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from the sea is a dominant theme from the Chinese
Nearly a decade has passed since U. S. President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-Lai) stunned the world with their announcement of the beginning of a new phase in the history of Sino-American relations.1 Over the past nine years, the relationship has slowly matured into an arrangement considered worthwhile by both nations. For the United States, the relationship has provided the opportunity for a balancing of Communist powers. The thought of a Chinese Vice Premier standing on the White House lawn and railing against the evils of Soviet hegemony, as Deng Xiaoping (Teng Tsiao-ping) did in 1979, would have been inconceivable as the 1970s began.
For the Chinese, the relationship has afforded the opportunity to sup from the table of American technological riches. The Chinese hope the new technology connection will provide them a sufficient basis for beginning a drive toward a tangible big power capability to match the potential of their enormous resources. Both sides have reservations. A few Chinese still see cooperation with the United States as the ultimate ideological corruption. For some Americans, the fact that the relationship turns on China’s need for technology rather than on any profound affinity for the United States is an indication that the Chinese, upon reaching the technological autarky they desire, will abandon their partners to continue the pursuit of Communist belligerency. Whether the United States is sealing the bonds of a lasting and peaceful relationship, or whether the' United States will be the victim of one of history’s greatest diplomatic ruses, America is for the moment committed to helping the Chinese achieve their primary objective—modernization.
The Navy in the Context of Modernization: In early 1978, Premier Hua Guofeng announced China’s plans to modernize its capabilities in science, industry, agriculture, and defense. The fact that the military is listed last among these four modernizations is no accident, for the growth of the military seems subordinate to the other three modernization goals. After passing through the wringer of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, the Chinese people are still generally dispirited and suspicious of new government attempts to significantly better their material existence. The people have heard promises before. In an effort to rekindle the nation’s spirit, the Chinese Communist Party leadership has voiced its commitment to economic programs to benefit the ‘For Footnotes, please turn to page 75.
individual. (Guns have few immediate benefits for the typical Chinese person concerned with improving his lot.) Yet, given the continuous Soviet military presence along the mutual border, the Chinese leaders remain keenly aware of Soviet power. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the threat of invasion o Poland are perceived as other manifestations of Soviet hegemonic designs. And as the Chinese defense planners look forward to the remainder of the 1980s, another military concern has surfaced. Not only have Soviet ground forces increased their capabilities in the past decade, but the Soviet Navy has greatly expanded its presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans- This Soviet growth coincides with an increasingly ambitious set of Chinese maritime objectives.
Thus, the Western Pacific, an ocean area once the virtually exclusive domain of the U. S. Navy, haS become a confluence for the various streams of in" ternational maritime interest. China intends to be one of the new arrivals in the waters for reasons o both internal economics and international points- With both local and global powers so interested m playing a role in the destiny of Asian waters, some tension is bound to result. The issue then arises whether a nation can adequately maintain its preS' ence in the area, and if need be, whether it can adequately defend its seagoing concerns. In this context, an understanding of the Chinese Navy (herea' ter referred to as the People’s Liberation Army Navy), and its role in the future of both Chinese domestic politics and Asian international politics becomes valuable for one concerned about the future the Asian region. What is ahead for the PLA Navy- Who are the PLA Navy leaders and what do they reP resent? How do they interact with the Chinese Communist Party? How will both the Navy’s leader ship and the party leadership react to the new cir cumstances that face them today? By considering ^ nature of today’s naval and political leadership, an the nature of the regional environment they work in- one can make reasonable assumptions about rbe Navy’s future. ,
The PLA Navy, founded in 1950, is the rh*r largest navy in the world, in terms of personnel aS signed, behind those of the United States and rhe Soviet Union.2 Yet this Navy is no mobile oce,'11 traveler as are the world’s two larger fleets. The Navy has been built almost entirely as a coastal de fense force designed to protect the long Chinese co*lS from those who would “. . .thrust our great mothcr^ land back into the abyss of suffering wherein 0 China, with a defenseless coastline, was subjugate bullying by imperialism at will.”3 Subjugatl0°
At left, two Chinese sailors man antisubmarine rocket launchers on board a “Hainan”-class fast patrol craft. In the background, rockets are being fired by a sister vessel. Above are Chinese coast defense cruise missiles, land-based versions of the Soviet “Styx."
th
Past> and the Communists have been determined not t0 repeat the mistake of coastal vulnerability.
Furthermore, this numerically impressive but defensively oriented Navy lacks the technological, Managerial, and tactical sophistication of the U. S. ar>d Soviet navies. Its capability to coordinate any 'arge-scale combat operations is untested. Perhaps the paradox of the world’s third largest navy being unable to project its power into blue water can be explained by the fact that the Chinese have been un- af>le to develop any consistent plan for long-range naval development. Though Mao Zedong (Mao Tse- tUng) called for a navy to be a “green curtain at sea,” tf,e Chinese admit that “the development of a power- fnl Navy has not been smooth sailing.”4 What, then, are the causes of the PLA Navy’s undulating fortunes through the years?
The PLA Navy is politically amphibious; it operates on the domestic turf of Communist Party poli- lcs as well as in the waters of international politics. n the PLA’s case, naval development is influenced •tst by the domestic environment—how the Chinese f-°mrnunist Party perceives domestic needs and feels the Navy should evolve in a social as well as a profes- Sl°nal sense, and then, how the Navy responds to tMsuing party directives. Traditionally, the party has t’Manded the Navy spend considerable time study- lng not only seamanship and navigation but also the Political directives of Mao, the Great Helmsman ‘Mself. Concurrently, the Navy has often made do "‘th outmoded material, and occasionally not tn°ugh of that. The Navy has been generally reluc- tar,t to allow the party the wide control it desires, Inferring instead to pursue traditional concerns such ^proved operational readiness. When the two &r°ups have shared similar views on these issues, ^Uch as during the Cultural Revolution when Defense Mister Lin Biao and the Navy’s Li Zopeng coopered extensively in involving the party in the Navy’s a*ly routine, the Navy has stood to benefit. During e period of this cooperation between Lin and Li,
Navy shipbuilding reached unprecedented levels. This cooperation has, however, been the exception rather than the rule.
The second factor influencing the Navy’s development has been the Communist Party’s perception of the international environment. Periods of perceived threat from a seagoing enemy, such as the early 1950s when a Nationalist Chinese reprisal seemed imminent, or in the late 1960s when Lin Biao sounded alarms about China’s encirclement at sea by the United States, provide the Navy a healthy climate for training and expansion as its leaders see fit. Conversely, a diminished threat perception naturally lessens the need for a Navy.
These two factors, then, are the crucial determinants of the PLA Navy’s future. The Communist Party and Navy elite must share similar views of the Navy’s proper function in Chinese society—and a sufficient international danger must exist—to warrant immediate attention to Navy building. Any supposition about the future of the PLA Navy must take these into account.
Today’s Party and Naval Leadership: Viable Partners? Without a doubt, the most important man in the PLA Navy Command today is 71-year-old Ye Fei, who became the PLA Navy’s Commander (referred to here simply as CNO) in February 1980. Ye replaced the venerable Xiao Jingguang (Hsiao Ching-kuang) who was CNO from the Navy’s creation in 1950. Ye’s selection received minimal publicity, and no public statements are available to reveal his intentions concerning naval development. Despite this apparent lack of evidence, a consideration of Ye’s past reveals his unmistakable political inclinations.
Following the Communist victory in 1949, Ye settled into civil and military administrative duties in southeast China. On 1 March 1979, after 22 years of dependable but uneventful civil service, and not a day of formal association with the Navy, Ye Fei became the Navy’s highest political officer, the 1st
Political Commissar. His appointment came just three weeks after the death of his predecessor Su Zhenhua, an officer once purged for his devotion to the causes of military professionalism and technological improvement. Ye Fei was transferred from the Ministry of Communications almost immediately upon Su’s death to become 1st Political Commissar. A year later, he became CNO. How did this happen?
An examination of PLA Navy history shows that during swift changes of the political line in China, political commissars have been dashed from power just as quickly, sometimes to be later restored with equal rapidity. Navy political commissars are political pawns—an established niche in the high echelons of Navy power is no guarantee of, nor a prerequisite for, even the highest of political commissar positons.
Obviously the 1970s and the year 1980 have been a time of rapid change in China, as Deng Xiaoping ensconced himself in the saddle of Communist Party control. Deng’s recent hints at retirement, as well as Hua Guofeng’s replacement as premier by an avowed Dengist, Zhao Zhiyang, accent Deng’s skill in placing his subordinates in key positions of party contm to guarantee the continuance of his pragmatic aP' proach to politics once he is gone. Appointment after appointment to top Chinese positions indicates that the newly appointed share a philosophy akin t0 Deng’s.
Thus, the arrival of Ye Fei as the PLA Navy’s CNO dovetailed nicely with the consolidation of De°£s power, and with good reason. During the 1960s, ^ lowing his own Cultural Revolution purge, Det1^ slipped quietly away from the vengeance of the Re Guards into Guanzhou Military Region where he 'vilS sheltered by Wei Guoqing, then 1st Political Con1 missar of the region. Several years later, a political rehabilitated Deng showed his gratitude to \Vei having Wei appointed to the important post of D1 rector of the General Political Department—the of' ganization reponsible for the control of all PLA com missars. Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing were no strangefS to each other. In 1949, Wei was the Deputy Pol*11 cal Commissar of the 10th Army Group within the Third Field Army while Ye was the unit com mander. In 1950, they both assumed similar PoS1 tions in the Fujian Military District. In the follo"'l(1h years, their respective paths did not cross directly' However, given the fact that both were constantly involved in the administration and politics of south east China, they surely remained in contact. Fuf thermore, both had close association with the £orn
avy s command—Du Yide, Liu Zhijian, and Liu a°sheng. The political orientation of these three ITlen is unmistakable. All have proven their affinity t(nvard the ideas represented by Deng Xiaoping— technological sophistication, military profes- ^uualism, and Western organizational and opera- ^l()rial doctrine—and all were purged for their ideas F their foes in the Cultural Revolution. All three p‘^e comebacks. Du became the PLA Navy’s 1st Qhtical Commissar briefly in 1978 and holds the F°s<tion now; Liu Zhijian became the political com-
^'ttee for Receiving and Settling Overseas Chinese ln the early 1960s.'1 The political link between Ye, (who directs all political commissars), and Deng 's dear.
Surely, though, others must have had equally suit- aSle political connections. Why was Ye Fei picked above others with similar ideological backgrounds and personal ties? Twenty-five years of army corned and 22 years of civil service are hardly the formal preparations of a Navy leader. In a Navy run y ex-generals, however, the fact that Ye is a native Fujian, long a province with substantial maritime and fishing heritage, might give him the background c°nsidered necessary for the Navy’s command.1’ Hav- |n8 been a part of this maritime environment so °ng, Ye might be suitably disposed toward a ITlaritime approach to make him an effective administrator in Beijing while his fleet commanders carry ^Ut professional operations. Ye Fei’s ascension to the avy pinnacle is more plausible in this light.
Lest one believe that the rise of Ye Fei is an iso- tt<a phenomenon, consider the careers of the sec- third, and fourth ranking members of the
missar in 1979; and Liu Daosheng became the 1st Deputy Commander in 1979. In April 1980, Du was appointed Commander, Lanzhou Military Region, significant because a Navy leader has never held this important non-coastal region post. And in addition, a Navy leader with proven Dengist sentiments, Pan Yan, was named to command the Beijing Garrison. The Beijing Garrison is responsible for the leadership’s security—Pan is certainly politically acceptable to the leadership.7
To discuss the political inclinations of the Navy, one is thus well advised to look to the leaders of the Beijing shore establishment, for they command the Navy, and are the liaison between the Communist Party and the operational Navy’s fleet commands. In bygone days, Navy articles sponsored by the shore command appearing in the Chinese press offered perfunctory support for the party line. Today, the Navy polemics that scorch the Gang of Four and call incessantly for modernization and professionalism are not the toadying of a Navy fighting for its survival but the heartfelt sentiments of a Dengist naval elite. In bygone days, a Dengist such as Su Zhenhua received little assistance from Xiao Jingguang within the Navy and faced resistance from political circles in Beijing. Today, judging from previous political experience, the professionally oriented high command should have the ear of the political leadership. Without a doubt, the first condition identified for an expansion of the Navy—a unified perception concerning the role of politics, professionalism, and modernization by the Party and Navy elite—can be found in China today.
The Party's Perception of the International Environment: The second area identified as crucial to the Navy’s development has been how the Communist Party perceives the international environment. This may seem a superfluous observation—certainly the political leadership’s perception of the international environment influences the priority given to defense issues in any nation. The Chinese, however, have proven particularly prone to not allowing plans for the Navy’s development to mature. In this land of limited developmental resources, projects that cry for immediate attention tend to take priority, while less
After many years of relying on Communist sources for their weapons, Chinese naval officers are now reaching out to examine the technology available from Western nations.
ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY (BOTH PICTURES
Above are a new Chinese replenishment oiler and a "Luta”-class guided missile destroyer. Ships of these types enable the PLA Navy to move beyond the coast defense force status it had for many years after World War II.
pressing items are relegated to the uncertain future. The latter has been the Navy’s experience in China. It is useful to consider what regional issues, and what domestic issues with a regional impact, affect the prospects of the Navy’s growth today.
The success of the heralded Four Modernizations will depend, to a large degree, on how successful the Chinese are in establishing an infrastructure capable of processing large numbers of imported raw materials and manufactured goods. The maritime industry can be considered part of this infrastructure. The shipping industry also, however, brings the modernization program into the realm of regional politics. Already the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) has come into direct commercial competition with the Soviet line, Morflot.8 As Chinese commercial ships increasingly frequent Asian waters, they will add another dimension to Pacific strategy.
Another sometimes neglected consideration in China’s modernization is the development of the nation’s offshore oil resources. Three discoveries in late 1979, all considered major finds, were accomplished by the Chinese without outside assistance. Because all three fields are well developed, many consider that the Chinese have enormous development plaflS for offshore sites.H A huge seismic development plafl is under way along the Chinese coast covering 550,000 square kilometers from the Gulf of Bohai to the Tonkin Gulf.10 The Chinese waters are likely t0 get busier.
If the Chinese are concerned about protecting these projects, then their primary cause for concern lS the Soviet Union. The Soviets have effectively gar risoned the 7,000-mile land border, and the Chinose now fear the same encirclement from the sea aS “• ■ -the Soviet Navy is moving forward with an lin' perialistic gunboat policy and carrying out the ol tsars’ policies by stepping up naval strength to seixe maritime and global hegemony.”11 In a different era* Soviet sea mastery would have mattered little to rh£ inward-looking Chinese. Today, however, Chinese feel a threat to their maritime enterprises >n the Pacific and Indian oceans. While vilifying bo1 the Soviets and Americans for expansion in the In dian Ocean, Chinese criticism of the United States 15 tepid, while the “desire of Soviet revisionism to ex pand into the Indian Ocean to acquire bases una friendly pretexts” is the true cause of alarm.12
The Chinese have more than a passing interest tn events in the surrounding waters. Indeed, more tha(1 ever, seagoing concerns will play a vital role in c^e development of the People’s Republic. With f ^ Communist Party and Navy elite both willing, an China’s new international conditions seemingly manding, the two fundamental conditions necessary
for the Navy’s development seem to exist. | with increased technological capability, and despite |
A Gold. Star Rising at Sea? Before glibly advancing Predictions about the bright future ahead for the PLA Navy, one must deal with a few final items. Deng Xiaoping and his cohorts in power have proven themselves anxious to modernize China’s military. But considering the fact that control of the PLA still tests primarily in the hands of generals with little nowledge of naval affairs, and that the Navy’s repreSentation on party governing organs is small in comparison to the ground forces’ and air forces’ representation, the prospects of Navy expansion become less eertam. A disposition toward military modernization °es not necessarily mean there is also a disposition toward naval modernization. A long border of poten- t'al conflict with the Soviet Union, as well as hostile noighbors to the south in Vietnam, combined with t e prevailing ground combat experience of the PLA’s toader leadership, creates a natural concern for the Certain readiness of the ground forces. Certainly, the Chinese fear the Soviet Navy’s presence in the Pacific arfo Indian oceans and the immense potential for deduction of China’s growing maritime concerns that •t offers. But the Soviets are not the only global sea- Power. The United States (with limited help from 1 e Japanese) is considered an anchor of stability in e Pacific. Indeed, the Chinese were not at all Phased with hints that the U. S. Seventh Fleet p°uld take a less assertive role in the Western a(dfic. Perhaps it would be ideal to put a fleet to ea capable of protecting China’s seagoing concerns; owever, for the moment, the Chinese are likely to ^ y on the presence of the U. S. and Japanese fleets o deter any threat to their shipping, petroleum, and °ther less salient interests, such as fishing. This is not to say that change will not occur *(h*n the Navy itself. The professional inclinations the leaders are likely to mean increased emphasis ° improved training and managerial systems that Siuire less capital outlay than do ship construction du weapons acquisition programs.1'4 And neither is 6 Navy likely to remain passive in a regional is°f^*Ct SUC^ as one Wlth the Vietnamese. The Navy ully capable of limited striking operations as well pS having a considerable defensive capability. The j X Navy is no match for a bluewater enemy like the °viet Navy, given the Soviets’ long-range power ca- dfo of striking the Chinese from outside their tJ| marine and guerilla boat perimeter. It is likely S(.at Navy would be a formidable foe in Ceoarios below a full-scale ocean war. f ^espite the fact that the Navy’s leadership might °r an expansion along Western lines, complete | LAIttL L1IC controlling tne Lommunist Party organs might be quite interested in developing a Navy to protect the fledgling maritime interests under the auspices of the Four Modernizations, the PLA Navy s prospects for growth will be modest in the near future. With tough economic choices confronting the political leadership from all sides, the military is likely to have a low priority, and within the military, the Navy is even less likely to obtain anything beyond the minimum possible allocation. Despite compelling reasons to develop the Chinese Navy, prospects for development of the Navy the Chinese want today and may need in the future remain dim. ‘Chinese names ace rendered in this article in the recently adopted Pinyin form. Both the Chinese and Western news media have adopted Pinyin as a means of expressing the Chinese language in English. For the reader's benefit, familiar names will appear in their traditional form following the Pinyin. 2Niu Sien-chong. "The Maritime Posture of Communist China," NATO's Fifteen Nations, February-March 1978, p. 111. 3Foreign Broadcast Information Service (People's Republic of China) 16 March 1977, p. El. *lbid., 14 July 1978, p. E2. ’Daniel T. Y. Lee and Rodney Tomlinson. “Chinese Leadership Biography,” a computer data bank on file at the U. S. Naval Academy, continually being updated. "An idea conveyed to this author on 7 March 1980 by Commander L. B. Swanson, USN. 7Lee and Tomlin'sin, op. cit. “A. Romenenko. China's Maritime Transportation,” Morskoy Flat No 8, 1978, p. 1. ' -"China Shipping Survey,” China Trade Report, (Far Eastern Economic Review, February 1980) p. 27. u)Ibid., p. 27. "Peking Domestic Service in Mandarin, 12 June 1976, p. A2. nIhid., 13 June 1979, p. Al. 13Niu Sien-chong, Ibid., p. 113, "Swanson, unpublished paper, “An Introduction to Chinese Command, Control, and Communications.” The author wishes to thank Professors D. T. Y. Lee and R. L. Ran of the U. S. Naval Academy and Commander L. Bruce Swanson for their assistance. 1 Ensign Houck is a 1980 graduate of the Naval 1 Academy, where he majored in international af- lairs and studied the Chinese language. As a mid- | shipman, Ensign Houck received the Office of Naval Intelligence-Harry E. Ward Prize for being the OUtStanding graduating midshipman in the mr * study of foreign languages. In 1979, he was selected for a six-week foreign exchange cruise with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, and he served as an intern m OpNav (Plans and Policy Analysis). Following graduation from the Surface Warfare Basic Course at Newport, Ensign Houck has recently reported to the USS Caron (DD-970). |
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