There are many ways of attempting to estimate the nature of naval surface warfare in the next quarter century or so. Some are based on systematic and relatively sophisticated extensions of perceived trends. Others are dependent upon a variety of projected scenarios of various types. All are just personal judgments or prejudices, if I may call them that. And all are highly suspect—as must be any projection into the future, the degree of uncertainty increasing with the length of the forecast.
The following thoughts are the product of my own prejudices, based on observations and exposures to the thoughts and arguments of many others. I shall therefore simply set them forth without trying to repeat the arguments that have led to them, other than noting that they contain the following basic assumptions:
- There will be no major naval war within the period discussed.
- There will be no major technological surprises during the period.
Prejudice No. 1: There will be a U. S. surface Navy in the year 2000 and beyond. This is based on the simple fact that we have a very substantial capital investment in our current fleet. Prudence is going to require that we protect this investment by whatever steps seem to be most cost-effective, whether this means retrofitting of new equipment, continued procurement of new versions of existing equipment, or the procurement of totally new systems. It is to be expected that any new element of the fleet—ship, plane, weapon, or equipment—will be introduced because it has some clearly apparent way of operating in concert with the existing elements to enhance their capability. If it has additional characteristics that permit it to perform new and unspecified missions, these characteristics will be developed in an evolutionary manner. The tendency to look at proposed systems as a total replacement for existing ones on an all-or-nothing basis has been the source of a lot of unrealistic projections in the past. Many of these projections have been associated with the Navy V/STOL (vertical and short takeoff and landing) aircraft program. The measure by which any system proposed for Navy use within the next 20-25 years will be judged, unless events demonstrate the wisdom of selecting some other criterion, is how capability of the current battle group built around the large carrier can be maintained or improved in the face of perceived threats.
Prejudice No. 2: Given my assumptions of no major naval and no major technological surprise, I believe we are going to start losing some of our 13 remaining carriers before we have anything like viable replacements. My estimate is that we will see at least one and possibly more large carriers built before reasonable alternative emerges clearly enough to warrant gambling our naval stature on an abandonment of a battle force built around the carrier air group. And that assumes that we get started now and are smart enough, or lucky enough, to hit on systems that work.
Prejudice No. 3: One of the obstacles standing in the way of progress in this direction is the subject of my third, and perhaps most deeply held, prejudice. I believe many of our problems are of our own making, generally springing from the managerial concept that simplifies a large administrative task by breaking it into smaller separate ones which can be more easily handled. The difficulty arises from bureaucratic pressures which result in the separations becoming impermeable walls. For example, it makes little or no sense to separate, as completely as is the case today, the management of the design of air systems from that of the ships upon which they are based. There is pretty good reason to argue that the optimum ship-aircraft system will not necessarily result from combining the optimum airplane with the optimum ship if the optimizations are performed separately and on the basis of different criteria.
Prejudice No. 4: Keeping my two assumptions in mind, it seems to me that the threat the fleet will confront can be projected over the next two decades. The space-based systems already in use will expand in capability, submarines will get quieter, missile ranges will become greater, and Soviet naval air power, both land- and sea-based, will continue to grow. One can picture development going forward in the fields of terminally guided intermediate-range ballistic missiles, subsurface-to-air missiles, and nearly intercept-proof and jam-proof communication links. Following the trends of the postwar years, increasingly advanced systems will find their way into the hands of Third World powers, so to varying degrees the Navy will be confronted with these threats, even if the Soviet Union is not the primary protagonist.
My fourth prejudice is that the Navy, while acknowledging the existence of the threat posed by space-based sensor systems, has not yet appreciated the implications. Within the projected period, technology will become available that will permit continuous all-weather tracking of any combatant- size surface ship with accuracies adequate for targeting. In all likelihood, similar tracking of aircraft under certain conditions will also be possible with the data being presented to tactical users on an essentially real-time basis. Although limited cover and detection options will probably exist, current procedures of emission control and use of weather cover will be ineffective. Naval commanders will be confronted with a situation in which not only the order of battle, but virtually every move of the opposing surface forces will be known with accuracies as great as or greater than those available to the individual ships’ navigators.
In the event of hostilities with an enemy possessing naval forces, the battle group will face attack by missiles launched from submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. The attack will probably be launched from several different directions with the missiles planned to arrive at the target more or less simultaneously and in sufficient numbers either to saturate or exhaust the antimissile capability of the defense. Since the objective of the attack is the destruction of the carrier and the offensive threat represented by her strike force, the Soviets’ long-range targeting problem is basically simpler than ours. Assuming that their ocean surveillance system continues to increase in positioning accuracy as the technology advances, if it is still intact at this stage of the hostilities, it would probably be used as the primary source of targeting information. Not concerned about the presence of friendly ships in the area, and firing at a target of such size that sensor systems are unlikely to be confused by other ships in the vicinity, their task is to get their missiles within an area from which their terminal guidance systems can acquire the target. In the case of long-range cruise missiles, this will mean the missile will be tracked and provided with mid-course corrections. In the case of ballistic systems, the initial targeting information may be sufficient.
If, at the onset of hostilities, the United States were successfully to attack the space assets of the Soviet surveillance system, the primary targeting responsibility would shift to another platform, probably an aircraft, but possibly a submarine, or in some scenarios, even a surface ship. It will be the function of the air group to attempt to see that no launch or targeting platforms are allowed within range. One Soviet counter will be to increase the range of the missiles in order to move the launch point beyond the carrier battle group’s defensive capability. At present, a Soviet “Backfire” bomber can reach its launch point and retire before a deck-launched interceptor can counter. It is thus necessary to have a combat air patrol airborne before the attack and to vector it toward the threat as soon as it is detected. Even with improved airborne early warning aircraft’ the attackers have a series of tactical options that can draw the combat air patrol off, forcing the defense to concentrate on the incoming missiles rather than on the launching vehicles. Such a defensive course does little to reduce the enemy offensive threat and won probably be much less than 100% effective against cruise missiles and totally ineffective against the ballistic type.
Clearly, what is required is the ability to identify, track, target, and attack enemy threats at much greater distances from the task force than we can now. One approach is to employ surveillance assets in space. To provide all-weather capability, active sensors would be required. To provide useful near- real-time information, continuous coverage is required, which in turn implies either a synchronous orbit or a substantial number of relatively low-altitude satellites. Far from impossible, it is likely that such space-based systems will be developed and constantly improved during the time under consideration. Whether they will be able readily to detect aircraft or missile targets with reliability is uncertain. but they will certainly provide a much-needed ocean surveillance capability. Space systems are extensive and, like any sensors, are vulnerable to various forms of attack and spoofing. Even if they could handle the complex fire control problems involved in bringing a target under attack, it would be highly desirable to have alternate means of doing so should one or more space-based assets fail or be destroyed. The present surveillance capability of the fleet is represented by the E-2C Hawkeye aircraft with limited range and antijam resistance.
Because of the desirability of reducing susceptibility to jamming and of increasing surveillance ranges beyond those of the E-2C, use of the Air Force E-3A AWACS (airborne warning and control system) airplane has been proposed. Under certain circumstances, this system could work effectively with the fleet and may represent a logical interim step until satisfactory space systems are developed. The aircraft are dependent upon the availability of suitable fields within range of the battle group’s radius of activity and are themselves vulnerable to attack. Such an important sensor system would be a target of highest Priority to the attacking forces. Additional capability preferably part of the battle group itself, is required when the use of AWACS is impractical.
This capability will probably be an improved E-2C-type system. To increase the coverage and survivability of these aircraft, it would be desirable to have several airborne simultaneously, operating on stations considerable distances from the carrier. Should these distances become too great, the vulnerability of the individual aircraft to attack becomes a matter of concern, but by locating them in a manner providing overlapping coverage, redundancy does reduce overall system vulnerability somewhat.
Prejudice No. 5: This problem of vulnerability has been recognized and various solutions suggested. One of these involves the use of V/STOL fighters based on escort vessels ringing the carrier at distances of 100 miles or so. My prejudice against this solution stems from the fact that, with the exception of the Harrier, which has a maximum speed in the transonic range, no high-performance V/STOL aircraft is currently available in the free world. Even the most avid enthusiasts agree that the development of supersonic V/STOL fighters will be a lengthy and expensive process. I have been led to conclude that by the time a practical V/STOL fighter—and of equal importance, a suitably matched all-weather platform from which to operate it—can be developed, threat missile ranges will have expanded still farther so that nothing much will be gained. A further difficulty arises from the fact that only a limited number of such aircraft could be fitted into the space available on a small vessel, greatly restricting the defensive force that could be brought to bear in any given sector.
Prejudice No. 6: It would appear that the speed and range required to intercept an incoming raid could be built into a missile in a much smaller envelope than is required for a man-carrying aircraft, a fact which fosters another prejudice—in addition to the development of long-range antiship missiles such as Tomahawk, attention should be directed to the development of surface-to-air missiles with comparable range. An escort vessel of a given tonnage could carry many more such missiles than V/STOL aircraft. The pinpointing of targets well beyond the ship’s radar horizon would be accomplished by appropriately configured aircraft that would take over control of the missile once launched, thereby performing the role of an airborne Fire control system. A battle group might thus look pretty much like that envisioned by the V/STOL enthusiasts with the carrier ringed by distant escorts employing aircraft designed to perform airborne targeting and fire control for weapon systems based on and launched from the surface vessels.
Although the airborne early warning aircraft performing these functions could be flown from the carrier, greater flexibility would be obtained if they could be launched and recovered from the escort vessels themselves. Such operation has generally been considered to impose a requirement for vertical takeoff and landing. Experience with the Harrier has shown that greatly improved range payload performance results from the use of a short takeoff run. Further improvement occurs if a ski jump or ramp is employed. Thus, the capability of a V/STOL aircraft is greatly enhanced if the ship from which it operates can provide a deck run of perhaps 450-500 feet and can turn into the wind to launch. This latter operational constraint, although of major concern to a carrier launching large numbers of aircraft at a time, is less restrictive to a small ship launching one or two.
Bringing the aircraft back aboard has, as a result of the Harrier experience, been generally conceived as a vertical landing operation, the aircraft having good vertical flight performance at the end of its mission as a result of having burned off much of its fuel weight. Some recent studies suggest, however, that even more or less conventional aircraft can land and take off from 500-foot decks, provided the aircraft have a high enough thrust-to-weight ratio and steps are taken to improve control effectiveness at low speeds.
A concept that would thus appear to deserve greater attention is a return to the World War II practice of using a takeoff run and an arrested landing. By considering the aircraft and ship together, the relative cost and complexity trade-offs between placing the capability in the aircraft versus the ship can be studied. There is a possibility that the use of a ramp (a greatly reduced version of the ski jump) may shrink the takeoff run still further. A 500-foot flight deck, although nothing like a supercarrier, is still a substantial requirement. The Vosper-Thornycroft “Harrier carrier” study developed a ship with a displacement approaching 8,000 tons and provided a deck run of 420 feet. To pick up the additional 80 feet on a similar type vessel would appear to require nearly 6,000 additional tons—still not in the carrier ball park, but a large vessel nonetheless. For a conventional monohull design, this additional displacement is probably necessary in any event in order to achieve the sea-keeping capabilities necessary to operate aircraft in foul weather.
Prejudice No. 7: As one looks at the surface ships (with the exception of the carriers themselves) currently being used as operating bases for aircraft within the Navy, one is forced to the conclusion that all operations are, to various degrees, weather constrained. The amphibious assault ships (LHAs and LPHs) have flight deck heights that provide reasonable wave clearance, but because of design constraints imposed by their primary mission of supporting amphibious landings, they tend to be lively in high sea. The addition of stabilization systems might help to some extent, but these ships remain helicopter platforms designed to operate close inshore under weather conditions suitable for sending landing craft ashore. The remainder of the ships have had helicopter platforms added, sometimes almost as afterthoughts, to basic designs optimized for other purposes. Thus, even though the LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) is increasingly important, its operation even from ships as large as the Spruance (DD-963) class is far from an all-weather one. Nearly as restricting as the motion and wetness of the flight platforms on these “air-capable” ships are the hangar spaces which permit only limited maintenance and repair to be performed on aircraft while the ship is on station.
These factors produce a strong prejudice in favor of the design of a ship specifically intended to use aircraft as an integral part of her weapon system, much as the existing carriers do. The difference would be in size and method of employment, the concept being for aircraft from these ships to act as part of the fire control systems for ship-launched weapons rather than the carrier of weapons to the scene of action. The two factors of primary concern in the design of such a ship should be sea-keeping and space, both for a takeoff run and recovery for hangar space for maintenance and repair.
Several design approaches have been under consideration, including a number of relatively radical ship types. A seemingly promising approach is the SWATH (small waterplane area twin hull) concept. The indications are that such vessels can have seakeeping characteristics normally associated with conventional ships of four to five times the displacement. A number of design studies are currently underway that indicate it will be possible to achieve a 400-plus-foot flight deck on an 8,000-10,000-ton ship of this type, although 4,000-5,000 tons more give a much more capable ship.
For all its undeniable advantages in providing a spacious and remarkably steady platform, the SWATH has major drawbacks. It requires careful buoyancy control, its draft and width are excessive for some applications, and it will probably be more expensive and somewhat slower (under smooth water conditions) than a similarly powered monohull. A number of highly innovative schemes for overcoming these difficulties have been explored, including the use of a towed submerged pod which could be employed for fuel storage.
Obviously, much more investigation is required of feasibility of the ship-plane-missile system suggested. The STOL (short takeoff and landing) studies were conducted for a hypothetical airframe; the SWATH is operational only in the form of the 200-ton workboat Kaimalino, and the necessary long-range missile systems are not yet designed. Nonetheless, it does seem possible to fly a STOL aircraft from reasonably sized vessels using conventional arresting techniques to recover them. The ship will have to be designed so that the entire deck is clear in order to reduce the hazards associated with flight operations from such a small platform.
A match between aircraft and ship does, however, appear possible without having to resort to totally new technologies. Indications are that it will be practical to base between four to six sensor aircraft o board such ships, thereby providing the needed continuous coverage. Major maintenance would be performed on board the carrier, but the relatively spacious arrangement permitted by the SWATH configuration should make practical the performance of routine maintenance on board the escort vessel itself. Already, a suitable V/STOL or STOVL (short takeoff, vertical landing) aircraft could be accommodated should it become available, but the important point is that it seems likely than an acceptable system can be developed now without the risk or delay attendant to tying it to a successful V/STOL program.
The battle group concept that evolves from the consideration of this type of sensor-ship-aircraft-weapon system might consist of a core of one or more carriers surrounded by distant missile-carrying escorts using their own aircraft to perform both targeting and missile guidance functions. This is clearly not the only organization possible, but whatever form eventually appears, the development will be evolutionary and will be heavily dependent upon two critical elements. One is the ability to perform the targeting functions (search, classification, localization, weapon guidance and post-strike damage assessment are clumped under this heading), and the other is the existence of appropriate command, control, and communication facilities.
Given these two essential capabilities, achieved through the use of aircraft and/or spacecraft-borne systems, the use of missiles to perform antiship and antiair functions in conjunction with the carrier’s aircraft seems destined to develop from today’s aircraft-dependent operations into a mode in which primary dependence is placed upon the missile.
Prejudice No. 8: The functions of the battle group discussed above are primarily of a sea control nature. It is likely that parallel evolutions will occur in strike operations. The experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War strongly suggests that antiaircraft defenses have improved to such an extent that, at least over limited areas, it is possible to establish and maintain air superiority with ground-based systems. To counter these defenses, it is necessary either to use standoff weapons launched from the strike aircraft with all of the attendant targeting problems, or to employ increasingly large percentages of the strike force for defense suppression. Currently both methods are being pursued, with electronic countermeasures, antiradiation missiles, and decoy drones being used to saturate the defense and various forms of air-to-ground ordnance being employed for the attack. Many feel, however, that we are approaching a point of diminishing returns indicating that some alternative strike mode is required.
Prejudice No. 9: My final prejudice is the belief that the time has come to take a hard look at the ballistic missile—either ship- or air-launched—as a major strike weapon. The Navy, for perfectly valid reasons, has long been preoccupied with cruise missiles, but these weapons are in effect small aircraft and susceptible in various degrees to the same type of attack as aircraft. The ballistic trajectory, on the other hand, requires what has until now been considered a prohibitively complex and expensive antimissile system, the speed of the weapon compelling the entire system, from sensors to counter weapon, to be totally automated.
Because accuracies are not great, ballistic missiles, after the early German experience with V-2s, have pretty much been limited to the long-range delivery of nuclear warheads. My thesis is that not only are navigational systems increasing in accuracy, but strides made with terminal guidance will make such weapons carrying conventional warheads practical. With this development it will no longer be necessary to concentrate solely on very long-range missiles. A variety of configurations and tactics come to mind, but the concept of ship-launched and aircraft- targeted missiles seems applicable to both cruise and ballistic missiles under numerous conditions.
The other side of this coin, of course, is that the carrier herself becomes a target for enemy ballistic missiles. With a flight deck of four and a half acres, even relatively crude terminal guidance could provide a weapon with which even such high-performance systems as Aegis would be unable to cope. It would seem likely, therefore, that as such weapons develop, the initial strike function, which must be to take such ballistic missile systems belonging to the enemy under fire, will devolve upon smaller, less costly vessels of the nature of the SWATH escorts already described. Carrier aircraft will continue the task once it is safe for the carriers to close within air strike distance of the target.
Conclusions: The evolution that seems almost inevitable in view of these trends is for many of the functions of the carrier, probably including the long- range antisubmarine role, to be distributed among the other ships of the battle group. Initially, only some of the antiair, antisubmarine, and antiship functions will be assumed by the escorts, but if the ship-launched, air-directed weapon systems develop as seems likely, these functions will shift almost entirely from the carrier, leaving offensive strike warfare as her major mission. The ballistic missile may erode even this role to the point at which other systems seem more attractive.
It would be foolish to believe that the airplane will, within the foreseeable future, be totally removed from the strike mission, or for that matter from all aspects of the other missions as well, but it does appear that as adjuncts to the surface-launched missiles they may not need to be so complex nor so capable as the fighters and attack craft of today. If this is the case, it may become possible to disperse such aircraft throughout a surface force in a manner approaching that originally envisioned by the V/STOL enthusiasts, although the ships upon which they would be based would in all probability be specially designed for the purpose. I believe the key to successful blending of the “small” surface ship to any form of aircraft is the sea-keeping ability of the SWATH ship, and I think the elements that make this blending desirable are the development of surface-launched, air-controlled missiles and the presence of space-based surveillance systems which will shortly make possible the accurate real-time tracking of any surface vessel and many aircraft.
I have purposely not shown specific battle group configurations nor the results of any survivability or costing studies. As one might suspect, such studies show that spreading capability over a larger number of individual ships increases flexibility, survivability and cost. Although the individual ship/missile/ aircraft system is cheaper than the carrier and her air group, in the aggregate to achieve the same offensive and defensive effectiveness (always excepting vulnerability, and advantages of graceful degradation) the total cost is greater. I tend not to be overly impressed by such studies. The most expensive war we can fight is the one that we lose, and I think the systems herein described, or something very like them, will evolve over the next 25 years, because there will be no other way to do the job.
That the supercarrier as we know her today is destined to disappear is certain but not, I strongly suspect, as rapidly as many of her detractors would like to believe. She will pass only when some other system has been shown capable of not only doing the job, but doing it better. To get the opportunity to make this demonstration, these competitive systems will have to fit together with the carrier battle group to improve its capability to a significant degree.
Only by starting now to examine all of the elements of these systems, ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons will it be possible by 1985 to decide development to push—and only by making that decision by 1985 will it be possible to have any form of viable option available when it becomes necessary to retire the supercarriers.