Comment and Discussion

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A Fantasy?”

(fe W. Outerson, pp. 72-77, April '980; R.

Holyoak, pp. 83-84, July 1980 Proceedings)

Robert C. Smith—I was appalled to see that Mr. Holyoak suggested that nu­clear power reactors be used as civil defense command centers. There are a ^variety of reasons why nuclear power teactors can be considered to be prime targets. First, the power reactor pro­duces large quantities of electrical en­^ergy that will be vital in recovery ef­forts; second, the nuclear power reac­tor produces, through its normal Power production, the raw material for nuclear devices (tritium, Plutonium); third, assuming that the uuildings survive intact, anyone inside ^W|ll be trapped for a considerable fougth of time, since the most effec- ^t,Ve method of attacking a hard ^target, such as a command center, a missile silo, or a nuclear power reac- ^t0r> is to ground burst the weapon, thus creating huge quantities of lo- oalized radioactive fallout in the im­mediate vicinity of the detonation; fourth, no matter how well protected foe communications may be for a nu­^clear power reactor, there is no point ^In using land lines that are not ^superhardened, or to attempt com­munications with another prime target ^area, Washington, D.C.; and fifth, electromagnetic pulse effects could very well “scramble” almost all elec­^trical equipment in the power reactor, '^Vlfo very adverse results.

No matter what the case, a near miss by a submarine-launched ballistic missile or cruise missile is virtually guaranteed to eliminate the external ^auxiliary equipment or damage it so heavily and contaminate the area so ^uch, that the repair of the reactor could be delayed for months, perhaps years, even if no other damage was in­flicted. Based on the experience of Three Mile Island, I believe that it is reasonable to assume that the elimina­tion or disruption of this equipment ^ould effectively eliminate the nuclear

power reactor, either through the di­rect effects of damage or being forced to shut the reactor down in the face of a potential attack.

It is not reasonable to believe that even the most superhardened installa­tions could survive the tremendous structural stresses imposed by relative near misses by nuclear weapons. It has become generally accepted that missile silos, one of our most hardened instal­lations, are becoming vulnerable to accurate missile targeting.

It is certain that Captain Outerson is more nearly correct in his analysis of the situation. Some backup to the concept of increasingly vulnerable superhardened installations is evi- ' denced by the recent planning revolv­ing around the improvement of the North American Air Defense Com­mand’s (NORAD) capabilities by creat­ing seven (or more) autonomous com­mand posts, apparently in case NORAD is eliminated.

“The U. S. Marine Corps:

Strategy for the Future”

(See W. M. Krulak, pp. 94-105, May 1980;

R. W. Mixon, pp. 20-21, June 1980; T.

Terry, p. 74, July 1980 Proceedings)

Colonel John G. Miller, U. S. Marine Corps—One hesitates to take issue with the Scriptures, or even with the particular wisdom in the parable of the servants and their talents. But the issues raised in Colonel Krulak’s co­gent article can also be viewed in a more contemporary perspective—that of Damon Runyon’s denizens of Broadway.

Contents:

A Fantasy?

Marine Corps: Strategy for the Future

Air Defense of the Carrier Task Group

Assault on the Liberty

The REAL Reason

Our One True Strength

An Alternative to Appeasement

Oman: The Next Crisis?

Summary of Major Military Forces

Missiles Make ASW a New Game

Mine Warfare: Promise Deferred

A Marine Choke-Point Strategy

Flags of Convenience or Flags of Necessity?

Retention: The Pressure Is On

Vigilante Fadeout

The Swinging Debate

The Twelve Days of the England

The Soviet Navy in 1979

Treating Adults Like Children

I Remember It Well

The Last Battleship

The Big Ship in My Life

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

For all practical purposes, the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), viewed in conjunction with the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) concept, is the only game in town— the only new game with new money, anyway. Like Nathan Detroit’s Oldest Established Permanent Floating Crap Game in New York, it has both advo­cates and detractors. It can also be

played in a number of ways by a vari­ety of players.

For the Marine Corps, the choices outlined by Colonel Krulak are stark: play RDf/mps; reconfigure to play NATO; or retire from the arena.

To the extent that the Marine Corps moves toward wholehearted embrace of and total commitment to RDf/mps, a particular image begins to emerge and sharpen focus: that of Sky Master- son staking his soul on the roll of the dice. To a number of people—both inside and outside the Corps—the possibility of losing a burdensome amphibious '‘soul” that has been under attack for three decades is quite welcome. With it, presumably, other fiscally constrained "too hard” mission areas (e.g., naval gunfire support and shallow water mine countermeasures) would also depart, leaving blue water sailors little to contemplate but really deep blue. For all this, however, there is something unsettling about a pro­jected loss of amphibious capability, that can be summed up in a recent comment by a senior official: "We are running out of friendly countries to invade.” In truth, a relatively benign environment is required for the mar- ryups of troops and equipment envisioned by RDF/MPS, and amphibi­ous assistance could be required to make things benign enough.

At the other extreme, however, we have members of the Nicely-Nicely school, to whom new ideas are anathemas. They do not wish to see the boat rocked, despite clear evidence that the boat has been gradually sinking — in terms of shrinking amounts of amphibious lift actually available and compressed turnaround times in maintaining standard peacetime deployments—and there is not much freeboard left. In addition, the NATO “fixation” to which Colonel Krulak alludes—one that has existed for nearly ten years, ever since the Sec­retary of Defense said that general purpose forces should be sized against worst-case scenarios—has engendered intense questioning about the am­phibious warfare mission area. In the current technological environment, a number of the questions remain unan­swered. This does not necessarily mean that answers cannot be found.

For winning (or even surviving) in the only game in town, perhaps the best approach is that of Harry the Horse. Harry would roll the dice in his own personal hat, concealing them from the others, and then would an­nounce his point and whether he had made it. The other players, remember­ing that Harry had once kayoed a real horse with one punch, chose not to contest this style of play, being con­tent to ask politely on occasion whether Harry had made his point the hard way. Although one might logi­cally assume that altering the rules of RDF/MPS is impossible without some semblance of Harry’s clout, it does appear in this case that some of the rules are being developed as the game proceeds, thus granting the players some flexibility. Under such condi­tions, marines might understandably

American Battleships, 1886-1923

Through their thoroughly detailed descriptions of each ship’s ^characteristics and technical history, the authors have created what will undoubtedly be regarded as the definitive book on the twenty-seven ships that made up America’s first battleship fleet. The exceptionally comprehensive text has been amply augmented by a series of previously unpublished plans, line drawings, and photographs, that clearly and accurately illustrate in remarkable detail the characteristics of the ten different predreadnought designs. Anyone interested in the development of the battleship will want to add this handsome volume to his personal library.

1980/236 pages/130 illustrations

seek the best of both worlds, embrac­ing some new concepts and clinging to old ones that are still suitable. This, rather than the hard necessity for “either/or” choices, seems to be the prevailing situation.

The question of whether the Marine Corps should play RDf/mps is moot. We are already involved in both, and the commitment will likely deepen. As things progress, however, the Navy and Marine Corps must take care to keep from getting their lines fouled. A distinct line of demarcation must be maintained—in both a pro­gramming and doctrinal sense— between the features and capabilities associated with RDf/mps and those as­sociated with the amphibious assault mission. When amphibious assault is viewed as a subset of strategic mobil­ity, for example, such complementary yet clearly distinct missions tend to blur. At the same time, though, ex­amination of the complementary roles that amphibious and rapid deploy­ment forces might play can sharpen perceptions of the potential value of forward-deployed afloat forces. It can sharpen awareness of deficiencies that must be corrected, as well. As one consequence, the Navy and Marine Corps have their best case in years for introducing a long overdue landing craft air cushion vehicle (LCAC) and for beginning to whittle away at an im­pending bloc obsolescence problem by replacing LSD-28-class ships with LSD- 4 is. These two independent (despite attempts to play them off against each other) programs, which represent the most promising amphibious ship­building development in some time, are relatively free of technological risk, and should move ahead without signif­icant difficulty. Looking farther ahead, proponents of surface effect ship (SES) technology now claim that, after years of developmental work, their designs are relatively free of the high-risk/high-cost aura that enve­loped them for so long. There are even indications that SES construction costs may, in time, become competitive with those of displacement ships. Until the old stigma can be dispelled, however, there will be opposition and delays before SES comes along—either in, say, a logistic or amphibious con­figuration. But it is not too early to look at potential SES applications when we begin looking at the LHDX, which will be designed to cover the projected shortfall in helicopter operating spots when the LPHs reach end of service life.

So the game continues, with no real assurance that Good Old Reliable Nathan (or circumstances beyond his—or anyone’s—control) won’t change it or move it. Although the RDF/MPS game cannot be viewed as an unalloyed blessing for the Marine Corps (opportunities for self-inflicted foot wounds abound), it does hold a distant glimmer of promise that am­phibious forces might not only be use­ful through the end of the century, but might even break free of their 20-knot speed of advance, as well.

And that would improve our na­tional security posture, as Damon Runyon would say, “more than some­what.”

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Air Defense of the Carrier Task Group”

®^ee J. E. Lacouture, pp. 60-67, July 1980 Proceedings)

Lieutenant T. McKearney, U. S. Navy I take issue with several of the ^all-too-common simplifications Cap­tain Lacouture falls back on in his dis­cussion of the carrier battle group’s air defense. Perhaps most disturbing is *s single-minded approach to the problem of countering the cruise mis- ^S1le threat to the battle group, in par- ttcular his concentration on the air- aunched cruise missile (ALCM) and his quick dismissal of the submarine- launched cruise missile (SLCM). In Practice, our ability to defend against the air-launched Soviet threat is con- ^S|derably stronger than our corre­sponding capacity to meet the chai­ns⁶ offered by the cruise missile- equipped submarine. Soviet land- ased bombers fly from known bases ^and, as Captain Lacouture points out, are easier to watch. In an open ocean ^attack, all Soviet land-based missile carriers (even the “Backfire”) will be constrained by range and the corre­sponding time available to search out and target the battle group. Accord­ingly, an attack from Soviet land- based aircraft will be easier to detect at its outset and provide the Soviets with limited tactical flexibility—i.e., little opportunity for evaluation and reattack after the initial strike. Signif­icantly, the ability of our intelligence support to alert the carrier battle group of the impending land-based strike will allow the battle group to adequately prepare its defenses with­out placing an extended strain on group assets.

The SLCM threat cannot be dealt with as easily, however, because of the elusiveness of the firing platform. However good our submarine surveil­lance is, the Soviet cruise missile submarine has the advantage of initia­tive with a greater probability of launching an attack without prior warning. Moreover, the efforts to lo­cate and neutralize the SLCM-firing submarine prior to launch must be continuous and drawn largely from the battle group’s own assets. In addition, the submarine surveillance that can be provided by these assets is within the range of several Soviet SLCMs.

Captain Lacouture’s article reflects the disturbing but popular theory that any of our tactical problems can be cured by dumping enough technology on it. While Captain Lacouture’s claims about the Standard Missile (SM)-2 and Aegis systems are valid, his casual treatment of the SM-l scarcely acknowledges the current capabilities of the two SM-l systems (MR and ER) or their position as the backbone of our sea-based missile systems. The SM-l will retain this position until the end of the 1980s when the SM-2 "backfit” to existing platforms will be completed and the Aegis cruiser pro­gram has produced enough units to make a significant operational impact on fleet strength. In the meantime, it is up to us to make the SM-l perform to the limits of its capability. I am convinced that the poor engagement statistics often seen in missile exercises

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are more a function of our poor use of the SM-l than basic design limitations of the system. Lack of personnel train­ing in the tactical use of the SM-l and poor quality control on the manufac­ture of system components are the leading causes of SM-l failures in the fleet. Empirically, those ships which train system operators and technicians and are able to keep their equipment “peaked" perform better at engaging all types of air targets. No amount of SM-2/Aegis sophistication will help a ship unsuccessful at training or main­tenance.

Overall, Captain Lacouture is to be complimented for outlining the prob­lems in our antiair warfare because of gaps in our hardware. The points he makes concerning our shortcomings in electronic warfare and electronic coun­termeasures must be taken seriously, and his positive comments on the E-2C/F-14 combination deserve second­ing as well. It is on this topic, how­ever, that the hard reality of fiscal limitations must be faced: the high price tag of the F-14 ensures we will probably not be able to afford as many of these “high-mix” aircraft as we would like to. Similarly, Captain Lacouture’s proposal to build more Kidd-class guided missile destroyers and convert the existing Spruance-class destroyers to DDGs is fiscally impossi­ble. In view of the practical con­straints on our procurement efforts, our goal must be the effective use of all battle group assets (including the Spruances and frigates which Lacouture apparently has little regard for) in a well-coordinated defense that consid­ers all possible threats to the force.

“Assault on the Liberty”

(See D. Blalock, pp. 108-109, March 1980;

D. E. Keough, p. 85, June 1980 Proceedings)

Virgil L. Brownfield—Donald Blalock has done an outstanding job in his re­view of this clear and graphically told story of what happened that day. Lit­tle did I know how much that day would change my life and blemish the history of the United States.

I was on the bridge during much of the attack that day. I remember well seeing my shipmates fall to their deaths and suffering the pain of being wounded myself in this useless battle. It has been hard all these years to obey the orders given to say nothing to anyone about the attack. And I’ve spent much time trying to forget, but I can still smell the awesome odor of death and hear the screams of pain.

After the attack, The New York Times quoted me as saying there were only three strafing runs on the ship. I remember surviving three without being injured. I was also quoted by another paper as saying the 75-minute attack only lasted 30 minutes. Did I say this in the shock of what happened or was this also part of the cover-up? The cover-up that has kept the Ameri­can public from finding out what really happened.

Less than a year after the attack, I left the Navy to pursue a civilian career. My frustration and bitterness over the way the incident was handled led me to make this decision. I was born and raised in the United States and was proud to serve my country. Now my morale is much lower, and I worry about this nation’s integrity. Everyone in Washington appears to be taking care of himself, and no one is taking care of the country. That’s a broad statement, but I feel we were sold out. No one came to our rescue. I suppose the hostages in Iran are the only Americans who know how it feels.

Even though much time has passed since the Liberty incident, my ship­mates and I are still hoping for a seri­ous congressional investigation of the attack and the cover-up.

Master Chief Petty Officer Stan White, U. S. Naval Fleet Reserve—I am very happy to see this story published. I was working for Mr. Ennes as his elec­tronics division chief at the time the Liberty was attacked. The Proceedings is to be complimented on the fine review of an unpopular subject. Congratula­tions!

Gip D. Oldham, Jr.—It has been gratifying to learn of your efforts to bring light into a dark area . . . that event of 13 years ago has been covered up far too long. There is a close paral­lel between the Liberty cover-up and another, that of the so-called "Lavon Affair.” Though they were 12 years apart in time, the same Israeli names are involved in both attacks against the United States by Israel. Both were aimed at throwing the blame on the Egyptians, and the “Lavon Affair” was successful for a few years.

In the “Lavon Affair,” no Ameri­cans were killed, though they could have been. It involved Israeli and Egyptian Jews firebombing U. S. government installations in Egypt, leaving evidence to incriminate Egyp­tians. This happened in 1954-55 when the United States and Egypt were getting too friendly to suit Israeli tastes. The United States accepted, at least publicly, the Israeli cry of frame-up when its agents were caught ‘firehanded’ by Egypt, tried, and con­victed.

At least one CIA report lists an un­confirmed report that then Israeli De­fense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered the attack on the Liberty. Several years after the “Lavon Affair,” the Israeli government revealed that Minister Lavon had been "set up,” a paper had been signed with his name authorizing the firebombings in Egypt. Lavon had claimed until his death that he knew nothing about the affair, though the signature tagged it with his name.

In the early 1960s, the Israeli gov­ernment discovered that, indeed, Lavon had been framed. It developed that the signature was a forgery, and that either Dayan or another was the culprit. This was to have a scapegoat in case the deal “blew,” as it eventu­ally did.

That “Lavon Affair” contributed to the breaking of relations between the United States and Egypt, to the Egyp­tians having to turn to the Russians, and to the Red foot getting in the Mideast door.

E. H. Katz—I found Mr. D. E. Keough’s comments concerning the publication of the book disturbing, and to encounter these remarks in the June 1980 issue of the Proceedings even more disturbing. He implies that there is a conspiracy to cover up the

f ⁰⁰ concerning the attack on the Lib- ^my- This conspiracy supposedly in- ⁰ ves the government and the media. ^ac °f availability of the book at gen- f^fa bookstores and a lack of reviews the media (New York Times. News- ^u*^e • etc.) are cited as supporting evi- ence. Are books reviewed by the ^aval Institute for a very specialized

sell ^{Knte normali}y found on the best ^er lists or normally reviewed by general circulation newspapers and ^rnagazines.’ⁱ I would think not! What ^s the availability of other books re- ^levved ^and selected by the Naval In- titute? A very plausible approach by ^andorn House would be to distribute ⁽ e book to bookstores that have the jRarket potential for selling such a °°k, with book orders being taken ^{e sew}here. There is no cover-up!

Reasons They Give. . . Anti the REAL Reason”

^T- Brown, pp. 86-87, June 1980;

^L MacMichael, pp. 21-22, July 1980; ^p Mozgala, pp. 23-24, August 1980 Proceedings)

Onr One True Strength”

^h J- Glaeser, p. 86, June 1980; J. L. acMichael, pp. 21-22, July 1980; D. P. ⁰²8^ala, pp, 23-24, August 1980 Proceedings)

^cutenant Commander Richard H. Pur­. ' U■ $■ Navy—Lieutenant Brown

•cates there is a general reluctance . ^voice the pay issue in letters of res- ‘gnation. Perhaps this is the case, but ^paragraph 3.b. of my own resignation ^reads as follows:

Another reason (for my resig­ⁿation) is the loss of income 1 have ex­perienced over the past six years. De- ^sP*fe a promotion and longevity pay Increases, pay raise caps and inflation ^ave effected a 15% decrease in my ^sPending power during this time. As '^v°uld be expected, my family has grown over the same period. The Promotion I received increased my job Responsibilities and commitments.

rankly, it does not make sense to re- ^Ce,Ve less money for doing more work ^apd having more responsibility. But, ^at is precisely what has occurred over the past six years. I do not find •s pay situation fair to me or my

family, and thus, I shall rectify it by finding a different profession.”

Poor, inadequate, or less than fair pay is an enervating problem. It saps an organization’s ability to compensate in other ways when the basic desires of the people for the quality of life sim­ply are not being met. So, with 13 years of service, a lot of patriotism still intact, and a less than happy countenance at the state of the Navy, I am taking permanent leave partially because of this one problem.

Ocean Systems Technician Third Class Robert K. Brooks. U. S. Navy — Lieutenant Brown’s gross annual in­come is approximately $22,000 or $1,900 per month. Thus, he makes about twice the U. S. income per capita, and he receives free medical and dental care. I really wonder if he could do much better in a civilian- related job.

Military service has been and always will be, in all aspects, a responsibility which demands sacrifices of the service member and his family. I believe the reason why military service members are leaving the military in large num­bers is because money is the only medium the military wants to reward them with, and it even advertises this fact. There is much more to military service than take-home pay, and the military should start telling this side of the story.

“An Alternative to

Appeasement”

(See M. N. Katz, pp. 58-62, June 1980

Proceedings)

Ensign Robert K. Morris, U. S. Navy—Let us not exaggerate the role of the U. S. Navy in Third World se­curity. The fleet can establish a pres­ence. The fleet cannot undertake covert operations as well as the CIA, nor can it rush as many troops to a crisis as rapidly as the Air Force. Mr. Katz’s ideas on the naval role in inter­ception of Soviet support are well con­sidered, but the belief that that role can replace closer diplomatic and mili­tary relations with our clients requires a heap of faith from the rest of us.

Aloofness—the premise of his strategy and recent presidential policies—is no alternative to appeasement.

“Oman: The Next Crisis?”

(See R. A. Stewart, pp. 97-102, April 1980;

C. W. Bond and G. W. Loveridge, pp.

21-22, June 1980 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander William A. Nurthen,          U. S. Navy — Captain

Stewart provides an interesting as­sessment of Oman’s potential to fall victim to a putatively Soviet- sponsored invasion by the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y., South Yemen). However, if this attack is so likely, especially since the downfall of the Shah of Iran, then why has it not occurred? Captain Stewart hints at the answer when he notes, “the relative inaccessibility of the border region between the two countries,” and “the vast stretches of desert [within Oman] ... for which tracked vehicles such as tanks are poorly suited.” A British diplomat charged with monitoring events in South Yemen recently remarked to me that "wherever one goes, the tribes are cut off by a desert or a bloody hill.” In short, this terrain would prohibit a conventional armored invasion, and if such folly were attempted, the massive pre-attack preparations required would obliterate any element of surprise.

A second reason why South Ye­men has not attacked Oman is be­cause neither Aden nor its strong supporters—Moscow and Havana— desires or could even afford to launch such an invasion. The U.S.S.R. has roughly 85,000 troops battling inde­cisively in Afghanistan and maintains several thousand advisers in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. Cuban troops in these same countries total nearly 40,000. These Soviet advisers and Cuban troops are used primarily to assist Moscow’s beleaguered clients in the consolidation of their repressive and unpopular regimes. In Ethiopia alone, there are more than 13 active opposition/liberation movements, spawned by Chairman Mengistu’s subhuman policies. South Yemen, de­spite copious Soviet, Cuban, and East German military assistance, has been

Comment and Discussion

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i_s ^ ^a ^^(>uth Yemen attack on Oman T^e ^''kness of the Dhofari rebels, eted f_r ^{h0fari units never have} recov- by j ^{r0rn t}f^|e thumping administered The ^{anian and} Omani forces in 1975. th*«-^Srna^ ^ret>^el bands are scattered

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S_0vj °^Urdl element working against a o_n q ^sP°nsored South Yemen attack not p^lan '^{S C}^^e f^act that Moscow does teact ⁿ°" f*^ow Washington would e_{nce o}p° ^SUcl¹ an invasion. The pres- /\_ra^. ^tWo carrier battle groups in the 0. 5'^ ^^ea and the recently signed m_ent ^,Tlani facilities access agree- Sovi_t._t ^<j^erta,n*y ^wiH cause the aging s_an* ^e.^adtrsf^|*P to think twice about ^sf^|°uld^>n'ⁿ^ ^{an attac}k ^on Oman. It 0 S ^notecl, however, that the

tribal and expatriot dissidents which serve to maintain ferment in the area and act as pressure levers upon moder­ate and pro-Western regional states. In view of the terrain separating South Yemen and Oman, this support may take the form of the Soviet Navy transporting small groups of South Yemeni troops and Dhofari insurgents to jumping-off sites along isolated portions of the South Yemeni or Omani coasts. The U.S.S.R. provided such support in 1973 when a Soviet LST transported approximately 200 South Yemeni troops from Aden to a coastal site near the border with Oman.

One goal of these destabilizing op­erations is to force states such as Saudi Arabia, the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), and Oman to con­clude separate accommodations benefi­cial to Moscow while continuously testing Washington’s will to respond. North Yemen’s gradual tilt towards Moscow subsequent to the 1979 bor­der conflict with South Yemen, as evidenced by President Saleh’s increas­ing willingness to accept Soviet arms, indicates that this pressure tactic may be working.

place of “Air Cavalry Combat Brigade." and “Special Forces Groups . . . 3" in place of "Airborne Task Force.

agteement with Oman does not

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ilit ”^e United States to commit

mvaded" ^°^{rCes t0} Oman if Oman is of ‘ Moreover, any introduction ■ forces in Oman would

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attack ^a^^sence °f a Soviet-sponsored this °.ⁿ Oman does not mean that charJ^*^{00 W}‘H enjoy a period of un- inr_rj ^Cter‘stic stability devoid of Soviet Peni ^Ue ^*^e history of the Arabian tiy_es ^{U a and} Soviet strategic incen- ^Stabip^ar^^{Ue a}g^a*^nst the prospects for cent 7 '^{n c}h'^s portion of the “cres- tiy_es ^criscs.” Soviet strategic incen- ^Stabili2^V°^{f SU}PP^ort f°^{r sm}all-scale de­horde operations such as cross ^r orays and isolated attacks by

“Summary of Major Military

Forces”

(See Naval Review, pp. 237-238, May 1980

Proceedings)

Colonel H. AT Hays. U. S. Army (Retired)—Under the heading of Re­serve Units, three infantry brigades and two special forces groups should be listed under combat units. The Na­tional Guard, which is not listed, should be. The National Guard in­cludes 6 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, 21 brigades, 4 armored cavalry squadrons, 2 special forces groups, and 115 combat battalions.

Editors NOTE: Under “Other Active Units" of the U. S. Army. “Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)" should appear in

“Missiles Make ASW a New Game”

(See W. R. Ruhc, pp. 72-75, March 1980 Proceedings)

“Mine Warfare:

Promise Deferred”

(See R. H. Smith, pp. 27-33, April 1980;

D. G. Powell and C. F. Horne, p. 79, June 1980, N. Polmar, p. 25, August 1980, Proceedings)

“A Marine Choke-Point Strategy”

(See G. W. Anderson, pp. 103-104, April 1980; N. Polmar, p. 25, August 1980 Proceedings)

Captain A. Winslow II. U. S. Navy (Retired)—Three approaches to essen­tially the same problem have been ar­ticulated with varying degrees of bril­liance and novelty in these three re­cent features. There are no more knowledgable and expressive writers in the fields of undersea warfare and antisubmarine warfare than Captains Ruhe and Smith. What Captain Ruhe terms “a favorable operational regime—sea control’’ seems little dif­ferent from the World War II concept of “local control of the air, the sea, and the undersea,’’ as applied to isola­tion of an amphibious operation from enemy interference, except in applica­tion to a mobile area rather than a fixed objective. It is not new, either, to attack the protective organization of a convoy first in order to establish sea control. Captain Ruhe’s concept of de­veloping missiles to attack both enemy surface and submarine forces is not unreal at all. After all, we have in being ASROC, SUBROC, Harpoon, and probably in the near future, the Tom­ahawk cruise missile, all providing varying degrees of standoff capability and closing speed.

Captain Ruhe cites only a 10-knot differential between a nuclear sub-

d

if

marine and presumably our best hom­ing torpedo, with the obvious impli­cation that the torpedo launch must be in the immediate vicinity of the datum. At the time I left close touch with the development and production of the Mk-48 Mod I torpedo in 1972, even then this was not true. The Mk-48 is often listed as a “conven­tional torpedo,” which only means that it has a conventional rather than nuclear warhead. In every other re­spect, it is anything but conventional. It is capable of extremely long ranges, it is very fast, and can go as deep as any submarine. It is wire-guided, has an on-board computer, and it can choose to home passively or actively against a low, quiet submarine. Since the Soviet subs are noisy, as Captain Ruhe points out, the Mk-48 could home passively or by wire guidance without difficulty—homing actively, as people on both sides know, is limited by the speed of cavitation, around 27 knots. Since 1972, this torpedo has under­gone further improvement, and a new contract has recently been awarded to Gould Ocean Systems Division for an ASW standoff weapon, which would presumably establish still longer launching ranges from datum. Also, the LAMPS system is an important capability which could be used in some situations. So, although I agree with Captain Ruhe that a fast closing missile capability, both ASW and anti­ship, would be most effective, we are at present in a somewhat better poten­tial position than Captain Ruhe inti­mates.

As Captain Smith points out, the North Sea Mine Barrage was planted during the closing months of World War I, from the Coast of Norway to the Shetlands, and contained 56,000 Mk-6 moored contact mines, effec­tively denying egress to the German High Seas Fleet. Today, not only have the choke or “scrub” points changed in favor of a mining containment plan, but there are options as to types of mines available. These include: the old Mk-6 and Mk-10 (the sub torpedo tube-launched version of the Mk-6); various ground-laid influence mines which are magnetic, acoustic, or pressure sensitive, or combine all types of sensors, with ship counters and varying sensitivity settings and sterilization features available; and vari­ous moored influence mines for deeper water. Also, there is or soon will be available the Captor, which is actually a dormant homing torpedo lying in wait as a mine until activated when it will launch out of its cocoon and rise and home on its target as a homing torpedo. This concept has long been under development.

Most of the various scrub points are favorable to mining for purposes of containment. To deny egress to the Soviets from the Baltic, the Sound, the Great Belt, and the Little Belt— all narrow straits between Sweden and Denmark—are quite easily and rela­tively inexpensively mineable. The problem here would be diplomatic; some of our allies would likely oppose such an operation. Alternates in this area, also involving diplomatic prob­lems, greater expense, and more mines, would be to mine the Kattegat between Denmark’s north point and Sweden, and the Skagerrak between Denmark and Norway. To deny egress from the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits are readily mineable, but again a problem with our Allies exists, as would also be the case mining the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. In the Far East, the scrub points which would also readily be mineable—again with diplomatic problems—are the Korean Strait, the Tsugaru Strait, and La Perouse Strait. In each case, the types and numbers of mines to be laid would depend on a number of factors in addition to the diplomatic considerations, the me­teorology and hydrography of the area, the type of delivery most advantageous (overtly or covertly—by surface, air, or submarine), the season of the year, and any special local considerations. To this list may be added, if the situa­tion deteriorates further in the Persian Gulf area, the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. The other choke or scrub point area, the Greenland- Iceland-U.K. (G-I-UK) Gap, is consid­ered too large and deep an area to mine effectively, although perhaps use of Captor or other special weapons in certain tactical situations would be feasible. Another point of egress from the Soviet base complex in the Vla­divostok area is north to the Sea ⁰ Okhotsk through the Tartarskiy Strait which is very narrow at some points, and therefore covertly mineable, the land on either side being Soviet terri­tory. Depending on the developing situation, this long narrow strait could also be mineable from the air.

Captain Anderson’s Marine Corps strategy of controlling these various choke points by projecting marine power from the land to control narrow sea areas seems to be quite novel an might work very well at some of these points. However, there are serious limitations. The advance planning- diplomatic problems, lead time, an time for implementation would be -*° considerable in all areas that the situa­tion might change radically as to u¹' validate the planned course of action- In certain areas, such as the G-I-Uh Gap, the sea areas are too great to be readily controlled by land-based ait- Even so, the strategy has some merit and might well work in certain areas it could be implemented promptly- ¹ shall never forget the many time* Marine Corps land-based air saved us from attack by incoming planes ^:lt Okinawa.

It seems apparent to me that non^e of these options could plug all of the points mentioned here. Perhaps a j^u' dicious mix of all three, however- could accomplish the effective con­tainment of the Soviet surface ant submarine forces, or, where already deployed in the open seas, could deny them return to their bases. Thi* should go far towards solving the problem of too few carrier task force* to cover all these scrub points. Carrier forces would have to continue to ope^f' ate in the G-I-UK area as well as other open-sea areas. But implementing Captain Ruhe’s suggestions, supported by SOSUS and other long-range detec­tion systems, Captain Smith’s idea ⁰ mining the various narrow sea areas- and Captain Anderson’s idea of p^r°' jecting Marine Corps air power frod¹ established bases next to choke point* would imprison the growing Sovi^et Navy, a victim of its own geography-

12»

(Continued on page

Proceedings / September 10⁹°

A

By Norman Polmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet

respect to carrier air wings ^e 1), the Navy has for several

24

10

10

tUrt^^{C tont}inuing controversy over fu- whjch^{rCraft tarner} programs—mainly futurt ^S*^10u^ be built in the ^asPcct~~'^{laS tenc}^^c^ ^to obscure another i_n j ^C naval aviation, the increas- ^a'rcr f^Str*°^US P^r°bl^em of not enough fjj ^{C to} bll existing flight decks.

aterb- *^3ro^⁾*^em may become ex- _Unt ^atct ‘ⁿ the near future because of _Whj|”^dmt‘^{es in} the F/A-18 program, _ejCari          areas of naval aviation, for

heli ^^C’ ^C^^e Marine Corps’ assault the j*yy^C*^rS’ ^may have similar crises in

With *'

(set Tabli

VF Fighter                    F-4 or

F-14

Light Attack A-7E Medium Attack A-6E ^vAQ Jammer EA-6B ^VAK Tanker         KA-6D

VAW Early WarnmgE-2C ^VS Antisubmarine S-3A ^ HS Antisubmarine SH-3 ^FP Reconnaissance RF-8G or RF-4B or

,                                                    RF- 14A*

lo,. ^VRC Cargo (COD) C-1A ^VQ Electronic

_..... -—SirrveiHance EA-3B

*»^l ^ ^are from the VF squadrons.

^ard forward-deployed ships.

bj j^^anned to adopt the McDonnell Fghf ^aS ^^orthr°p F/A-18 Hornet as a air **"Fght attack aircraft. In carrier agj_n ^Ul^^S’ the F/A-18 would replace the ^s8UaH Phantom in six fighter 24 ^f0ns (^VH and the A-7 Corsair in att^k _Sq_uatj_rons (_VAy _while the ni_nt '“Orps would use the aircraft in ^and , °^{r more} fighter-attack (VMFA) *^F»t attack (VMA) squadrons. Be- p_t0t ^t*^{1e ec}onomy of a large aircraft ^ement, using the same aircraft

in VF- and VA-type squadrons would simplify and reduce the costs of train­ing, logistics, and maintenance. The fighter and attack versions of the F/A-18 are identical and can be recon­figured from the va to VF role or vice versa on board ship in less than one hour. While now capable of firing the Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air mis­siles, in the late 1980s, the F/A-18 should have the improved, longer range, AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile).

But the F/A-18 program has encountered problems from the outset, beginning in 1973 after the Air Force had held a competition for a light­weight fighter aircraft. There was a flyoff between the General Dynamics YF-16 (33,000 pounds empty weight) and the Northrop YF-17 (21,000 pounds). Significantly, they were single- and twin-engine aircraft, re­spectively. The Air Force chose the F-16, which has now entered squadron service and is being procured (and co-produced) by several NATO nations as well as by Israel. Congress directed that the Navy should buy a carrier- based version of the Air Force F-16 to realize the benefits of joint develop­ment and procurement (as had worked so well with the multi-service F-4).

The Navy, however, decided on a modified YF-17 to be built by McDon­nell Douglas and Northrop that has evolved into the 33,585-pound F/A-18. There was immediate controversy, as congressmen—supporting the views of aircraft plants in their respective districts—opposed or supported the Navy decision. Some within the Navy asserted that buying the F/A-18 marked a step backwards in aircraft develop­ment because the F/A-18 was inferior to the Navy F-14 Tomcat—F/A-18S will replace some F-l4s in later years—as well as Soviet aircraft the F/A-18 would be expected to counter. But with De­partment of Defense support, the F/A-18 program was approved in 1975.

“We’re going to build a low-cost fighter no matter how much it costs,” one defense budget analyst is alleged to have said.

At that time, the Defense Depart­ment estimated that the F-14 was cost­ing $18.8 million a copy (a 390- aircraft program), and in similar dol­lars, the F/A-18 would cost $9.6 mil­lion per plane (for 811 aircraft). Op­ponents of the F/A-18 noted that buy­ing more F-l4s would lower the Tom­cat's unit cost.

Now five years later, the F/A-18 pro­totypes have flown, and the F/A-18 program has expanded to 1,366 air­craft which include aircraft for Marine Corps squadrons. The estimated cost is up to about $22 million per copy (while the current F-14 cost is $23.5 million).* Perhaps more significant, the F/A-18 has experienced a number of technical problems, mostly minor and correctable. These problems have in­cluded the aircraft’s outer wing panel and roll rate, both of which are said to be solvable, but at the cost of more dollars and weight. There have also been lesser problems, generally downgraded by the F/A-18 supporters and exaggerated by F/A-18 opponents. In addition, the Marine Corps has said that instead of buying 322 F/A-18s for its attack squadrons, it wants to pro­cure the AV-8B advanced Harrier, a V/STOL aircraft.

The latest manifestation of the F/A- 18 s problems came recently when Sec­retary of the Navy Edward Hidalgo *This F/A-18 cost is based on full program costs of $30 billion averaged over 1,366 air­craft. The 48 aircraft in fiscal year 1981 cost an average of $22 million compared with an aver­age cost of $23.5 million for the 24 F-14s in fiscal year 1981. The F/A-18 figures for fiscal year 1981 include some research and develop­ment and startup costs. While inflation has af­fected both programs, the F/A-18 being later has suffered more. (All fiscal years are year of aircraft authorization.)

craft now in service could be retain^ (upgraded?) and the production reopened. Although the last Na^vl A-7Es were authorized in fiscal y^eilt 1979, A-7K variants are still beinfj produced for the Air Force and seven foreign versions are in production rework.

Vought had earlier proposed twin-engine A-7 variant as an alterna­tive to the F/A-18 in the VA role. T*^llS aircraft would have some training logistics-maintenance commonal'y with the A-7E and may be a suitab substitute if the F/A-18 were not ava¹ able. Still another proposal is a stan ard or modified A-6E Intruder, carrier-based all-weather attack aircra* produced by Grumman, that could ^ a partial substitute for the A-7 dra'' down.

With respect to Marine Corps a^c tack requirements, there are now thr^ Marine Corps AV-8A Harrier squ^;1 rons, five A-4M Skyhawk squadron^5-

Th^c

advised Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that production may have to be slowed some 40-50%, given the air­craft’s rising costs and the overall con­straints on the Navy’s budgets during the next few years.

Congress has now fully funded de­velopment of the AV-8B following the highly successful trials of the two YAV-8B prototypes, converted from AV-8A Harriers. The marines, who have developed the world’s finest air- ground coordination, consider the AV-8B to particularly suit their needs. Marine Corps V/STOL aircraft could operate from the 12 helicopter carriers (LHAs/LPHs) in the fleet as well as from the larger attack carriers, while the F/A-18S could fly only from the bigger ships—if they were available—until bases and support facilities were avail­able ashore. The AV-8B Harrier can fly from unimproved bases ashore, albeit with all of the support problems one has away from a carrier or major air base.

The technical problems and other factors threaten to further delay or, if there are additional cost increases,

cancel the F/A-18. At this writing, the F/A-18 is scheduled to enter service with Navy fighter squadrons in 1983 to replace Phantoms and, in 1984, to begin replacing Corsairs.

A delay in F/A-18 delivery could be compensated for by further prolonging F-4 service life (done once by upgrad­ing the F-4B/J variants to the F-4N/S configurations). Another response to F/A-18 program delays is to procure more F-l4s beyond the 491 now planned through fiscal year 1984. If the F/A-18 were cancelled entirely, the only alternative for a ship-based fighter during the 1980s would be additional F-l4s.

Of the 13 carriers that the Navy plans to operate in the mid-1980s, all but the Midway (CV-41) can operate F-i4s. There is some talk of retaining the Midway's sister ship, the Coral Sea (CV-43), in an operational role- (She is now scheduled to become a training carrier in 1983.) These ships would continue to operate F-4s until their demise in the late 1980s.

If more Grumman F-l4s are pro­cured, consideration may be given to providing the additional planes with an improved engine rather than the TF30 turbofan now installed. That engine has experienced considerable problems and has been the subject of numerous “fixes.” Early in the F-14 program, it was planned that the main production run would be the F-14B

configuration with an improved turbofan engine, but it was neve⁽ done. All Navy Tomcats are F-l^A⁵ with the TF30 engine.

Delay or cancellation of the F/A-'⁸ would also hurt Marine Corps figh^te( squadrons. Now scheduled to declm from the current 12 to 9 by 1984, ^ VMFA squadrons have the F-4. T*¹* marines have never flown the F-14, an the only options once their F-4s wea^f out would be to give up fighter squad' rons altogether or buy a non-carfl^er capable aircraft, most likely the F'¹'^1, Marines have flown "non-naval” ^alf craft in the past, among them the B-^ (PBJ) twin-engine bomber. Consider ing the limited possibility of Marin^e Corps fighters operating in signified¹ numbers from Navy carriers in the fu' ture, the F-16 becomes a natural can' didate.

On the attack side, delay or can

cellation of the F/A-18 raises oth^e(

vA

problems. Twenty-four Navy ^v squadrons now fly Vought A-7E Co^f sairs which are to be replaced by ^ 18s. On an interim basis, the A-7 *^lf

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and five A-6E Intruder squadrons.

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Marine Corps hopes to have eig¹ _ AV-8B Harrier squadrons and the A- units, thus loss of the F/A-18 won not affect the attack picture if ^ marines have their way.

*The

comtv, ^{6 316 a}^^so Problems with other

T_h?;;r:^{s of the} _{air wing}.

fXcelltnr ^{ntruder has} proved to be an attack i ^a '^Weatber, multi-purpose

tier air _f^ne' ^But’ ^{1,ke most other car}‘ these ^C*f ^{1 C}^^es’ rbe Navy is short of P anes. All 12 carrier-based cut from 12 to

ls also

shortage in carrier- ₀^Lanker aircraft, the KA-6D ver- ^tanWf_{0r B}^{e lntmder}' ^The current ^Variants°^{rCe COns}‘^sts °f converted A-6A aircraft       ^new'P^roduction KA-6D

Cra^r> the° i^5rov*^de rhe necessary air- 1^VK) _Pr ^{6 Nay}y plans new aircraft 'ⁿg in °r^CUrernent °f 56 aircraft start- ^Candida ^ISCa* ^^ear 1983. The prime of the p^{ttS are a KA}"^6H configuration ^diri°nal ^r°^Wl^{er or} modification or ad- iflg asvc ^Pr°^{CUrernent of the S}'^{3 Vik}' There ^aifCra^ h^)r tanker use.

8 ^'plan^ ^SU^'^c‘^{ent S-}3As to provide

b; sion

la

having '^{Vldl A}‘^6E authorizations

Thf r_A^{n d in f,Scal} y^ear 1980.

Prowler ^ ^variant of the A-6, named craft        ^{an e}l^ectronic-jamming air-

attackin       ■ ^{1 nva}l^uable for defending

defense^ p'^rcra^^r b°^m hostile missile fou_r ^acb ^a*^r wing should have

there ot, ' ^CSe a*rcraft. In addition, Corp_s     ^ f°^r rb^e Marine

most _aj ^Ma<^ squadron. However, Sq_Uacj_r^{r w}‘ⁿ8^s have only three-plane schetJ_ui°?^{S and}’ ^w‘rh production there j_s V^{0 end in fisca}l year 1982, here ”       ^{00 wa}7 ^t0 8^et there from

There

lar&e _c ^{e s}9^uadron to each of the 12 ^^ecentl^frierS Pl^anned for the 1980s. ^sougi|_t ^tl^|e Defense Department aircraft fr ^rernove some or all of these as tank ^{f0rn tde} carriers and use them aircraft ^{and e}l^ectronic surveillance Rior_e t)_e l ^{kde t}^*^s would have freed rhey ^ ^{C s}pace for VF/VA aircraft—if ^<dePrive₍j"^{6 ava}ilat^>le—it would have Asve ^tl^|c fleet of a most useful , Astern in

rbe g_s ^ electronic surveillance role, ^EA-3g Sk-^t<>Ldd replace the venerable fc'rr_e(j  yWarriors, affectionately re-

iargeti^ ^{&S w}hales’’ because of their Ploys t₀ L^<>nl ^s*^ze- When a carrier de- Pacifjc ^{1 e} Mediterranean or Western mally Cq P^air °f EA-3B aircraft nor- ^v*de th_t ^r?^{tS to ro}°st on deck to pro- ^tr0ni_c ^orce commander with elec- bis are_a^U-p^L'^dance hostile forces in he A-3 was developed as the

A3D in the late 1940s for the nuclear strike role. The last A-3B was delivered in 1956. At this time, the Navy has no planned replacement for the EA-3B.

Another type of plane with re­placement problems is the carrier- based reconnaissance aircraft. The last RA-5C Vigilante squadron came ashore in September 1979- The only Navy recce planes left are a few RF-8G Crusader photo planes. The Navy has only enough to provide three-plane detachments to five carriers; the marines, who fly the RF-4B—another plane not found in the Navy’s inventory—have provided an RF-4B detachment to one carrier to help make up for the Navy’s shortfall.

As an interim recce plane, the Navy is modifying 49 F-l4s to carry a Tacti­cal Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS). Three aircraft in each carrier will be TARPS capable. The planes can be converted back to a fighter role on board ship. This is considered an interim scheme, with the RF-14s later returning to the VF role to make up for attrition. For the long term, a photo-reconnaissance F/A-18 is planned.

The final fixed-wing aircraft unit on board carriers is the airborne early warning squadron (VAW), flying mostly the E-2C Hawkeye. There is a shortage of these planes too, but the five-year aircraft procurement plan provides for buying six per year.

There is also a shortage in carrier on-board delivery (COD) aircraft. The Navy has 30 C-1A Traders, 12 C-2A Greyhounds, and 1 US-3A Viking COD prototype. The Navy hopes to begin procurement of a new COD (VCX) be­ginning in fiscal year 1983 with at least 24 planned.

The aircraft carrier remains the Navy’s most flexible and versatile war­ship. The continuous deployment of carrier battle groups into the Indian Ocean following the seizure of Ameri­can hostages by Iranian terrorists and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is timely testimony of the utility of these ships. Indeed, an issue before Con­gress this year has been whether or not to reactivate the Oriskany (CV-34), one of the “small” EssexlHancock-class ships of World War II construction.

But what aircraft would fly from the Oriskany? The Navy has been look­ing at a "scratch” air wing composed of Marine Corps and Navy/Marine Corps Reserve A-4 Skyhawks, A-7 Cor­sairs, and AV-8A Harriers, with RF-8G Crusaders for reconnaissance. There are sufficient F-8E Crusaders in mothballs to form one VF squadron for the Oriskany. The ship is too small to operate F-4s, and also would not have ASW, AEW, or VAQ aircraft.

Navy planners are more concerned about filling the flight decks of the ex­isting carriers. There are too few air­craft being procured to support the current Navy-Marine Corps aviation structure. In fiscal year 1980, the Congress approved the procurement of 127 aircraft—24 more than the Carter Administration requested. That is still fewer planes than needed to replace operational losses and aircraft wearing out.

In fiscal year 1981, the Carter Ad­ministration asked for only 104 naval aircraft. The later years of the Carter five-year plan show more aircraft— 179 in 1982, 269 in 1983, 318 in 1984, and 354 in 1985. The Navy re­quires an annual procurement of over 300 aircraft of all types to fill all Navy and Marine Corps squadrons and train­ing and pipeline requirements, while not significantly increasing the age of the force. Not since fiscal year 1970 have that many aircraft been procured.

While Carter Administration plan­ning will meet the 300 number in fis­cal year 1984, recent history shows that the higher numbers of ships, air­craft, tanks, or any military weapon planned for the latter years of the five-year programs are usually pushed off when the five-year program is re­vised on an annual basis. This situa­tion, coupled with the questions raised about the viability of the F/A-18 program, means that the nation may lose a considerable portion of the effec­tiveness of the Navy carrier force—in the words of the Chief of Naval Oper­ations, “The measure of difference be­tween the U. S. and Soviet navies.”

(To be continued in the November issue.)

eroc,

Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 120)

^acrtnd D d                     „

h_as . ' °^ru’ns—Captain Church

of L^rov'ded a much-needed overview m_arj ^{C cr}'^t‘^cal issue of American wk:_.^Ime dependence on shipping

‘ence.

ment₀fl k                          ^W’

tio_{n e} ^ljoeria has the right to requisi- ^ve*ssel ^VerW ^one °f the Liberian-registered Pletef ^ this may not be com- ^el/^^i0na1’ ^the new regime of ^or₍.^ant ^^oe I’as shown an erratic side. knoty⁰^’ ^Libya'^s Colonel Qaddafi is tel_at: ° ^{t0 bave} offered advice and closer ^ °ns with Liberia’s leadership.

Li be-'- ar8^ument can be made that

of Convenience or ^ags of Necessity?”

»A T n, .                    ¹

^P^ee_dl„_gs) ^C ’ ^PP’ ⁵²‘⁵⁷' J^{Une 1980}

fi

sails under ‘‘flags of conven- , Unfortunately, Captain many*^{1 S art}'^c^^{e ma}y have been, as too overt\^⁰^^C^~^re*^eVant writings are, ref_ei.^a"^en ^ events. Specifically, I tne ^t0. ^tbe overthrow of the govern- °f Ljk°-^President Wiliam R. Tolbert Point ^ena ®^ecause’ as Captain Church ^tonna^S °^Ut’ ^one-t^^,‘^rcl of U. S.-owned t^,()ns ^^Cf ^{IS blbena}n-registered, the ac- D_0e °^{f MaSter} Sergeant Samuel K. scrutiny^ ^'^{S assoc}*^ates l^jear dose

u_ny_a^enj^^ers °f the Institute who are of _a^mi *^{ar w}ith the potential problem Ljb_e • ^sei2ure, or ‘‘requisition,” of Gove'^30sltipping by the Liberian Will; ^{nrncnt are} referred to the article by as_sj_st ^arn Woodward, a former legislative (D _f^^{nt t0} Representative Gerry Studds theoJ*f^S^’ ^{m tb}e 20 June 1980 issue of Wood ^St‘^aK ^^C‘^enceMonitor. Briefly, Mr. tem_at-'^Var<^ ^argues that under in- ^lonal maritime law, the govern-

Derj_a .

L ^under the overthrown True ^ents^f ^art^ ^an<^ ^{tbe ebte} descend- f_erecj ° fotmer American slaves, suf- h_ands ⁿ^°'^c°lonial exploitation at the Wj_t^ major American corporations, regj ^regard to extremely low vessel rati₀ ^tfat'^{on fee}s, the major oil corpo- this °^S ^^{aVe been} beneficiaries. From ship ^V'^ewP^0|nt, Liberia’s new leader- ^'ght be encouraged, if only to

authenticate its “revolutionary” cre­dentials, to implement a recommenda­tion of the United Nations’ Confer­ence on Trade and Development, to wit, that flag-of-convenience opera­tions should cease, in particular through ownership by nationals of the flag under which the ships sail.

Mr. Woodward argues that a requi­sitioning of the Liberian flag vessels is perfectly legal, that the vessels’ cap­tains are obliged to comply with such an order, and that Liberia could ask any coastal state to assist in effecting its orders or even “deputize the Soviet Union to enforce its statutes on the high seas.” While either the imposi­tion of higher registration fees or the gradual nationalization of the Liberian-flag fleet would create a de­gree of economic discomfort, this pales in comparison to the potential for mischief should an abrupt requisi­tioning order be closely coordinated with an oil embargo which might be imposed in case of renewed warfare in the Middle East. Given the seriousness of such a scenario, I hope members of the Institute will discuss the problem further in the Proceedings.

Further, it would be desirable to have an international law specialist address himself to the legal aspects, not so much making a one-sided pre­sentation of the American doctrine of “full compensation” (The First and Second Hickenlooper Amendments), but giving full consideration to the Third World’s position on “unjust enrichment.” Specific questions might be whether the so-called “Calvo Clause” (foreigners required to abide solely by national law and forbidden to resort to diplomatic claim) pertains to flag-of-convenience registration, and, if the United States could assert a claim before the World Court, whether the law would favor a judg­ment for the United States. Is the law sufficiently clear that prompt action could be taken to void the effects of a requisitioning of all Liberian-flag

tankers? Or, as this author suspects, is international law so much in a state of turmoil that legal remedies would be totally unable to aid in solving the immediate crisis?

“Retention: The Pressure Is On”

(See). F. Kelly, pp. 40-45, April 1980; D. P.

Van Ort, p. 20, June 1980; D. R. Putnam,

p. 22, July 1980; B. D. Cole, pp. 75-76,

August 1980 Proceedings)

Bruce M. Putnam—I read with interest Captain Kelly’s article—the latest in a sad line of woeful tales and comments regarding the low retention rates in the Navy—a problem which I under­stand is not limited to the naval serv­ice. While much or all of what Cap­tain Kelly and others have said may be true, I detect what 1 believe to be a major omission in the discussions to date.

Some evening, when you have noth­ing better to do, turn on the TV and watch the ads for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These services will pro­vide the applicant with on-the-job training (no prior work experience or interest in the military needed) which will stand him or her in good stead when the duty tour is up. Little or nothing is said about a career or duty to country.

The potential applicant is prom­ised, in the best Madison Avenue fash­ion, that he or she will have a lot of fun, get in good shape, make friends, see the world—in short, have an all- expenses-paid vacation. Little wonder that when the new recruit discovers that summer camp is not what it was cracked up to be, thoughts turn homeward.

pr_0l

Certainly, the problems of competi­tive pay, meaningful jobs, and effec­tive communication flow are not in­significant and deserve continuing at­tention. Captain Kelly’s comment that "increased remuneration may be the least expensive way to improve per-

sonnel readiness” is on target. On the other hand, the Navy should not mislead—unintentionally or other­wise—its potential recruits that mili­tary service is one of the prizes of the Newlywed Game.

“Vigilante Fadeout”

(See P. B. Mersky, pp. 63-69, June 1980 Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) Rick Morgan, U. S. Navy, Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron-33—Concerning the disposi­tion of the RA-5C, at least three have been saved for display in addition to 156608 at Memphis. 156624 is at the Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, wearing the colors of RVAH-6, having

NAVAL AVIATION MUSEUM, PENSACOLA

immediately arrived there after the squadron's last cruise on the Nimitz (CVN-68). RVAH-3, the Fleet Readiness Squadron, is represented by 156621 at the Naval Photographic School on Naval Air Station Pensacola. While at the old home, Key West, 156612 has been placed on display with the paint of Heavy-12 (RVAH-12). It is only fit­ting that several of the type have been preserved for viewing by future gener­ations.

“The Swinging Debate”

CSV? R. Hanks, pp. 26-3 1, June 1980 Proceedings)

Technical Sergeant Richard A. Walters, U. S. Air Force (Retired)—The U.S.S.R. has been developing its con­ventional forces at a “go-for-broke” rate because that is exactly how it intends to use them. Little attention has been paid in this country to the fact that the Soviets are increasingly improving their civil defense and hardening their industrial and military defenses to improve their survivability rate. Why? To neutralize the nuclear holocaust we might unleash. When they reach a point where they feel they can come out on top, I believe they will use those forces in the following manner. They will decide what coun­try, or countries, they desire to move into, and they will move. When we shout and threaten with nuclear retali­ation (if we dare), they can afford to ignore the threat because they (and we) will realize they would lose less than we. Having felt reasonably safe, they can resort to, and force us into, conventional warfare. How would it look if we fought conventional forces with nuclear bombs?

Let's face it, even our technological superiority (which is becoming smaller) does not overcome the in­creasing numbers of ships the Soviets are producing. They are covering all phases of warfare while, as Admiral Hanks states: "Warships, fighter and attack aircraft, and other systems have invariably taken their place in the fiscal line well behind fleet ballistic missile submarines, ICBMs, and other elements of strategic power.” These items are a must, but as is advanced by Admiral Hanks, "The stakes are simply too high” to put all our eggs into one basket. The swing strategy is a budget-stretching theory that will not survive a numeri­cal and qualitative superiority ⁰ enemy vessels and weapons.

The military establishment must awaken the public and, in turn, th^e Congress to the fact that all monies we cut from defense to give to social programs will not protect th^e social programs, but the reverse ^lS true.

“The Twelve Days of the England”

{See J. A. Williamsom and W. D. Lanier, PP^ 76-83, March 1980; W. J. Ruhe, p. 81, J^unC 1980; P. Gretton, p. 25. August 1980 Proceedings)

Captain R. A. Bowling. U. S. ^^ar- (Retired)—Captain Ruhe asks why D^£S were superior to DDs in ASW capab*| ity in World War II. A very plausib ⁶ partial answer may be found in the re i sponse to a similar type question by I Japanese naval officer shortly after th^e war ended. Asked why the Japan^ese had done so little to protect their met chant marine from virtual annihd¹¹ tion, largely by American submarines' Captain Atsushi Oi attributed the df bade primarily to the "offensive spirit of the Imperial Navy. For e* ample, he quoted a destroyer group commander, when assigned an A^s escort mission, as complaining, ^w are not trained to accompany me^r chant vessels, but to fight a fleet & tion.” (See Captain Oi’s "Why Jap^af,s ' Anti-Submarine Warfare Failed, PP' j 587-601, June 1952, Proceedings ' \ Japanese naval officers, including those in destroyers, were not train⁶ to “think submarine.” Instead, devoted their professional time ^an energies almost exclusively to perfe^ct ing expertise in a fleet action. Th^lS dedication to a single purpose suP^ ported the Mahanian strategy adop^te by the Japanese Navy and reflected ¹ ₍ its complex "attrition” and “ambush battle plan to annihilate the LL Navy in one Jutland-style battle.

This “offensive” spirit with its e¹¹¹ phasis on “fleet action” was not l^irl1 ited to the Imperial Japanese Navp’ however. Between wars and well in^c World War II, the Mahanian phil^t7S ophy of the superiority of "cap^lC^ ships” and the "offensive,” the de^cl

11

siveness of "big battles,” and the “sec­ondary nature” of the guerre de course permeated naval thinking in the United States, the lessons of World War 1 and the earlier experience of the British in World War II not­withstanding. This emphasis on “fleet action” can be attributed largely to a revival of Mahanian theory between World War I and World War II. As a result, the U. S. Navy—and the British and Japanese—devoted most of its limited manpower and fiscal re­sources to manning and maintaining its battlefleet. While at the Naval War College, the Battle of Jutland— although indecisive—was studied and restudied by class after class in terms of the Mahanian “principles” involved and their application to refining the Orange Plan and executing the super- Jutland-style battle plan envisioned therein. And in the fleet, training was limited, by policy and fiscal con­straints, almost exclusively to fleet ex­ercises in which the "Blue” American fleet defeated the “Orange" Japanese fleet in a classical Jutland-style battle: opposing conterminous lines of battle­ships exchanging thunderous broad­sides for command of the sea.

Naturally, there was some training in ASW since it was one of the many missions expected to be performed by our multi-purpose destroyers. But the introduction of sonar just prior to World War II fostered a premature and over optimistic conclusion that it was the answer to any submarine that had the temerity or misfortune of coming within range. Thus, with the submarine threat supposedly contained through technology, the major em­phasis in the destroyer force continued to be on traveling with the "big boys” (i.e., BBs, CVs) and preparing for a “fleet action” in which the “small boys” (DDs) would go dashing in to launch their deadly “fish" against the enemy's main battle line. That is what being a destroyerman was all about. Consequently, as in the case of their Japanese contemporaries—and Brit­ish— U. S naval officers in general and destroyermen in particular had not been trained to “think sub­marine.”

The obsession with the offensive and fleet action is only understandable in a profession steeped in the Nelson- Jones-Togo tradition, for “to go to sea to hunt down and destroy the enemy makes a strong appeal to every naval officer. It gives a sense of the initiative and of the offensive.” But in the light of history it cannot be condoned with­out reservation. As an example, in World War II, this obsession was a primary cause for the virtual annihila­tion of the Japanese merchant marine, as previously noted, and contributed materially to the grevious shipping losses suffered by the Allies.

Specifically, in the case of the United States the consequence was that “the United States Navy was woe­fully unprepared, materially and men­tally, for the U-boat blitz on the At­lantic Coast in January 1942. . . . This unpreparedness was largely the Navy’s own fault. . . . [It] couldn’t see any vessel under a thousand tons [referring to the lack of convoy es­corts] . . . [not ready] for a reasonable protection of shipping when the sub­marines struck, and was unable to im­provise [plans] for several months.” Meanwhile, the U-boats enjoyed a “merry massacre.” (See Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War ll. Vol. I, pp. 12, 200-201.)

Belatedly, the Navy developed a very credible ASW posture. Germane to this discussion is the fact that the surface elements of forces dedicated to the ASW mission consisted almost ex­clusively of destroyer escorts and smaller type vessels (PFs, etc.), not fleet destroyers. The latter, except for the vintage “four-pipers,” continued mostly to run with the “big boys.” Thus, DE crews became more profi­cient in ASW for the simple reason that ASW was their primary—almost exclusive—mission whereas it was only one of several—and not necessar­ily the primary—naval warfare areas in which DDs trained their crews.

In addition to having better trained ASW crews, DEs were equipped with better ASW weapons systems. For ex­ample, “Hedgehog,” which was used so devastatingly by the England, was installed only on DEs and PFs, with minor exceptions in the case of DDs. The DEs also had depth charges. Thus, DEs had the option of attacking with

the usually more effective ahea thrown projectile, or depth charges, °^r both—a deadly combination. only had depth charges.

The exploits of the England and th^e question, posed by Captain Ruhe off^ef an invaluable lesson and opportunity for the formulation of ASW policy" Both the U. S. Navy and the R°>'⁹ Navy learned early in World War that normal naval training was ⁿ°^c enough to qualify personnel for ^ highly complex but often boring ras of ASW; special training was requif^ in tactics, sensors, weapons, weapons systems. That lesson does not appear to be reflected in current nav policy that leaves the vital mission ⁰ the protection of shipping to our all'⁴’⁵ or to the reserves. Little wonder tl such a policy is conducive to a geneta apathy, or even antipathy, toW*^f ASW. (See Captain Ekelund’s C&D °ⁿ “The S-3 Needs a Shot in the Art^0, Not Major Surgery,” pp. 28-33’ March 1980 Proceedings.) Failure to re verse this less than positive attitu ^e toward ASW could be the single crucial factor if we are ever again fate with a concerted submarine att»^c against our shipping or in the bold^eSt of bold enterprises against our bar^{1 e} groups. History has shown that best insurance against the success ⁰ such attacks is to provide in peacetime a cadre of dedicated forces, special equipped and trained for ASW. If fail to so provide, then we shall be ^ft' peating the same type of error as <^^e Royal Navy in 1934 when it ignor^e Admiral Jellicoe’s rhetorical questio¹¹' “The fast vessels needed for es<T^fI against submarine attack cannot improvised. ... Is it not time ^ provision be made to ensure the EU¹ pire [i.e., our own SLOCs] against f^uj ture disaster?” The consequence ⁰ such a repeated error would be equal*) or more severe: a high probability t*¹⁹ our SLOCs would be severed, at least the North Atlantic. Actions necessau to reduce such a probability to an a^c ceptable level must be taken now, ^nt,t in the future when any action mi#^^f be too little and/or too late. NoU' the time to start “thinking ^sU^ marine,” in both ASW and AS>¹ terms: and then doing somethin# about the threat.