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--..^luncubive carrier progr; meanwhile, the existing Navy
(jnjS are ^e'ng heavily employed. The grou States "has kept two carrier sej2 *n the Indian Ocean since the Ir .fe American hostages by the Sl0n'a" terrorists and the Soviet inva-
^ndian ^^^an‘stan- addition to the one n ^cean deployments, at least \fej.Carr'er is being kept in the pacjpterranean and one in the Western Irari *C 0n a tegular basis. (Prior to the carri Afghanistan situations, two
in \wrS °Perated in the Med and two
1 WesPac)
tiers" the°ry’ the 12 active U- S- car‘ pl0Can Ptovide a 1 -in-3 forward de- tfent on a continuous basis. How
th - ^ ma)or defense issues that e Reagan Administration must ad- jfess *s a*tcraft carriers. The carrier ^ e ls among the most controversial ^ecause of the ships’ cost, differing 0n what size they should be and ate*1 a*rcra^t they should oper
a, ’ and their vulnerability (or surviv- 'ty if one is a carrier proponent). f . e Carter Administration stead- Wjtj^ °PPosed carrier construction, ]Cw ^r- Carter vetoing the fiscal year jt defense procurement bill because ^contained funding for the fourth 10mitz (t-VN-68)-class carrier. The fol- bu'u^ year> Congress again voted to 1 a cvn, and Mr. Carter ac- qutesced.
'J’L
C . ere are now efforts under way on int0 add funds to the com- f0r 3 *SCa* year 1982 defense program the ?n0t^er nuclear carrier. Already on
and s S the fiscal year 1981 House lion /nate authorizations are $30 mil- Carf. 0r development of a new class of desi„fS and million to initiate the sjjj °h a new class of air-capable Phib' t'lat cou'd operate in the am- sup *°US assault role or as a V/STOL fense°rt S^'P' ^r- R-eagan and his de- an<j fc a<dv*sers must sort out these issues jnt ’ ln v*ew of intensive congressional f0rt^est *n the subject, rapidly put a comprehensive carrier program.
icr - • ■ -
r‘ets
ever, the transit distances from U. S. bases to the Indian Ocean have placed an added strain on the carrier force. Problems with personnel assignment and retention, ship overhaul scheduling, and the assignments of air wings are exacerbated by the Indian Ocean situation.
At this time, the Navy has 13 aircraft carriers (CVs/CVNs), one of which is undergoing a two-year-plus service life extension program (SLEP) modernization. In theory, as soon as the first SLEP carrier, the Saratoga (CV-60), emerges from the yard another will enter for SLEP, thus keeping 12 carriers in commission, of which 4 would normally be deployed and the others would be involved in training, transit, or overhaul.
Two more nuclear carriers are now under construction. The Carl Vinson (CVN-70) should become operational in 1982. At that time, according to current planning, the now-operational Coral Sea (CV-43), completed in 1947, would become a training ship (AVT). Then, when the recently ordered CVN-71 is completed about 1987, the Coral Sea would be disposed of and the then 42-year-old Midway (CV-41) would be relegated to the AVT role.
But there are at least two major potential flaws in this plan. First, the pioneer nuclear carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) will reach her 30th year of service in 1991. In theory, she will undergo a SLEP modernization to give her another 10 to 15 years of useful service. However, the cost and complexity of rehabilitating the ship’s eight-reactor nuclear plant will, in the opinion of some Navy planners, make the SLEP impractical. The ship has eight outdated A2W pressurized-water reactors, a type found only in the cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9).
A second concern is the SLEP process in general. The Saratoga work was delayed by controversy over where to modernize the ship, and will take significantly longer and cost more than originally planned. The delays will, in turn, cause problems in scheduling subsequent modernizations.
A third factor to be considered is the international situation. The continued problems in the Middle East- Persian Gulf regions and the potential crises in various parts of Africa could increase the requirement for U. S. general-purpose naval forces. Also, the continued increase in Soviet naval capabilities, most recently demon-
lTOc
®edlngs1 January 1981
109
strated by recent deployment of the nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov and possible appearance in the mid- to late- 1980s of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, could also lead to more U. S. carriers being required. Although antiship and land-attack cruise missiles aboard surface warships, attack submarines, and even patrol aircraft could help to counter Soviet developments, for the foreseeable future manned aircraft will have a role in surveillance, over-the-horizon targeting, early warning, force air defense, and strike against certain types of targets ashore and afloat.
For all of these reasons, the continued construction of aircraft carriers must be considered a viable course of action. While Congress included another 93,000-ton CVN in the fiscal year 1980 budget, it was a compromise ship. The Senate had preferred an oil-burning John F. Kennedy- type CV of some 81,000 tons. Both houses rebelled against the Carter Administration’s proposal to build a 55,000-ton oil-burning CVV.
There is now a move under way in the House to add another CVN to the fiscal year 1982 budget. Such a move would add almost $3 billion to Mr. Reagan’s initial budget, possibly causing problems in other, more- immediate problem areas such as readiness, the rapid deployment force, and Navy aircraft procurement. While the Navy’s leadership would ’’like” another CVN, there is already concern about the manning of the existing carrier force, especially the Carl Vinson and, later, the CVN-7,1 with their big appetites for scarce nuclear-trained personnel.
Smaller, non-nuclear carriers would have less financial impact on a given year’s budget, would be easier to man, and could be constructed in any of several shipyards. (At this time, the only yard in the United States that can construct nuclear carriers is the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.) Since the early 1970s, a number of “small” carrier designs have been put forward, from the sea control ship (SCS) of some 14,000 tons to the CVV of about 55,000 tons. Still- smaller “carrier” concepts, such as flight-deck Spruance (DD-963)-class de
stroyers, have never been seriously considered by the Navy’s leadership.
A recent candidate that has received attention in the Navy is the so-called SSS or STOL support ship. Such a ship, of 40-50,000 tons and built largely on merchant ship lines, would operate some 25 aircraft on a permanent basis with a surge capability of perhaps 55. With arresting gear and only one catapult, if any, the ship would carry F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft, as well as antisubmarine, and airborne early warning, and reconnaissance planes. There has even been a proposal to convert one of the Sealand SL-7 high-speed containerships to an experimental SSS—dubbed Langley II by Rear Admiral George Jessen of the Naval Air Systems Command.
Congress has provided $30 million for additional development of a new class of aircraft carrier, which could be a SSS-type ship. According to the fiscal year 1981 authorization conference report:
“For over three years, the Navy has been studying various sea-based aircraft platform alternatives. Despite this intensive study effort, no program has been forthcoming to increase naval air capability at sea. Air-at-sea continues to provide the greatest flexibility in meeting new and challenging technological changes in warfare. It would be shortsighted indeed to fail to provide adequate forces, and especially air capable platforms, in this era of increasing naval capability.”
An additional consideration in the carrier picture is the amphibious assault situation. The Navy has seven
18.0- ton helicopter carriers of the luo Jima (LPH-2) class, completed in 1961-1970, and five ships of the
39.0- ton Tarawa (LHA-l) class, which joined the fleet in 1976-1980. The former ships will require replacement in the 1990s if the Navy-Marine team is to keep the ability to forward deploy three battalions with full helicopter capability on a regular basis and with a total lift of 12 battalions with helicopters.
The 1981 authorization conference report calls for the expenditure of $9 million to initiate the design of a new class of amphibious ships (LHX) which
could also perform the V/STOL supporl ship (VSS) mission. This differs fro'1' the SSS concept in that the ship wou> not have arresting gear and would op erate only V/STOL aircraft and helicop ters. Thus, these ships could be use in amphibious assaults, for limited tack roles (with, for example, Av-|i Harriers), mine countermeasure oper#" tions, or ASW.
The Marine Corps, with some Nav) support, is looking at a slightly ferent concept for the LPH repbce' ment. Labeled the LHDX, this ship would be about 30,000 tons with * docking well for amphibious tractor*' air cushion landing craft, and sm31 boats. The well-deck requirement ff suits in a larger ship than one carryin|j only aircraft and troops, with the ho design producing a slower ship thJ|1
otherwise produced for a given
si
and horsepower. Further, a sing
basic carrier design that could serve 1
the amphibious, mine countering sure, ASW, and strike roles could lel)l
to economies in production, person11
id
maintenance, and logis1
tit*
training support.
Reportedly, the Marine Corps 1 seeking authorization of the first V replacement in the 1986-1987 peri0 The congressional conference rep01* calls for “holding to the 1983 objet tive ,for procurement of the first veS sel” of the LHX/VSS type.
There is an obvious need for ad<f tional aircraft at sea, and the Congf£Si has been most supportive of cartel
most supportive ot car‘‘'|(iy programs during the past few years. 1 appears particularly feasible at time to pursue a two-phase tarn program: series production of smaller fixed-wing carrier and multi-role V/STOL/helicopter ship
th'\
rit’v' ;
If
has become obvious that additio*1.
Nimitz- type produced in
nuclear ships cannot numbers nor
large
additional ships be built in the i’1’:
mediate future without mal
•1
realignment of shipyard activity ^ improvements in procedures for <e cruiting and retaining personnel. The construction of large-deck
riers must be continued if the LL
tlv
Navy is to be able to respond to - » oft-heard question in the Wh|[t
question ... ...^ •• _
House situation room during a cf*s “Where are the carriers?”
1 10
Proceedings / January l1