This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
”hen a Soviet Kiev-c/ass carrier and a USS Spruance-c/ass destroyer steam within sight of each other in the Mediterranean, the navies of ^°th nations recall past incidents when the SuPerior sea power of the U. S. Sixth Fleet carried the day. The tables might well be turned, °h’ever, if the confrontation took place in or near the Persian Gulf The Soviet fleet is lowing stronger and would have land-based SuPport there as well.
JjUring the past decade, the Soviet Union ^achieved naval parity with the United States.
implications for American naval diplomacy are . ofold: a tremendous escalation in the degree of p involved and a reversal of the military balance ,! Power in the Persian Gulf. The basis of naval Plomacy is credibility; the foundation of credibil- \JS the perception that vital interests are at stake. Ihe Soviet Union has historically been unable to gate American efforts at naval diplomacy, be- I Use it lacked vital interests beyond its borders to nd credibility to its naval diplomacy. Now, how- er> the combination of Soviet naval and land ^0vver in the Persian Gulf has altered the military ance to the degree that the Soviet Union is per- lved as the predominant military power, thus 'ng the credibility of American naval power in !? region of vital concern to the United States. jn he vital interests of the United States are global v Sc°pe and diverse in nature, encompassing a °ad range of economic, diplomatic, and cultural are°C'at'onS- "^e vital interests of the Soviet Union pr- re8'onal in scope and limited in nature, covering marily defensive alliances with buffer states con- ^*ch°US t0 tBe borders of the Soviet Union. This Potomy results in part from divergent political
and cultural experiences as well as the evolution of the United States as a sea power and the Soviet Union as a land power. The Soviet Union is now attempting to implement naval diplomacy in areas outside the region where its vital interests are concentrated. Soviet efforts at naval diplomacy have proven ineffective in the past; these efforts will continue to prove ineffective in the future if the Soviet Union is unable to develop significant economic and diplomatic associations in regions beyond the areas contiguous to its borders. Naval force in the absence of vital interests is of limited utility as a means of diplomatic leverage.
American and Soviet efforts at naval diplomacy in the Mediterranean since the end of World War II provide a useful focus for an examination of the utility of naval diplomacy. During this period there have been four major crises, discussed in detail below, in which the United States employed naval force either in the form of presence or power projection ashore in an effort to influence the behavior of Middle Eastern states and the Soviet Union. The results support the observation previously stated: force in and of itself is not the decisive factor in naval diplomacy; rather, the perception of credibility is the essence of influence.
In July 1958, U. S. Marines were landed in Lebanon to prevent the collapse of the pro-Western government by forces aided by the United Arab Republic, which was in turn supplied and encouraged by the Soviet Union. The diplomatic objectives of the United States were to bolster the pro-Western government and to indicate to the Soviet Union that expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East through the use of surrogate forces would not be tolerated. The vital interests at stake for the United States were diplomatic. The United States had repeatedly asserted its influence in the Mediterranean after World War II in an attempt to fill the power vacuum left by the exhausted colonial powers. The landing of marines proved to be a credible deterrent to Soviet-sponsored insurgency, because the intervention was based upon historic precedent and
roc^i;
lngs / November 1981
27
ence in the Middle East. It was an attempt to p\
arlay
military power into international influence, an
backed by a clearly superior military power. The Soviet Union had no alternative other than to restrain its clients, because it possessed neither the economic nor diplomatic basis for influence in the Middle East.
During the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Soviet Union attempted to expand its influence in the Mediterranean through the deployment of both naval and air forces to Egypt in an effort to demonstrate both the resolve and ability to support its allies. Soviet aircraft defended Egyptian cities against Israeli attack, and Soviet warships were deployed to Egyptian seaports to effect presence and thereby deter Israeli air attack. Israel was not intimidated. The Soviet deployments were clearly not large enough to be decisive, nor were they an effective deterrent because Israel did not perceive the Soviet efforts as credible. The significant military force in the Mediterranean was the U. S. Sixth Fleet. The American guarantee of Sixth Fleet intervention in support of Israel in the event of direct Soviet attack served both to reassure the Israelis and to deter Soviet escalation. The fleet’s deterrent value resulted primarily from the perceived credibility of American promises to employ it. All parties concerned recognized that a vital U. S. diplomatic interest—the survival of Israel—was at stake. The limited Soviet deployment of naval and air power proved to be inadequate as an instrument of diplomacy and served to accentuate the paucity of Soviet influence rather than the resolve of the Soviet Union to support its Arab allies. The decision of the Soviet Union not to reinforce its inadequate military support in the face of Israeli victory indicated to the Arab world that Soviet diplomatic interests in the Middle East were perceived in Moscow as peripheral.
By the Jordanian crisis of 1970, Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean had increased dramatically. Since the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Soviet Union had continuously maintained a naval presence in the Mediterranean. The immediate diplomatic objective of the United States was the reassurance of Jordan in its effort to repulse invading Syrian armor disguised as Palestinian forces. The general objective of American policy was the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East. The diplomatic objective of the Soviet Union was to expand Soviet influence by overturning the status quo through Soviet-sponsored insurrection.
Jordan’s King Hussein sought and received assurances of Sixth Fleet air support to counter the Syrian air force if it intervened in support of the invading armor. The Sixth Fleet was positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean to underwrite the American guarantee to Jordan. American naval diplomacy forced the Soviet Union to select a course of action from among three disagreeable alternatives: ► Employing Soviet naval forces in an attempt to interdict the Sixth Fleet
►Ignoring American requests that the Soviet Union restrain Syria and simply do nothing
►Using Soviet influence to restrain Syria Soviet strategists recognized the futility of the
first option. The second option would have resulted in American intervention on behalf of Jordan, the political cost of which would have greatly reduced Soviet prestige since the Soviet Union was not militarily capable of defending Syria. The third option, that of restraining Syria, was the least costly tn terms of Soviet influence and prestige and was the course of action followed. The American diplomatic objective of maintaining the status quo (in part by the bolstering of the Jordanian monarchy) w'a^ achieved simply through positioning of the Six) Fleet. The Soviet Union was powerless to act mi itarily and powerless diplomatically to resist tn course of action suggested by American diplomacy- By 1973, the Soviet fleet had been expanded an was able to match each of the Sixth Fleet carrtf task groups with an anticarrier group. While tn numerical equivalence did not constitute eqmva lence in tactical capability, the Soviet Union clear' hoped to neutralize the political potency of the Six Fleet. The Soviet strategists gambled that the visi manifestation of Soviet naval power would be* terpreted as proof of the legitimacy of Soviet inn
infld'
ence for which the economic and diplomatic f°u dations were nonexistent.
The initial Israeli setbacks in the October 1 Yom Kippur War appeared to strengthen the Soy* position for naval diplomacy. The Soviet strateg1 . undoubtedly hoped that the United States w0 ^ choose not to risk the Sixth Fleet but instead to se^ a negotiated solution. Such a choice would n been a striking victory for Soviet naval diplorIia „ American hesitancy to intervene would have { perceived in the Middle East as an acknowledge^ of Soviet naval superiority or at least as a de~ phasis of U. S. diplomatic interests in the reg*° .js The United States chose instead to reaffir*11^ commitment to Israel through diplomatic aS^nS ances and the delivery of critically needed weap and petroleum products. As the Israeli forces gained their balance in the Sinai, the outlook successful Soviet naval diplomacy began to vv'a(|)e When the Egyptian forces were surrounded •** n Sinai, the Arab world looked to the Soviet U*1 \ for support of Egypt. The Soviet Union respo*1 ^ by placing airborne divisions on alert and by tajjeS, steps for a massive sealift of troops and sUPE c(i- In anticipation of the Soviet sealift. President ard Nixon ordered the Sixth Fleet to deploy ata s, the sea lines of communication between the porus and the Eastern Mediterranean. vjet
28
Proceedings / N°'el
nit*r
The diplomatic tables had been turned. The S j Union chose not to challenge the Sixth Flee! ‘
sought instead a negotiated solution from a position °f inferiority. The diplomatic cost of the Soviet faille at naval diplomacy was Egyptian rapprochement with Israel and the United States. The Soviet decision not to challenge the aggressive Sixth Fleet deployment amounted to a public admission that Soviet interests in the Middle East were considered to be peripheral in Moscow. The American President’s decision to deploy the Sixth Fleet in opposition to a possible Soviet sealift reaffirmed the diplomatic position that American interests in the Middle East were considered vital.
The Sixth Fleet’s tactical advantages served to etlhance its diplomatic utility, while the tactical lim- jlations of the Soviet fleet proved to be a diplomatic handicap. The ability to project power ashore in the 0rm of carrier air power or amphibious assault by embarked marines added a degree of flexibility to American naval power which the Soviet fleet did n.ot possess. Carrier-based aircraft offered the pos- ^bility of a limited response against the Soviet fleet.
he Soviet fleet, designed specifically as an anti- Ca|rier defensive force, had only one combat option, always be stepped up. The massive surprise-attack tactic for which the Soviet fleet was designed placed severe limitations on its political utility. It is unlikely that Soviet strategists would risk initiating a naval confrontation which might result in the destruction of a key echelon in the strategic defenses of the Soviet Union unless the issue was vital to the survival of the Soviet state.
As a land power, the Soviet Union has viewed its navy in a defensive role, a virtual extension of its land army designed to protect its seaward flanks. To risk this fleet for peripheral political objectives would be to expose the Soviet Union to retaliation from vulnerable seaward flanks. The United States, as a sea power, has developed its navy as an offensive weapon. It is the nature of a sea power to employ offensive naval force in defense of vulnerable commercial and diplomatic interests around the world. In the cases discussed, the interests at stake for the United States were vital, while those of the Soviet Union were not. Why, then, does the Soviet Union continue to pursue naval diplomacy in situ-
.Soviet strategists the opportunity to reconsider
'r Position before losing their entire fleet. The
°f all-out missile attack against one or more of
v carriers. Such an attack would have been met p'm massive retaliation against the Soviet fleet and y Ss'ble nuclear retaliation against the Soviet sni«n. The Sixth Fleet could have responded to a v'et attempt to land troops or supplies by sea by tK^ing a limited number of ships, thus allowing
loir!°n of limited response allows for greater dip- matic leverage in that the limited response can
29
No\ ember 1981
Landing craft from the attack transport Rockbridge (APA- 228) offload men of the Third BattalionISixth Marines at Red Beach, Beirut, Lebanon, in July 1958.
litical potency because the deployment of na power does not irreversibly bind the governmeo ^
ations in which the superpower interests at stake imply superior credibility for American naval diplomacy? Examination of the present American and Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean provides an interesting answer to this question.
American economic and diplomatic interests in the Persian Gulf and adjacent Middle East are vital to the survival of the United States. Western Europe, and Japan. The question of oil supplies and the maintenance of functional diplomatic relations between the states of the Persian Gulf and the Western world are clearly of paramount concern to the United States. The vulnerability of these interests to assault both from the Soviet Union and from forces internal to the region underscores the credibility of the Carter Doctrine. The Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf, as in the Mediterranean crises discussed, are peripheral. The Soviet Union does not require Persian Gulf oil, nor are the Soviet diplomatic or economic interests in the region of central importance to the existence of the Soviet state. Even so, in the Indian Ocean it is the Soviet fleet which has the political advantage.
The relevance of Soviet land power to the present situation in the Persian Gulf is the critical dimension which differentiates superpower naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean from the naval diplomacy of the Mediterranean crises previously discussed. The comparative political weakness of the Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean with respect to U. S. naval forces in the area is offset by the proximity of 50 Soviet divisions near the Iranian-Afghanistan border. During the Mediterranean crises, intervention by large numbers of Soviet ground forces was precluded by the presence of the Sixth Fleet. In the present crisis in the Persian Gulf, American naval power could not prevent direct intervention by Soviet ground forces. Although the deterrence value
of the U. S. force in the Indian Ocean is significant, it is not absolute. In the present situation, the ultimate restrictions on Soviet seizure of the oil fields in the Persian Gulf are self-imposed.
The military, economic, and diplomatic elements of power are interactive and mutually supportive- U. S. influence in the Persian Gulf is comprised of these three elements and strengthened by the fact that our economic and diplomatic interests in the area are recognized as vital. However, the marked imbalance of military power in the region in favor of the Soviet Union is eroding American influence- The Gulf states are focusing their attention on Soviet military superiority, to the detriment of American diplomatic influence. The absence of interests vital to the Soviet state becomes a moot point if the prospect of a Soviet blitz of the Gulf without fear ot defeat becomes a realistic option for Soviet strategists. When the military balance between the superpowers is near equilibrium, then the question ot vital interests becomes decisive, as was the case in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Given the Soviet perception of naval power as an extension of land power, the primary purpose of th® Soviet Indian Ocean force is to protect the seaward flank in the event of a Soviet invasion of the Gut states. The secondary purpose is to extend the p°" litical power of the Soviet land forces massed in the vicinity of the Iranian-Afghanistan border. The de ployment of Soviet naval forces in coordination wit a large Soviet land army is an ominous developmetl in the ability of the Soviet strategists to empl°* military power for diplomatic ends. The Soviet to dian Ocean deployment marks the first time that tn Soviet Navy has been employed for the purpose to which it was designed, as a defensive flank forta Soviet Army. The military confrontation is no 1 onS® restricted to naval diplomacy but involves the Ju* taposition of American naval power and the co bined land and sea power of the Soviet Union- ^
In Force Without War, their extensive study the use of military power as an instrument of dip ^ macy, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan foU.nt. that the highest probability of success for the Po11, ical use of military power was associated with lad based air and ground forces. These authors p°s , late that the higher probability of success f°fjan0f based forces is a function of the irrevocability their deployment. The political decision to einP them implies a greater resolve than the decisio0.^ commit naval forces for political purposes. The herent flexibility of naval power diminishes its Pjj a particular course of action; naval forces can withdrawn as easily as they can be deployed- ^ sidering the superiority of land-based power as ^ instrument of diplomacy in areas where it c3tl j„ brought to bear, the Soviet military presence
30
Proceedings
, l#1
/ \ovemb*r
Afghanistan and on the borders of an enfeebled Iran institutes a serious challenge to American influ- ice. It appears that Soviet strategists intend to exploit the political advantages that their land and nail forces possess in this vital area. Soviet naval Power alone is at a distinct disadvantage with respect to the American Indian Ocean force. However, in combination, Soviet land and sea power assume a position of political superiority in the Per- S'an Gulf. Soviet strategists will attempt to trans- !0rm the superior position of their military power *nto diplomatic influence. . The immediate challenge for American diplomacy ls to offset the political advantage of Soviet military superiority in the Persian Gulf. A long-range objec- tlVe should be to reassert American military supe- ri°rity in the Persian Gulf. Soviet military superi- °r'ty in a region of vital American interests, if left ^checked, will erode the economic and diplomatic lr|ks which form the basis of American influence ar,d power. In answer to the immediate challenge posed by ^ political advantage of the Soviet forces, the United States should seek to assuage the concern ?enerated by a fear of Soviet intervention. The in- J'al step in this process would be to reaffirm existing efensive agreements and obligations with Middle astern states friendly with the United States. Overtures to traditionally hostile Middle Eastern pow- e^.s and to Iran should also be considered as a means ° accentuating the resolve of the United States to e^ain the dominant influence in this area. Cultivation of American economic interests, spe- •tically the sale of advanced technology and laments, and the continued recycling of j ^etro-dollars” is essential if the basis for American Pfluence and power in the Persian Gulf is to be gaintained. The sale of U. S. weapons to Middle ,.astern states raises difficult issues in the areas of Wotnacy and domestic politics. However, the pri- arV concern of American strategists should be the hancement of this country’s influence; the sale of po^anced armaments effectively serves this pur- cj *n suPport of the diplomatic and economic poli- Cres suggested, the United States should show conte evidence of its intention to reestablish military p^Periority in the Persian Gulf. A continued naval esence an(j a convjncjng effort at developing a ty Pld Deployment Force with considerable punch Co u‘d complement the economic and diplomatic jn rjjP°nents of national policy. U. S. naval presence Ujj . Indian Ocean is now performing a critical StatSl0n 'n defense °f the security of the United W ®s* The absence of our flag from these seas en ^ Precipitate a weakening of diplomatic influ- aroe and herald the decline of American power is thndthe WorI(I- Nava* power in the Indian Ocean e linchpin of our foreign policy. The coupling | of Soviet land and sea power in this crucial area has effectively challenged American naval power as the ultimate arbiter of international events. This challenge must be met while the United States still retains the predominant diplomatic and economic means of leverage. The effect of Soviet naval parity on the ability of the United States to employ naval power as an instrument of diplomacy is essentially a question of geography. The United States should seek to exploit the political advantage of American naval power at every opportunity in those areas where Soviet naval power is isolated from the support of the Soviet Army. Soviet naval intervention in Angola in 1975 was a daring political gamble that was able to succeed only because the American government was paralyzed by confusion and self-doubt. The United States passed up the opportunity in the Angolan crisis to inflict a humiliating political defeat upon the Soviet Union as the price for Soviet naval diplomacy. In the Persian Gulf the political deck is stacked in favor of the Soviet Navy ; as a sea power, the United States cannot afford to lose this confrontation. Bibliography Blechman, Barry M. and Kaplan, Stephen S. Force Without War.Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978. Bundy, William P. “Elements of Power,” Foreign Affairs, October 1977, pp. 1-26. Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, J. M. Soviet Naval Diplomacy. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron. Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966. Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979. Luttwak, Edward N. and Weinland, Robert G. “Sea Power in the Mediterranean,” The Washington Papers, Vol. 61, 1979. Morris, Eric. The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality. New York: Stein and Day, 1977. Sprout, Harold and Margaret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980. Turner, Stansfield. "The Naval Balance: Not Just A Numbers Game,” Foreign Affairs, January 1977, pp. 326-354. Westwood, LCDR James T. “Soviet Naval Strategy, 1968-1978: A Reexamination,” Proceedings, May 1978, pp. 114-127. Captain Jordan was graduated from the Univer- shy of Pennsylvania in 1972 and commissioned ■ through Officer Candidate School in 1976. Foleys *- lowing communications school he served as com, munications officer of Marine Wing Support C j Group 17 in Iwakuni, Japan. He returned from Japan in 1978 and served as executive officer of 1 Service Company, Support Battalion, Marine Corps Development and Education Center, Quantico, and later as communications officer of Training Support Company, The Basic School. He is now stationed at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., serving as the officer in charge of the communi- cations-aviation writer section at the Marine Corps Institute. Captain Jordan is a student in the Naval War College off-campus program. |
| 71 |
/ November 1981
31