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Perhaps, then, if the defenders of the amphibious assault mission will evaluate these risks, they may decide to accept them and willingly support a movement of the Marine Corps in the direction of mission flexibility. Then we might actively seek—rather than passively acquiesce in—a change to the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect our desire to be fully flexible in employment. If that change were to occur, the Corps could logically expect
• hich the
to enter into a new phase in wn ^ amphibious assault was but one among its many profess capabilities.
124)
(Continued on paS
By Captain W. G. Carson, U. S. Navy, and Captain R. A. Shinn, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Command in the Amphibious Force
Surface warfare: Submarine warfare: Aviation warfare:
hign nd Po1'
make the situation more equita ^ First, there should be equal opP ^ nity for aviators and submariners
have commands in the cruiser-
ahih1'
Would the Navy give command of a cruiser to an officer who had not qualified for command, had no experience in that type of ship, or had never stood a deck watch, much less qualified as officer of the deck? Of course not! Then why do such officers get assigned to command amphibious ships? Would the Navy give command of a cruiser-destroyer group to an officer who had never served in a cruiser or destroyer? Of course not! Then why does an officer with no amphibious experience get assigned to command an amphibious group?
The average citizen and the average sailor probably assume that their Navy selects the best-qualified officers for command. While this assumption is true in the sense of prior performance, the quota system now used is incompatible with the concept of best fitted. The CNO-approved policy for amphibious captain commands at sea is outlined in Table 1.
There once was a time when officers well qualified in amphibious warfare commanded almost all amphibious ships, squadrons, and groups. The first incremental change was the assignment of a larger proportion of aviators and submariners (and, recently, surface warfare officers without amphibious experience) to command amphibious ships. But that was all right, because the squadron commanders were all experienced in amphibious warfare, and they could keep an eye on the commanding officers. Then these same submariners and aviators began to command amphibious squadrons. But that was all right, because the
Table 1 Amphibious Captain Commands
Major Commands
_________ (LPH, LPD, LKA, LCC)_______________
Surface warfare: 12
Submarine warfare: 3
Aviation warfare: 14
Second Sequential Commands
(PHIBRON, LHA)___________________________
5
1
6
group commanders were all experienced in amphibious warfare, and they could keep an eye on the squadron commanders. Then these same submariners and aviators began to command amphibious groups. But that was all right, because these officers now had amphibious experience. Then surface officers with no amphibious experience began to command amphibious groups. Somehow, it just doesn’t seem to be all right anymore.
Perhaps the greatest consequence of the system is that nobody at high levels is an advocate for the amphibi
ous warfare force. Aviation war af ficers who cycle through the amP^ ous force leave with no commit to amphibious warfare. Surface officers with a great deal of amp ous experience simply do not get selected for vice admiral. So, w j high levels makes force structure force-level decisions for the amp ous force? Who at high levels >s pared to recognize when an amp t0 ous operation is a good tactic an , evaluate its feasibility? Who at ■ levels has evaluated the commanu icy for the amphibious force ^r0I^fCe? point of view of the amphibious Who, indeed? . ^
If we must accept the premise aviators and submariners, to have portunity for selection to admit ’ ^ should learn to command surface by commanding surface ships 1 ^
do make excellent commanding ^ cers, but fewer make excellent phibious warfare officers), there ^ still some things that can be do destroyer force as well as the amP ous force and service force. There 30 cruisers and 9 destroyer ten e^ that could be shared. Second, am^ phibious squadron and group c j j manders should be selected frorn_ the most experienced officers phibious warfare.
86
Proceedings / Novel
mber