O. Davis

In developing a job analysis of Physical tasks performed by the U.S. Marine Corps combat infantrymen IMOS 0311), the author and a team of

mulation ranges between 3 and 15 ^eet. The MWTC is a cold, dry envi­ronment much like the Arctic, but "util high altitudes. The MWTC has ^{a v}ariable terrain, including expanses °f open glade, bounded by sheer cliffs. Measurements gathered by the Na- Health Research Laboratory at . Diego of the marines taking part |ⁿ the exercise before their exposure ⁰ cold weather conditions at MWTC ^uionstrated that the marines were Physically fit. Their field performance fder the extreme conditions at MWTC was judged to be exceptional.

^ut it was apparent that these troops ftried loads that were detrimental to h^eir extended and efficient perfor- fince in a high-altitude, cold weather P'uronment.

. Personal Equipment—No single ^ctor had more influence on the in­

^exercise physiologists visited the Mountain Warfare Training Center <MWTC) at Pickle Meadows, Califor­ⁿia, from 28 February through 5 March 1981. Our job was to gather human physical performance data, specifically to document the load ^eights, distances, and types of ter­rain covered by the marines training ^ln high-altitude, cold weather condi­tions. We found that equipment and ^environment had a profound impact °ⁿ physical performance. The follow- ^ln8 discusses the factors that affect sustained performance of the marine ^combat infantryman.

The Environment—The Mountain Warfare Training Center is located in [he Sierra Mountains, in the Toiyabe Rational Forest in northern Califor- ^n,a. The base camp is 6,700 feet above sea level. It is an excellent location °^r high-altitude, cold weather infan- ^trV training. Field exercises are con­futed at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 ^eet, with temperatures typically rang­es from -20°F to 50°F. Snow accu­dividual marine’s mobility than the equipment he wore or carried. The equipment that was issued, or could be issued during armed combat, is listed in Tables 1 through 4. Each piece of equipment was weighed in the field with spring scales. Additional in­formation was provided by the U.S. Army Clothing and Equipment Ma­terials Engineering Laboratory (CAMEL) in Natick, Massachusetts, and the Mobility and Logistics Divi­sion Development Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) in Quantico, Virginia.

As seen in Table 1, a marine adds 21.17 pounds to his frame by donning the cold weather clothing. The fight­ing load brings his total to 52.4 pounds, of which 11.69 pounds are

worn on the feet. The existence load, with pack and contents, as shown in Table 3, puts the total at 93.68 pounds for a medium-size clothing issue, with considerable ranges of weight actually carried in the pack (25 pounds to 81 pounds). But the marine with the 25- pound pack was found to have many essential items missing and suffered accordingly.

This equipment greatly reduces mo­bility, decreases tactile and sensory perception, and interferes with the body’s vital cooling process during increased exertion which is common when operating in mountainous ter­rain. During a hike, metabolic rate over basal state is increased by a fac­tor of 15 over that of resting. While we did not have the capability to per­form direct measurements, we were able to infer the true physical cost of work under these circumstances. In a previous project, during which we determined the energy costs to fire­fighters of wearing protective equip­ment, it was found that 52 pounds of protective equipment reduced effi­ciency by 33%. Inasmuch as the fire­fighters were physically larger than the marines, we can infer that the items contained in Tables 1 and 2 re­duce effectiveness by 33% in any sus­tained type of physical activity, par­ticularly in individuals with body weights less than 170 pounds.

Clothing—For the most part, the cold weather clothing issued to the troops will keep them warm. How­ever, this clothing can cause heat ex­haustion because it is not properly ventilated. Bulk and layering are nec­essary to conserve body heat, but this can also be achieved with lightweight, long-wearing garments that are avail­able commercially. These alternative garments are warm and conserve body heat by transferring the evapo­rative surface from the skin to the outer layer of the garment.

Each marine was issued a cold weather cap, a wool shirt, field trou­sers, and a parka. The cold weather cap lacks a visor which could serve the marine in bright sunlight or heavy snowfall. The wool shirt, while du­' rable and exceedingly warm, readily absorbs moisture in a heavy snow or rain, thereby increasing the risk of hypothermia. The field trousers are

Table 1 Cold Weather Clothing, Medium Size

•Not issued or worn on the observed operation.

very durable, but bulky and absorb­ent. When the trousers get wet, they are very uncomfortable. The parka provides little protection from rain or melting snow because it is not water- repellent. When removed, the parka is difficult to store because it cannot be compressed. Several marines told us they preferred to wear their cam­ouflage utilities because they dried more quickly than their cold weather gear. But utilities offer little protec­tion from the cold.

No single piece of personal equip­ment is as important as footwear. The “Mickey Mouse” boot (so called be­cause of its similarity to the cartoon character’s feet) is an impressive piece of equipment, being both warm and lightweight. It comes in two ver­sions: white (to 60°F) and black (|° - 10°F). The boot travels well *ⁿ packed snow. However, on long hikes over sloped, bare ground, it can cause serious blistering. In addition, mois­ture is a constant problem with this vapor-barrier boot. The marine should frequently change socks, pon­der his feet, and perform other time­consuming maintenance, which a^re seldom done, to prevent immersion foot, athlete’s foot, and foot odor.

The balance of the personal protec­tive wearing apparel is too heavy and bulky for practical use under cold weather combat conditions. Most of the marines discarded their web gear (M-16 clip pouches, canteens, and covers) because of the difficulty 'ⁿ using these items with the all-purpos^e lightweight carrying equipment (AL* ICE) pack or their heavy loads. Oth^er marines stuffed these items into the>^r pockets. Many variations in eqmP' ment must be made in view of an 'ⁿ' dividual’s size and structure.

Pack—While the pack is reasonably well suited for loads up to 35 pounds- it taxes the neck and shoulder muscle when overloaded. It is not possible to adjust an overloaded pack to relic'^e this strain. The outside pouches gi'* easy access to frequently neede items, but picking up and putting °ⁿ the pack, especially while on sno"' shoes, requires considerable eff^of1 The main straps for closing the coV^^r are difficult to fasten with cold hand' in subfreezing weather.    ,

Attaching a sleeping bag or an. other object that will not fit readily the pack is next to impossible becauj* the straps are too short to fit east • over the extra bulk. A sleeping bag ⁰ any optional equipment should al"'^

be carried high on the back. Lowering the weight not only makes the pack more awkward to carry, but signifi­cantly increases the likelihood of a disabling injury. Four marines from °ne squad sustained muscle injuries resulting from weight-bearing activi­ties like this. There was no way to rest the back muscles except to drop the Pack or to sit down in wet snow. The keeping bag is durable, but bulky and heavy (weighing nine-and-one-half Pounds). The ideal bag weight is less than six pounds, and many models are commercially available in fast-drying materials. Lightweight foam pads lodging are, however, preferable to the standard arctic tent, which is a comfortable lodging, but difficult to move or to rapidly disassemble. Therefore, its use is limited to semi­permanent conditions. The tent, weighing 73 pounds, is usually moved by vehicle, but may have to be towed on an Ahkio (sled).

The arctic tent was also a health hazard. With a Yukon stove, the in­terior temperature becomes a toasty 70°F. Coupled with exhaled air, the 15 to 23 marines stuffed into this ten- man tent are at increased risk for up­per respiratory infections, as evi- with wood fuel, provides an accept­able cooking surface. The smaller squad stove was useless because of the excessive maintenance problems associated with it. Heat tabs (a fuel source consisting of trioxane) were found to bum slowly, but effectively. Obviously, heat must be provided since C-rations are next to impossible to eat frozen. As an alternative to C- rations, some members of the obser­vation team carried long-range patrol rations (LRPRs), a freeze-dried meal that can be eaten dry or cooked by adding water. Although the LRPRs were time-consuming to prepare, they

•iitu

^cav,

^e and energy. Sheltering in snow

_n °uld also be considered as an alter- J‘^,'^ve to the three-and-one-half ^u°d air mattress currently used. Shelter— Shelters which can be ^ade or set up quickly are essential, under these simulated combat _s^e'^d conditions. The marines re- I landed well to the job of construct- I ® ‘‘hootches,” but just as a new 8'ng was completed, orders were • ^Ven to move out, resulting in lost

^es and other types of expedient

denced by persistent coughs among at least half the members of the bat­talion. Reducing the temperature dif­ference between the inside and out­side environment would be an effective way to reduce discomfort and coughing, as well as to improve adaption to cold weather. We found that the heater/stove was unnecessary for warmth. Close supervision by NCOs and officers could eliminate over-heating and its adverse effects.

Messing—The Yukon stove, even

Pulling an Ahkio in snow, usually a three-man task, may require as many as nine marines to get over even a small hill.

were nevertheless a significant im­provement to C-rations. Needless to say, the marines were envious of this compact, lightweight ration. A single C-ration meal weighs two pounds, while the LRPR weighs only four ounces. This is a staggering difference when one considers that 7 meals added 14 pounds to the total load, while the same number of LRPR meals added less than 2 pounds. The new meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) being developed by the Army will average about two pounds for seven meals.

Cold weather dehydration was a serious and common problem. De­hydration under these conditions is caused by a combination of low hu­midity, altitude, and exercise. Dehy­dration produces a host of complica­tions, including exhaustion, increased susceptibility to frostbite and, for those wounded, shock. Freeze-dried food presents an excellent mechanism for ensuring that the individual re­mains hydrated, provided that water is available for reconstituting the food. Using one-half quart of water to prepare the meal and one-half quart for a warm drink, each marine would consume approximately three quarts of water a day with meals, assuming that time exists for these meals in combat. During the exercise which we observed, there was one 18-hour pe­riod in which messing was not possi­ble. The disproportionately high quantity of protein in the C-rations and MREs is a questionable feature because carbohydrates are the critical food fuels needed for extended phys­ical activity. The traditional quick-en­ergy consumables (e.g., chocolate and caffeine beverages) compound the problem of dehydration by increasing the excretion of body water, yet the items are provided in copious quan­tities in C-rations and MREs. So, if these items are consumed, additional water must be consumed.

The likelihood of being able to drink sufficient water from a plastic canteen at 32°F or below is remote because the canteen allows water to freeze quickly, and thawing becomes a major problem. This equipment problem is another factor contributing to dehy­dration. A conscious effort must be made to maintain hydration through forced drinking and observation of urine color. (Urine turns dark during dehydration.) Indeed, water supply in a combat environment represents a major logistical problem as it has to be considered as a tactical weapon. (Melting snow is an extremely ineffi­cient method of acquiring water.)

Effective sanitation associated with the cleanup of messing gear was not possible because of water shortages. (The LRPRs require no cleanup, thor­oughly eliminating this problem— another advantage for using these ra­tions.)

Movement—Snowshoes or skis are the only realistic equipment available to permit the infantryman to move in deep snow. The regular issue snowshoe is simple in design and function. The ease of fastening is an advantage, especially when it is nec­essary to keep exposure of bare fin­gers to a minimum. The metal frame and wire mesh appear durable. Some reduction in weight would no doubt ease the marine’s burden. Learning to walk with snowshoes is accomplished in a few hours, but accommodation to skis takes significantly longer. The marines’ 207-cm. skis had no safety releases and were less than optimum for efficient movement; without wax, movement uphill in skis was virtually impossible.

Our observation team’s experience leads us to believe that the whole con­cept of using skis for marine opera­tions should be reevaluated in view of the availability of short, lightweight cross-country skis. However, even individuals with cross-country skiing experience require annual training.

Transporting arctic tents and sup­plies for short distances is accom­plished using the Ahkio. This is a sled on waxless skis towed by two or three marines in harness and one marine pushing. The typical load carried on the Ahkio is 350 pounds. Uphill move­ment changes the manpower require­ments dramatically. We saw a ten- man team take 45 minutes to move an Ahkio only 200 meters up an 18° grade.

Mechanized support in this exercise was poor to nonexistent. Trucks with chains are only effective on packed surfaces with grades of less than 6°. Tracked vehicles designed primarily for warm weather amphibious opera­tions do not perform satisfactorily in snow. While there are tracked vehi­cles designed for snow and cold weather operations, we had none at MWTC. Helicopters were unavailable because of other operational commit­ments. In any event, helicopters are unreliable because poor weather can

quickly preclude their deployment.

Snowmobiles, which are being eval­uated, show promise for high-speed transport of reconnaissance and strike groups. While underpowered for heavy hauling operations, snowmo­biles have excellent promise if ^a sturdy military version were to be de­veloped with an adequate power-to- weight ratio. However, today’s snow­mobile’s engine is unreliable at ex­treme temperatures.

Communications—The old PRC-25 radio has been replaced by the new long-range PRC-77, but the weight (22 to 26 pounds) remains the same. The marines claim that the PRC-77 is re­liable but electronically outdated. W^e were unable to communicate effec­tively with the command post for more than two days—an unusual oc­currence, we were told. Nevertheless, use of modern electronics would lessen this weight considerably. ^aS well as improve reliability.

Medical Support—Corpsmen ^are critical to the effective combat read­iness of all marine units. We were most impressed with the work of the corpsmen in preventing and caring f°^r cold weather injuries. Corpsmen car­ried the weapons and packs of injured or sick marines without a compIai^nt' But a single marine casualty causes the “loss” of at least four other ma­rines who are required to tow him °ⁿ an Ahkio. The long-term prognosis for a severely injured soldier is bleak un­der these cold weather conditions.

Strategically, we are sapping th^e fighting force of the Marine Corps by using standard-issue, life-supp^ort equipment that takes more from *h^e infantryman than it gives to him "J return. Antiquated supplies ^an equipment are undermining chance for success of Marine Corps col weather operations. Ignoring physiological stresses of coping '^vl* outdated, inadequate, and overweighj gear could prove to be crippling, tf ⁿ° fatal, in actual combat conditions-

If marines are to fight in the col • then technology should be brought¹ bear in this common sense area of¹ gistics. Let’s not leave the marines o in the cold.

Dr. Davis is a member and fellow of the A , ican College of Sports Medicine and Direc*® j, the Institute of Human Performance, a re'C amt consulting organization specializing ^1IJ ,, dev elopment of physical performance stand , for occupations requiring high levels of pW fitness.

A Counter-Terrorism Program

By Captain David J. Kenney, U. S. Naval Reserve

Despite a mind-boggling increase in terrorism, American responses to this Modern scourge continue to be vague and ineffectual. Why?

Since World War II, problems of thermonuclear warfare have ab­sorbed our best strategic minds. Until tecently, serious students of war terely addressed terrorism: princi­pally, because it did not lend itself to ⁿ8orous systems analysis or demand S'Zeable military resources. Britain’s ^exPerience in Malaya proved an ex­^CePtion. Even so, terrorism was seen ^as the weapon of the weak and the ^VVe*rd. We denied its efficacy because ^We could not trace its root causes. The ■Husion persisted that terrorism could Jtever become a permanent political ^,actor in a well-policed and comput- ^er'Zed world.

In fact, terrorism has evolved into Pndeclared war. It saps international ^0rder and jeopardizes the legitimate ■nterests of nations. It consumes re­sources and snuffs out lives. It can ^^scalate almost indefinitely and could ^ead to a nuclear episode. It has be- jtenie a finely honed tool for achieving ⁿ'te political purposes. Nonetheless, °^Ur perceptions of this lethal bane re­gain hazy and limited.

Few noticed that, by the 1970s, so­phisticated technology could give ^steall bands the military capacities °nce reserved to major powers. Now, J¹⁰ Person or facility is immune to ter- ^r°|ist attack.

Terrorism succeeds. The chief rea- ops are clear. War’s principal ingre- ’^ents have become moral and psy- hological. They are no longer Material. Terrorism’s patrons pin­_s ^lnt almost uncannily those weak l^apis in society where sudden vio- P^ce has its greatest chance for dis- •j,^0,v*ng _a nation’s will and cohesion. ^errorist acts destroy institutions not y brute force but through humiliation _a despair. Terrorism, from the left Bd the right, broke Turkey’s govern- ^ ^ent not by defeating its armed forces I te by demonstrating its ineptness and c * of control. Can any international p^Ure feel as safe as he did before the °Pe and Anwar Sadat were shot?

^ Media coverage has often afforded ^°rism a specious respectability. ^8itimate journalism once cast mem- ^rs °f the Baader-Meinhof gang as

acceptable reflections of political strife. TV reporting occasionally por­trayed the infamous Carlos as a slightly tarnished Robin Hood. All this reduces terrorism’s horror to the image of a tolerable inconveni­ence—like a traffic jam.

Terrorism exerts a multiplier effect on whatever social or political insta­bilities it touches. Societies in tran­sition are characterized by charis­matic leadership and are especially prone to violence against persons. Iran’s painful slide into chaos and isolation was engineered partly by ter­rorist attacks against its own citizens.

Terrorism mocks the traditional foundations of national power such as military force and geographic posi­tion. For example. U. S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean serve to guarantee the flow of oil against Soviet military intervention. Yet, they are helpless to prevent destruction of pumping sta­tions by small bands of terrorists equipped with technology’s latest nasty gadgets. Equally, a non-mari­time power can wreak havoc by min­ing harbors and destroying critical port facilities.

The greatest obstacle to under­standing terrorism lies in persisting beliefs that savage behavior directed toward defenseless humans is lunatic. We must realize that terrorists act ra­tionally when they throw grenades into crowded school buses. We must understand that an extensive sub-so­ciety of trained malefactors is pre­pared to die during the commission of terrorist attacks. The distinction must be made that while specific world leaders finance terrorism, they do not control it. Only then can we take the full measure of terrorism’s scope and potential for disruption.

No perfect solution to terrorism ex­ists. Nonetheless, much can be done

to diminish its frequency and restrict its damage. Concerned nations, led by the United States, must commence a five-pronged program immediately.

► The Reagan Administration must convince the world community that terrorism works to the disadvantage of all. No country, whatever its nu­clear arsenal, can execute a successful foreign policy in a negotiating envi­ronment destabilized by random vio­lence. Terrorism’s patrons must re­alize that they run the risk of becoming its final victims.

Eleven years ago, terrorists destroyed three hijacked commercial jets. If such acts become commonplace, life as we know it will cease to exist.

► Nations’ knowledge of terrorism must be shared broadly and unself­ishly. A consultative mechanism com­posed of police, military, and intelli­gence officials could accomplish this task readily. Joint counterterrorist action would inevitably follow close exchange of data.

► The First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution must be respected. The media must not, however, cross the line that separates objective coverage of terrorism from idolatry of terror­ists. The media must not extol squalid sociopaths as model figures of society. Identities and photos of alleged ter­rorists should be withheld from gen­eral dissemination.

► The Reagan Administration must define a "bill of rights” for nations

under terrorist threat or attack. No­tice must be served that in doing violence to defenseless noncombat­ants, terrorists forfeit the law’s normal protections. Nations must guard themselves against terrorists by military means including preemptive attack—when clear and present dan­ger exists.

► Nuclear parity makes conventional wars more likely. The Reagan Admin­istration must grasp that terrorism is the newest discipline of nonnuclear warfare. It must develop doctrines, weapons, and tactics to make the costs of terrorism unacceptable for activitists and sponsors alike. The ad­ministrative practices and judgments that led to Desert I should not be whitewashed. Countering terrorism is not a parttime job for conventional military forces. It demands the full­time efforts of a professional corps. A repetition of Desert 1 would be inexcusable.

Two overriding perils remain. First,

terrorists could acquire a nuclear de­vice for blackmail. Second, terrorist acts could occur so frequently that will become conditioned into accept­ing them as normal methods for in­ternational negotiation.

Should either event take place, in­ternational life as we know it would disintegrate. The fragile mechanisms we have evolved to make our planet liveable would wither away.

The answer to the threat of terror­ism lies in an overwhelming display by the Reagan Administration and other concerned nations that they P°^s' sess the political will, the military re­sources. and the tactical deftness to crush international terrorism wher­ever it sprouts. The Reagan Admm' istration must prove that terrorism >^s as hazardous to its perpetrators as <^[ is profitless to its sponsors.

Captain Kenney has served overseas in ^var’⁰[J* assignments and is a frequent contributor to •" Proceedings.

The Soviet Naval Infantry—A Limited Threat

By Midshipman First Class James B. Seaton III. U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

Born during the reign of Peter the Great, blooded in 18th and 19th cen­tury wars, immortalized in Soviet his­tory through its World War II ex­ploits, the Soviet Naval Infantry is a small, but important element in the tactical military forces of the Soviet Union. The morskaia pekhota (trans­lated literally, "naval infantry”) is viewed by Russians in the same light as we in the United States regard the U. S. Marine Corps—as an amphibi­ous assault force. Most observers of the Soviet military believe, however, that the Soviet Naval Infantry is ca­pable of only limited long-range power projection—i.e., the Soviet marines' primary purpose appears to be in sup­port of amphibious landings in areas contiguous to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets created an amphibious

doctrine simultaneously with Admiral Gorshkov’s ordering the Soviet fleet to sea in 1963. This doctrine estab­lishes two missions for naval infantry forces:         amphibious landings and

coastal defense.

The execution of amphibious land­ings includes strategic, operational, and tactical landings, as well as land­ings for reconnaissance and sabotage.

Strategic landings are designed to open a new front or theater of oper­ations. The classic example of this type of assault is the Western Allies’ D-day landing along the Normandy Coast in June 1944. The Soviet ma­rines have never conducted a landing of this type, and with only slightly more than 12.000 men (as compared with the 188.000-man U. S. Marine Corps), they are presently incapable

of launching a strategic landing.

The amphibious landing subord¹' nate to strategic strikes is the oper³' tional landing. Somewhat smaller "j scale, normally on the division le^ve and with a different purpose than ³ strategic landing, an assault of t*¹' size would operate in support ⁰ ground forces to surround and destro) enemy positions in coastal areas- ¹ serving as the spearhead of an op^er. ational landing, the Soviet marine* duty is to seize and secure a bead¹ head. After follow-on army units am in position to conduct further op^eI?. tions, the task of the naval infantry¹⁵ completed.               .j

The landings that the Soviets cou presently be expected to initiate am tactical, reconnaissance, and sab^ tage in nature. A tactical landing ¹

^what the authors of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia probably had in mind ^when they defined a naval landing op­eration: “to strike an enemy maritime grouping in the flank and rear . . . (and) to capture islands, naval bases, roajor ports, coastal airfields, and im­portant sectors of the enemy coast.” An operation of this size, noticeably smaller than a strategic or operational landing, could be conducted by a bat­talion-sized force operating inde­pendently of army units. The majority °f World War II Soviet landings were °f this type.

. Reconnaissance and sabotage land- ^mgs are designed either to gather in­formation on enemy defenses and em­ployments or serve as diversionary measures. In the diversionary mode, 'Parine units would be used to disrupt ^communications, sabotage coastal or rear area facilities, and generally dis- operations are limited by several fac­tors. First, the Soviet marines are few in number. Second, divided into five regiments, they are widely dispersed with regiments based with the North­ern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets. The other two naval infantry regiments are located in the East with the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Third, instead of being responsible to a central headquarters, as is the case with the U. S. Marine Corps, the naval infantry regiments are operationally subordinate to the individual fleet commanders. Fourth, although growing, the amphibious lift capability of the Soviet Navy is small. In fact, the U. S. Sixth Fleet’s “am­phibious task force alone is equal in size to the entire amphibious force the Soviets deploy, and far exceeds it in capability.”* A fifth limiting factor is the lack of seaborne or overseas tac­tical air support and helo-assault ca- seaports or along the Amur River on the Russian-Manchurian border. To the south, the presence of Soviet ma­rines in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region poses severe implications. If Soviet marines were to veer from their present politico-military function and be used against Pakistan or one of the oil-producing nations, this would likely be cause for rapid U. S. intervention in the crisis area.

pabilities. While the Kiev-class car­riers could be used as components of an amphibious task force, their mis­sion appears to be primarily antisub­marine warfare.

In a modem Far East crisis, besides defending the Vladivostok naval base and facilities, the naval infantry could be used in operations against Chinese

"Bradford Dismukes et al., Soviet Naval Diplo­macy. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) p. 60.

^5 or tie down enemy units.

regard to its mission of coastal _e ^Cnse’ naval infantry would only _a .?^a8e in the ground support role for j_s ^,rr,ited period, however, because it ^ⁿ°t equipped with heavy artillery. j_n ^e mission of coastal defense also °'^ves defending naval bases.

_S|j oile the Soviet marines have _dJⁿ themselves to be capable of i>₀P °V'ⁿ8 outside home waters (An­^a 1^76, Indian Ocean 1980), such

In Southern Europe, the mission of the Soviets’ Black Sea marines would be to seize the Turkish Straits—the Bosporus and Dardanelles. As is the case with most of the Soviet naval bases, the Soviets’ ships could be bot­tled up unless they control this vital waterway. In the north, the Soviets would have to strike at and seize the Danish Straits. The Soviets must ac­complish this objective or their Baltic Fleet could be trapped in the inland

The Soviet Naval Infantry employs both conventional and air cushion landing craft. In fact, the Soviet Navy has the world’s largest fleet of surface effect ships—the “Aist,” pictured below, is the largest.

fleet. Consequently, Soviet interest in the approach to this naval base is in­tense. In view of U. S. military equip­ment prepositioned in Norway, the Soviets would be likely to launch an amphibious strike in conjunction with a parachute assault by the Russian airborne forces to gain control of this region before U. S. marines could ar­rive to take part in any armed conflict- Since the 1960s reformation, the Soviet Naval Infantry has grown to become the second largest marine in­fantry force in the world. Although it has become an elite combat force ca­pable of operating in nuclear or con­ventional environments, the Soviet Naval Infantry cannot challenge the U. S. Marine Corps’ worldwide strike capability.

waters as it was during World Wars I and II. If the Soviets decide to in­tervene militarily in Poland, their na­val infantry troops could be used to gain control over the Gdansk port fa­cilities or to spearhead river cross­ings.

It is not difficult to envision the So­viets launching an amphibious assault on Scandinavia. The world’s largest naval base is located on the Kola Peninsula; this ice-free base houses three-quarters of the Soviet strategic submarine fleet and 40% of the surface

Midshipman Seaton, a senior at Jackson'il University. Jacksonville, Florida, will be com missioned a Second Lieutenant in the U. S. M^a line Corps in April 1982.

A “Wing” Strategy to Support the Fleet

By Philip H. Watson

A great deal of productive discus­sion has taken place concerning the employment of naval aviation in the ocean control and land support roles. Land-based air support of the nation’s fleet, however, has not been widely considered.

There is no denying that, in the past, sinking ships with land-based aircraft has not been the easiest of tasks. Problems of a technical na­ture—bombsights, bombs, and air­craft range, on the one hand; antiair­craft gunnery, target size, and the vastness of the oceans on the other—have not made ship killing a natural role for land-based aircraft.

The onrush of technology has changed the balance to the extent that a mod­em surface warship can scarcely be countenanced in a naval role without an extensive and sophisticated antiair warfare system.

The use of land-based aircraft also raises the issue of bases. If the United States were to adopt a land-based sup­port system, it would have to nego­tiate basing rights within regions where threats are anticipated. This is the government's share in meeting the national commitment. All such land bases do not necessarily need to be located within all the potential prob­lem areas. Bases can be placed astride an enemy’s lines of communication Land bases can also be employed iⁿ‘ directly. As U. S. Navy battle group⁵ move from a trouble-free zone. the'J responsibilities can be assumed in tha zone by land-based units during thc^,r absence.

It is unnecessary to recount to th* readership the use of air power in con junction with the fleet. However, few thoughts about land-based air craft are offered. While there is a lar? degree of commonality between Ian based and carrier-borne tactical an^ interceptor types in terms of size an capability, land-based aircraft can heavier, larger, and of greater ran?

^and endurance. This is evident in the widespread employment of the mari­time patrol type of aircraft—e.g., the Orion, Nimrod, Aurora, and Atlantic. The West lacks the equivalent of So­viet (land-based) Naval Aviation. Its “Badgers,” “Bears,” and “Back­fires” complement the role of the So­viet antisubmarine warfare air arm, thus providing a balanced force whose capabilities are the cause of so much Western concern. Such a capability ^ln Western hands would permit a rapid reaction to maritime threats at speeds ^at least 10 to 20 times that of a surface force “swinging” from one ocean sta- fion to another.

Many alternative forms of land- oased support are available. Within certain range limits, a surface force can be provided with air cover without ^lhe presence of an aircraft carrier, within the narrow seas—i.e., Sea of •^Pan, South China Sea, Arabian taulf, Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea, ^and Caribbean—land-based intercep­tors operating from friendly bases can °c directed by air control ships. The V^est does have experience in the rou- ^tlne handover of tanker-supported in­terceptors from the shoreside envi- ^r°nment to naval direction and their ^rePlacement and recovery. The same ^c°mmunications network can be used ^to initiate fleet-requested, land-based ^strikes at enemy surface units and to ^lrtlPlement surveillance. Recent ex­perience of such procedures can be erived from the United Kingdom’s treasures to close the gap between its pommitment to provide air support to he fleet _an(j j_ts shortage of carrier- °rne aviation. Soviet implementa- '°n of land-based naval aviation sug- ®^ests that they at least believe in many ^asPects of the system.

fo develop a land-based aviation ^stem to support fleet operations will equjre four basic elements: bases, lo- ^l'i?ics, communications, and aircraft.

ne problem of basing requires an ₀ ^a.^mination of the ocean littorals for ^Phmum locations and negotiations ^^etWeen the U. S. Government and ita^ ^Countr'^es- B *^s possible that lim- l^fions in the use of such bases may imposed in periods of prehostili- 5 In such instances, the United j_u .^les must make some form of value ^ 8ment as to their relative utility, lie^ °^{ne narrow seas} listed ear- im ^IS k°^un(ied entirely by nations in- $_t'^Cable to the policies of the United ^tes- There are indeed nations in these areas which would like to see the United States adopt a more visible profile.

The question of logistics and com­munications depends to some degree upon prepositioning. Steps already being taken to construct a worldwide military satellite communications sys­tem and global navigation systems are reducing the required infrastructure for forces deployed away from home bases. Satellite terminal access and local communications equipment can be brought in by air if necessary.

The touchiest point could turn out to be selecting the land-based aircraft to be used to support fleet operations. The right aircraft would seem to be those which can get to the theater of operations “the fastest with the most- est.”But there are many associated political issues that must be consid­ered. The responsibility for the solu­tion to this problem would ultimately reside with the Pentagon. The aircraft should be those which provide op­position task forces with the uncom­fortable knowledge that they have un­invited company. Such aircraft should be well equipped with active and pas­sive surveillance systems and possess a significant loitering capability. Their presence in the area should be suffi­cient to cause a surface force to in­stitute emission control procedures and adopt some form of screening. It would be even more flattering to the effort should the opposition find itself obliged to provide a /f/ev-class carrier with her “Forger” aircraft as part of its task force. Bearing in mind the ef­fort and expense of developing Aegis- type vessels, it would appear remiss of the Western world to deprive the Soviets of the experience!

The size and scope of future hos­tilities are unpredictable. Would they automatically lead to an interconti­nental struggle, fought out in the At­lantic and European waters, or will the struggles be fought at points pe­ripheral to the centers of power? In either case, fleet dispositions will never be ideal. The first blows are the hardest to take and the most difficult to deliver because the initiative comes at the points of the aggressor’s choos­ing. Therefore, in addition to a “swing” strategy, why not a “wing” strategy?

Mr. Watson served in the Canadian Armed Forces as a navigator in Maritime Air Command and subsequently with Training Command as an instructor prior to becoming a fighter controller in the Royal Air Force in 1970. On retirement from the military in 1978, he joined Litton Sys­tems Canada Limited where he is presently em­ployed in the Advance Programs Group.

Concerning Things Amphibious

By Captain William G. Carson, U. S. Navy

Whatever the organization being observed, somewhere between the rigor of Parkinson's Law and the gen­erality of Murphy’s, repetitious pat­terns abound that have yet to be cod­ified. This is an attempt to describe some of these patterns for the U. S. amphibious warfare force.

Embarkation: The Marine Corps always proposes loading plans which call for more load than should be put in the amphibious lift available. In ad­dition, the Marine Corps sends inex­perienced second lieutenants to the amphibious warfare ships as embar­kation officers. Often the result is that these second lieutenants’ obvious in­competence but dedicated persistence (for fear of reporting anything less than total success) enlists such sym­pathy (or challenge or frustration) from the ships’ first lieutenants and boatswains that the ships’ crews rise to heroic performances and load everything in the plan. The largest amphibious warfare ships have Ma­rine Corps combat cargo officers as­signed to them who disrupt this rea­sonably workable system. These more senior officers do not have great patience with incompetent second lieutenants with unworkable loading plans. This disruption of the natural process only delays the inevitable. Admirals and generals and commo­dores and colonels have already agreed on Navy-Marine team spirit. They turn deaf ears to ships’ captains and Marine Corp G-4s (Supply Sec­tion) who suggest that Navy-Marine team spirit may be flagging somewhat with regard to embarkation. “I’m sure it will all work out,” say the admirals and generals. (“If only my subordi­nates were competent," they think.)

An Embarkation Rule: Regardless of degree or timeliness of planning, the deck crews of the amphibious war­fare ships will have to work all night.

A Sizing Rule Related to Embar­kation: Any marine will tell you (this must be lesson one at The Basic School) that a marine amphibious unit, brigade, or force (MAU, MAB, or MAF) is a task-organized, air- ground team made especially to fit the mission. Thus, the size of a MAU, MAB, or MAF can be specified in ad­vance only in notional terms. This sit­uation frustrates mobility planners.

They prefer for things to have definite sizes. Well, there is an empirical rule that solves the problem. The size of a MAU, MAB, or MAF will be 110% of the capacity of the ships assigned to lift it. (Note: this rule is indepen­dent of the number of ships assigned.)

Navy-Marine Negotiations: When it gets down to brass tacks, when ap­peals to reason have failed, marines will quote NWP 22, which they call LFM 01. (All marines memorize LFM 01 at Amphibious Warfare School.) Thus, they reason, the trump card has been played, and the Navy must com­ply. After all, LFM 01 (The Bible) was signed by The Chief of Naval Opera­tions as well as The Commandant. But, in fact, the trump card doesn’t take the trick. The Navy negotiators are unfamiliar with NWP 22, except maybe as a dull document which they once leafed through out of a sense of duty or boredom. They certainly don’t treat it as holy writ. In any event, quoting from it doesn't seriously hinder negotiations, and most will end in reasonably fair compromises. After all, negotiators for both sides under­stand that they are under the com­pulsions of the deaf ear and Navy- Marine team spirit discussed earlier.

Negotiation and the Intelligence of Marines: The things that make ma­rines valuable in wartime tend to make them difficult to deal with in peace­time. Marine norms are designed to produce institutional heroism in the heat of battle, but they can sorely try Navy-Marine team spirit when far from the battlefield. What Navy offi­cers, with their more flexible ap­proach, tend to forget is that service inflexibility does not equate with stu­pidity. A Navy officer who enters into negotiations believing marines are dumb will end up owing four ships for three weeks, the shirt off his back, the admiral's daughter, and a pledge of two sons to visit the Marine Corps recruiter.

Negotiation and the Ultimate Re­tort: If the training, lift, and deploy­ment requirements for amphibious warfare ships are totalled, the gap be­tween ships and requirements be­comes very large. This causes com­petition for the ships to do either Marine Corps things (such as lifting troops and equipment from bases to training areas) or Navy things (such as repair availabilities). Then, the schedulers must negotiate: The Ma­rine Corps side is intractable (“The readiness of the Corps is at stake!")'■ and the ultimate Navy retort is, "Ho"’ many ships does the Commandant own, anyway?” This really is an un­fair ploy, and so is used only with great provocation—i.e.. about once a month.

Who Owns the Helicopters? A pop" ular misconception is that a marine amphibious unit is an entity consisting of amphibious warfare ships and the marines in them, and that the MAb is commanded by a Navy officer. I” fact, the ships which carry a MAU are an amphibious ready group (ARG> The ARG commander is in the Navy- the MAU commander is in the Marine Corps. Neither commander has au­thority over the other, except during the execution of a specific operation- These commanders’ immediate com­mon superior is the numbered fl^eet commander.

The command relationship between the ARG and MAU commanded might be described as diplomatic co* operation. It works surprisingly well- except when non-amphibious warfare admirals want to use the Marine Corp⁵ helicopters. Often, non-amphibiou⁵ warfare admirals task ARG com manders to do things with the h^el' copters—carry              passengers, spa¹"

parts, or the like—without know'i°- or seeming to care a fig for amphibiou command relationships. The AR commander then must go hat in han to the MAU commander to see if” feels inclined to use the helicopters ^L carry the passengers, cargo, or wha not. As often as not, the MAU com^ mander will feel so inclined, but on “you-owe-me-one” basis. The AR has but one recourse to avoid ¹ ^ you-owe-me-ones building ¹⁰ ,_e crushing debt level: He must task¹ one Navy helicopter that belongs ^ the flagship. That helicopter will i¹³'^ to carry the load. Navy helicop^te^ with amphibious forces get lots flight hours.       ^

Amphibious Counting: Count - things is a frequent evolution on a ' phibious warfare ships. Troop ¹¹¹ j., tresses, troop bunks, troop life J^3C ets, and lashing gear are some thi

counted often. Boatswain’s mates are first counters. Since their tallies don’t roeet expectations, division officers ^are second counters. Department heads get both counts, which seldom ^agree, don’t believe either, and resort to their running accounts of numbers bought, expended, and on hand. The executive officer ignores the figure supplied by the department head and finds out how many the boatswain’s mate counted. The executive officer

®Ports this fairly accurate figure to ^{e Ca}ptain, who changes it to the rjtount that should be on hand and ^s the XO to order the difference.

' ^e°. the captain answers the mes- • ‘‘Se that caused the count to be taken *fie first place.

offi ⁽'°^un,inS Rule: The ship’s supply orn^{Cer never} b^{as enou}gh money to ^er the difference between the XO’s _0n^uto and the number that should be tu-1 ^ar(b A balance between the ac- necessity for having the things ^'ⁿg counted and the limited budget u^SUres that these items are always at th»^St short. If everyone realized at, we _cou|₍j _{save ourse}|ves a lot of Anting.

\\*^n,pllibious Exercises: Some who _Crc ^e Participated in amphibious ex- ^ISes, and have noticed that all

didn’t go well, have been curious about commendatory messages after­ward. There is a simple explanation. The purpose of exercises is training. The purpose of training is to correct imperfections. Without imperfection, one would not have to exercise. Said another way, an exercise that went perfectly would, in retrospect, have been unnecessary and hence could not in any meaningful sense have been successful. Thus, since all exercises are deemed necessary and are in fact imperfect, their success is assured. “Well done!”

The H-Hour Rule: H-hour, regard­less of what you may have been led to believe, is not predicated on the tides, achieving surprise, having a full day to fight ashore before dark, or the like. H-hour is determined by when it’s convenient for VIPs to assemble in the reviewing stand.

Helicopter Lanes: In theory, heli­copter lanes should never pass over a beach where a surface assault is being made. This is to avoid mutual interference between helicopters and fire support for the marines on the beach. Yet, an amphibious planner who lays out helicopter lanes any­where but over the beach places his career in jeopardy. Helicopters and landing craft together make a good show for the VIPs. If it’s true that we do in wartime what we practice in peacetime, we need some means to induce the enemy admirals and gen­erals to sit in reviewing stands.

The True Speed of the 20-Knot Am­phibious Force: Sixteen knots; maybe 17; 18 in a pinch, but not for very long.

Marine Fixed-Wing Air: The argu­ments justifying Marine Corps fixed- wing forces are highly structured and well known to the protagonists, but seem to go on with unceasing vigor. A marine aviator who refused to get involved in the arguments—indeed, disdained them—expressed the fol­lowing refreshing viewpoint: “The reason the Corps exists is to justify marine air.”

Concerning the Navy Hierarchy: There is a saying in the Army that goes something like this:

“The most high is the almighty Kaiser. Beneath the Kaiser, there is the Kaiser’s horse. Beneath the horse, there is the mud. Beneath the mud, there is nothing. Beneath nothing, there is the infantry.”

The members of the Navy’s amphib­ious warfare community are grateful for those serving in the mobile logistic force, without whom the amphib folks would feel like infantry.

Other Subjects: The prose is left to the reader’s imagination for the fol­lowing:

► The Relationship between Size and Quality for Amphibious Operation Orders

► Why Marines Speak in the Third Person

► How to Integrate Smoothly Sailors and Marines in Mess Lines

► The Modern Naval Gunfire Support Capability

► Securing Sheep’s Foot Tampers on Amphibious Warfare Ships

► How to Employ the U. S. Air Force and Allocate Airspace in the Amphib­ious Objective Area

► Why Department Heads Seek Split Tours in Destroyers and Amphibious Ships.

After commissioning at Auburn University in 1957, Ensign Carson was assigned to an LSD and then an amphibious squadron staff. Thirteen years and three destroyers later. Commander Carson, thinking that he was a dyed-in-the-wool destroyerman, was assigned to command an LSD. Subsequent tours have included duty at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command at Quantico and an amphibious group staff. Captain Carson is now on the Naval Op­erations faculty at the Naval War College.

A Frontline Marine Corps Tactical Data Switch__________

By Lieutenant Colonel Ray E. Huebner, U. S. Marine Corps, Darrell Dufresne, and David Blauvelt

Table 1 Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems

The instantaneous dissemination of information across the battlefield has long been the dream of tactical com­manders. With the advent of low-cost, large-scale integrated (LSI) digital electronic circuitry, this dream seems close to becoming reality. Within the Marine Corps, an early decision was made to acquire separate automated systems for the different functional areas of tactical responsibility. The collection of automated systems is called the Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control Systems (MTACCS). These tactical systems, their acronyms, and purposes are listed and described in Table 1. In the broadest sense, each of these systems can be considered as clusters of digital electronics with a need to be inter­connected by a network of secure, reliable digital communication cir­cuits.

After the joint tactical communi­cations (TRI-TAC) program was de­veloped in the early 1970s, consider­ation was given to using it to provide the necessary communication for MTACCS. The following alternatives were considered:

► Using Dedicated Circuits: The transmission equipment from the TRI- TAC system will provide high-quality digital circuits with a capacity of 16 and 32 kilobits per second (kbps). These circuits could be used on a ded­icated basis for the individual MTACCS, as needed. The 16 and 32 kbps channels were more than ade­quate from a data capacity, or throughput, standpoint. This use of dedicated circuits, however, would be highly inefficient for the scarce and expensive transmission resources.

► Using Circuit Snitch Circuits: For voice communications, telephone­switching equipment has long been employed to best use transmission re­sources. If used only when needed, the 16 and 32 kbps channels have ad­equate capacity for use in MTACCS. But signaling and synchronization de­lays, for the high frequency of mes­sages and their relatively short dura­tion, precluded further consideration of circuit switching.

► Submultiplexing Dedicated Cir­cuits: Dividing the 16 and 32 kbps channels into more appropriately sized full-period dedicated circuits could add greater efficiency. Various sizes of subchannels were necessary for different MTACCS systems; the resulting complexity in equipment and coordination procedures caused the Marine Corps to turn toward dynam­ically allocatable systems.

After analyzing these alternatives and coordinating with the TRI-TAC office, the Marine Corps decided to proceed with the development of aⁿ austere data switch suitable for use a⁽ the unit-level combat echelons.

The goal of the new unit-level mes­sage switch program, which has been coupled with the unit-level circuit switch program, is to provide the best method of interfacing the emerging MIACCS with the well-engineered network of communications equip" ment soon to be available from the TRI-TAC program. This program>^s being managed for the Marine Corp⁵ by the Naval Electronics Systems Command under the TRI-TAC P^r0^ gram umbrella. The nomenclature o* the equipment now under develop" ment by ITT Defense Communica" tions Division is AN/GYC-7.

The AN/GYC-7 is a transportable-

12-line, multi-micro-processor-com

trolled data switch. The switch will bf contained within three modules, eac designed to be carried by two people The three modules are the electronic* module (the switch itself), the po"^e module, and the communications se curity (COMSEC) equipment. Th switches for the network control fum tions will have an AN/UGC-74A co*¹¹ munications terminal associated W them.

Plans call for 16 AN/GYC-7 me*' sage switches to be delivered in J^u - 1983 for operator and maintain‘d training and for field testing. The* switches will be delivered with all ov erational computer software and co^ prehensively-designed logistics ^ port. ,

i**¹

The AN/GYC-7 will be used by ^lP₍ same military units and in the environment as the SB-3865 unit Ie^v circuit switch. Indeed, many of

specifications are identical. There will be advantages from this commonality. This is particularly so because the same prime contractor used for the bB-3865 unit level circuit switches and AN/TTC-42 has been selected for toe AN/GYC-7. Similarities between ⁽he circuit and message switch pro­grams will include elements of both hardware and software, as well as lo­gics support, resulting in significant ^cost savings in the long run.

Tactical store and forward switches ‘or narrative record traffic have been developed for a number of military Programs and are currently available. Architectures for conventional store “tod forward switches traditionally have been based on minicomputers dad rotating magnetic bulk storage devices. This approach is unaccept­able for the AN/GYC-7 because of its ^SrOall size, weight, and power require- toents. Also, the processing time re­tired for each message in store and orward switching is much too long for he type of data transmitted between he Marine Corps Tactical Command ijhd Control Systems. The AN/GYC- design is based on microprocessor ^echnology, using high-speed, low- ^p°^wer semiconductor memory tech- ⁿ°logy to implement both the main ^memory and all bulk message storage jhemory. The AN/GYC-7 will be able ⁰ switch 30 messages per second with switch transit time of less than 100 dliseconds with a mix of command hd control data and conventional ^arrative record traffic. The AN/ \C-7 is a 12-line switch. The basic 'tch architecture will, however, j^eadily support the addition of access ®°Ps and trunks and a significant ^0vvth in switch throughput to ac- tonmodate requirements. ^ln addition to the data-switching ^Pability, each AN/GYC-7 has the _t, toty to monitor the performance of ^e network it is assigned to, imple- _n ^ent>ng control actions to adapt the ^work to a continuously changing ^tw°rk environment.

The AN/GYC-7 unit-level message switch development goes beyond that of the AN/GYC-7, including perfect­ing the network control architecture.

To minimize life-cycle costs and operator training requirements in the field, the AN/GYC-7 electrical and mechanical design will draw heavily on the design of the SB-3865 unit level circuit switch which has now com­pleted hardware development. There are significant similarities in the op­erator’s controls and rear panel layout between the circuit and message switches. Procedures learned and de­veloped by the operators or main- tainers on one switch will be able to easily transfer to the other without much additional training. Since many of the hardware items, including power supply electronics, printed wir­ing boards, frequency standards, bulk information storage unit, large-scale integrated devices, etc., are common to the two switches, there will be many development and logistics sup­port cost advantages.

The software resident in the AN/ GYC-7 will consist of approximately 190,000 bytes. The development of such software is practicable only with the application of modern methods of software organization and manage­ment. The unit-level message switch software development will follow the guidelines of M1L-STD-1679. This process assures the proper allocation of functions for software as compared with those for hardware and that all software performance requirements are documented in program perfor­mance specifications prior to the ac­tual software design. Software design begins with the generation of program design specifications which describe in detail the makeup of the various elements (programs, subprograms, routines, etc.) of the total software package. These are reviewed and ap­proved. Only then does actual coding, debugging, integration, and testing of software occur.

The manufacturer, in addition to being responsible for actual produc­tion of the hardware, also has the task of assuring that the design can be built at the lowest cost.

The AN/GYC-7 program requires timely consideration of design to cost and logistics support. Design to cost and logistics personnel are a part of the design team; design to cost and logistics approvals are required at each major review milestone in the development process. These person­nel have a responsibility for the design of the AN/GYC-7 equal to that of the hardware and software design teams. The result will be a unit-level message switch which will be fieldable, oper­able, maintainable, and affordable.

Colonel Huebner, is the Deputy Program Man­ager of the unit-level circuit switch and unit-level message switch programs at the Naval Electron­ics Systems Command.

Darrell Dufresne is the Program Manager of the AN/GYC-7 unit-level message switch program at ITT Defense Communications Division in Nutley, New Jersey.

Dr. Blauvelt is the technical director for the unit- level message switch program at ITT Defense Communications Division.