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study of technology and warfighting. The conflict
dimensional operating space. The resultant hybrid proved itself a key factor in combat.
For nearly 30 years, tacair survived a series of measure and countermeasure developments in both tactics and technology. Postwar developments of air defense technology produced a stream of limiting effects on both the employment and effectiveness of aircraft. Evolutionary advances in air platforms, weapon systems, and tactics, however, enabled tactical air power to maintain a combat performance edge over similar evolving defensive systems up through the early 1970s. Spectacular Israeli Air Force successes in the Six-Day War of 1967 provided vivid illustration of tacair’s pre-eminence over the battlefield Confidence in the fighter-bomber’s key combat role continued until the decade of the 1970s.
Difficulties encountered by the Israelis in the face of more sophisticated defenses in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 challenged tacair’s dominance. Such new defenses, deployed by the Warsaw Pact in great numbers, organized into mobile, integrated systems and manned by front-line Soviet troops place in question the utility of Western aircraft and doctrine over a future European battlefield. This essay will briefly investigate whether tactical airpower can be successfully employed in support of theater operations in the NATO central region. The efficacy of carrier air power in the area will provide a secondary focus of investigation.
Mission Contribution: Although catalogued somewhat differently by various observers, the missions assigned to modern tacair forces fall into three general categories: counter-air, air interdiction, and close air support. Traditional employment strategies include a hierarchy of functional tasking, usually employing a sequence of campaigns against enemy aircraft and other air power systems to enable effective power projection directly against ground forces. Achieving air superiority is the goal of initial air power employment. Counter-air missions, including direct air defense, air-to-air attrition, and air strikes against airfields are the traditional means employed to meet the air superiority requirement.
It must be stressed that air superiority is a condition; it is a means to an end, not a final objective in its own right. The goal is more than just safeguarding friendly forces; it is to prevent opposing aircraft from interfering with the application of friendly air power to the land battle. To enable one’s own side to employ air power freely is the goal. Like horse 'For footnotes, please turn to page 39.
cavalry, air power’s initial task in battle is to create a favorable set of circumstances or conditions, . ■ t0 create the greatest possible number of opportunities for observing the enemy’s disposition and movements, and carrying firepower against his ability t0 wage war on the ground.”2
This cavalry-like function carries over directly int0 the second of tacair’s missions, air interdiction. A>r interdiction is designed to neutralize the enemy5 military potential before it can be committed effec" tively against friendly forces. Lines of communics' tion, command and control elements, and second echelon combat forces are typical targets of the a‘r interdiction mission. Once again, this campaign dot5 not constitute an objective in its own right. It 15 more properly executed as a method of enhancing one’s own effectiveness on the front line.
It is in performance of the close air support m|S' sion that tactical air power has the potential to be most dramatically effective. In this mission, a,r power serves as a substitute for artillery and anti' armor fire. The advantage of providing supporting , fire from the air lies in the extreme mobility of mr" planes, permitting a rapid response of concentrate firepower over a wide area and with great economy 0 force.
Implications of Yom Kippur: The deterministic effeCt of weapons technology upon tactics is amply ill115' trated by military history. This relationship is ind1' cated by Figure 1. The Arab-Israeli War of Octobet 1973, however, provides a point of departure in dlC fers the first and, to date, only look at the comb3t employment of modern weapons on a large scale' Many observers have seen in the 1973 conflict upset in the traditional balance between offense defense in the air war. The technological surpr‘st achieved by the new Soviet/Arab air defense severely degraded the effectiveness of Israeli air power in ;l but the pure air-to-air/air superiority role.
Perhaps the most important technological advancC demonstrated in 1973 is the capability of ground dc fenses to achieve battlefield superiority by then1 selves. Some analysts see evidence that the new a‘r defense systems, primarily the SA-6 Gainful/zsU 23' [
Shilka combination, have fundamentally altered dlC relationship between aircraft and missile defense Nearly 80 Israeli aircraft were lost to ground defen5t'|. during the first week of action. Significantly, most 0 these were shot down over the same Syrian fr0llC where the Israeli Air Force achieved spectacular snc cesses in 1967.3 In all, the Israelis reported 102 tac tical aircraft lost during the October 1973 confl*ct’ I
___________________ Measure__________________
Observation and strike capability
profile adjusted; go higher and faster to exploit lrr>e of flight characteristics of defensive munitions
^edi
routi
^be determined
A/C
s’ infrared
Performance improvements; jinking profiles, e tctronic threat warning
■ performance improvements to permit aerodynamic defeat of missiles; on board ECM (ALQ/
lar/iR Decoy); profiles adjusted beneath SAM e"velope
edicated ECM support tasking; further profile ad- jj Strnent underneath SAM envelope; external stores
Stations to enable additional A/C performance
•cated suppression tactics; defense avoidance ng> stand-off weaponry
Sll ^'rtraft; AAA—antiaircraft artillery; SAM—surface-to-air missiles;
____________________ C ountermeasure__________
First generation AAA; unguided visually directed fire
Second generation AAA; proximity fuse, radar fire control
First generation SAMs (SA-2); air intercept missiles, command guidance
Second generation SAM (SA-3); improved aerodynamic performance missiles, ECCM for radar fire control, optical fire control
Third generation SAM (SA-6); terminal homing missiles, extremely low altitude performance
_______________________ Plui_______________ _ _
Third generation AAA (ZSU 23-4); extremely rapid rates of fire, track mounted mobility, computer fire control
Defense in depth; infantry mobile SAMS (SA-7/8/9)
With the
Gainful/Shilka combination claiming half
th ~
Wtrt0tab Although Arab claims of air-to-air kills
0 I S1gnificantly greater, the Israelis acknowledge °f the 102 losses to causes other than ground
tnses.1
could be dealt with in a concentrated rollback and suppression campaign that the Israeli Air Force achieved the requisite air superiority over the front which permitted both effective close air support and acceptable loss rates. Only after two weeks of intensive efforts, including significant employment of antiaircraft weapons and helicopters, did the Israelis gain control of the air over the battlefield.
The significant reverses inflicted on the fighter- bomber have prompted many observers to predict the demise of tactical air power. As defense analyst Seymour Deitchman asks:
“If the effectiveness of tactical airpower and all its accouterments has been placed in doubt, and if the price keeps rising until it may cost more to destroy a target than the target is worth, why pay the price?”6
Even the most confident advocates of air power have recognized the need for a radical change in equipment and/or tactics to accommodate the dramatic new capabilities of air defense. The need for a dedicated suppression effort has been the most obvious lesson.
Although such implications were quickly grasped by the Israelis, the early successes of the Arab ar-
In
e"ted
Addition to inflicting aircraft losses at unprece- tates, the Arab air defense denied Israeli ‘tndV ^ ^reec^orn t0 conduct the close air support 1 Attlefield interdiction missions fundamental to ab ^ * ^e^ense Force doctrine. In fact, Israel twice G(^°ned air support and interdiction strikes on the t\v<ln ^ront because of prohibitive losses on the first 0 days of fighting.3
di
Nai
.Another
V|Ppur
gr0
dcs
"nd
significant factor highlighted by the Yom
experience is the implication of aircraft sheltering on traditional air interdiction tac-
5 'T’l
' ltle Arabs, having been defeated while still on tli br°"nd in 1967, had prepared their air forces for Ee Isfaeli Air Force strikes which came against slJ^an and Syrian airfields in 1973. With aircraft tEeCr,ng and rapid runway repair an Arab strength, tjCjSraebs were forced to rely more on air-to-air tac- COuln their air superiority campaign. In this e^-a, effort, the Israelis were spectacularly suc- ub however, it was not until the ground defenses
th,
ECM—electronic countermeasures; ECCM—electronic counter countermea-
ment, and sacrifice was able to stop the Arab a' vances. After two weeks’ effort, Israel had achieve
air superiority and had seized the initiative on
mored forces and the adverse political considerations of giving up ground in the Golan did not permit committing the Israeli Air Force to a sequential employment of suppression and then support. The parallels between that situation and the NATO defense in Europe’s central region are apparent. If one cannot afford to give up ground, the price of holding that ground may be exorbitant.
The War in Europe: Observers impressed by the achievements of Arab air defenses in 1973 are sometimes overwhelmed by prospects of employing tacair against Warsaw Pact forces, whose air defenses are heavier, deeper, newer, and much more mobile than those which were so effective against the Israelis. The lessons learned in 1973 were not lost on the Soviets, who multiplied their arsenal of air defense systems three times in the first five years after the Yom Kip- pur War. For every U. S. surface-to-air missile system operational, there are generally two Soviet systems in the field. The ratio of surface-to-air missile launchers in Europe favors the Warsaw Pact forces by a factor of more than three to one. The presence of a two-to-one numerical superiority for Warsaw Pact fighters (based upon the opening days of a shortwarning war) and the commitment of Warsaw Pact air forces to a large-scale program of shelter and dispersal for their aircraft make the air problem a formidable one for NATO.
The Warsaw Pact air capability and air defense order of battle seem especially forbidding when viewed against NATO’s tacair employment strategy. Essentially, tacair is the great equalizer in the NATO defense plan for Europe’s central region. Outgunned, outnumbered, and conceding strategic and tactical initiative to the enemy, NATO relies on the mobile firepower of its fighter-bombers to counter the massive armor attack expected from the east. The idea is to concentrate air power at the critical points of the Warsaw Pact offensive, to slow the enemy’s advance until reinforcements can be in place from European rear areas and from North America. According to unclassified Congressional Budget Office studies, the air support focus is especially critical to short war and surprise attack scenarios in which ”... the most important missions would be defense against preemptive air strikes and close air support to blunt the tank offensive.”7 Such scenarios appear to offer little opportunity for sequential commitment of air superiority tactics, whether directed against ground defenses, air bases, or preliminary air-to-air attrition schemes.
A paradox is apparent in such a strategy. While NATO’s tacair forces have become an increasingly important part of the ground defense, current doctrine for fighter-bomber employment runs contrary 10 what is required to enhance air power’s effectiveness or provide for its long-term survival. If unable to give ground while conducting dedicated suppression campaigns, NATO’s tactical aircraft will have to pay the same high price extracted from the Israeli A*r Force in 1973- This price may be measured in term5 of aircraft and aircrew attrition or in the relatively short period air power will be available beh,re cumulative losses neutralize its battlefield utility' Perhaps Deitchman is correct when he says:
“Since the high cost of aircraft limits then numbers, even with the best performance, the available air force will run out of sorties long t>e' fore it runs out of targets. For this reason, tactic^ air power is unlikely to be decisive on the battlefield, even though its collaboration with ground forces is indispensable.”8 To be fair, the “success” of tacair employment within such a framework depends upon the evaluator’s point of view. The Israeli Air Force, f°r example, lost significant numbers of planes when political considerations forced it to penetrate front' line defenses without preparatory suppression effoftS in the first week of the 1973 war. Despite loss rateS clearly unacceptable over the long run, and perhaP5 for some societies unacceptable over any period 0 time, the Israeli Air Force did achieve its objective5. Aircraft survivability improved after ground foNeS were used in suppression of fixed air defense site5, after penetration and ordnance delivery profiles wefe adjusted and electronic countermeasure support e*
panded. A combination of revised tactics, reinforee
id'
d
the
ground. The price was dear, but the mission was aC complished.
The Tactical Pendulum: The dynamics of measure countermeasure were not arrested permanently by cl new technology demonstrated by the Arab defend5 in 1973- The evolutionary process depicted in Figuft 1 has been a continuing one. Given that currellj NATO strategy casts tacair in a difficult and crit[C role, considerable effort has been directed at impt°v ing the effectiveness of aircraft against modern ;1,t defenses. Reactionary efforts have been focused 1(1 three primary areas, namely:
y Exploitation of technological and conceptual gaP in the Soviet networks
► Development of new technology to improve otfe(l sive capability in spite of defense capabilities
at units (see Figure 2), a concentrated effort n8 a single divisional or army group sector could
a corridor for air access to the rear of the ex- r•, e<3 battle front. Having penetrated such a cor. r; NATO tacair might reap large dividends by b,;in8 second-echelon forces staged immediately *nd the front. The mass of the total offensive k t be diluted before it could be focused on the
ort
tffc
Cr‘tical
aPpears more attractive from both cost and ef-
con-
Centr;
New
^eetj
ate strike aircraft in close support roles.
technology has primarily concentrated on
by -l
o ne new defense networks. Aircraft have been t0 at extremely low altitudes (below 200 t0 stay beneath the overlapping fire control
Figure 2 Typical Air Defense of GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) Army Group
Weapon | Type | # Batteries | # Launchers |
ZSU 23-4 | AAA | 32 | 128 |
S-60/57mm. | AAA | 23 | 138 |
SA-6 Gainful | SAM | 5 | 15 |
SA-4 Ganef | SAM | 9 | 27 |
SA-2 Guideline | SAM | 3 | 18 |
AAA—antiaircraft a | rtillery; SAM— | -surface-to-air missiles |
Adjustment of tactics and doctrine to enhance air- traft survivability and mission effectiveness
Even sophisticated air defense systems have vulnerabilities which invite exploitation. Strong points sometimes be converted into Achilles’ heels. °dern surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery netvv°rks are prodigious consumers of fuel and ammunition. These characteristics make them vulnera- c to tactics of saturation and decoy. Night and Poor weather feints by manned aircraft, coupled with massive, cheap penetration of small sectors by unmanned remotely piloted vehicles, could rapidly de- k ete fke magazines and fuel tanks of Warsaw Pact atteries maneuvering ahead of extended logistics p31 S' Concentrated defense suppression missions by Wild Weasel aircraft, in conjunction with elec. nic countermeasures deception, could achieve con- t'table defense attrition. Follow-on attacks could en achieve further hard kills of the air defense sys- s or complete necessary direct support missions, tie eC3Use a‘r dcfenses at the forward edge of the bat- area are generally organic to Warsaw Pact ground
comb; aloi open point of attack. Such a battlefield interdiction ctiveness standpoints than the current plan to by ,ng the strike profile restrictions forced on tacair
for.
feet)
tu^3r horizons of modern surface-to-air missiles. f01 Phots consider 500 knots a minimum airspeed eSuccessful penetration of the engagement Sh It ^tS raP'd-fire artillery systems such as ne3' hfigh speeds and low altitudes are unable to 0f rahze the threats entirely, but the aircraft’s time
nave placed great demands on both pilots and Pu[fe)n systems. New inertial navigation and comfit tr re^ease systems, however, have enabled ex- Cremely few, fast, circuitous penetrations w'hile in- rej. S‘n8 navigation accuracy and target acquisition gtr)1 It:y. These same systems, coupled with a new' t>o precision guided munitions (“smart
s ) and area cluster bomb units, have resulted in increasing target kill probabilities per delivery pass and per strike sortie. Standoff, “fire-and-target” weapons such as Maverick highlight the new air capability for combining increased target destruction w'ith decreased aircraft exposure. The result has been an improved exchange ratio of targets killed per aircraft lost. Over time, this equates to an increase in the period in which a given size air force will be operational and an increase in the costs the enemy must bear to engage it.
Direct improvements in aircraft survivability have also been achieved. The A-10 and F/A-I8, for example, have been designed with features to enhance both aircrew longevity and airframe resilience. On-board protection equipment has continued an evolutionary course of matching specific defense threats. Radar deception repeaters, chaff and infrared decoy dispensers, and aerodynamic performance advances all reduce the kill probability of the defense systems. Infrared suppression sections on tailpipes and a new infrared source suppressant paint have been developed to counter the expanding threat of terminally homing, infantry mobile, infrared missiles.
Offensive tactical developments have also responded to the new defensive capabilities. Perhaps the most, significant advances in tactics are those which combine tacair and other combat assets to beat the sophisticated defenses. Although the airplane may no longer claim unchallenged mastery of the battlefield, no other single weapon system can claim the title either. Israel’s 1973 efforts at using the 45- nautical mile Lance missile with a 1,000-pound cluster bomb warhead were pioneer if ineffective attempts to integrate ground firepower in the air defense suppression role. Newer developments in conventional and laser guided counter-battery fire from ground artillery promise new effectiveness for an air-ground suppression team. Joint aerial attack tactics, employing complementary attack helicopters and fighter-bombers should enable saturation of sector defenses with large numbers of strike aircraft and suppressive firepower. As Van Creveld predicted from his observations of the Yom Kippur war:
“The result is not likely to be the disappearance
of manned aircraft, but their integration with
other weapons in a closely-knit team affording
mutual support.”9
The Role of Carrier Aircraft: Carrier air wings provide the same general battlefield utility as the land- based planes already discussed, subject to the same limitations posed by defensive orders of battle. Specific systems may offer a marginal increase in effectiveness in specific mission applications, however. The F-14/AWG-9 multiple target engagement capability could be a way to augment the airbase defense or a battlefield counter-air campaign assigned to less sophisticated land-based fighters. In similar fashion, the improved A-6E/TRAM all-weather attack aircraft could augment the F-Ul direct-support and interdiction missions. In the general case, however, carrier planes and land-based U.S. planes can be substituted for each other.
The most attractive aspects of tacair carrier planes are found in the nature of the aircraft carrier, not the specific aircraft. It is worth remembering that every permanent South Korean military airbase was overrun by North Korean forces within the first five days of the 1950 Communist attack.10 The presence of mobile master jet bases afloat provides an additional dimension of depth and maneuver to the NATO air defense and air strike posture. Such flexibility could be especially significant in the Northern Army Group area, where the NATO defenses are never very far from being backed up against the sea. The carriers offer bases much less vulnerable to targeting by surface-to-surface cruise missiles, short-range attacks by Soviet Frontal Aviation or sabotage than the fixed bases ashore. By its very nature, the carrier provides a flexible, standoff capability not otherwise available.
An additional attribute of carrier-based air power is the balanced nature of its “packaging.” The difficult communications environment expected in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict will make detailed planning and coordination among dispersed support, command-control-communications, defense, and strike assets difficult to achieve. The carrier air wing, with elements of all the necessary type planes in residence, presents a multi-mission, multi-role capability that is self-contained and "ready on arrival.” The firepower of such a package should not be underestimated. Post-Vietnam studies indicate that 5 land- based fighter squadrons and 20 KC-135 tankers (the nominal load of two air bases) were required to match the sortie rate of a single aircraft carrier. Any
contribution of carrier-based tacair to NATO’s defense is dependent upon assumptions as to carrier availabil' ity, threat level at the time the carriers are engaged, and the specific mission tasking involved. In particular, potential carrier operating areas are time and scenario dependent in terms of both operational suitability and task force security.
A potential sanctuary for carrier operations is offered by the Irish Sea. Forces might operate effec' tively there in deep-strike and interdiction roles even early in the campaign and under high threat levels from full-strength Warsaw Pact forces. Readily sealed against hostile submarine and surface forces and shielded by friendly land masses, a one- or two- carrier task force could remain free to maneuver over a reasonably large geographic area and still be well within range of the forward edge of the Europen11 battle area. Tacair embarked here could operate free from the onus of the precision surface to surface nns' sile targeting that threatens fixed position land bases. Depending on political developments, a simdar sanctuary could be offered by the Adriatic and I Tyrrhenian Seas in the Mediterranean.
If commitment of the carrier or carriers were withheld until after substantial attrition of sub' j marines, a similar haven could be created along ^ Norwegian coast or even in the North Sea. The lat' ; ter, covered by an allied air umbrella and by ancl'
battalion
Regiment
Subrnarine and mine barriers, also offers reduced opportunities for covert hostile submarine operations by
suhUe *tS s^a^ow depth. With local surface and surface naval superiority, carrier task groups ^n'Sht operate very close to the battlefield, offering lrnportant measure of depth to the total tacair ef- o^rt and a significant addition to the total inventory air assets. Figure 3 illustrates the radius of action g Ssi°'hties for carrier based tacair in the central rr°Pean region. A nominal 500-nautical mile *us is assigned for strike and interdiction missions A'[1][2] [3] [4] [5] [6]> A-6, A-18, and F-4 sorties. A 250-mile radius is ^ned for close air support. a$ne specially promising use of carrier air forces is wa strategic tacair reserve. Withheld from harm’s during the first high-attrition phase of the bat- tr ,Carr*er planes could be the decisive factor if in- ■ Uced over the battlefield at the proper moment.
could air
C
_________ Equipment__________
1 SA-9 Gaskin Platoon (4 tracked vehicles of 4 launchers)
1 SA-7 Grail Company (400 shoulder fired launchers)
(J) P
(2) r°U^ ^e^enses based uPon a fr°nt 50km wide by 100km deep t ^Xe<^ base facilities (airfields, barracks, supply terminals, etc.) pro- te<J by dedicated SA-3/ZSU 23-4 combinations.
Power projection deck loading of two carriers provide 90 fresh attack aircraft and 40 or more ^ superiority fighters for such an effort. The same 'Ps with F/A-I8 air wings might represent 150 fresh k^-role aircraft.
CarrVen ke^ore the carriers themselves are available, c, ler aircraft could be a factor over the battlefield, 'vin Uhen at surge posture, one or two fleet air ** and both reserve air wings are in being with- av . a ^eck to deploy upon. This force would be tnena e ^or transatlantic deployment as reinforce- baStu an<^ replacement for the dedicated grounder l^anes- Although the carrier planes would not enjoy t*le same degree of interoperability with allies rtprye<^ by the land-based planes, they nevertheless esent a significant capability.
\.ti(fnc^us*on: Modern advances in air defense pac.tnol°gy have had an undeniably significant im- ftri . °n cbe effectiveness of traditional concepts of of- f)0^ Ve a*r operations. Without question, tactical air t0tr bas been forced to surrender its earlier claims Unchallenged superiority over the battlefield.
Claims that the fighter-bomber cannot survive an engagement with contemporary ground defenses, however, seem premature. Those who see in the Yom Kippur War and in recent Soviet air defense development the demise of tactical air power’s combat utility fail to recognize the full swing of the technological and tactical pendulum.
Far from being banished from modern warfare, tacair has maintained a large part of its combat utility, thanks to continued evolutionary development of equipment and tactics. Airplanes, where available, will still be employed for missions where their unique attributes can help accomplish missions not otherwise attainable. The extreme mobility and firepower concentration potential of air power remains an essential ingredient for the defense of the NATO central front. Directed against second-echelon forces immediately behind the forward edge of the battle area, and in conjunction with a dedicated defense suppression strategy, tacair’s combat contribution could be critical.
Although the costs of employment would be high, tacair can and must be successfully engaged in support of NATO’s theater defense. Carrier air wings, with their integrated mission packaging and basing mobility, have the potential to provide significant augmentation to land based forces. Depending on the timing of its commitment, naval air power might even be decisive.
Lieutenant Commander Connell was graduated from Yale University in 1969 and commissioned through the NROTC program. He is a career light attack plane pilot, having flown various versions of the A-7 aircraft in VA-87, VA-174, VA-192, and his present squadron, VA-97. He was graduated with distinction from the Naval War College command and staff course in June 1980.
'See Charles E. Myers, Jr., "Deep-Strike Interdiction," Proceedings, November 1980, pp. 47-52.
"Seymour S. Deitchman, New Technology and Military Pourr (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 33-
[2]See Martin L. Van Creveld, Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1975), p. 53.
''Tyrus W. Cobb, “Tactical Air Defense: A Soviet-U.S. Assessment,” Air University Review. Mar.-April 1979, p. 32.
'Chaim Herzog, quoted by Robert D. Rassmussen, "The Central Europe Battlefield,” Air University Review. Jul.-Aug. 1978, p. 4.
“Deitchman, p. 62.
[6]CBO Budget Issue Paper, Planning General Purpose Forces: The Tactical Air Forces. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 28.
"Deitchman, p. 42.
"Van Creveld, p. 31.
"See John Lehman, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1978), p. 36.