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Solving the Nuclear Submarine Officer Manning Problem
By Commander Albert H. Konetzni, Jr., U. S. Navy
tlon, howi for the rion
■nadequate sea and shore rota- out submarine officers experience ()r rhe prime reason that 81% of our
The lack of adequate accessions 20° submarine force for the past t , years and the Navy’s inability to j C a<aequate action to solve the prob- pl^1 during that lengthy period have tion^ *tS sukmar*ne branch in a posi- 011 from which full recovery is not Possible fX, ,
tor another seven to ten years even if f I. . •
. 11 tun corrective action were
taken today.
n/>r^er t0 understand the position in find 1 •t^le nucNar submarine officer t|^ s himself in today, one must review nuclear submarine officer manning
s,tuat
F
sub
prove
bring the last two decades, naval .a ers have frequently focused atten- 10n °n nuclear submarine officer re- ^otion, which has been billed as the
ayy s number one officer personnel Problem.
Nuclear submarine officer reten- ever, is not the prime reason (Uclear submariners of commanding lcer seniority and below are at sea
p 10n f°r the last two decades. rorn its inception, the nuclear sta |?ar'ne force demanded high staar<fs from its personnel. These ards of technical and operational the ftlSe Were not easily accepted by sub naVa* community outside the SePar3r'ne ^0rce tklen anc^ tended to fromatt nuNear submarine force
f0tke other warfare groups. The 'S'arf *atera* transfer draft of qualified f0arespecialists into the submarine
Cc in the early 1960s further polari2eri ■
cje tne two groups—i.e., nu-
f... ^ Submariners and all others—and sub u ln a situation in which the Sol rnar’ne community was forced to -p, lts manning problems alone. e submarine force’s efforts to imthe s-nuclear officer manning during
. >xties and Seventies were extensive. Tu . .
fj ’ ine growing nuclear submarine
Sea C°Ub not continue to accept only experienced lateral transfer officers
to man its ships. As a result, the primary accession base became direct input officers from the Naval Academy and other universities. These officers did what direct input officers into the surface and aviation communities had done: about two-thirds resigned after their minimum obligated service was concluded.
Continued submarine force growth and failure to meet accession goals forced senior submarine personnel managers to direct all efforts toward improving officer retention. A continuation bonus of $15,000 was instituted in 1969. This bonus obligated junior officers to an additional four years’ active service and was an attempt to retain the “fence-sitter” through the critical department head tour. In addition, several officers were detailed to postgraduate schools and non-submarine-related shore assignments to help create the perception that submarine officers would, during their early careers, experience a wider variety of assignments. The assignment of junior officers to nonsubmarine billets was limited primarily to critical recruiting assignments such as the Naval Academy, Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) units, and the recruiting commands where they could actively assist in the accession problem. Later, retention efforts consisted of greater emphasis on the individual commanding officer’s role in retaining his officers, guaranteed shore assignments after the junior officer sea tour, frequent detailing trips to improve the detailer and constituent relationship, spot promotions for those officers serving as engineer officers, an incentive bonus which would provide $4,000 per year to a nuclear-trained officer until he completed his 18th year of service or his command tour, whichever came later, and an upgrading of the continuation bonus to $20,000 for four years’ obligation.
These original initiatives were successful and came to be only as a direct result of strong urging by submarine force officials in attempting to solve the officer manning problem. The efforts were necessary because today’s nuclear navy could not accept anything less than the total dedication of its officers in carrying out the strategic and tactical mission of the force. This required dedication meant long deployments and error-free operation and maintenance of the nuclear propulsion plant and weapon systems. The initiative served as an acknowledgment of the value of the nuclear submarine officer and nation’s need of his service.
However necessary and successful these incentives may have been, they could not solve the basic problem of nuclear submarine officer manning: too few ensigns to support the requirements for department heads several years hence. Although the nuclear submarine force boasted an officer retention rate of approximately 35% during the last ten years, 41% of the Navy’s combatants are nuclear propelled and are operated and staffed by an officer corps which is only 6% of the Navy’s total officer population. This cadre of officers has the same number of lieutenant commanders today as it had in 1970.
Obviously, the Navy and the nation must continue to do everything possible to retain submarine officers in order to improve the submarine force manning situation.
Officers leave the submarine force today to seek greater monetary compensation for their individual talents and to reduce the excessive family separation. These have been facts of life for too long in the submarine force. Few leave because of crisis management and failure to feel selfactualization in their chosen careers.
In order to break this vicious family separation-low retention cycle, the Navy will have to continue to seek
service and that perhaps no other j°c in the world can place that much r° sponsibility on a young man who ha5 only reached his 26th birthday?
Additional nuclear submarine 01 cers must be assigned to NROTC umtS Currently, only nine nuclear-train0^ junior submarine officers are assign0 to NROTC units. Although alrea ) undermanned ashore, the submar*116 force will have to tighten its belt ev0(1
■ ■ fth°
more to permit manning or 11
NROTC units in order to spread d16
word.
th°
-of'
the
ibl°
:rf
means to compensate these highly trained professionals for their services and arduous sea tours. Bonus and submarine pay systems must be continually evaluated and increased when necessary to keep pace with inflation and marketplace demands. These systems must not only be designed to provide adequate compensation but must not penalize an officer by withdrawing his submarine pay when he goes ashore to a critical support billet as he reaches some mid-grade seniority. Currently, efforts are being made to solve these problems, and these efforts must continue. However, the long-range solution to correct the submarine officer manning problem must be to achieve an adequate minimum accession of officers into the nuclear power program on an annual basis. The numbers necessary each year must be based on the predicted force size seven years later when these officers would commence their department head tours. In addition, annual minimum accessions must provide an adequate sea and shore rotation to provide greater opportunity for submarine officers to experience more assignments outside the submarine community and in the field of Navy- sponsored graduate education.
If minimum accessions were pro
grammed over the next decade and current efforts were continued, the major ills associated with personnel shortfalls would be cured. At present, a nuclear submarine officer experiences only about three years of shore duty between his first sea tour and completion of his submarine command tour. His department head tour is three- and-a-half years, his executive officer tour is three years, and he can expect a four-year command tour.
The programming of minimum accession goals over the next several years would provide instant relief for those officers w'ho volunteer for submarine duty under the policy. They would expect to have sufficient numbers of officers in their year groups to provide enhanced opportunities for postgraduate education and for assignment outside the submarine force as early as during their first shore assignment. Greater opportunity would exist to transfer to the restricted line, and all submarine sea tour lengths would be reduced.
If these minimum accession goals are to be successful, the Navy must announce, well in advance of an officer candidate's commissioning, the minimum goals for each naval service branch. More important, Navy officials must clearly state the reasons for the accession goals and ensure that every member of the officer corps is well versed in the background behind the decision. This type of planning will result in decreased polarization between communities, contribute to a more efficient use of our officer candi" dates, and provide a far greater opp°r" tunity for the individual officer’s pr()" gression.
The key to minimizing the eff«-ts of forced accessions is to continue to work toward achieving sufficient voluntary applications for nuclear power training and, later, submarine training. This can be achieved by impr°v' ing several aspects of current access1011 id
to billets involving the training midshipmen must be exceptional old' cers. They must be chosen for then dedication to the service and the poSI' five manner in which they condlltt themselves and lead their subordinates. Assignment of top officers t these billets must be made regards of the need for them on submannC staffs and in operational training commands. .
These officers must be kept aware 0 latest developments in submarine fof°e manning as well as the current stat**5 of submarine operations in order t0 maintain an up-to-date dialogue wid1 their charges. For example, how many of the first-class midshipmen at d*0 Naval Academy or NROTC units kn°" that the four chief engineers most re cently detailed to Trident submarin^ have just over five years commission0'
d
The Navy must advertise to fullest the challenges and many opP1 tunities associated with a career in
submarine force to every elig* NROTC college student in the coun and reinforce this by frequent visits u‘ young submarine officers. ^
Submarine summer cruises for m1 shipmen should be tailored such th**1 only ships whose schedules allow th0**1 to give individual attention to midshipmen would participate in such ^■lining. This may result in fewer b!PS Providing midshipmen training, r lf would create a more meaningful ‘ln professional experience for the ^'^shipmen and result in positive tvdback to the other members of their ,lval Academy company or NROTC Un>r after the cruise.
Greater effort must be made to improve the technical education of those AU tnts enrolled in NROTC programs. °re important, NROTC and Naval erny midshipmen must be coun- ‘ early in their college education yarding the importance of achieving minirnum standards of excellence in
their studies so as to be eligible for highly demanding nuclear power training on graduation.
It must be reiterated that minimum accession goals, although not desirable, will have to be maintained throughout the next decade to adequately distribute the meager officer assets available. In fiscal year 1980, a minimum accession base of 250 Naval Academy graduates and 250 NROTC graduates were required to commence nuclear power training. These numbers and other nuclear- trained officer sources will make up less than 10% of the total number of officers the Navy accessed in fiscal year 1980. This is a small percentage in view of the fact that almost one half of our fleet is nuclear powered. To allow a minimum accession policy to be discontinued after one year would only serve to further complicate the nuclear submarine officer manning problem.
Commander Konetzni graduated from the Naval Academy in 1966 and obtained his master’s degree from George Washington University. He has served tours of duty on board the USS Mariano G. Vallejo (SSBN-658), USS William H. Bates (SSN-680), USS Kamehameha (SSBN-642), and as the Submarine Placement Officer and Executive Officer Detailcr the Naval Military Personnel Command. Commander Konetzni is currently the prospective CO of the USS Grayling (SSN-646).
Navy sea pay pr0p0sais: a Historical Perspective
y <'-aPtain Thomas M. Hale, U. S. Navy, and Linda D. Pappas
On 5 Decembe;
aPproved
r 1980, Congress new sea pay legislation. It
*"*d Career Sea Pay to all petty
leers
eers °-3 th
sea duty and included offi- m (lle grades of O-IE, 0-2E, and
on
years 0f t‘on to
tough 0-6 with more than three
cumulative sea duty. In addi- lt , expanding the field of eligibil-
iiArorn about 36,000 to more than 1 >0,000 tent
sociated with the overseas area portion of the plan. Again, no action was taken by OSD.
1970—The Navy revised its 1969 plan by eliminating any provisions for overseas remote area pay. The revised plan slightly modified monthly sea pay rates that ranged between $15.00 to $115.00 per month based on cumulative years of sea duty, payable to both officer and enlisted personnel. Its cost was estimated at $135.1 million. The plan won the approval of the Secretary of Defense but was rejected by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for several reasons: concern over the uncoupling of sea pay and overseas remote duty pay, competing budget priorities, and the failure of the Navy to prove that the pay would solve retention problems.
1970— The Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, took exception to the OMB disapproval and wrote a strong reclama to the then-OMB Director, George Schultz. The reclama was disapproved because of the expressed desire to assess the impact of large across-the-board pay raises on retention and reluctance to address sea pay in isolation from other special and incentive pays.
1971— Not accepting even a firm “no” by OMB, the Navy resubmitted its 1970 proposal at a revised annual
than 12 cumulative years on sea duty. Both officer and enlisted personnel would have been eligible. The cost of the proposal was estimated at $130.6 million. No action was taken by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on the Navy proposal.
1967 — Knowing of the Navy proposal and noting the lack of action taken on it by OSD, Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of The House Armed Services Committee, introduced into Congress his own sea pay plan. This proposal (H.R. 13886) was identical to the Navy plan submitted earlier in the year. The bill died in Congress before any hearings were held, and before OSD had an opportunity to formally comment on it. A draft OSD report expressed opposition to the bill, stating that the First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (yRMC) was studying changes to the pay system.
1969 — Acting on the recommendations that came from the First QRMC, the Navy forwarded a new sea pay proposal which provided for the same entitlements as the 1967 proposal but included members assigned to remote overseas areas. The Navy estimated the cost of this proposal to be $118.0 million. The plan was actively opposed by the Air Force and-Army for technical and budgetary reasons as-
members on sea duty, cur- sea pay rates were increased by as was the most sig- ■rnprovement in sea pay in
?“ch as 400%. It
nifi,
cant
itlote
Was t^lan ^ years- The legislation
the culmination of more than 1 ^ years „r
for
r S effort by the Navy to provide meaningful level of sea pay. refor-!''St°r'ca^ rev‘ew °f attempts to
Vtrtrrn sea pay shows a dogged perse- tec nCe °n t>le Part °f the Navy to
«,c°r
8n'2e the hardships of sea duty by asing sea pay. A year-by-year re-
v‘e\v of
rj0r^^ Acting on a recommenda- Task t>1e Secretary of the Navy’s Co h°rce, the Navy developed a for f^ft'osive sea pay proposal that, hicti i tlrne’ represented significantly Plan tVe's °f Pay f°t sea duty. The Pay W°u>t> have overhauled the sea sine S^Stem that had been in effect ran f and called for pay levels
tOor"1^ >tom $15.00 per month for diatv t^lan ^ cumulative years on sea t° $105.00 per month for more
the record tells the story.
*Toc
d Ms-
4-
cost of $107.3 million. OMB anticipated a resubmission and foreclosed OSD action by reiterating the previous year’s disapproval. Leaving the door somewhat open, OMB indicated a willingness to consider a restructured proposal.
1972— Acting on study results of the Second QRMC, the Navy developed and forwarded a completely new sea pay concept. It provided for only two levels of pay: $25 per month for those with less than two continuous years of sea duty and $75 for those with more than two years of continuous sea duty. Anticipating objections for including senior officers in the plan, it limited entitlement to officers in pay grades 0-3 and below. All enlisted grades were eligible for the pay providing, of course, they had the requisite time at sea. Although the cost was limited to $111.3 million and was gaining the support from OSD, the proposal was rejected by OMB. Again, OMB stated that the plan did not demonstrate how the Navy’s retention problems would be solved by the proposal and indicated that more time was needed to analyze the impact of the large pay raises enacted for the all-volunteer force (AVF). The Navy was also criticized for not using the variable reenlistment bonus and proficiency pay more effectively in .solving retention problems.
1973— The Navy resubmitted its 1972 proposal with additional justification and analysis. This time it was rejected by OSD for inadequately demonstrating how the pay would solve retention problems.
1975—After regrouping, rethinking, and much debate, the Navy submitted yet another major sea pay proposal. This time, officers were excluded and only E-4s and above with more than three years of sea duty would be eligible for the pay. The plan was two tiered. At one level, $100 per month was to be provided for those with more than three years of continuous sea duty. On a second level, $25 monthly would go to those who had more than three years of cumulative sea duty, and $100 monthly for those who had more than eight years of cumulative sea duty. Thus, even mid-grade enlisted personnel could get the maximum rate of $100 if they spent the requisite three years on continuous sea duty. An attractive feature of the plan was its low cost of $47.5 million. This was less than one half of the cost of previous pay plans. It won OSD support but was rejected by OMB. This time, the reason was mandated ceilings on budget increases. OMB suggested that any new sea pay plan be considered in the context of the Third QRMC then getting under way, and recommended that a bonus- oriented proposal be developed.
1977 — With results from the Third QRMC supporting the need for a sea pay change, the Navy developed the proposal that was finally enacted into law as career sea pay in October 1978. Historically, OMB had not been willing to approve an across-the-board sea pay increase that would add extra cost to the defense budget. The career sea pay rates of $25 per month for more than 3 years of cumulative sea duty to $ 100 per month for more than 12 years of cumulative sea duty were carefully constructed to remain within the old sea pay cost of $30 million while providing pay increases for those enlisted members who spent considerable portions of their careers at sea. A three-year pay phase-in was developed to provide a type of savings feature for those receiving the old sea pay and to remain within the budget. It was quite similar to the plan first proposed by the Navy 12 years before except that officers were not included.
1979— Within a year of the passage of career sea pay, the Navy was back with a legislative proposal to accelerate the three-year phase-in period. The Navy was finding that pay increases of $ 17-20 per month were having no noticeable effect on retention. The accelerated phase-in (plus a 15% increase in sea pay) was included in the Nunn-Warner Amendment to H R. s 168 which was signed into law by President Carter on 8 September 1980, a full year ahead of the pay phase-in originally envisioned by Congress.
1980— -Even before the 1 October 1980 effective date of the full implementation of career sea pay, the Navy had submitted a comprehensive new sea pay proposal to OSD which would establish sea pay as a percentage of basic pay for both officer and careef enlisted personnel.
Among other modifications, OSD changed the pay from a percentage of basic pay to fixed rates of pay and deleted officers’ sea pay from the pr0" posal. The proposal was further modified by OMB when it added a new fea' ture which would provide a $1^ monthly premium pay for those who have served at least three consecutive years on sea duty. This additional p*y concept was similar to the one Pr0' posed by the Navy in 1975 only to he rejected by OMB because of budget limitations. The new sea pay proposa was submitted to Congress in eaf^ November 1980. The Senate reincot' porated officers in pay grades 0-lE' 0-2E, and 0-3 through 0-6 with m°re than three years cumulative sea duty into the proposal and passed the leg15' lation as a rider to the House Falf Benefits Bill (H R. 7626) on 4 December 1980. After a scurry of maneuver ing, the modified bill was passed by the House on 5 December 1980. ThlS measure carried a price tag of abou1 $132 million and was signed into la" on 23 December 1980.
The new sea pay is the most sigtiif1 cant raise for members on sea duty since the 1942-49 period wl>e(1
enlisted personnel were provided sea pay at the rate of 20% of basic and officers 10% of basic pay. Of Paf ticular importance to the Navymarl today, the approved legislation triple the number of members on sea d^V who will receive sea pay; this result5 from eliminating the requirement that one had to serve at sea for three yeafS before qualifying for sea pay. Tim5, after 15 years of unrelenting eff°rt’ the Navy has finally received a mean ingful sea pay for its people. Unfortl1 nately, the removal of the featur^ which indexed sea pay as a percent^ of basic pay will eventually result 1 the reduction of the value of the rtf" pay over time.
Captain Hale, assigned to the Compens^1111 and Enlistments Branch, OpNav Staff, an* Pappas coauthored the November 1980
■ . r Ceil
ings article, “The Unique Hardships j
Duty,” and the December 1980 profess*0*1 note, “Blue Water Bounty.”
What’s Happening with JEFF?__
Lieutenant Colonel William D. Siuru, Jr., U. S. Air Force
For more than two decades, U. S. rtl|litary services have been interested 'n air cushion vehicles (ACVs). These cn>ft r'de on a cushion of air, and thus Can move over water, land, ice, or snow. Navy and Army ACVs saw ac- tl0n 'n Vietnam, and the Army is cur- tently procuring several 30-ton Payload lighter, amphibian air cushion Vehicles for its logistics over-the-shore ^•ssion. Several related developments . CUrrently being examined, includ- nfe the U. S. Navy’s amphibious as- Sauh landing craft (AALC) program.
is °^^ect‘ve °F tF,e AALC program t0 define, develop, and demonstrate n advanced landing craft that can ^-effectively move men, vehicles, ^Pplies, and equipment from ship to ^ote during an amphibious assault.
, ® AALC program, which began in ^ ”> has produced the JEFF craft. ese are very large ACVs because they e to be able to carry the heaviest j s ln the Marine Corps’ inventory, uding the M-60 Tank Retriever. Us the need for the JEFFs’ ability to rry a 60-ton payload.
As an advanced development program, the AALC project will not develop a particular vehicle that will be built in quantity and put into the fleet. When such an operational craft is built, it naturally will be based on the information and experience gained from this program. Furthermore, the AALC advanced development program conducted an intensive operational demonstration that validated the military utility of air cushion craft under simulated amphibious assault conditions with military personnel. This demonstration established the confidence necessary to proceed to the next step, the acquisition of the landing craft, air cushion (LCAC).
There are two JEFF craft. In 1970, two contracts were let for the preliminary designs, one to Aerojet General Corporation and one to Bell Aerospace, Textron. When the designs were complete, there was no clear basis to pick one company’s design over the other’s. Moreover, each contractor had chosen quite different approaches, each having unique and innovative features. Thus, it was decided that in order to have the greatest technology base and the maximum amount of information and experience, both designs should be constructed. The Aerojet craft was designated the JEFF (A); Bell’s was called the JEFF (B).
Both JEFF craft have many similarities, which is to be expected since they were designed to meet the same operational requirements and constraints. Each is about 90 feet in length, with about a 48-foot beam and a height of about 23 feet. These dimensions are mainly governed by the fact that the AALC was designed to be operated from the docking wells of current Navy LSDs. Each can carry a payload in excess of 120,000 pounds and has cargo decks that are wide enough to carry three lanes of military vehicles. The beam and length, coupled with a total vehicle weight of around 160 tons, translate into a cushion pressure, or weight to platform area ratio, in excess of 100 pounds per square foot. Most current ACVs have cushion pressures of only about 20 to
The JEFF (B), carrying a 60-ton payload, maneuvers in and out of the USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32) during tests in the Gulf of Mexico.
60 pounds per square foot. Thus, the JEFF craft place great demands on the lift system, and this is just one of several instances where the JEFF craft are in the forefront of technology.
The JEFF craft are designed to operate at speeds of at least 50 knots over the water in a Sea State 2 environment with a 25-knot headwind and a 100°F ambient temperature. Combining the speed and headwind specifications results in an equivalent 75-knot relative wind requirement for the propulsion system. It might be asked, "Why the 100°F temperature requirement when in Sea State 2, or working against a 25-knot headwind, when both are unlikely real-life situations?” The answer is simple: The JEFF craft are prototype vehicles designed to demonstrate technology. When the production LCACs are built, it is better to interpolate within already proven operating environments rather than having to extrapolate to unproven operating regimes. The JEFF craft have a range of 200 nautical miles.
Aerojet’s JEFF (A) uses four turnable, 90-inch diameter shrouded propellers, one located in each corner of the ship, as its propulsors. These propulsors are used to achieve forward motion and for steering. The Bell JEFF (B) has only two shrouded propellers, although larger in diameter, 140 inches. These are located at the stern of the craft. Besides using these propulsors for steering, additional control is obtained from rudders and two rotatable thrusters at the front of the craft. Because the JEFF craft have to be transported within the docking well of an LSD, they are limited to the height of 23 feet. This, in turn, limits the height of the propulsors. In order to achieve the desired thrust from smaller diameter propellers, they are shrouded instead of using free propellers as are used on other large ACVs. To obtain the cushion of air on which they ride, both have several lift fans. The JEFF (A) has eight single-entry, 48-inch diameter fans, and JEFF (B) has four 60-inch diameter, double-entry fans. Both craft use six AVCO Lycoming TF-40 marine gas turbine engines rated at 16,080 horsepower to drive propulsors, lift fans, and supply other power requirements.
There are several other significant differences between the two designs. The JEFF (A) uses all-welded, corrugated aluminum for its structure, and ship-type construction techniques are used throughout. The JEFF (B) uses welded aluminum construction below the main deck. On the main deck and above, riveted aircraft-type construction is used. Both craft use quite different skirt designs, but both trap the pressurized air and lift the ACVs five feet above the surface. The skirt must be flexible so that it can deflect as it encounters waves and other obstacles. The skirt represents one of the most challenging components in the design of an ACV.
While contracts to build the JEFF craft were let in 1971, construction was not completed until 1976 for JEFF
(A) , and 1977 for JEFF (B). In their early stages of operation, both craft encountered difficulties which are not unexpected for any new craft that is at the forefront of technology. The JEFF
(B) made its first over the water “flight” in late 1977, while the maiden “flight” of JEFF (A) was delayed until October 1978. Since then, both craft have undergone extensive testing that demonstrated their ability to perform in an operational environment and that the technology is ready to be incorporated into a low-risk design of the LCAC for fleet use. For example, during tests, JEFF (B) achieved a speed of 55 knots overland and crossed 10- foot-high sand dunes while carrying its full 60-ton payload. During operational demonstrations, both JEFF craft successfully carried everything froin M-60 tanks to a cross-section of combat equipment.
Besides developing the JEFF craft themselves, an amphibious in-haul device (AID) is also being developed as part of the AALC program. The AID provides positive control of landing craft from the time they first cross the LSD’s stern gate until they move f°r' ward and finally are positioned in £he docking well. The AID is essentially an electronically controlled chain ptalW system installed in the walls of tbe docking well. This control system |S important, since there is little clear' ance between the JEFF craft and dlC bulkheads of the docking well. A Pr0" totype AID has been installed in me USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32), and succesS ful tests have been conducted bot with and without the AID system c° dock the JEFF craft. Although theJEff craft were designed to perform AIDed docking well entries, the ^ system improves the entry efficiency’ particularly in rough sea conditions-
The next step in the program is c0 acquire landing craft, air cushion ve' hides for use with the Marine am' phibious forces for the mid-1980 t0 1990 time period. The JEFF craft have shown that the technology is ready-
Lieutenant Colonel Siuru is currently the mander of the Frank J. Seiler Research Labo^ tory located at the U. S. Air Force Acadeh1!' Previous assignments have included duties as )<] Assistant Professor in the U. S. Academy’s Department of Engineering, P^11 ning for advanced space and rocket propuls'011 systems, and work in technical intelligence- ‘‘C has authored articles on a wide variety of sU^ jects and has coauthored two books—Sky^' Pioneer Space Station and General Dynamics F-‘^
Physical Fitness and the Naval Mission
Andrew G. Webb and John G. Pagani
a 01nS the physical tasks. Some ex- r ,es chat do and will continue to inlre physical participation are load- perStores and ammunition, high-line c0nt°nne^ trans^ers’ bringing damage sh' *l°^ eclu‘Pment to the scene of a f^°ard casualty, and mooring, m ulth phasing-in of labor-saving sh' °<*s anc^ devices on board war- nel^S’ Navy an<f Coast Guard person’ hke members of the general deli aC6’ are becoming incapable of jc . Vering a full day's effort in a phys- j- ^ demanding job and degenerative SlJc^ases associated with inactivity, rise ’u5 ^eart disease, ... are on the q ' More and more Navy and Coast amo a TeoP*e spend disproportionate Utlts °f their careers desk bound betC^tr ashore or afloat) and yet may
e!tert^ed °n at an7 t*me to physically reft tdemselves as naval missions may a 'Ulre- Consider the ultimate irony of "^ly productive officer or ted person having a heart attack,
Throughout naval history, seapower as been defined as the ability of one aatlon s forces to control the sea lines 0 c°rnmunication better than those of Mother nation. Until recently, human NhJscular strength and endurance were en the final determinants of a nation s seapower. That is, the nation °se ships were maneuvered the thickest, could fire their cumbersome j=Uns the fastest, and could sustain h the longest became the victor.
inT^' wars^‘Ps propelled directly or trectly by manpower (oars or sails) a a life span of nearly 5,300 o*ars far longer than the mere 100 years of steam and otherwise rae- at>ically propelled vessels.
Ven with the advent of steam fo et’ ^uman muscle was still used most tasks on board warships.
• ^ ln the last 40 years have electric-
y and other forms of energy j P anted human muscle as the pre- ! ^,ninantmeth(xj 0f performing most ate°r ^0t 6Ven 'n r^e ^'stant future 'here indications that technology sc°mpletely eliminate the need for e manpower, although a smaller Ventage of people will most likely
because of overexertion, experienced while climbing a ladder in response to a general quarters alarm. Not only may the human component have failed, but this failure may contribute to the loss of the whole system—the ship and the mission.
The performance of our naval missions depends on the physical fitness of our Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel. Since the Marine Corps is excluded from Navy directives on physical fitness, this discussion will deal only with the Navy and Coast Guard. To understand the role of physical fitness in relation to naval missions, we must define some terms. y Physical Fitness—the ability of each person to carry out the daily tasks of the service with vigor and alertness, without injury or undue fatigue, and with ample energy to meet unforeseen emergencies
► Work Capacity—the capability to accomplish production goals safely and without undue fatigue
► Aerobic Capacity—the amount of oxygen the body can process in a given time
Upgrading the level of physical fitness in the Navy was the subject of a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Education and Training to all commanders, commanding officers, and officers in charge of naval training facilities in October 1977. In the memorandum, he said:
“I am . . . concerned about physical fitness, which should logically go hand in hand with weight control. More emphasis is needed in this area. An acceptable military appearance does not give assurance
that an individual is physically fit
”2
All managers—civilian and
military—should realize that physical fitness is a variable in a common mini-max problem—i.e., maximizing performance of organizational goals at minimum cost. Costs include not only monetary costs, but lost man-days because of sickness, stress, and other maladies resulting from poor physical conditioning. Fit people miss fewer days of work than unfit ones do. In the private sector, managers recognize fit employees are good business. In 1975, 50,000 U. S. companies spent an estimated $2 billion in fitness and recreational programs for their employees.3 Likewise, many life insurance companies offer lower premiums to their insureds if they are in better than average physical condition and/or do not smoke.
But how does one know if he or she is in better than average physical condition? After all, most people find it difficult to relate their physical condition to anything but athletics. These questions should be asked about everyday jobs: Do I maintain the same level of alertness during the work day? Am I as alert at the end of the work day as I was at the beginning? Do I have energy left over after work for hobbies or other leisure time activities? Do I have the energy for weekend chores and some left over for fun? If the answer to any of these questions is “no,” aerobic capacity should be improved. But what incentive is there for an individual in the Navy or Coast Guard to maintain good aerobic and overall fitness? Presently, no incentives exist (except personal pride) for individuals to maintain good fitness. Besides this, no physical fitness tests are required by the naval services, except quarterly physical fitness tests by the Marine Corps. The Coast Guard and Navy require an individual to meet weight standards for his/her particular height, but no one-to-one relationship exists between one’s height, weight, and fitness.
Clearly, some reliable and economical means of measuring fitness is needed by the services. Some examples of tests available to measure fitness, percent of body fat, and other factors are underwater weighing, resting heart rate, treadmill, resting blood pressure, 12-lead EKG, stress EKG, and blood analysis. But these methods are, for the most part, either inconclusive or prohibitively expensive. Two methods that are good indicators of overall fitness which are easy to administer
and are not cost prohibitive are the skin-fold thickness test and the bench-step test. The former yields a body composition assessment in terms of body fat percent; the latter measures cardiovascular-respiratory function. Knowing a person’s body composition can tell us about his/her tendency toward such health problems as heart disease, diabetes, cirrhosis of the liver, hernia, and intestinal obstruction. It is therefore recommended that body fat percent be maintained at a reasonable standard. Finally, the most important factor in a person’s ability to perform arduous work is cardiovascular-respiratory fitness. The bench-step exercise is used to measure this type of fitness, and the main ad
vantages of this exercise are that individuals can be tested in short periods, it requires no special equipment or facilities, and it is highly correlated with aerobic capacity.
In that weight control and physical fitness standards have already been established by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, administration of the above named tests could measure compliance with those standards. However, no regular physical fitness testing or training of Navy or Coast Guard personnel presently occurs except during entry-level training at recruit training commands, officer candidate schools, ROTC colleges, and the service academies. It would be pre-
U. S. NAVY (COURTESY C. W. CULLEN)
| ( |
SI | A" \ |
sumptuous for us to recommend specific physical fitness programs °r intervals at which testing should be done, as guidelines for one type program have already been established. They are available off the shelf and might possibly eliminate the need for separate studies and extensive research into physical fitness programs.
While the services have promulgated directives dealing with both physical fitness and weight control, only weight control programs are no" being actively pursued. It is now time to address the issue of physical fitness as well, and to find ways to motivate our people to maintain good physic^ conditioning without imposing additional administrative requirements °r monetary burdens.
Motivating the individual toward the goal of physical fitness can be done in many ways. It would seem that a logical addition to refresher training would be an evaluation of the overal fitness level of the unit undergo*0? training. Shore-based units could hoi physical fitness evaluations in conjunc' tion with periodic personnel insp°c' tions in keeping with the belief rha physical appearance goes hand-in-han‘ with weight control and physical fic' ness. These evaluations should be do°e on an ail-hands unit level—not an *n dividual level—to promote the unirs esprit de corps. As with refresher train
id
f ■ ■ • | V |
|
|
|
|
Physical activity is not only a necessary form of personal relaxation, it is essential for success in naval missions. Air department personnel of a U. S. frigate "relax" on a flight deck rigged as a volleyball court.
ing awards, unit excellence in physica fitness could be denoted by the add*' tion of another letter on the side of rbe ship. But there is no way to guarani that individuals will feel obligated t0 give their best in any unit evaluati0(1 of physical fitness—not every°°e identifies proudly with his/her unlt' One way to promote individual Par' ticipation and excellence in physic conditioning is to make physical X ness a mandatory graded item on off* cer fitness reports and enlisted Pef' formance evaluations. Physical fit°eSS would then be in company with sud1 highly regarded items as leadership’ conduct, and professionalism. Th°s’ any candidate for promotion or vancement would have to meet minimum physical fitness standards °r be considered ineligible for prom0' tion/advancement. ,
Another way in which participado(1
°uId be encouraged would be the yarding of an individual Physical ‘tness Achievement Medal to rank on e same level as Navy and Coast ^u‘>rd Achievement Medals. The ra- ^‘Onale behind this proposal is that n«s is just as important to the naval ,. ces as is, for example, marksman- *P> for which two medals are already ^Warded. While basic marksmanship ‘' skill that can be acquired in a few lif. • ’ Physical fitness requires a l Ctl'tle commitment. No permanent ' *t can be derived from promoting tn^S°na^ fitness only during brief tra.r^'^evef training periods. Physical lnin8 must be continually pro- Wk i °Ver tbe course °f one’s career, exist 6 * ^°0<^ Conduct Medal already ats tbat recognizes good conduct as ^^Performance factor, a Navy- and 0- Guard-wide fitness medal (for |j$,ttrs a"d enlisteds) could be estab- yet0 recognize physical fitness as "nother performance factor. This onl^°Se<^ me<^af should be awarded t0 ehose whose performance ex- ^i^S’ by predetermined amounts, rent'0111111 stan<^ards described in cur- 'v>th SerV'ce directives. To coincide Phv ■ Promotion of career-long telca fitness, physical performance s f°r this award should be conducted annually and before recommendations for promotions or advancements are submitted. A renewal cycle such as this would automatically provide incentive for servicemen and women to maintain their physical fitness. The medal should not become a permanent award since the incentive for maintaining physical fitness might, thus, disappear.
Given current manpower shortages, some commanding officers are bound to ask: “When can time be found to conduct unit-level physical training given present mission requirements?” Current manpower shortages increase rather than diminish the need for those people we do have to be physically fit. That is so since shortages mean more jobs, which are accompanied by more responsibility and stress, will be assigned to each person. With these come the increased possibility of failure under stress and the inherent cost to the organization of each failure. But these proposals place most of the burden on individuals to find time to exercise, and thereby lessen the load on the commanding officers. Commanding officers need not allot more time to physical fitness training than that now given, for example, during lunch hours and on Friday afternoons in port. Conversely, physical training could provide a welcome supplement to the routine general quarters drills at sea.
The Navy and Coast Guard will probably find that any new emphasis on physical fitness will have shortterm negative effects on retention, advancements, and possibly, recruiting. But these effects must be tolerated and absorbed for these services to reap the long-term benefits of safer and better job performance. "Fitness can neither be bought nor bestowed; like honor it must be earned.”4 And, like honor, fitness must be promoted and rewarded.
’Brian J. Sharkey, "Fitness and Work Capacity," Forest Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Agriculture, 1977), p. v. "Commander, Naval Education and Training memo of 19 October 1977, Subj: "Weight Control and Physical Fitness."
"Sharkey, p. v.
■•ibid.
Both Mr. Webb and Mr. Pagani graduated from the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in 1975, and both left the Coast Guard in 1980 to pursue graduate studies in international relations and mathematics, respectively.
R •
etluirements for All-Weather Attack Aircraft
By £
rtlrnander Robert A. Weatherup, U. S. Navy (Retired)
ated rh ? ------ ------ ~r
>y ’ nese are relatively old aircraft
ack and fighter aircraft stand-
lui
Th
stU[j e ^avy and the Air Force are all ying the requirements for new, l,Jrcte;‘ther attack aircraft. The Air an<j • las anticipated a need to replace tack lfn^rove upon the all-weather at- F.|l [ CaPat>ility now provided by the repja ^ s°tne point, the Navy must Weat^e Var'ous versions of the all- terris tT A ^tbougf1 the avionic sys- these aircraft have been up- bv
ards. *ru , -
IcjgQ ne A’6 made its first flight m It Se’ an^ the F-i 11 first flew in 1964. sit^jia 'S C*1at there may be enough . ’ties between the services’ re- ir p Cnts to justify a joint Navy and nt;rce effort in the development of ah-weather attack aircraft, earlier times, there were many advantages in having separate aircraft, engine, and missile developments by the Navy and the Air Force. These separate developments resulted in competition which usually produced superior aircraft and weapon systems tuned to the unique requirements of the Navy and Air Force. These separate developments also supported a broad industrial base and maintained competitive design teams. However, the costs of developing a new aircraft and its systems are now so high that joint developments need to be considered as the requirements evolve. If a joint development effort is feasible, it would save on development costs and tend to result in larger and more efficient production runs. In theory, at least, the cost per aircraft should be reduced, and thus, the country could afford more aircraft.
Joint weapon system developments are possible. In Western Europe, three nations—the U.K., West Germany, and Italy—were able to join forces to produce a tactical aircraft—the Tornado (pictured on the following page).
eroc,
There have been very few joint aircraft development efforts in this country. In part, this has been because of the historic competition between the Navy and the Air Force. It has also resulted from the practical administrative difficulties of coordinating efforts between separate aircraft development organizations. In this connection, the Navy’s F-4 and A-7 proved to be excellent aircraft in Air Force roles. While the Air Force’s F-lll did not
F- 15 F-16 A-10
Air craft
Aircraft
Country
509
1,366
Country
220
644[1]
165[2]
809
212
112
100
While other production aircraft might be considered, the aircraft listed here would probably be primary candidates if a new all weather attack aircraft should be
Ob-
and
Trief
the
suitable if it is to be considered by
id
aircraft to minimize the deck spate
quirements for the all-weather attal aircraft.
k
► Radar with moving target m°
work out for the Navy, this failure occurred, at least in part, because the services were trying to meet different tactical requirements. When the requirements are compatible, it is technically possible to produce one aircraft which will meet the Navy’s and Air Force’s needs.
In principle, the Navy and the Air Force have the option of deriving a new all-weather attack aircraft from attack/fighter airframes already in production. This may turn out to be the best course of action. Such an approach, however, would probably preclude the joint development of requirements for a new all-weather attack aircraft. That is, the Air Force might be unwilling to accept the Navy’s candidate production airframes. Also, it would be difficult to obtain “carrier suitable” versions of those aircraft now in production for the Air Force. Considering the practical problems inherent in joint aircraft developments, it appears that the chances for success would be increased if the Navy and the Air Force first coordinated their requirements for a new all-weather attack aircraft. Such action would tend to remove emotional bias and might result in an aircraft development recommendation which would be acceptable to the Department of Defense and to Congress.
The Air Force has the following attack/fighter aircraft in production: F-15, F-16, and A-10. Based on numerous unclassified sources, the projected numbers of production aircraft for the U. S. Air Force are as follows:
Projected Number of Production Aircraft
729
1,388
733
The F-16 is also in production for NATO air forces:
Single-Seat Two-Seat Versions Versions
Projected Number of Production Aircraft
F-14 F-18
Although the European-built Tornado is not in production for the U. S. services, it will make a major contribution to NATO air forces:
Projected Number of Production Aircraft
Germany Air Force Navy Italy
Great Britain Royal Air Force Sub Total Royal Air Force Total
rived from production airframes viously, the individual services contractors have their preferred ap proaches. In the opinion of this au thor, none of these aircraft would bc seriously considered as a new baS'f all-weather airframe which could serVC the U. S. Navy , the U. S. Air Forehand possibly some of the NATO ajr forces because none would seem to W fill both the Navy’s and the A|f Force’s requirements.
All-weather attack aircraft hiivt tended to require a two-man crew that one man can give primary acte(1 tion to sensors and weapons, while the
other gives primary attention to
safety and to coordination with
aircraft. All-weather attack aircnl
Mol
have also tended to be some"1' larger than “day” fighters and “light” attack aircraft in order to Pfl vide increased range, time-on-stati°°’ payload, space for sensors, etc. Ob'11
ously, any new aircraft must be cai
Navy. Within reason, the Navy "'°u^ want to limit the physical size of c
.ck
By definition, an all-weather a[tat^ aircraft must be capable of cart)'1 and exploiting most of the sensors a0 ordnance which are capable of loc^j and destroying targets when the vlS bility is severely reduced by dark*1 and/or by weather. The candidate se(1 sor systems include:
► Simple radar(s) for opera£) against targets such as ships at sea
tion (MTI): MTI has been develope1
^ Passive
cation of radiating targets: Various '^*^erence systems have the po- tvith ^°r *ocat‘n8 electronic emitters . efficient accuracy for attack, ^en if the emitter shuts down. Unfor- re^ e y> the concepts require precise tfenCe systetms, coordination be- een different aircraft and/or
sta-
etc.
This list
of sensors is not complete,
b,
ut
che point where tanks, trucks, jeeps, etc- can be detected by virtue of their movement.
^ Synthetic aperture radar (SAR): SAR provide the resolution necessary ldentify and attack most fixed j*rgets. Combined with MTI, good an<J proper ordnance, SAR may so be effective in the future against sh° tar®etS- The aircraft design °u d anticipate growth systems of thls general type.
systems for detection and ttons,
Infrared sensors for detection of Wh'i temperature differences:
Sf)r ' the performance of infrared sen- thes- Cter'orates rapidly in fog or rain, Sensors can be very effective on
Clear nights.
quit ^°eS dernonstrate general reair ?^ents f°r any new all-weather Ser)s1 t0 be adaptable to a variety of j^>rs ancI compatible ordnance, t eory, most of the sensors listed
here could also be mounted in the ordnance itself. However, the sensors mounted in the ordnance would be less capable than the basic sensors in the aircraft. Depending on the effectiveness of the enemy’s antiaircraft defenses, it would be “nice” to have ordnance with a standoff capability roughly equivalent to the detection and localization capability of the basic sensors in the aircraft. That is, the standoff ordnance would be capable of carrying the ordnance-mounted sensors close enough to the target, and perhaps below the overcast, so that ordnance-mounted sensors could then take over for the terminal guidance. However, in the general case, this may not be possible because of the cost and limited availability of the more expensive and sophisticated standoff ordnance. Still, studies of compatible aircraft systems and ordnance should be a part of developing aircraft and ordnance requirements which blend the ideas which are technically possible with those which are affordable and cost-effective against a reasonable spectrum of enemy defenses.
A new all-weather attack aircraft would also carry a rather complete suite of defensive systems. In this connection, saturation tactics have always been successful in reducing the effectiveness of enemy defensive systems. However, it has always been difficult to control large numbers of aircraft for coordinated attacks during bad weather. Perhaps this is a fertile area for technical development. There is a somewhat analogous precedent in the multiple missile control capability of the F-l4/Phoenix missile system.
Since the current all-weather attack aircraft will need to be replaced in the relatively near future and costs for new aircraft, sensors, and ordnance are climbing almost out of sight, the time appears to have come for the Navy and Air Force to coordinate their development of joint requirements for a new all-weather attack aircraft. If successful, a new joint aircraft development would result in lower costs per aircraft through reduced development costs and a larger and more efficient production run.
Commander Weatherup's operational career included both ship and squadron commands. He also served in the Office of Naval Research and the Naval Air Systems Command (then BuAer). Since retirement from the Navy and as an employee of a major aerospace corporation, Commander Weatherup has been responsible for the operations analysis portion of several major studies of V/STOL aircraft.
*Th
e Classification Society Obligation
°yco;
inlander John W. McCurdy, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)
.e at Sea? How is it that fire and c0ulc, (as reported by the press) feet i„0t be contained in a ship 427 Wity, °n£ between perpendiculars, majn n,'ne watertight bulkheads to the .l eck, and a collision bulkhead tc
dividS<d°nd deck? Th'S sh‘P WaS: (1' to lnt0 vertical zones with mean;
decl<
ughout; and (3) possessed
SoPhi
A
Unc°ntrolled fire gutted the lj0vvedands cruise ship Prinsendam. sibieC°U^ 't happen? How is it pos- Ur>de C° ^°Se a S^'P ku‘Ic *n 1973 tern .rides set forth in the latest In-
of ra^,0nal Convention for the Safety Gfe -
hoodj
Ci
feet lo
th
to deyent dle spread of fire from Cor>stt and bulkhead to bulkhead; (2' thr^,. <;ted °f fire-retardant material: st'cated fire detection system anc means of remote control to smother and prevent the spread of fire from its (reported) point of origin in the engine room.
Press reports indicate the Netherlands will convene a board to investigate allegations of: negligence and/or incompetence on the part of the crew; malfunctioning and/or lack of maintenance of fire-fighting drills; defective ventilation systems and lack of smoke-tightness at bulkhead/deck boundaries; haphazard work practices and procedures; etc., etc., etc.
But, will the Netherlands probe further than the officers and crew to expose possible negligence? For instance, will the performance of those organizations and their surveyors who are entrusted by the Netherlands to carry out the inspections required for the issuance of seaworthy certificates required by the several international safety of life at sea conventions be examined? Organizations and surveyors, such as the classification societies— i.e., Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, American Bureau of Shipping, Bureau Veritas, among others—are members of the International Association of Classification Societies supported by shipowners worldwide and recognized by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (1MCO) as technical advisors. These societies were founded to prescribe rules for the construction and certification of seaworthy ships upon which the marine
underwriter could predicate his risk. Since the societies are established worldwide, maritime nations have entrusted them to perform the various safety of life at sea (SOLAS) surveys on their behalf rather than support a global bureaucracy of their own. The maritime states are authorized to grant this entrustment by the international maritime conventions to which they are signatory.
In the past, this writer has expressed his respect for the classification societies; they are near sacrosanct in the world of ship construction and deservedly so.* Without their presence, there would be chaos in the realm of maritime safety. Today, however, the classification societies, through their surveyors, are not conducting thorough, effective inspections for the granting of the various international seaworthy certificates. This charge is based not only on my observations, but on those of the Western World’s most venerable maritime nation: Greece.
The Hellenic Republic’s Ministry of Mercantile Marine addressed a letter, dated 14 October 1978, to all classification societies on the subject of vessel
•See J. W. McCurdy’s “The Marine Surveyor," December 1975 Proceedings, pp. 34-40.
inspections. The following are excerpts from the letter:
“1. Since the above circular was issued, it has been ascertained from various facts gathered from reports of extraordinary inspections conducted by the Greek Port Authorities that in many cases, ships have deficiencies and irregularities often without any excusable ground.
“2. Specifically we noted many cases where Safety Certificates were renewed despite of serious defects, or where extensions were granted for extremely long periods. Also, in some cases, the whole inspection was carried out in an unfavorable manner.
“3- In particular, extraordinary inspections undertaken by the Port Authorities have revealed that even shortly after a general inspection vessels fail to fulfill many of the requirements, lacking necessary safety equipment and carrying out maintenance of a very poor level.
“4. In view of the above, we draw your kind attention to the above mentioned relative circular as well as your general obligations under the existing regulations and request you to issue necessary instructions from your Head Office to your all representative and surveyors all around the world to inform them about what the Greek Authorities have observed so far. Please instruct them that they must conduct strict and
detailed inspections to determine that 11 Greek vessels satisfy the required /***' ' maintenance and safety requirement' (Emphasis added.)
To corroborate the Hellenic obser^ vations, the following cases are offef for the reader’s consideration. * cases are typical of many I have 0 served during the course of my °''n limited sphere of activity as an ,n pendent marine surveyor.
Case I: A bulkcarrier of 15,400 t0flS was left unseaworthy by a coif5'011 that ripped open her bow and collisi0”
bulkhead with resultant flooding
0vet
20% of her length and back to bulkhead between # 1 and #2 hoi s
reserve
With obviously impaired
buoyancy upon which her original ^
ternational load certificate was bas^ the vessel changed flags—and granted a new load line certified
an existing vessel permitting the draft and freeboard she had enj°yeCj^te a new ship. Suffice to say, a comP1 ^ survey of the ship, as intended by International Load Line Convent!0^ was not carried out. Subsequently’ j- ship was loaded with 10,000 tonS
erc““
scrap, towed to sea on a com®0 venture, and foundered with suiting loss of her crew.
Case II: A 15,000-ton bulkhead &
hea''
rier sustained exchanger explosion
an exhaust-gas *j-^j
which bu<>
bulkheads in the crew’s quarters
out'
side the engine room. There were
safe"
injuries valve was
The exhaust heater
found in the debris
tod1
4 0^
Proceedings / February *
*0tn ‘ts mounting; removed to a Iabo- t0rJ ^or testing and examination, it j(jaS. (>und inoperative because of rust, )rt‘ign deposits, and misalignment of «*■ inspection of heat exchanger sivemen‘s isce photos) indicated exces- Ve pressure on the waterside that C a^ . ave been relieved had the valve nctioned properly. A diligent search urouSb the wreckage failed to turn a steam pressure gauge though the in^f1^ °Ut^et header included a mount- fe^ one- A search of classification a °r s on board ship failed to produce recCrt^1Cat*0n beater. Further,
be °r S 'nd*cated the heater had not tes n | 'nsPected or the safety valve te >n more than three years though
rules call for annual inspections.
Case III: A 5,600-ton breakbulk ship’s International Load Line Certificate indicated that she had undergone an annual survey as required by the Convention within 60 days of this surveyor’s boarding of the ship. The following conditions, among others too numerous to relate, were: hatch covers wasted to near penetration; missing and/or wasted hatch panel wedges and fittings for same; and main deck areas wasted to paper- thinness. It was obvious the vessel’s seaworthiness was seriously impaired and that these conditions were the result of years of neglect during which time the ship was subject to numerous
surveys by classification surveyors.
What actions are the societies obligated to take to prevent the continuing recurrence of such cases as the above? The following are offered:
► Employ only exclusive surveyors whose careers are dependent upon continual professional performance. y Rid classification ranks of nonexclusive surveyors who are usually retained in ports where traffic does not support an exclusive surveyor. Nonexclusives are generally independent surveyors engaged in multifarious surveys on behalf of shipowners, charterers, and cargo owners. As such, their positions are prejudicial to the best interests of the society. The cost of
employing sufficient exclusive surveyors worldwide will have to be passed on to the public.
► Establish an indoctrination school to instruct all surveyors in a common approach to surveys and the manifold points to be covered as intended by the conventions. A school similar to the U. S. Coast Guard Merchant Marine Safety School, Yorktown, Virginia, is recommended.
► Periodically examine the professional performance of all surveyors.
Since classification surveys represent very few days in the life of a ship, the Admiralty Courts have determined the
surveys lend to the ship only cloak of seaworthiness.” The obltg8' tion of the societies is to assure the cloak wears well.
Commander McCurdy is a member of the tional Association of Marine Surveyors. He 15 frequent contributor to the Proceedings.
American Naval Power
1776-1918
can seapower, originally published in 1939, was for years required reading for generations of naval officers until it went out of print in 1968. The book covers the institutions, events, ideas, motives, and personalities that shaped the course of American naval development from colonial times through World War I. It examines the predominant theories of naval defense and strategy that developed during these years, as well as the implications and controversies of the steadily advancing naval technology. This reprinted edition should generate high interest among naval historians, 1*' braries, students of naval development, and all those interested in how the modern American Navy came into being.
19801420 pages
A Naval Institute Press Book List price: $14.95 Member’s price: $11.95
__________________________________ Two for the Price of One_______________________
During the energy crunch of the early 1970s, my husband was Assistant Officer-inCharge of a Naval Autodin Switching Center in Albany, Georgia. The center used computers to relay messages.
A message was sent from the Commander of Naval Telecommunications urging all commands to conserve energy by avoiding the production of unnecessary copies of messages.
Since the Autodin Switching Center was a small command with only four military personnel assigned, the normal “shotgun” approach of copying and routing messages was unnecessary. The original copy of the message was simply routed, initialed and then filed, with no extra copies being made.
Thus, my husband immediately sent a reply to the Admiral’s message. So did the Officer-in-Charge.
The next morning the Admiral had two messages on his desk. Both were from Albany, and both stated emphatically, “We do not duplicate messages!”
Irene Hazen