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During the 1970s, when Navy enlisted men were put in coats and ties, Navy life-styles moved toward the sort of permissiveness that was widespread in American society at large. But the armed forces are different and require a higher standard of discipline to be effective. Sailors’ white hats are back now, and so is discipline. The discipline needs to be even tougher. | cers. The latter were inclined to take the attitude o “don’t make waves” because of the libertarian tone o these previous directives. In addition, the chain 0 command and discipline were further weakened and continue to be—by a proliferation of special advisors and committees forced on commanders. As 3 result, disciplinary problems have been resolved too frequently through special advisors and committees instead of by prompt and firm command action- Such “committee” and “town hall” approaches to the administration and operation of an organizatiofl through consensus, negotiation, or appeasement might be appropriate for civilian enterprises, but they have no place in a military organization. As the Hicks report from Congress put it, “The Navy most |
T^or more than a decade, military smartness and X discipline have been eroded by a libertarian approach to the military aspects of naval life. The overall result has been the development of “permissiveness” in the Navy to such a degree that as early as January 1973 a congressional committee concluded that the concomitant “dangerous deterioration of discipline” would destroy the Navy’s enviable tradition of discipline if not reversed.1 Belated measures, such as the promulgation on 14 November 1972 of Z-gram 117, which addressed the mandatory requirement for the maintenance of good order and discipline, only served to reduce the rate of deterioration, not reverse it. For the chain of command, upon which the restoration of traditional discipline depended, had been seriously weakened by a series of previous Z-grams and associated directives.2 Thus, when middle management petty officers attempted to reverse the continued deterioration of discipline, they were overruled frequently by their offi- | be controlled by command, not demand.” In a noble but misguided over-concentration °n human and social goals during the past decade, the Navy has wandered far from concentrating on ltS fundamental purpose: military operations against the enemy. A current case in point is the soft appt°aC^ to drug abuse at the expense of combat readiness. 1980, the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, uphold ing a court-martial conviction for off-base drug ,n' volvement, noted that drug abuse in the military lS 3 serious problem because: ^ “As military equipment has become more an more sophisticated, there is the concomitant i° creased risk that an operator will be unable t0 handle the complicated weapons system which he is entrusted and upon which his safetf and that of others may depend. . . . [T]here is n° individual in our modern armed forces whose pef formance may not touch others in a signified way.”3 The Navy’s kid-glove approach to discipline duf ing the 1970s apparently stemmed from the vie" |
'For footnotes, please turn to page 50. | that the military has to conform in general with cl vilian standards since military personnel are but 3 mirror image of the general population. In faCt’ |
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however, the armed forces always have had the task of training individuals to be more disciplined than their civilian contemporaries. This concept is supported by a 1974 Supreme Court decision which held that civilian standards do not necessarily apply to military law. The court held that the military is a “specialized society separate from civilian life,” and therefore entitled to its own judicial process.4 Significantly, in its ruling the Court upheld the broadest proscriptions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), General Articles 134 and 135. In 1980, the Court of Military Appeals ruled that:
“The power [of the Congress] to raise and support an army and to maintain a navy and the power to declare war are meaningless unless the reliability and efficiency of the force can be assured in time of peace.”’’
In view of the foregoing, the recent reemphasis by the Chief of Naval Operations on military smartness and discipline in the Navy is a refreshing breeze long overdue. Addressing a group of senior commanders in November 1980, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward laid it on the line: “We have been lax for too long and it is time to reassess where we are. ... I don’t think people join the Navy to be sloppy. We are involving everyone in the chain of command ... in a general assessment of permissiveness. We are going to intensify discipline in the Navy.”6 Admiral Hayward’s call for a higher order of discipline in the Navy comes none too soon. For when next the Navy faces the enemy—and who can say when that will happen?—it is very probable that its ships and men will be faced with the constant threat of air, submarine, and missile attack as never before. Under such conditions, there must be no doubt about the steadfastness of the officers and men. And such steadfastness can be best assured only through military discipline inculcated during peacetime.
Some years ago, Admiral Robert B. Carney described that kind of discipline. Addressing officers in
the Washington, D.C., area shortly after assuming his post as the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carney admonished them to remember well that the “ultimate objective of the Navy is to prepare its forces for combat.”7 Such preparation, he continued: . . adds up to one need: an unceasing attention to command smartness, to discipline, and to professional competence. There can be no compromise in these objectives. If a military service is to maintain the standards necessary for success in war there can be no abridging of the authority necessary to achieve these objectives.”
Speaking specifically of military smartness and discipline, the admiral had this to say:
“I have seen ships where every tiniest detail was cared for with meticulous attention, where inspection and supervision of drills admitted of nothing less than perfection, where competition between the divisions within the ship was razor keen, and those ships were inevitably proud and happy organizations in which serious breaches of discipline were almost unknown. There is nothing wrong with that kind of discipline.”
The political climate today could hardly be more propitious for the reinstitution of that kind of discipline. The Commander in Chief, the Congress, the judiciary, and, most importantly, the people again are highly supportive of the military. Now is the time to make changes while that support runs high. Actually, the first essential steps in that direction already have been taken. In early February 1981, in a special videotaped message to the fleet and in his posture statement to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Admiral Hayward stressed that professionalism is an all-hands evolution. In order to become true Navy professionals, he stated:
“. . . we need to reestablish a firmer, more effective chain of command. We need not only to tighten up on leadership principles, but also strive better to put them into daily practice. High standards of military behavior, courtesy, and appearance are vital parts of readiness because they indicate a command’s sense of alertness, discipline, and motivation.”8
On 28 February, the admiral followed up on this statement of general objectives with NAVOP 031/81,
entitled “Authority of Officers and Petty Officers- In part, he stressed: “If military pride and profes sionalism are to be restored throughout the NavT the full scope of the authority linked to officer an petty officer status must be understood and ex ercised.”
Those two actions alone certainly set the tone forll restoration of traditional military smartness and d's cipline in the Navy. In order to maintain, even *n crease, the momentum already generated in that direction, the following additional specific action5 are suggested:
► Special Advisors, Councils, and Committees—Rest°re a strong, single chain of command by terminating immediately all directives that mandate special a visors, councils, or committees dealing with “human relations” matters in a quasi-chain of command man^ ner. Many of the proceedings and activities associate with these entities actually bypass the chain of com mand or create vehicles that obstruct Pe7t^ officers—the most essential links. Let’s stop running things by “committee” or “town hall” proceedings-
► Commanding Officer Authority and Responsibility ^ Give commanding officers the chance to comman ■ There are more than enough directives and regtila tions to guide them in the performance of the*r duties, including the administration of military juS tice. Let them run their commands within those guidelines instead of essentially running their com mands for them by making strong recommefl dations—tantamount to commands—or even issuing direct orders to them whenever a problem ariseS' Then judge commanding officers on their ability get the job done on their own. If occasionally °n^ fails to meet muster, then he should be relieved, an the cause for his relief should be written off agai°s^. the price that must be paid for the development
bued don ► D:
price will be well worth it, for officers im- Wlth that ability are invaluable in a crisis situa- or combat.
rug Abuse—Abandon the soft approach to drug
commanding officers who can think and act for crnselves without recourse to higher authority. And the
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Se' ^ *s by far the single greatest threat to in- a security and combat readiness; and yet, the avy continues to treat drug abusers simply as mis- s.Ul ed persons who have made a mistake. The Navy D kJ cannot afford to grope with the drug abuse ern ^rom such a liberal viewpoint with combat ^ ness at stake. The service must be as clean as cmanly possible, with drug abuse detection and wht' Pr°gramS already *n ebfect to keep it that way re 7 s^oc^ combat comes. Otherwise, combat sh *,neSS undoubtedly will suffer—just when it U ^e improving—as the result of a sudden in- Pr^0^ ^ar^e numbers of personnel, many of whom sh 3 ^ have been habitual users of drugs. A tough j a^e UP or ship out’ policy on drug abuse could be P cmented by the following three actions:
First, revise the current drug exemption program to provide for the termination of universal, unconditional exemption on a fixed future date, say 30 days after promulgation of the revision. Thereafter, exemption would apply only to individuals in need of medical treatment. However, after completion of whatever mandatory drug treatment is required, they should be discharged as medically unfit or as undesirables. All others who get involved in drug abuse should be referred to courts-martial for adjudication, not captain’s mast. If an individual is convicted for drug abuse by a court-martial but not discharged,
Drugs are the root of many of the Navy’s problems in enforcing the discipline it needs. Drug-sniffing dogs may he part of the solution, hut even more necessary is a get-tough attitude to rid the service of its undesirable characters.
A- DAVIDSON
then the conviction should be used as cause to administratively discharge the individual as an undesirable. In the latter regard, a recent ruling by the Court of Military Appeals held that only under “unusual” circumstances would drug involvement by military personnel off-base be a matter for civilian authorities alone. The Navy should take full advantage of that ruling to rid the ranks of drug abusers. Second, establish a drug abuse detection and control program at least equal in priority and emphasis to that afforded the existing drug education program. A fatal defect in the current effort to detect and control drug abuse is that there is insufficient expertise at the unit level in modern police methods for the detection of drugs and the legal fine points that must be observed to best assure a conviction when a detection is made or a violation suspected. Third, expand the master-at-arms rating to include all rates instead of starting at the first class petty officer level. That is, make it a full-time, full- scale professional rating. Modern police work compared with the knowledge required by masters-at- arms of yesteryear is as advanced as a missile compared to a smooth-bore cannon. With at least one career master-at-arms, trained in the most modern crime prevention techniques, assigned to each command, the number of drug detections and convictions for drug abuse should initially increase substantially. But within a short space, the deterrent effect of the two-pronged detection and conviction assault should result in a sharp decline in abuse. As a side effect, expansion of the master-at-arms rating to a full career program to cope with the drug problem also would materially assist in the reestablishment of good order and discipline in all areas. Taken together, these three measures should constitute a viable program under which the Navy can conduct an unconditional, no-quarter war on drug abuse in its ranks. For those who claim that the measures recommended are too draconian in this age of permissiveness, the answer is that the soft approach has failed, and failed miserably to the point where internal security and combat readiness are at stake. Now let's try the traditional approach. As for dissension within the ranks when the measures are adopted, a great majority of the officers and men, particularly the career petty officers, are sick and disgusted with the existing drug scene, nurtured by a bleeding-heart approach to the problem that makes a mockery of any attempts at effective control. Give those career petty officers strong, traditional, military leadership as espoused by Admiral Carney and recently reemphasized by Admiral Hayward, coupled with a program such as outlined above, and | they will break the drug subculture in our ranks wide open. We can no longer afford not to give them at least the opportunity to try. And if they succeed—and succeed they shall—they will have eradicated the single greatest threat to military discipline, internal security, and combat readiness. The Navy can continue to tolerate a deterioration in good order and discipline exacerbated by a drug abuse problem of major proportions, or it can eradicate the problem root and branch and restore traditional concepts of military smartness and discipline. If the Navy is to maintain a credible and effective fighting force, then there really is no choice; f°r as another former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., put it, . . the Navy is no different than any other institution in that ic requires complete and total obedience. It can be no other way.”9 There has been a good start in that direction. Let’s keep up the momentum. Captain Bowling was graduated from the NavaJ I Academy with the class of 1946 and commands I a number of ships: the minesweepers YMS-419? 14 YMS-463, and Magpie (AMS-25), the submarine , Q rescue vessel Tringa (ASR-16), the Secretary 0 the Navy’s yacht Sequoia (AG-25), the submaria*- 1 Cutlass (SS-478), and the amphibious common ship Mount McKinley (AGC-7). In addition, he served on the st of ASW Group 3; as chief staff officer, Submarine Squadron 3. aS antisubmarine warfare officer on the staff of Commander F,rs|. Fleet; in the General Operations Division (J-3) of the office the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and as Commander Service Group ' After his retirement from active duty in 1974, Captain Bowl10# earned a Ph D. degree in history and became a licensed master mariner. Currently, he lives in San Diego and is self-employ^ a mooring/lightering master for offshore tanker cargo operati°nS along the southern California coast and as a freelance writer. 'Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U. S. House Armed Services Committee No. 92-81, 2 January 1973. PP 17679, 17691 (Hicks report). Permissiveness was defined as: “. . . an attitude by seniors down the chain of command * tolerates the use of individual discretion by juniors in areas in the s ices which have been strictly controlled; it means a tolerance of f^u a failure to enforce existing regulations which have validity; failure to require that existing standards be met, and a sufferance 0 questioning of valid orders.” i 2Z-grams, or Z-NAVOPS, were originated by former Chief of a ^ Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. Z-01 was promulgate _ 14 July 1970, a total of 121 were issued, the program was cance e 29 June 1974. See Hicks report, sect. A.2., p. 17680, 17682. 3U. S. v. Trottier, 14 October 1980. 4Parker v. Levy, 1974. %U. S. v. Trottier. 6Quoted in The San Diego Union, 14 November 1980, p. A-12 ^ 7Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, "The Importance of Personal ship Today,” an address to officers in the Washington, D.C. area, 8NAVOP 019/81, 14 February 1981. *Z-117, 14 November 1972. |
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