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This past June, the ballistic missile submarine Ohio (SSBN-726) went to sea for the first time on trials. When she and her forthcoming Trident-armed sisters are commissioned, the U. S. strategic deterrent will be strengthened at a time when the other two legs of the triad— manned bombers and land-based missiles—are considered increasingly vulnerable to Soviet defenses. Isn't there cause to wonder also about advances in Soviet antisubmarine warfare and their effect on the missile-armed “boomers”?
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uring the past few years, with the increasltlr theoretical vulnerability of land-based missil^ the importance of U. S. sea-launched ballistic mb siles has grown. However, Dr. William J. Perr'j former Undersecretary of Defense for Research a*1 Engineering, stated the following on 24 April l9j^' “Submarines are invisible today. By the 1999 ' whether we will have learned a way or whetn ^ the Soviets will have learned a way of making 9] oceans transparent is precisely the issue. judgment is that we ourselves will be able to d tect and locate Soviet submarines at sea at m period. I have no reason to believe that the viets will not be able to do a similar thing- Any assessment of the survivability of U. S. se^ based strategic forces must logically be based analysis of the Soviet antisubmarine warfare (A^ -c program and particularly its implications for ball*s
^'ssile-carrying submarines. While much of the Serial on Soviet efforts in this area is classified, a §reat deal of information also appears in open s°urces. The purpose of this article is to attempt to ^lece together this information and to arrive at some ^elusions concerning the strategic implications of ae Soviet ASW program.
Geography: While the Soviet Union possesses the I °rld’s longest coastline, it is actually all but land- ^cked. Russia’s few available ports are poorly , aced and lack convenient outlets to the deep ocean as>ns. The Soviets’ resulting difficulty in projecting ufficient ASW forces into deep waters is crucial •nee America’s geographic position—along with e locations of its allies—allows the U. S. Navy to I Perate ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in rge portions of these waters.
The Soviet ASW Program: Soviet naval declaratory policy since 1964 has emphasized blunting nuclear attacks from sea-based ballistic missiles. Within this context, the Soviets have two concerns: (1) limiting damage to their homeland and military forces and (2) bringing any conflict to a favorable conclusion by degrading the American strategic reserve. However, some Soviet statements made since the late 1960s have indicated that strategic ASW may no longer occupy the primary position it once did, largely because of technical and operational difficulties. While the Soviets are probably still interested in countering American missile submarines, they are not likely to achieve a solution in the near future.
The Soviets are conducting a broad-based effort to develop a number of systems which might prove useful in conducting strategic ASW. The following is a survey of that effort:
► Sea-Based Surveillance Systems. It has been reported that the Soviets have installed a hydrophone barrier stretching from the Kola Peninsula to Spitsbergen, protecting the approaches to the Barents Sea. It is also likely that Soviet fixed acoustic installations in the Kurile Islands guard the entrances to the Sea of Okhotsk. They have employed bottom- anchored acoustic devices, essentially large sono- buoys, which are feasible in some waters not contiguous to the Soviet Union, since these systems can be laid covertly and read by passing submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. Devices of this type have been deployed off Norway and Great Britain and probably have been installed in parts of the North Pacific. There have also been indications that similar systems may be laid in the Canary Basin off Northwest Africa, a potential deployment area for Poseidon-armed submarines. In the future, similar acoustic devices and perhaps sensors designed to detect extremely low frequency (ELF) submarine communications might be emplaced in other waters, particularly at key geographic choke points.
Since the early 1960s, Soviet intelligence gathering ships (AGIs) equipped to detect and analyze radioelectric and electromagnetic signals have been deployed in the immediate vicinity or within easy reach of American ballistic missile submarine bases. While this practice does not enable the Russians to discern where the submarines actually go, by tuning into U. S. communications, AGIs probably gather valuable information on deployment schedules. On occasion, Soviet nuclear attack submarines operating in conjunction with these ships have attempted to trail American submarines leaving port.
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► Nuclear Attack Submarines. The Soviet Union’s nuclear attack submarine force is currently inadequate to present a threat to American ballistic missile submarines except perhaps in waters near the U.S.S.R. Recent developments in Soviet propulsion and hull technology could help improve their
submarine ASW capabilities. Two to three ships of the new “Alfa” class are reported on active duty with five additional ships under construction. On the basis of her speed, deep-diving capability, and improved active sonar suite, this submarine could have a greater technical capability than her predecessors to trail American SSBNs as well as to conduct ASW operations in general.
► Land-Based Aircraft. Soviet Naval Aviation forces for ASW operations appear to be quite limited, especially for conducting operations beyond contiguous waters without forward bases. The IL- 38, an aircraft similar in appearance but not quality to the American P-3, has an operational radius of little more than 1,500 nautical miles and operates widely over the Barents and Norwegian seas as well as the North Pacific. About 60 are believed operational with Soviet naval units. The Beriev M-12, 80 of which are on active duty, is an amphibian with an operational radius of approximately 1,000 nautical miles. The only Soviet aircraft with sufficient range to conduct ASW operations in the deep ocean basins is the “Bear F,” a variant of the large turboprop strategic bomber, which has an operational radius of 3,000 to 4,000 nautical miles. Approxi-
Since the early 1960s, Soviet intelligence gathering ships such as this AGI of the “Mirnyy” class have been deployed in an effort to detect and analyze electronic signals from U. S. submarines.
mately 30-40 units are reported on active duty,3 number wholly inadequate for the task at hand. Procurement of new fixed-wing ASW aircraft seems to have halted in 1976, although “Bears” have bee" converted to perform the ASW mission at the rate of approximately five per year.
► Surface Skimmers. Since 1965, the Soviets have conducted an important research and development program on wing-in-ground (WIG) effect vehicles' a form of surface effect ship that resembles a flyin? boat. Soviet statements have indicated that long- range WIG effect vehicles may be used in ASW are3 search operations. While some analysts believed that such vehicles would join the Soviet Navy in the late 1970s, none has become operational, perhap5 indicating that some technical difficulties have arisen or that the program is no longer an important priority.
► ASW Mines. Soviet naval mines can be divide^ into four major categories: moored, seabed, flo3'" ing, and nuclear. Many of them are suitable for hampering submarine movement from port or through important geographic choke points. These include several new deep-water influence mines, possihh detonated by a submarine’s magnetic signature' which enable them to block key geographic point5 previously considered incapable of being mined- Delivery platforms include aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines. While the sophisticatin'1 of Soviet mines may be sufficient to threaten American ballistic missile submarines and impose P^' chological constraints in wartime, delivery to are35 far from the Soviet Union could prove to be e* tremely difficult.
■ surface and submerged wake effects produced passage of a submarine through water; and .signatures generated by submarine communi- ^fi°n systems, such as towed buoys and trailing
^ Acoustic ASW Technology. The United States has always placed a great deal of emphasis on the procurement of quiet submarines, so quiet in fact that advanced American ASW systems have had great difficulty in tracking American SSBNs in exercises. The combination of quiet American submarines and a relatively unsophisticated Soviet signal processing CaPability has rendered Soviet passive detection ^sterns relatively ineffective and has forced the Asians to invest heavily in active acoustic sensors CaPable of detecting self-generated sound bounced jjff an enemy submarine. Active acoustic sensors, nature, have much shorter ranges than passive s°nars. As a result, Soviet ASW platforms can track and attack enemy submarines only at fairly short ^Pges.
* ^ong-Range Ballistic Missiles. There have been judications for a number of years that the Soviets aave seriously considered the potential role of all j^Pes of ballistic missiles in crucial naval operations. n addition to a special casing to permit reentry ve- a'des to withstand the stress of impact with the °Cean’s surface and to detonate underwater, the ^ssile must either (1) be equipped with a terminal ^idance system for in-flight course corrections to plow for submarine movement between initial deletion and the arrival of the missile, or (2) carry a arge number of powerful warheads able to lay down atl effective barrage over an area large enough to .^e into account target movement.
Afew Technologies. In 1978, Rear Admiral Sumner pnapiro. Director of Naval Intelligence, remarked, ,'Ve know the Soviets are engaged in a very exten- ?lve research and development effort, particularly 1,1 Hie nonacoustic realm.” As a result, deployed jj°Pacoustic sensors, particularly magnetic anomaly I .fetors, seem to be comparable to those of the P'ted States. It has also been reported that Soviet [^acoustic research and development programs be as much as five to ten years ahead of similar j^Perican programs. The broad nature of the Soviet ^acoustic program deserves further examination. . evelopment of nonacoustic technology involves aePtifying three broad categories of submarine sig- aiures: the magnetic signature of a submarine hull;
While nonacoustic detection systems could prove useful when mounted on a variety of platforms, their maximum potential could be most effectively exploited when mounted on satellites. In 1969, Rear Admiral Levering Smith, then Director of the Navy Strategic Systems Project, stated that the Russians did not have an operational ASW satellite capability. Since then, while there have been no official statements on Soviet satellite systems, there has been no evidence that they have overcome the enormous technical problems in developing such a system. Included among such problems are a high false- alarm rate and difficulty in detecting submarines not operating near the ocean’s surface.
It is conceivable that the Russians do have some satellite systems in orbit with limited applicability to the strategic ASW mission. For instance, electronic ferret satellites could be capable of intercepting an American submarine’s communications and fixing her position. However, it is important to note that these submarines maintain silence for much if not all of their time at sea. Also, Soviet
early warning satellites equipped with infrared sensors might fix the position of a submarine firing her missiles in a nuclear war and bring down counterbattery fire on her.
Operational Assessment: The Soviet Union’s ability to concentrate sufficient ASW capabilities to present a potential threat to American ballistic missile submarines is severely limited. The only waters in which the Russians might present a threat to American submarines, particularly the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea, lie contiguous or near to the Soviet Union. The perceived threat posed by Soviet ASW forces in these areas is relatively high since it is in these waters that the main Soviet capabilities are concentrated in peacetime and where they are likely to be found in wartime. Also, the Norwegian Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Sea of Japan are likely to be perceived as increasingly hazardous SSBN operating areas largely because of the expansion of Soviet naval operations in these waters. This could have some impact on the perceived ability of SSBNs to perform certain specific missions. For example, a missile-carrying submarine can move closer to enemy shores, thereby reducing warning time and simultaneously increasing the accuracy of her missiles. The mission could become more difficult if the chances of detection are perceived to be great.
However, it is important to distinguish between the perceived threat and the conduct of actual operations against any American submarines. There
have been reports of American nuclear attack su^ marines occasionally slipping in and out of the Baf ents Sea and even Soviet ports without being covered. It seems reasonable to assume American SSBNs, if need be, could also avoid oe tection in these hazardous waters and in the pr0* imity of Soviet ASW forces in other areas. Secon • maintaining track of a submarine once contact 1 made might also prove difficult, given Soviet re 1 ance on active sonar. Based on U. S. Fleet exercise and projected trends in Soviet ASW technology new Trident submarines are supposed to have su ficient speed to make them highly survivable *n the next century, while Poseidon-armed SSBNs a likely to have sufficient speed until the 1990s.
nally, American acoustic countermeasures are deigned to deal effectively with the Soviet active sonar threat.
In any case, the importance of waters contiguous lo or near the Soviet Union as potential operating areas for U. S. ballistic missile submarines has deceased over the past two decades at the same time as Soviet ASW capabilities have gradually improved. Since the deployment of the first American SSBN in 1960, steadily increasing sea-launched bal- ‘istic missile ranges have enabled U. S. sea-based strategic forces to expand potential patrol areas and |° “stand off' from potential targets in the Soviet ynion at greater distances. In spite of the decreasing "Pportance of the waters relatively close to the “•S.S.R. for American missile-carrying subma- r'nes, it is important to note they should still have s°me relevance as SSBN patrol areas until at least ljie early 1990s. Waters such as the Norwegian Sea, ae Mediterranean, and those near the Soviet Union VV|H continue to account for a significant percentage
the total patrol areas available to the Poseidon- arrned SSBNs.
fn light of this evolving situation, the Poseidon snips are likely to bear the brunt of many of the Projected improvements in Soviet ASW capabili- 'es- According to Dr. David E. Mann, Assistant . ecretary of the Navy for Research and Engineer-
“The Soviets are expected to have more long- range patrol aircraft, more surface ships with improved ASW capabilities, improved acoustic seniors and possibly towed-array sonars. . . . These improvements will give the Soviets better tech- n'cal capabilities to detect, track and attack submarines operating near the USSR, who are in confined waters or are transiting chokepoints." fie U. S. Navy has been concerned for some time tb°ut potential vulnerabilities, as evidenced by con- lnUed efforts to procure the extremely low fre- fijjency (ELF) communications system which would ev>ate the requirement to operate near the surface. The technology for the detection of a submarine’s trailing wire and towed buoy is well documented, and the Soviets are known to be conducting research into potentially useful nonacoustic sensors. While there are no operational Soviet systems of this type known to be deployed today, based on present technological evidence, even aircraft with moderate-range nonacoustic sensors could present a potential future threat. However, it should be noted that this concern —according to testimony in 1977 by Vice Admiral Robert Y. Kaufman, then Director of C3 Programs in OpNav—is limited to the possibility of “a chance one or two sinkings” in wartime.
Clearly, the crucial question in evaluating Soviet strategic ASW capabilities is the effectiveness of forces available for deep ocean basin operations since these waters have and will continue to acquire increasing importance as SSBN deployment areas. At present. Soviet ASW forces available for peacetime and wartime operations include an inadequate number of submarines, aircraft, surface vessels, and intelligence-gathering ships. This shortage is enormously magnified by the absence of an area surveillance system which might give the Soviets some idea of the approximate locations of American SSBNs on patrol and enable them to concentrate their limited forces. Moreover, the extensive U. S. surveillance systems covering potential American SSBN patrol areas provide the submarines with continuous information on the whereabouts of Soviet naval forces, thus enabling them to take evasive maneuvers if necessary.
The key to the Soviets establishing an improved strategic ASW posture in the future would seem to depend on how successful they are in detecting and tracking American SSBNs in the deep ocean basins. Two potential approaches to such a capability, not mutually exclusive, can be postulated.
► Trailing. This would involve peacetime operations designed to follow ballistic missile submarines throughout their patrols. The most practical method to initiate a trail is simply to wait at base exits or at relatively narrow geographic choke points for these ships. Nuclear attack submarines, because of their speed and endurance, are considered the most effective ASW platforms for trailing. However, even if the new “Alfa” class is procured in sufficient numbers and is employed in trailing attempts, other factors come into play which would probably serve to curtail any potential threat posed by these submarines as well as any other Soviet attack submarines. Geography is a powerful constraint on the Soviets’ ability to concentrate capabilities outside of American submarine base exits. The U. S. Navy recently ceased strategic operations at all of its overseas submarine bases except at Holy Loch, Scotland. The great distances between Soviet sub-
marine and American SSBN bases make it extremely difficult for the Russians to attempt trailing on anything more than an occasional basis. This difficulty in attempting to station attack submarines near base exits is compounded by the generally low peacetime Soviet submarine deployment rate of 1015%.
There has been some speculation that the possible availability of naval bases in Cuba in close proximity to the new ballistic missile submarine base at Kings Bay, Georgia, might help change this situation. However, in 1977 Rear Admiral Albert L. Kelln, then director of the Strategic Submarine Division in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, stated in response to questioning by the Senate Armed Services Committee:
“If you are asking could the Soviets stage a threat in peacetime out of Cuba, the answer is yes. Would it cause us some due concern? I think that with the assets we have at hand we would be able to handle that problem quite adequately.” This points out another problem the Soviets face in attempting to mount any trailing operations; any submarines they do position outside of American base exits are not likely to be there without the knowledge of the appropriate U. S. military officials. Soviet submarines leaving their home ports are subject to almost continuous surveillance by American and allied ASW forces, surveillance which is likely to become increasingly effective during the next decade, especially in the deep ocean basins through which Soviet submarines must pass to reach SSBN bases in the continental United States. Consequently, American ASW forces are in a position to initiate the appropriate countermeasures designed to prevent Soviet boats from successfully initiating trailing operations.
► Area Search. Basically, this would involve utilizing a long-range area surveillance system to provide initial target information for appropriate ASW platforms. For example, the U. S. sound surveillance system (SOSUS) can determine the position of Soviet submarines in many areas of the world to within 50 nautical miles, allowing ASW forces to conduct follow-up operations. The area search threat seems to be the ASW strategy which most concerns U. S. defense planners. Therefore, the new Trident-armed submarines have been configured to address this concern.
It seems to have become quite clear to the Russians that because of their geographic, technical, and operational ASW problems, they would have to construct an open-ocean area search system different from that of the United States. One Soviet option which has been the repeated subject of speculation would be a satellite-based, nonacoustic detection system providing near or real-time target data to land-based installations. The key technical issue is whether a space system can be developed to the point at which it would be able to provide target data with sufficient reliability. This would entail overcoming the substantial technical problems already mentioned. In addition, an ASW satellite system probably would have to be able to distinguish between different types of submarines in order to identify those which carry ballistic missiles. Theoretically, this might be possible in some cases since the 18,700-ton Tridents are likely to generate a more distinct set of nonacoustic signatures than other submarines. Distinguishing between smaller submarines approximately equal in size could prove very difficult. An alternative might be for some sea- based system, either AGIs or submarines, to provide initial identification after encountering an American SSBN; confirmation would be by the satellite system.
The development and deployment of a satell»te detection system would represent an enormous technical feat and would be a definite improvement over current Soviet deep-ocean basin surveillance capabilities. Although a space system would certainly create a more hazardous operating environment for American submarines, this is not to say that it would render sea-based strategic forces vulnerable to attack, especially in view of the countermeasures available to the United States. As has already been noted, the Trident SSBNs are designed to limit the extent of the threat any area search capability might pose to that force. Indeed, even a few detections by a satellite-based system could be avoided in most ocean areas. Since satellite orbits are predictable, a submarine could simply l'e “quiet” as the satellite passes overhead or adjust her speed so that the satellite never passes over' head. Another possible countermeasure is procuring communication systems which free American SSBNs from the need to conduct operations in fhe upper ocean layers where the satellite detectin'1 threat is likely to be greatest. Alternative comm11' nications systems, such as the ELF which could be built in a relatively short period of time, or perhaps blue-green lasers sometime further in the future would help alleviate this vulnerability. Moreover- Soviet ocean surveillance satellites are likely to. the primary target of any American anti-satelh operations. .
Conclusion: While much of the appropriate *n formation on the Soviet ASW program and its im plications for the survivability of U. S. sea-base strategic forces is classified, an analysis of °Pe sources tends to confirm the conclusion that Ame ican SSBNs at sea enjoy a high level of invulner^ bility. There seems little prospect for a significaj\ change in this state of affairs. This is not to discou the fact that the Russians are committing signififa resources to their ASW program. However. ll. important to note that, to the extent the distinct^ can be made, a large fraction of the Soviet A
investment is probably made with the goal of improving tactical ASW capabilities designed to provide better protection for new Soviet SSBNs operating near the USSR. Indeed, this mission and the associated one of strategic strike seem to occupy the most prominent position in current Soviet naval declaratory policy. In any case, gradual improvements in deployed technologies are not likely to have any impact on the survivability of American SSBNs, especially in the face of U. S. technological and operational countermeasures.
Given these conclusions, there would seem to be little justification for the remarks cited in the introduction to this paper which seem to indicate a serous vulnerability problem by the 1990s. While it ls obvious Dr. Perry has access to information on Soviet ASW efforts not available to the public, his comments appear to run contrary to conclusions lhat have been made public by the U. S. intelligence immunity and most high civilian and military Department of Defense officials. Indeed, remarks like "erry’s have provoked a certain amount of consternation as well as anger among senior U. S. naval officers. Moreover, only two months before his surprising comments, Dr. Perry himself reaffirmed the commonly accepted view when he stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the introduction of the Trident I missile and the Trident submarine would give the United States “high confidence in the continuing survivability of our sea- 'aunched ballistic missiles.” An alternative explanation for Dr. Perry’s alarming statements is that hey were motivated by concerns other than some Postulated Soviet ASW threat to American SSBNs.
1 is no coincidence that these comments have apPeared in connection with efforts to preserve the mtercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) leg of the S. strategic triad through procuring the MX sys- £m in a land basing mode. This is not the first time ,nat somewhat exaggerated assessments of sealed vulnerability have appeared in connection "ath efforts to preserve land-based strategic sys- ems. An earlier case was during the debates on the ami-ballistic missile (ABM) system in 1969.
This leads to another important point; U. S. perCePtions of survivability are almost if not just as "dportant as actual estimates of Soviet ASW capabilities. While the general consensus in the ap- Pr°Priate government circles is that the U. S. sealed strategic force is highly survivable, underly- this consensus is a certain uneasiness. This is Probably caused, on the one hand, by the realization at the total invulnerability of that force when at Qea might not be maintained forever and, on the Jner hand, by an understandable desire to maintain I at invulnerability. This desire has been intensified iP recent years by the perception among senior • S. defense officials that sea-based nuclear forces re increasing in importance within the overall strategic equation. According to Admiral Kaufman, “as national reliance on the sea-based force expands with Trident and as technology advances threaten other elements of our Triad, the importance of maintaining high submarine survivability is obvious.” Indeed, a crucial underlying factor in the Navy’s drive to procure the ELF system has been the desire to enhance further an already high level of survivability.
In these somewhat sensitive circumstances, possibly combined with general uneasiness perceived over worldwide Soviet military and political advances, any changes from past U. S. pronouncements on SSBN vulnerability could have an adverse impact on perceptions—possibly outweighing the actual significance of the threat. Therefore, statements like those of Dr. Perry or any other high government official which signal even a minor, perhaps insignificant change from past assessments of SSBN survivability could serve to erode U. S. confidence in the continued effectiveness of a vital component of the U. S. strategic arsenal. Developments in either deployed Soviet ASW technology or in the operational uses of those systems might also stimulate undue threat perceptions. For example, it is possible to conceive of situations in which even increased trailing attempts might cause such exaggerated perceptions. A successful trailing operation or the initial deployment of even an experimental space-based detection system, if learned about, could have an even more drastic impact.
In the context of sea-based systems, there is a spectrum of potential degradations in survivability, many of which fall far short of an actual capability to destroy even one ballistic missile submarine, let alone a significant number of deployed boats. In this sense, the task of destroying SSBNs is more complicated than that of destroying land-based missiles; therefore, any sea-based system vulnerability debate is likely to involve far more complex issues. Because of these factors, it will be all the more important in the future to avoid any oversimplifications which might tend to propel the discussion beyond the proper proportions. We must keep the debate within bounds in order to avoid needless defense expenditures and perhaps irreparable damage to continued arms control efforts.
jH Mr. Wit holds a bachelor's degree in international relations from Bucknell University (1976) and a A master's degree from the School of International Affairs at Columbia University (1979) where he ^B specialized in international security studies. This article and several others on the subject of ASW and the future of sea-based strategic forces are the result of research sponsored by the New York office of the World Without War Council. Currently, Mr. Wit is a consultant at the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, Arlington, Virginia. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U. S. Government.