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The Corps Should Lift the Amphibious Lift from the Navy
Having witnessed the struggle to keep the amphibious warfare forces afloat during the past year. I think it might be time to consider a drastic solution to the problems that attend that effort.
First. let’s restate the problem. The Navy is competing with the other services for defense monies. The competition will not subside, even under an administration that promises to increase defense spending with the cooperation of the Congress. There will never be too much money for defense in the minds of those who have programs that have not reached fruition because of budget restraints. Many worthwhile ideas have been discarded as too expensive, because they would draw funds from other even more important programs. In the Navy Department, the argument is a many-sided brawl. The surface, subsurface, and aviation communities find themselves competing either for or against the nuclear power contingent, the personnel people, the electronics, intelligence, and other constituencies, depending on who's on first, what day of the week it is, and what the chairman of some House committee may have had for breakfast.
In the midst of all that, the amphibious warfare forces have had a bad time. The curves that show the coming decline in amphibious lift alarm everyone who believes that our capability for forcible entry ought to be maintained at current levels or higher. That includes, for starters, the Marine Corps. But the Marine Corps finds itself in a difficult position. Amphibious lift is a Navy problem, and all the Corps can really do is say: "Here is what we need to lift; please provide the means to do that.” But when the Marine Corps goes to testify on behalf of its programs, the question inevitably arises: “If we give you that, how are you going to get it to where the war is? What is your opinion. Mr. General, on the Navy’s lift capability?” If the general chooses to enlighten, he stands a chance of embarrassing the Navy and incurring the wrath of the CNO and his staff. If he decides to dodge the issue, then he—and the Corps— must live with the fact that there may not be enough lift to handle everything. Current figures suggest that there isn’t enough now and won’t be in the future.
The Navy, on the other hand, is stuck with its realities: the cost of an aircraft carrier: the need for more forces to support emerging policies regarding presence in the Indian Ocean; problems arising from long deployments and short turnaround times between them; etc. Amphibious warfare forces simply do not get the attention they deserve, and it’s not always somebody’s fault.
An answer that is guaranteed to make few people happy and quite a number more than a little perturbed would be to transfer all the Navy’s amphibious warfare forces to the Marine Corps. Make the Marine Corps the single manager for amphibious warfare, so that when the Corps goes to the Hill to talk amphibious matters, it can address the whole picture. The officers and crews that man the ships could remain in the Navy but wear Marine uniforms, as chaplains and medical personnel do now. Or, better still, the Marine Corps could absorb the entire structure. Before that is dismissed as too bizarre, let’s recall the Marine Corps’ philosophy that every Marine is a rifleman who can do his job, whatever it is, better if he understands the needs of the man he is supporting. In ideal cases, all Marine pilots go through The Basic School, and they attend other courses throughout their careers primarily designed for the ground officer. Couldn’t the amphibious task force commander and his staff do a better job of planning and executing a landing if they were specialists in amphibious warfare, if they had walked the ground many times themselves, appreciating the logistics. communications, and other problems that tend to arise during a landing?
Certainly, such a move would create some problems. If Navy officers and enlisted personnel in the amphibious forces spent their careers attached to the Corps, they might well suffer when promotion time came. It is my understanding, however. that duty with the gators is not necessarily career enhancing as it is now, at least for officers. And if the ship drivers were marines, the officer corps would be expanded considerably, and a new classification ot officers would come into being, competing with the officers in the ground and aviation communities f°r promotions. On the other hand, a certain degree of flexibility might be introduced in that certain Marine officers and enlisted personnel could be used on board ship with little, some, or considerable additional training. Communications, intelligence, data processing, supply, and motor transport are a few of the specialities that come to mind in tha regard.
This concept would not have to b£ an all-or-nothing proposition. In fact, it would be possible to man amphibious ships with a corps of Marine sailors and staff the areas common to all vessels—engineering and fire control and the like—with regular Navy personnel.
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The result of such a transfer of aS sets would be a need to expand the capability of the Marine Corps to handle increased burdens in personnel, staffing support at headquarter and other agencies, and the owner ship of the actual ships and supPort equipment. A lot of people would have a lot to learn, so a period of transition would be needed to bring
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Proceedings / November
everyone up to speed.
Other beneficial side effects might be a closer coordination between the Marine and Navy staffs and a clarification of responsibilities for the development of amphibious doctrine. The current situation has things fragmented among Op-37 (Mobile Logistics Support Force. Amphibious. Mine, and Advance Naval Vehicles Division) and various parts of
Op-090 (Program Planning Office [Navy]) and Op-095 (Office of Naval Warfare). The Marine Corps might even see fit to move part of its headquarters into the Pentagon, a move that would be virtually unanimously applauded by marines who have served in the Pentagon.
This proposal, if initiated, would not likely make the future any worse
for the country’s overall amphibious warfare capability. And, at the very least, the serious consideration of such a move might rattle a few cages in certain corners of all the staffs directly or indirectly concerned with amphibious warfare so that more positive attention would be given to keeping up that indispensable part of our ability to defend our interests around the world.
Nobody asked me either, but . . .
Lieutenant Charles F. Warton, U. S. Navy
Outward Mobility or Outward Bound
As a naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO) stationed at Camp Lejeune. I have become increasingly aware of the Navy's lack of concern about the men who fill my billet. The evidence indicates that these individuals are detailed to the Marine Corps because of professional problems and quickly forgotten until they resign or are forced out of the service. Performance in the billet means very little, if anything. There is no career option for these men.
The handwriting is on the wall from the time a young officer finds himself ordered to this billet. At least two detailers told me that this was an undesirable job before 1 ever began training for it. One officer let me know, point blank, that good performers were not ordered to this billet. When I reported to school. 1 found a classroom full of people who had run afoul of the Navy system: detached for cause, failure from Surface Warfare Officer School, personal confrontation with seniors ... the list goes on and the stories behind the list are too numerous to recount. All of the stories. however, boil down to two things: failure to conform to the standards of another community, or failure to measure up to those standards to begin with. The community usually involved is the surface warfare community, and in some cases, the only crime these individuals were guilty of was not wanting to be surface warfare officers.
The point is that the Navy has created a community of people it does not want. These people are not necessarily without talent. However, having once found themselves in one job they did not desire, they now' find themselves forced into a job that they are told has no future. The result is that the Marine Corps experiences a lot of performance problems from many of these individuals. The general perception of these men and the Navy-initiated perception of their jobs leave little incentive for performance. Let’s face it. the Navy’s selection process ensures that more than the representative share of genuine losers will wind up in this billet. This certainly does not aid Navy-Marine Corps relations or contribute to the effectiveness of our fighting forces. It simply keeps up the body count by associating names with billets.
The NGLO community does have some outstanding performers—men who have too much personal pride not to perform. These officers, however, suffer the same stigma as their less industrious brothers. The history of promotion boards and future job assignments indicates that there simply are no promotions or future jobs—at least none that will lead to a viable career in the naval service.
The most unfortunate thing is that there are places where these men could continue to make a contribution to the Navy. In the naval gunfire (NGF) field alone there are the NGF qualification ranges, mobile training teams, and NGF schools.
This does not even take into account the more senior billets with the Fleet Marine Force, and units such as air and naval gunfire liaison companies. There are. in fact. Navy lieutenants filling lieutenant commander billets with the Marine Corps, who will never wear that extra half stripe. If new designators w'ere provided for individuals with proven performance records, the Navy would find an underemployed source of leadership and brain power.
When you cut through all of the rhetoric, posed indignation, and groundless denials, the Navy does not consider this job to be important. There seems to be a prevailing attitude that anyone can do this job- on very short notice, with minimal training. It is apparent that the Navy is not concerned about the drive, motivation, or talents of the individ' uals it sends to this job, or obviously by the type of job that ultimately gets done.
To the first attitude. I say that this is certainly a job that most officers can learn, but few will excel at. If demands a peculiar mix of leadership ability, professional expertise, and diplomacy. Working with a different service is never easy.
To the second attitude, the general lack of concern about who is provided for this job. I’d like to sa> that if it is really felt that naval gunfire support, fire support coordination. and fire planning are trivial matters not worthy of motivated personnel and top performers. “iel it to a Marine!”
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Proceedings Nosember