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A few years ago, when these pictures were taken, women marines underwent self-defense combat trining together with male counterparts. This defensive training is now provided separately on the apparent assumption that, if the place for the Corps’ women is not to be the home, it certainly never, never, never will be the battlefield.
Since 1977, the number of enlisted women marines has grown to 6,921, an increase of 92%. Today, about 1 in 25 enlisted marines is a woman. Remarkably, three-fourths of the recent distaff increases have been absorbed by the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF). Women are now to be found in 39 major FMF units, performing jobs ranging from clerk to mechanic to teletype technician. The effects on mission performance and combat readiness remain poorly documented and largely unquantified.
The Marine Corps has trained women in noncombatant skills and assigned them to rear-echelon FMF units on the premise that they cannot serve in combat, but present policies are no guarantee that women won’t come under fire. In past wars, rear- echelon units were frequently involved in close combat. Ten days after Iwo Jima was officially declared secure, a well-armed column of 200 Japanese slipped by marine infantry units to launch attacks on logistics elements on the western beaches. In the hand- to-hand melee that followed, two men of the 36th Marine Depot Company earned Bronze Stars. Both Marine Corps and Army units experienced similar situations in Korea. In a 1950 action along the Kum River Line, the 24th Infantry Division contained an enemy attack by organizing a reserve of rear-area cooks, drivers, mechanics, and clerks to contain the enemy assault and launch a counterattack.
In any future war, similar incidents should be expected to an even greater extent than in the past. Soviet tactical doctrine calls for deep strikes in the enemy’s rear to disrupt command and control elements, capture airfields, destroy logistics installations, and interrupt transport systems. The Soviets’ airborne divisions and helicopters may well be employed for such purposes. Thus, current assignment policies will result in the increasing presence of women in the very FMF units most likely to be targets of Soviet airborne and airmobile attacks.
If women marines in the FMF deploy to a war zone with their units, they are going to be the targets of bombing, shelling, and small-arms fire. Significant numbers of them are going to get hurt. A “back of the envelope” analysis presents some sobering figures. If II Marine Amphibious Force were deployed in its entirety to a high-technology, high-intensity combat environment and committed to a defensive posture, about 180 women would be located in the main battle area, with an additional 680 in the rear area. (These figures were arrived at by retaining women in the units to which they are now assigned and positioning all marines on a hypothetical battlefield by unit and occupational field.)
After 72 hours of combat, more than 10% of the women are likely to become casualties: 56 killed, 25 wounded, and 9 missing. These results are consistent with a more comprehensive U. S. Army analysis. To argue that this is unlikely because women marines will mostly be far to the rear ignores enemy capabilities and the uncertainties of war. Moreover, field commanders will experience a degrading effect on combat operations because of their diminished capability to use available assets to reconstitute forces which have suffered casualties.
In view of women’s exclusion from combat mill' tary occupational specialties (MOSs) and the very limited tactical training they receive, it is quite apparent that the Marine Corps neither intends nor envisions a combat role for them. Hence, a sudden outbreak of war would result in feverish deployment preparations in which women would most likely be pulled out of FMF units, to be replaced by male marines. The adverse effects on leadership continuity and unit integrity are obvious. At the time ot greatest operational turbulence, unit commanders would face unprecedented personnel turbulence as well.
Of immediate concern is the impact of women
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No>e»nt*r
marines on peacetime operations. When vV?rn^rl were first assigned to Fleet Marine Force units 1974, the Marine Corps was not embarked on unit deployment program. The first test assignee' of 13 women to the FMF that year was consider a success, but in retrospect the results were posd’V because the test population was so small. A L dozen women could easily be absorbed into 73- FMF billets without any adverse effects on the e ployment of the male population. When unit
Ployment was initiated in the FMF in 1977, the initial Phase involved 9 units, and the numbers of enlisted Women had increased from 13 to 575.
Since that date, the Marine Corps has aggressively pursued the unit deployment concept. Today, 55 battalions and squadrons are involved. This program has developed a tremendous requirement for deployable marines. Since many deployments are °n board ship, women in the squadrons, supporting detachments, and headquarters units must be replaced by men prior to the embarkation of these elements. The Commanding General of the 2d Marine Division recently observed:
. they [women] cannot be utilized for staffing of MAU’s [marine amphibious units] or MAB’s [marine amphibious brigades] that require duty aboard ship. The restricted use of [women] in the FMF is a handicap when preparing for operations in the field or at sea. Though . . . assigned to key billets, when the requirement comes to augment staffs or deploy, they must be replaced or substituted for to meet the commitment, often at the last minute.”
Unit deployments were first conceived as a bold thrust to meet overseas commitments while avoid- ln8 the hardship of year-long unaccompanied tours, to reduce permanent change of station moving costs, ,0 achieve uniform levels of readiness among like FMF units, and to significantly reduce personnel turbulence in the FMF.
This last goal now presents the Marine Corps with a Painful irony. The presence of nondeployable ^omen in the FMF actually aggravates personnel turbulence that unit deployments were intended to deviate, and the unit deployment program is now requently perceived as a principal cause of the personnel turbulence it was intended to reduce. De- Pt°yable men find themselves shuttled about to meet jtp ever more rigorous operational schedule, while ue women occupy stationary billets. If assigned to nV one unit in sufficient numbers, it is possible for ,ye Women to fill all the “ashore” billets, while their ‘ aIe counterparts meet themselves coming and j^lng on the deployment treadmill. The folk wisdom an enlisted male marine leaves little room for foment:
“When the platoon goes to the field, she doesn't 8°- If they go to combat, she doesn't go. If they 8° aboard a ship, she doesn’t go. Why is she in J^is platoon?”
I There is another aspect to the personnel turbu- ^Ce issue that has received scant attention. Coni'^61' two sample populations: 100 non-prior-service jl a*e enlistees, all high school graduates, and a sim- c?r Population of 100 women. Because of early dis- j^rges, only 76 males remain in “the system” at 0j.e completion of four years of service, about half lhe losses occurring in recruit training and the rest in fleet service. Of the 100 women, only 52 would complete four years’ service. Thus, 24 males and 48 females will fail to complete a four-year enlistment. Since distaff losses are twice as high, there is an increased load in the replacement pipeline: more women in skill-qualification and recruit training, and ultimately greater accession quotas to fill the same number of billets. The women filling the billets serve shorter tours, on the average, than their male counterparts. This increases the pressure for replacements and contributes to personnel turbulence, irrespective of gender.
There are also differences in the number of lost man-hours. While a male marine may break an arm or absent himself without authority, he does not get pregnant. The time lost from the 18th week of pregnancy to about the 6th week following delivery is considerable. Is it realistic or fair to consider pregnant women fully capable of field exercises, guard
concern of the country’s "force in readiness.
duty, and all the other fatigue details associated with FMF service? It is time to squarely face the harsh biological reality: a female in her third trimester of pregancy can hardly sit at a typewriter, much less change a spare tire.
Many factors contributed to the present situation:
►Female strength increases since 1977 have occurred for essentially non-military reasons.
►The probability of female casualties in wartime was not fully addressed in the rush to provide a greater spectrum of job opportunities for women in the early years of the previous administration.
►The FMF experienced marked increases in nondeployable women at the same time the unit deployment program was implemented. Meeting both objectives has proven to be more difficult than first anticipated.
►The FMF has traditionally experienced the highest levels of personnel turbulence in the Marine Corps. The assignment of women to the operating forces has compounded the problem.
►There is a basic incompatibility between pregnancy and military service, especially in the operating forces. The pregnant servicewoman is simply in no condition to deploy or fight.
What action is necessary to resolve the problem? It must first be decided whether or not women marines are going to be exposed to the rigors of combat. It is not possible to affirm that all FMF units are, “by their very nature, considered to be deployable,” which implies a combat or related role for all such units, and also hold the position that women can be assigned to supporting FMF units so long as they will not be “routinely” exposed to “direct combat action.” While well-intentioned, these equivocal terms do not provide precise definitions or specific guidance. If the prospect of female combat casualties is unacceptable, then women should be entirely excluded from the FMF. This resolves the problem before the first shot is fired. Such a policy could be implemented over a two-year period, by allowing women now filling FMF billets to complete normal tours and replacing them with male marines. In addition to those already mentioned, other points argue in favor of such a course:
►Problems regarding fraternization and sexual harassment would be minimized in the operating forces.
►Problems regarding privacy and separate sanitary facilities in field conditions would be eliminated.
►Commanders would be relieved of the mental gymnastics of determining appropriate FMF working conditions for women. How many women stand solitary guard posts in the middle of the night? How many are allowed even to work alone in office spaces after regular working hours?
►Marine training is oriented toward, among other things, achieving group cohesion. The presence of females—and the inevitable liaisons that develop" fractures the cohesion so vitally necessary to good morale and fighting efficiency. A conservative exclusion policy would minimize such problems in the units in which the maintenance of cohesion and unity of effort is a paramount concern.
An FMF exclusion policy would facilitate a termination of the present absurdities in pursuit of amorphous social goals. Moreover, such a policy would relieve the apprehension of many women in the FMF that in the event of war they may become involved in combat. For decades the Corps followed the sensible philosophy that the role of the woman marine was to “free a man to fight.” As evidenced in a recent attitude survey of 150 women marines^ this view is exactly consistent with that of mosl women in the Marine Corps today.
It is time to terminate the effort to integrate women into the operating forces of the Marine Corps. Instead, we should strive for maximum of erational flexibility and combat readiness. During the same period that the Marine Corps increased the number of women in its ranks, the number o* “critical” skills (MOSs) increased by 8% to an all' time high of 132. “Critical” MOSs are those ^ which the trained personnel number less than 85/C of the requirement. Most of these skills are in technical fields that, in the event of war, are essentia for combat sustainability.
Had an equal number of similarly qualified mate* been enlisted in lieu of women, the present shortfa' in skilled personnel would be less severe. The lo^fj first-term attrition rates applicable to males woid have yielded more trained marines over the course of time to fill the billets. Almost 6,500 skill require' ments have remained unfilled for the past four yearS' despite successes in meeting total strength objcc' tives. The effort to more fully integrate women the operating forces may have imposed “costs' 1 excess of the perceived benefits.
Marshalling well-trained, disciplined fighting | into the operating forces ought to be the Pr*nClHf presence of women in the Fleet Marine Force u11 dermines the battle-proven axiom that “every 11,8 rine is first and foremost a rifleman.”
Lieutenant Colonel Evans received his B-A ■ history from the University of Illinois in 1966 his M.A. in English from the University of - braska in 1977. Commissioned through NROTC in 1966. Lieutenant Colonel served in Vietnam as an artillery officer ano g served in a variety of positions since, inclo ^
_ . ____ company commander, battalion and regitUyJ^i
staff officer, and Marine Officer Instructor with the NROTC , at the University of Nebraska. From 1978 to 1981. Lieuten . Colonel Evans was assigned to Headquarters. Marine where he was involved in the development of computer-b manpower allocation models. He is now on duty at the PenWr
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