Lejeune of the Naval Service

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COURTESY OF NAVAL ACADEMY ARCHIVES

Naval Cadet Lejeune, 1884

By Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr. U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)

that the harbor had been badly battered; most sn^ had dragged anchor. Included was the Vandali⁰; , her engines couldn't hold against the sea. She dn down on the Calliope's ram, cleared it, and grounded 200 yards offshore. Waves pounded so Lejeune and others took to the rigging ^vV*' ^ their ordeal lasted several hours before they '' rescued. The common experience made the au | saries forget the warlike tension, and a p°^te international crisis passed.

God and man both tried, but neither could deprive the U. S. Marine Corps of its 13th Commandant. John Archer Lejeune was born 10 January 1867. He was taught at home by his mother until, at the age of 13, he went to a boarding school in Natchez, Mississippi. When the USS Alliance visited that city, Lejeune visited the ship. He was impressed by her smartness and her crew in full dress uniform. Among those on board was First Lieutenant George F. Elliott, later Major General Commandant of the Corps. Seeing the Marine officer’s double-breasted frock coat and his sky-blue trousers, Lejeune left filled with dreams of trips across trackless oceans in ships flying the American flag.

From Natchez, Lejeune went to Louisiana State University. As a sophomore, he applied to the Naval Academy, which he entered in 1884 at the age of 17. Like most of the cadets of the period, he soon re­ceived a nickname. Lejeune's ancestors had gone from France to Nova Scotia and were resettled dur­ing the French and Indian War. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow later immortalized the resettlement in “Evangeline,” a poem about the life-long search for the lost Gabriel Lajeunesse by his sweetheart. As a plebe at the Academy, Lejeune had to memorize the epic and recite it to upperclassmen. The asso­ciation of plebe and poem and the similarity of sur­names earned him the nickname of Gabriel. He was “Gabe” the rest of his life.

On 8 June 1888, Lejeune was graduated from the Academy. His class would go to sea as passed mid­shipmen for two years, then assemble for exami­nations to fix class standing and determine future assignments. Lejeune went first to Mare Island for duty in the USS Mohican, then transferred in mid-

January 1889 to the screw sloop Vandalia. She W^aS to join Rear Admiral Louis A. Kimberly’s Pacin^c Squadron in Apia, Samoa. Samoa and the Ha^a¹" ians were the last important islands in the Pacific n° yet under foreign control. Trouble flared when tn Germans attempted to gain control of one of l*¹ independent Polynesian kingdoms of Samoa. Duriⁿ| the voyage south, Lejeune began the love affair o a lifetime when he commanded a pivot gun mannc by marines.    _q

The Vandalia put into Apia on 22 February 1°. The harbor teemed with men-of-war. The USS sic was the only other American until the Trento Kimberly’s flagship, arrived a few days later, modern cruiser, HMS Calliope, represented ‘ Queen. The Kaiser’s squadron comprised ¹ ^ cruiser Olga and gunboats Adler and Eber. Seve sailing traders were present as well. It had r»^e quiet since December, and then the situation " turned upside down by an act of God.             _e

On 14 March, a typhoon hit. Preparations ^w . made to ride out the blow. Boilers were lit oft ^a.^ masts and rigging secured. Lejeune had the watch on the forecastle. He secured himself , line and waited through the night. Dawn sho^

After surviving the disaster in Samoa, Lejeune returned to San Francisco. He finished his sea tour *n the USS Adams and made another cruise to Sa­moa. He was happy to leave for Annapolis in March 1890 for final examinations. Lejeune had decided upon the Marine Corps and was confident of the assignment. He explained his rationale:

“. . . I arrived at my choice chiefly by a process of elimination. First of all, I promptly eliminated the Engineer Corps, because I had no bent for mechanical engineering. The choice between the Line of the Navy and the Marine Corps was much more difficult... I liked going to sea occasionally but not for the greater part of my life; I preferred the military to the naval side of my profession;

• . . and most important of all, I realized that whatever ability I had lay in the direction of han­dling and controlling men rather than . . . handling and controlling machinery. From my own stand­point, therefore, the Marine Corps seemed to pos­sess more advantages and less disadvantages than did the other branches of the naval service; and I made my decision accordingly.”

. Lejeune did very well on the examinations stand­ing 13th of 35 in his class. He did so well, in fact, ^lhat Commodore George W. Melville, Chief of the "Ureau of Steam Engineering, insisted that the Academic board assign Lejeune to the Engineer Lorps. He was considered too high in the class for *he Marines. His pleas to superiors in the chain of ^c°mmand did no good, so he decided to go out of °fficial channels. He visited Senators Randall Gib- j*°n and William Eaton Chandler. The latter was °eing beseeched by a classmate, H. O. Stickney, for ^Waiver of vision standards and a commission in the Engineer Corps. Lejeune offered his slot if he could 8et the Marine Corps. They called on Secretary of file Navy Benjamin Franklin Tracy. Lejeune was 'utroduced as a survivor of the Vandalia. The case presented logically and concisely. Tracy rang *°^r the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation: “Com­modore, I want this young man assigned to the Marine Corps.” And so he was, thus foiling an Act °f Man to keep him out of the Corps.

. lu the midst of a period of alternating tours of ■ ^uty at sea and shore following his commissioning 1890, Lejeune married Miss Ellie Murdaugh in ~*^ctober 1895. For his next sea duty, he requested be Maine but was assigned instead to the Cincin- ^^Qti. When the executive officer of the Cincinnati him that the duties of the marines on board °uld be curtailed, Lejeune appealed to the com­manding officer for increased duties. His request 3^s granted. This action was the first manifestation ” Lejeune’s life-long belief that the Navy needed arines—troops familiar with shipboard life and ^aval ways, able to conduct land operations in sup- ^0rt of naval campaigns. Conversely, marines could

not exist without a Navy. He was to build a new Marine Corps on that simple fact.

The Cincinnati was up the Amazon when news came of the Maine's destruction at Havana. The fickleness of assignments had kept the young officer from sharing her fate. His ship was involved in no action during the Spanish-American War, but when it was over he benefited through quick promotion from a law doubling the size of the Marine Corps.

A flurry of short assignments followed: an exam­ining board in Washington; recruiting duty in New England; and command of the marine barracks at Pensacola. In January 1903, as a major, he was aide to the Adjutant and Inspector. Then he took com­mand of the “floating battalion” on board the USS Panther and was thus introduced to a forerunner of the Fleet Marine Force. Lejeune tried to work out satisfactory arrangements for training his men for service ashore—their primary mission—rather than the daily requirements of shipboard routine. He did not succeed until the battalion shifted to the USS Dixie. By then he had worked out a viable plan for embarked troops. It was adopted by an enlightened skipper who wished to get the job done. The Dixie landed her marines at Colon, Panama, and the battalion became part of the 1st Marines in the bri­gade commanded by George F. Elliott, the Brigadier General Commandant. In Panama, Lejeune suc­cessfully commanded his first large unit under ad­verse conditions of climate, environment, and san­itation.

By 1909, after further duty both in this country and overseas, Lejeune had been commissioned al­most 20 years and was a lieutenant colonel. He had a fine service reputation for both energy and intel­ligence. He was a forward thinker. Thus, it was no surprise that his next assignment was discussed with him personally by General Elliott. He was assigned to the Army War College, returning to school for the first time since 1890.

He adopted Army procedures and by his own as­sertion was for all intents and purposes an Army officer during this period. There was one feature of the course that Lejeune particularly enjoyed. He felt the tactical rides to Civil War battlefields were most educational. The end of the course brought an outstanding report on his performance to General Elliott. It had a far-reaching effect on Lejeune’s ca­reer and his subsequent assignment to France with the Army.

Graduation sent him to command the 500-man barracks at Brooklyn. There he encountered a dis­cipline problem from drunkenness and post-payday absences. The new commanding officer, never one for slackness, immediately tightened ship.

Then in October 1913, came a flattering surprise. William P. Biddle, Elliott’s successor as Comman­dant, asked to retire. The chief of the Bureau of Navigation invited Lejeune to be interviewed by

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels as a can­didate. Probably because of his rank and age, he was not nominated, but he was recognized as having potential. Colonel George Barnett became the 12th Commandant in early 1914.

While Lejeune was at Brooklyn (1909-14), the “floating battalion” which he had led into Panama helped further the Marine Corps as a vital arm of the fleet. Technology had changed the entire role of marines within the naval service. Long-range guns opened up the distances at which ships engaged. There was no need for riflemen in the rigging to rake enemy decks. Sail had given way to steam. Steam required coal which had to be stocked at advanced bases. Bases had to be defended or, if not ours, seized and defended. Marines had a new mission.

In 1913, the General Board and the War College planned the 1914 fleet maneuvers. As part of the exercise, the Advanced Base Force was to occupy and defend the Caribbean island Culebra as a fleet base. On Thanksgiving Day, Lejeune was ordered to whip the 2nd Marines (previously a regiment only on paper) into shape at Pensacola. Captain William F. Fullam, USN, never a lover of marines, was anx­ious to command the Advance Base Force. He ar­gued that marines needed outside “urging” and “driving” to accomplish such a mission. Rear Ad­miral Charles J. Badger, commanding the Atlantic Fleet, disagreed. He was vindicated by the success of the marines.

The force returned to Pensacola. The brigade commander, Barnett, left to become Commandant. Barnett offered Lejeune the post of Assistant Com­mandant. Lejeune asked for a delay, feeling that there was trouble coming in Mexico. Marines would be in action, and Lejeune wanted to be with them. Ships’ detachments were sent ashore to deal with troubles at Tampico and Veracruz. Army Major General Frederick Funston commanded ashore. Lejeune suggested to Admiral Badger, an old ship­mate from the Cincinnati, that the ships’ detach­ments reembark but that the Advance Base Force remain with the Army. Approval was secured from Washington. When Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller arrived to command the brigade, Lejeune resumed command of the 2nd Marines. Service with the Army was good experience.

The return from Mexico brought the duty pro­posed by Barnett. On 2 January 1915, Lejeune be­came Assistant Commandant. In his first six months, with the Commandant away, Lejeune was called upon by the Navy to provide an expeditionary force for immediate service in Haiti. A fine point in amphibious command relationships was solved for future reference. Colonel Waller was ready to com­mand all troops of the brigade ashore. Rear Admiral William B. Caperton desired that control of each unit ashore be vested in the commanding officer of the ship at anchor off that town. Lejeune appealed to Caperton’s fleet superior, Admiral William Ben­son, that the principle of unity of command ashore be maintained. Benson overruled Caperton. The Haitian brigade was under a single commander. Marines gained fighting experience and the Corps a combat reputation.

Two other problems, ones which did not involve combat, were ably handled by Lejeune during that period. The first was personnel. He and Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt came up with a bill as part of the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916- The Marine Corps was increased to 15,000 with the President authorized to add 2,400 more. It also meant immediate promotion to brigadier general for Lejeune. A major recruiting effort was made to fi" the expanded ranks. The second problem was that of facilities for an expanded Corps. Marines had been scattered in barracks and detachments in navy yards. The innovation of having the 2nd Marines in readiness in the Philadelphia Navy Yard had shown its value during the expedition to Haiti in 1915. Navy yards, however, are industrial complexes serving the fleet. They lack terrain for training. Thus, m^a' rines were authorized to acquire facilities at San Diego and at Quantico.

When war was declared in April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson astonished the nation by calling for an Army of 1.5 million men. It was decided to send an Army division and a Marine regiment to France at once. Lejeune now faced a dilemma. “ had long been an advocate of the Marine Corps as an arm of the Navy, but the nation was now con¹' mitted to a land war in Europe. Gallipoli had ruin^e the case for amphibious war, and European fl^eets did not need advanced bases. Yet, if the Corps w^aS to survive, it needed to be part of the action. Dam^e solved part of the problem by detaching the 5th afl 6th Marines for service with the Army. Lejeune new problem was how to get to France.        .

The first step was to leave Washington. Barne was suspicious of his motives, but Lejeune cO ^ vinced him of his genuine desire to lead marines action. In September 1917, Lejeune went to Qu^an tico to train marines for service with the Allied ar ies. New regiments were formed, and the 4th Mar¹¹^ Brigade went to France. Thinkers at Quantico talk of a full Marine division. Lejeune saw merit in * idea and hoped to implement it overseas. First had to get there.      _f

Opportunity came when the brigade command ; Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, was invali home. Lejeune assured Barnett that if sent, would fare well. He knew General John J. P^ersri y and Brigadier General James G. Harbord, two Ar officers he had encountered in the Philippines; College classmates were in high places. In late M ^ he sailed; with him was Earl H. “Pete” Ellis. , whom he had served on Barnett’s small staff afl Quantico. General Pershing interviewed Lej^eu

to,

^and turned down the idea of a Marine division. In j^'d-June, Lejeune visited the 4th Marine Brigade ^resh from Belleau Wood. He talked to their corn- lender, Army Brigadier General Harbord. In July, J“5J^eune got the 64th Brigade of the 32nd Infantry ^U|vision. Ellis was his operations officer.

On 14 July, Harbord was promoted to command i*^e 2nd Infantry Division. Command of its Marine ^figade was open, and it went to Lejeune on 25 • ^u|y. Three days later, Harbord sent for him. Persh- 'ⁿ8 had ordered Harbord to straighten out the ser- .^ICe of supply, and Harbord recommended that Le- ^J5^une succeed him in command of the 2nd Infantry ^lvision. The only problem was rank. The latest ^aei appropriation act had provided for another general. The President promoted Lejeune 'jh immediate effect.

September, the 2nd Infantry Division had re- P^ced the men who suffered from the heavy cas- I ^a’^l*es of the summer battles at Soissons and Bel- ,^eau Wood. From the 12th to 17th, it led the attack 1° reduce the St. Mihiel salient. Because of head- J,^nes, Belleau Wood was the legendary Marine : ^0rPs action of World War I. More decisive and j.^st. deadly was the fighting of October 1918. The j*^vision jumped off on 3 October toward Blanc In seven days, the division accomplished Pat the French hadn't been able to do in four i^ears—broken the German position and forced a 40­¹ °nieter retreat. The 2nd Division returned to the 1st *^rmy.

j_t Meuse-Argonne offensive had stalled. To get ®°'ng, Lejeune’s division was to lead the assault

of the forward corps. They moved out after heavy artillery preparation. Initial objectives fell quickly, and their advance through the Hindenberg Line be­came a stern chase. The day before the Armistice, the 5th Marines were across the Meuse.

The guns fell silent. Lejeune led his division back to New York in the summer of 1919 and then re­ported to Quantico, relieving Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. Then Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels dropped a bombshell. To the sur­prise of all, especially General Barnett, he an­nounced that on 1 July 1920, John A. Lejeune would become the Major General Commandant. The ap­pointment was part of the President’s policy to re­ward promising officers for war service. The Senate adjourned before confirming Lejeune. Despite the lack of assurance of tenure in the job, the new Com­mandant turned to.

It was a demanding job to offset the postwar let­down and keep the Corps functioning and ready for expeditionary service with the Navy. The 5th and 6th Marines were reorganized and in readiness at Quantico. The principle under which Lejeune op­erated was simple: “The good of the Corps, com­bined with the just treatment of all officers and men, was paramount and, therefore took precedence over all other considerations.” From this flowed many things. Officers’ military education was essential. Hence schools were established: at Philadelphia for second lieutenants; at Quantico, one for company grade and one for field grade officers. Athletics, es­pecially baseball and football, were stressed. They helped morale and provided exposure which re-

cruited the men the Marine Corps wanted. The min­imum age was raised to 21 and physical standards were rigid. Enlisted marines finally became eligible for the Naval Academy.

The Harding administration was about to replace the Democrats. The new secretary was Edwin Denby. He had enlisted in the Marine Corps, been commissioned, and fought at Blanc Mont. He asked Lejeune to stay. Thus, the day after inauguration, 5 March 1921, Lejeune was confirmed by the Senate for a four-year term. Among the things facing him were problems within the officer ranks. War expan­sion saw many officers, particularly in France, pro­moted rapidly. Adjustments were required. What Lejeune wanted but never got was a selection sys­tem such as the one the Navy had had since 1916. Despite repeated requests, the Corps was stuck with a system of rigid seniority. Promotions depended on deaths, resignations, orretirements.

While Lejeune was adjusting the Marine Corps to peacetime, he was also directing its preparations for the next war. Wendell “Buck” Neville, a future commandant, headed a planning section. “Pete” Ellis was chief planner. He produced a document called “Operation Plan 712, Advanced Base Oper­ations in Micronesia.” Lejeune approved it on 23 July 1921. It was more concept and philosophy than the detailed plans we think of today. It began pro­phetically: “In order to impose our will upon Japan, it will be necessary for us to project our fleet and land forces across the Pacific and wage war in Japanese waters.” It reflected naval thinking, par­ticularly what was being taught at the Naval War College. Thus, it accurately gave a scheme of ma­neuver of a drive across the central Pacific to Japan, defeating Japan's fleet and leaving that country at the mercy of our naval power. The Pacific war was going to be a naval campaign, and OpPlan 712 spelled out the land operations required of marines to seize and defend advanced bases for the fleet. It is a remarkable document and a definitive testimony to Lejeune’s belief in the position of marines within the naval service. In 1922, landing exercises were held on Culebra; in 1923 in Panama. These were the prelude to ones on a broader scale. A brigade was in the 1924 fleet exercises. Marines were developing doctrine for the years ahead.

It was not all development and training. Trouble came in bundles. China and Nicaragua erupted in 1927. Expeditions were mounted for both. China turned into a show of force lasting a year. Nicaragua would be a six-year struggle against the sandinistas and the jungle and a training ground for World War II combat leaders.

By 1929, Lejeune had served two full terms and part of a third as Commandant but had not reached mandatory retirement age. Friends wanted him to stay on. He demurred and on 5 March 1929, after more than 45 years in uniform, retired. He had first planned to stay on active duty, but he was offered the superintendency of Virginia Military Institute. He remained there until 1937, inspiring half of a generation and doubtlessly recruiting many for his Corps. He was still physically fit when he decided to step down because he “. . . had reached the mag­ical Bibical age of three score and ten.”

In April 1942, Congress authorized that officers who had served with distinction be recognized, and in August Lejeune was promoted to lieutenant gen­eral on the retired list. That same month, his long- held dream for the Marine Corps came true when the 1st Marine Division landed on Tulagi and Guad­alcanal in the Solomon Islands. The mission was to seize, occupy, and defend an advanced base, Hen­derson Field. The battle for the Solomons became one of the longest naval campaigns in our history’ Marines were responsible for many of the land op­erations involved. Later, marines followed the path of OpPlan 712 across the Central Pacific to help the fleet advance steadily toward Japanese waters.

After a three-week illness, Lieutenant General John Archer Lejeune, United States Marine Corp^s (Retired), died on 20 November 1942 in Union Meth' odist Hospital, Baltimore. He was survived by h>^ widow, three daughters, and tens of thousands m marines, many yet unborn.

Colonel Hammond was graduated from the Na^va Academy in 1951. As a platoon leader he '^va wounded in Korea. Subsequently, he was an 'ⁿ structor at Basic School, company commander- aide to Major General David M. Shoup in - Marine Division, and editor and publisher of^tn Marine Corps Gazette. He commanded 2d Ba talion 4th Marines in Vietnam until wound®" when recovered, he was plans officer, 3d Marine Division, n instructed at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College- ^w public affairs officer and then plans officer of Fleet Marine For Pacific. He retired in 1975. Colonel Hammond has an M.A- 9 temational Law) from Catholic University and an M.A. (Jo , nalism) from the University of Nevada-Reno. He is now enrol in a doctoral program in American history and writing The Navy, a history of the naval services between the two Wo Wars.