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Reforming The Military
Jeffrey G. Barlow, Editor. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981. 44 PP- Bib. $3.00 ($2.70).
Reviewed by Major Kenneth W. Estes,
U. S. Marine Corps
This short collection of six essays summarizes the principal positions and, more important, the critical approaches of five of the leading proponents of the Military Reform Movement in the United States. This movement, a loose association of ac- five and retired officers, defense analysts, and congressmen, attempts to focus attention and action upon or- Sanizational and doctrinal improvements in tandem with costly material advances to improve defense readiness and effectiveness. The long discredited tendency of bureaucrats to .'throw money” at problems or conjure a technical panacea to counter an °Perational tactical deficiency revives particularly rough treatment at lhe hands of these reformists.
In the keynote essay, Edward N. f-uttwak chastises the common bureaucratic measures of efficiency, cost-accounting, and systems analy- s,s- Luttwak holds that combat effec- tlveness stems not only from mathematical calculation and economic analysis but also from those elements °f fhe military art which determine the ability of a military force to defeat the enemy. He challenges defense leaders :° . . move beyond cost-account-
'ng debates and .... ‘systems anal- j.s,s,’ to address the really serious tac- ,cal. operational and strategic ques- l|°ns” instead of finding technological s°jutions for every problem and subluting “budgeting, programming and politics” for strategy at all levels.
The tone of the reformers’ platform bus set. the other essayists succinctly ^Uuimarize their chief contentions. ,even L. Canby criticizes inherent ^aste in manpower allocation by cen- ralized management, which robs j-°ntmanders of the ability to form co- esive combat units, and then seeks 0 stabilize retention with a pay increase. He makes the point that military pay, however, is “ . . . poorly perceived by its recipients.” Ultimately, the Department of Defense’s “analytical community, dominated by psychologists and economists, accepts the current manpower system as a given." However, “a sound manpower system supports good tactics by providing cohesive units, lean organizations and all-level command initiative. Unfortunately, the American manpower system fails to provide any of these.”
The various services are then assessed by the analysts most closely associated with them. Norman Pol- mar cites naval problems in numbers, design scope, and quality of the various ship types; William S. Lind challenges the Marine Corps to embrace the Rapid Deployment Force mission and tailor its doctrine and organization accordingly; Canby finds “the Army is a service in trouble” and charts an overhaul scheme centered on personnel and tactical reforms; and, finally, Pierre M. Sprey assesses tactical aviation (chiefly the U. S. Air Force’s) as having “never been less effective” to the extent that “. . . more spending will merely exacerbate current problems.”
These essays provide lively discussions in a highly compact form to challenge and stimulate the professional military officer. It would be pedantic to criticize them for omissions, given the pamphlet medium.
It remains worthy of note, though, that military reformers have yet to define doctrinal notions for sea warfare in the same vein they have advocated Boyd Cycle analysis and maneuver warfare forms for land and air combat. This is disappointing because Polmar’s usual approach of analyzing by using inventories of ship and weapon types does not approach the vital question of how to fight a particular opponent at sea. The future proves especially vexing for a service which consistently mistakes operations analysis for tactical innovation. The “inventory” approach imputes ship versus ship combat on an attrition basis, whereas combined arms have been at least as influential a development at sea as ashore.
Equally significant is the apparent lack of a reform contribution dealing with a strategic weapons doctrine, particularly fertile ground for introspection in terms of effectiveness and doctrine. One wonders if the reform movement sacrifices this field deliberately in hopes of gaining inroads in controversies surrounding conventional areas by avoiding unpopular positions in the emotion-charged strategic armaments arena.
At any rate, the impressive caliber of thought demonstrated in this pamphlet hopefully will be succeeded by more numerous and detailed tracts as this pathfinder work.
Major Estes, having recently completed a three- year tour with the Second Tank Battalion, is currently an NROTC instructor at Duke University.
The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
Alfred L. Monks. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981. 60 pp. $4.25 ($3.82).
The Struggle for Afghanistan
Richard H. and Nancy Peabody Newell. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981. 236 pp. $14.95 ($13.45).
Reviewed by Captain Don Rightmyer,
U. S. Air Force
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was the first overt use of the Soviet Union’s military forces outside the Warsaw Pact area since the end of World War II. That action made Afghanistan the center of world attention and forced many to reconsider the Soviet Union’s intentions in the world today. Many experts expected a quick suppression of the Afghan resistance by Soviet forces, but the ensuing months have involved heavy resistance throughout the countryside as well as in the major cities. Today, at least 100.000 Soviet soldiers are still inside Afghanistan’s territory attempting to suppress the rebellion and bolster the Marxist regime of Babrak Karmal.
Why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan? What did they hope to achieve? Why have the Marxist governments before the current one been blatantly unsuccessful? What is the portent for the rest of the world? What role must the United States play in it? These and countless other difficult questions are prompted by the current situation. The two books under review look at the issue from vastly different directions but, taken together.
provide a well-rounded treatment of the subject.
Alfred Monks’s short study approaches the Soviets in Afghanistan from both a regional and an overarching world view. Following a brief historical background of Afghanistan, Monks examines the motivations behind open Soviet intervention and the implications of that intervention. He takes a close look at Soviet leaders’ perceptions of their own regime’s security, looking from Moscow outwards. He believes that hard-line, militant members of the Politburo, such as Party ideologue Suslov, had a major role in the decision to invade.
Monks finishes by discussing the derstand the intentions of Soviet external policy.
The Struggle For Afghanistan by the Newells approaches the Afghan question from the perspective of the Afghan people themselves. Following a detailed coverage of the geography, society, and peoples of Afghanistan, the authors lay the background for the Marxist takeover of 1978. The bulk of the volume then covers the Khalq coup, the December 1979 invasion, and the continuing struggle for the Afghan cities and countryside.
tries where the Soviets support ‘ na tional liberation movements.” ulated by vastly differing peoples wb are largely Islamic in faith, Afgh3!1^ stan caused incalculable problems 1° Marxist leaders touting Soviet athe istic ideology and symbology. ks Both of these well-written boo are logical examinations of the co
possible and recommended actions for the West in response to the Soviet Union’s actions. The possibilities range from one extreme, acquiescence, through other options such as threats of military force against the Soviets. The option he supports most strongly is a firm stance against Soviet expansionism and a move to fully un
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A close examination of Afghanistan's difficulties in reconciling itself to Marxism points up significant problems that may appear in other coun-
plex factors surrounding the Afghan problem. The Newells’ book is sometimes too segmented in laying the basis for a chapter, but not to the point of distraction.
Where is the world standing today, nearly two years after Soviet troops moved into Kabul? Perhaps it is measurably closer to a better understanding of the precarious nature of the world scene. Hopefully, the world is more aware of the need to understand what the Soviets mean by the word "detente” and not what our own wishes for its meaning might be. These two volumes may not provide the reader with the answers, but they certainly provoke much-needed thought.
Captain Rightmyer is a 1973 graduate of the U. S. Air Force Academy. He currently serves as an area specialist on the Soviet Union with the Air Force's Directorate of Soviet Affairs in Wash- 'ngton, D.C.
The Great Gunnery Scandal: The Mystery of Jutland
Anthony Pollen. London: Collins, 1980. ^63 pp. £7.50 Approx. $14.01.
Reviewed by Commander M. G. M. W. E|lis, Royal Navy
Most books viewing the Battle of Jutland from the British side have s°ught to find reasons why the overwhelming numbers of the British Grand Fleet failed to secure a Trafalgar over the German High Seas Fleet. Throughout all these books, there has °een a series of excuses claiming bad luck, bad communications, poor visibility, timid tactics, inadequate hells, or inadequate armor protection forked against the British. For the ast excuse, many authors were influenced by Admiral David Earl Beatty’s 'mniediate assessment, as the second his battlecruisers blew up and sank, hat “there seems to be something Wrong with our bloody ships today.” The Great Gunnery Scandal puts °rward a more fundamental reason 0r the Grand Fleet’s relative lack of success, namely that the fire control ^stem used by the British was hope- essly inefficient. In addition, the book ss-eks to explain why the Admiralty a Wed the Royal Navy to enter the ar with an inefficient system when , better one was not only available, ut was being pressed upon them by s inventor at no small cost to himself.
The inventor was Arthur Pollen, an extraordinary English businessman, and this book has been written by his son, Anthony Pollen, clearly as a labor of love.
Possibly inspired by a private expedition to the Rocky Mountains, Arthur Pollen realized that the methods used for naval gunnery more closely resembled hunting: rapid short-range shots based on good aim, rather than those used in competitive rifle marksmanship where scientific principles were applied to score maxima at the greatest possible range. In those days, Royal Navy tactics were to close and fight at a “decisive” range, say 7,000 yards, rather than the extreme ranges of up to 19,000 yards of which the big naval guns were becoming capable. Admiral of the Fleet J. A. (“Jacky”) Fisher, the predominant influence in the Royal Navy, followed sound strategic theory in building a fleet of more and bigger ships, with more and bigger guns, than any other navy, but failed to observe that weapons dictate tactics and allowed Royal Navy tactical practice to remain virtually on Trafalgar lines.
Having identified the problem, Pollen promptly solved it, showing, in 1904, that there was a need to measure continuously and accurately the range and bearing of the target and the rate at which these were changing in order to predict where the guns should fire (allowing for the time of flight), and to transmit these data to the guns in a way so that they were unaffected by the maneuvering of the firing ship.
In presenting his theory and subsequent inventions to the Admiralty, Pollen met with alternating encouragement and rejection. Patriotic throughout, he passed up many opportunities to sell his system abroad and, more or less, tried to give his ideas to the Royal Navy. However, by 1914, rejection prevailed, largely because of the influence of Frederic Dreyer. A successful young gunnery officer, Dreyer had also invented a fire control system which was simpler, cheaper, and, perhaps most important, more easily understood than Pollen’s was by those responsible for Admiralty policy. To add insult to injury, although Pollen never complained, it was subsequently shown that Dreyer incorporated enough of Pollen’s ideas into his system for Pollen to be given a large monetary award after the war for his contributions.
Author Anthony Pollen analyzes the Battle of Jutland to show that each phase of the engagement either vindicated his father’s claims, or proved that Dreyer’s system only scored hits during the few short periods when the fleets were steaming on steady nearparallel courses, noting particularly that on almost every occasion they came into gun range of the enemy, the Grand Fleet units were compelled for various reasons to maneuver significantly.
In addition to his vindication of the fire control system, Anthony Pollen also describes how, despite repeated snubs, his father became a leading publicist for the Royal Navy in World War I, writing profusely for newspapers and journals and, in the critical year of 1917, lecturing in the United States. Pollen’s public relations skills may have also saved the Admiralty from the worst effects of its gloomy first post-Jutland communique and helped persuade the British to adopt the convoy to counteract the devastating German submarine attacks on merchant shipping.
Depending on which side of the line you stand, you may be indifferent to or disappointed by the lack of a rigorous mathematical explanation of Pollen’s fire control system, but either way, this book is worth a read to see the conduct of a battle between a technologist who was a naval amateur and a naval establishment which was technologically naive, and further, as an- illustration of the thesis that weapons dictate tactics.
Commander Ellis is currently serving as Fleet Communications Officer to the British Commander-in-Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET).
Everyday Heroes
Frank Hughes. Norwalk, CT.: Tower & Leisure Sales, 1981. 310 pp. $2.50 paper.
Reviewed by Captain Walter Spangenberg, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)
The operational side of the Navy, viewed from the individual ship or squadron, is as different a world from grand strategy and weapon system acquisition as is the world of Adam Smith from the macroeconomics of John Maynard Keynes; yet professionals in each walk of life must understand both sides of their respective businesses. And while Proceedings readers probably spend less time with fiction than do Book-of-the-Month Club members, for instance, a novel can often describe very real times and circumstances more vividly than can a nonfictiona! chronological history. This is especially so if we are interested in the people involved.
Wartime combat situations are made to order for treatment in novels, and the treatment can vary from hyper-heroic to ultra tongue-in-cheek. Frank Hughes, however, uses the carrier aviation in Vietnam situation so realistically, combining the routine familiar to every carrier aviator with many of the noteworthy incidents which occurred in that frustrating conflict, that no hyper or ultra treatment is needed. He tells it very much the way it was, with characters typical of those to be found in squadrons throughout the Navy. Technical errors are few and trivial; the worst is a picture on the book’s cover of a Phantom taking off, when there were no Phantoms in the air wing of the story.
Everyday Heroes follows Lieutenant Jim Howard from his arrival at NAS Lemoore. circa 1966, through a training and deployment cycle, back to Lemoore and to the arrival of another new everyday hero. There is comic relief in the antics of Jim’s roommate, Louie North, ashore; and tragedy revisited several times in flashbacks to a shipboard fire reminiscent of that which occurred on board the Oriskany (CVA-34). A problem CO is almost unbelievable, except that we have all known someone somewhere who was like that.
The author clearly knows his subject. and describes it with an insider’s experience of getting a squadron reorganized, moving the family to a new and strange locale, training hops in a new airplane, revisiting basics at survival school, moving on board ship with the subsequent operational readiness inspection in Hawaii, and the driving routine at Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf. There are Alpha Strikes, SAMs, flak, and MiGs. with a Hong Kong port visit after 60 days on station. It's all there, and well combined.
This book will be different things to different people. To the carrier pilot, who lived through most of the incidents in the book, it will be a replay of fun, fright, and frustration. To Navy people in general, it will explain a little of what the fly boys do between carrier launch and recovery, and sometimes between recovery and launch. To the citizenry at large, it will require some patience with the technical jargon, but that patience will be rewarded with a good story and a deeper understanding of the men who fought in an unpopular war than that available during the Vietnam years from newspapers or television. This story brought to mind the question I heard so often in those years, “Why do they do it?” The immediate answer, of course: “Because the job needs to be done.”
Everyday Heroes is eminently worthy of a place on one's bookshelf reserved for memorable naval fiction- This book makes one feel good about naval aviation, the Navy, and this country.
Captain Spangenberg was designated a naval aviator in 1950 and acquired an aeronautical engineering sub-specialty. He was involved >n project management in Naval Air Systems Command and commanded VF-143 in Vietnam an the USS Monticello (LSD-35).
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
naval affairs
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vols. VII and VIII
Barnes L. Mooney, Editor. Washington. D.C.: Naval Historical Center. 1981. Vol. VII: 735 PP- Ulus. Map. Append. Bib. $16.00 (S14.40): vol. VIII: 576 pp. Illus. Map. Bib. $15.00 (SI3.50).
Students of naval history will cheer the aPpearance of the final two volumes of the Naval Historical Center's 20-year project which offers biographies of all U. S. fight- ln6 vessels and their namesakes from the American Revolution to the present. Earlier volumes have been a great boon to student and scholar alike, and the completed Project will serve as an essential reference work for all naval historians. The editorial ■earn is currently at work updating the early volumes in the series.
ffi Gold Wings, Blue Sea: A Naval Aviator’s Story
^aPt. Rosario Rausa. USNR. Annapolis. MD.: Naval Institute Press. 1981. 200 pp. Illus.
S*5.95 (SI2.76).
Captain Rausa is the author of several °9°ks on naval aviation, and in this mem- 0lr. he traces his own experience as a naval
^iator from his entry into the service in to his assignment as editor of Naval Nation News in the 1970s. It is a sprightly Narrative and was clearly a labor of love 0r the author.
The Naval Air War in Vietnam
Peter B. Mersky and Norman Polmar. Annapolis; MD.: Nautical & Aviation Publishing, 1981. 224 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
The authors of this heavily illustrated chronology of the naval air war in Vietnam do not concern themselves with high-level policy or strategy but focus instead on accounts of air combat. Though they argue inferentially that the rules of engagement forced on U. S. pilots were counterproductive to combat success, their real theme is the skill and courage of U. S. naval aviators.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
An Illustrated History of Seaplanes and Flying Boats
Maurice Allward. Ashbourne. Derbyshire. England: Moorland. 1981. 160 pp. Illus. Ind. £6.95 Approx. $12.98.
This attractive little book records the history of seaplanes in words and pictures from the first successful flight in 1910 to the modern use of small seaplanes by sportsmen seeking otherwise inaccessible lakes and rivers. Particularly interesting are the accounts of exotic seaplanes such as the Italian 6-winged Caproni Ca-60 (launched in 1921) and the German 12-engine Dornier Do-X (1929). Other chapters record the services of seaplanes in wartime.
[3] The Calculator Afloat, A Mariner’s Guide to the Electronic Calculator
Henry H. Shufeldt and Kenneth E.
Newcomer. Annapolis. MD. Naval Institute Press. 1980. 225 pp. Bib. Ind. $16.95 ($13.56).
This volume is essentially an updated version of Slide Rale for the Mariner published in 1972. It contains formulae for solving trigonometric problems involving sines, cosines, tangents, cotangents, and logs by using an electronic calculator. Chapters provide examples of calculator use in coastal navigation, celestial observation, and miscellaneous computations.
The Care and Repair of Marine Gasoline Engines
Loris Goring. Camden, ME.: International Marine. 1981. 133 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $15.00 ($13.50).
This book covers most aspects of care and
maintenance of marine gasoline engines, including carefully diagramed instructions on how to service equipment such as cooling systems, fuel, carburetor, exhaust, and electrical systems. It is designed largely for the sailor who lacks a technical background, but should be useful to almost any sailor with an on-board gasoline engine.
S.S. Great Eastern: The Greatest Iron Ship
George S. Emmerson. North Pomfret, VT.: David & Charles, 1981. 182 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. $22.50 ($20.25).
The Great Eastern was one of the wonders of the world when she was built in the 1850s. A triumph of man’s scientific genius, her statistics were quoted to an awed public: 600 feet long, 18,000 tons displacement, and built entirely of iron! Alas, her history did not live up to her advanced billing. The Great Eastern's high point was her role in laying the Atlantic cable in 1866. But though gawked at wherever she went, the Great Eastern developed a reputation as a jinx and was never a big money-maker. Her history is engagingly told in this book.
Traditions & Memories of American Yachting
William P. Stephens. Camden. ME.: International Marine, 1981. 378 pp. Illus. Ind. $35.00 ($31.50).
From June 1939 to July 1946 William P. Stephens published a series of articles on the history of U. S. yachting in Motor Boating magazine. Subsequently, most of these articles were published as a book, now long out of print. This new edition reprints the entire series in the small type face of the original magazine articles. The topics covered include “The Genesis of American Yachting” (which Stephens dates from the 1870s) to the design and development of various yachts through the 1940s.
Yacht Joinery and Fitting
Mike Saunders. Camden. ME.: International Marine. 1981. 191 pp. Illus. Append. Ind.
$20.00 ($18.00).
This handsome and prolifically illustrated volume is subtitled Practical Guidance on the Planning and Building of Cabin Accommodations in Sailing and Power Draft and is intended as a do-it-yourself guide. It is very thorough in covering all aspects of shipboard carpentry from the selection of wood type (aided by a full color fold-out chart) and choosing the proper design to finishing and shaping.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Jane's Military Communications, 1981
R. J. Raggett. Editor. London: Jane's, 1981.
629 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $125.00 ($112.50).
This second edition of Jane's Military Communications was published only a year after the first edition despite a plan to publish every two years. The editor's explanation is that the technology of military communications is changing so fast that a new edition was necessary. Coverage includes radio communications, encryption and security devices, electronic warfare, and laser and optical communications.
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
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Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation
Col. William E. LeGro, USA. Washington. D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. 180 pp. Maps. $5.50 (S4.95) paper.
Colonel LeGro was one of the last Americans to leave Saigon in 1975. In this monograph. he offers a detailed account of the last three years of the war. focusing particularly on military developments. He concludes that "The outcome could have been different." The flaw, he argues, was not in the South Vietnamese Army, but in weak civil and military leadership and. of course, the end of U. S. support.
FICTION
All the Drowning Seas
Alexander Fullerton. London: Michael Joseph. 1981. 263 pp. £6.95 Approx. $12.83.
This is the sixth in a series of novels about the seagoing Everard family in the era of World War II. Earlier stories concerned the involvement of family members at Narvik and the defense of Crete. This volume follows two members of the family: one who commands a cruiser in the Battle of the Java Sea. and another who fights off the Luftwaffe during a Mediterranean convoy.
Frigate
John Wingate. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1980. 216 pp. £5.25 Approx. $9.69.
International tensions mount during a future crisis with the Soviet Union, the frigate HMS Icarus, part of StaNavForLant.
is in the middle of "the Second Battle of the Atlantic” in this realistically written novel. Wingate evokes a spirit of fraternal dedication reminiscent of World War II in describing the problems which Captain Pascoe Trevellion has instilling discipline and espirit in his ship while facing an escalating Soviet naval offensive. This is the first volume of a promised trilogy.
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED
How to Sail: Gary Jobson. New York: Ziff-Davis Books, 1980. 121 pp. Illus. S6.95 (S6.25) paper.
One More River: The Rhine Crossings of 1945: Peter Allen. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1980. 320 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. S 16.95 (S15.25).
Over Here: The First World War and American Society: David M. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. 404 pp. Maps. Bib. Ind. S19.95 ($17.95).
Roland: A Case for or Against NATO Standardization?: Daniel K. Malone. Washington. D.C.: National Defense University. 1980. 120 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. SI 1.00 paper.
Stuka at War: Peter C. Smith. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1980. 128 pp. Illus. Append. S19.95 (S17.95).
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