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Show of Force
Charles Taylor. New York: St. Martin’s Pr«s, 1980. 281 pp. $11.95 ($10.76).[1]
reviewed by Lieutenant Commander John P. Morse, U. S. Navy
C'Winlander Morse, aide to the president of the War College, wrote in July 1979. "/ t'nd Proceedings’ policy of not reviewing t'etion somewhat parochial." He went on to '"oke a convincing case which contributed to the decision to change that policy.
Charles Taylor’s first novel projects Soviet naval threat into 1984— rSe naval equivalent of General Sir J°hn Hackett’s The Third World War, ^ugust 1985 (New York: Macmillan, *978). Though falling short of literary Parity, Tayl or deserves credit for exploring the likely future naval con- r°ntation between the superpowers. Civen the volatility of the Indian Ccean theater and the naval buildup °n both sides, Show of Force is not chirnerical; it may well be prophetic.
The novel’s plot is complex but banniliar—it is the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse. The United States as been quietly constructing a tactiCal missile base on Islas Piedras (the hhnly disguised island of Diego Gar- Cla) where the highly capable Wol- Ver>ne missile will slow the spreading Soviet sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and the oil- Pfoducing nations bordering the Per- s'an Gulf. The Soviet takeovers of Afghanistan and Iran are in progress and ^eir g0ai Gf a warm water port is "'■thin grasp. When the Soviets detect tPle missile sites, the United States Unconvincingly claims that a Trident sobmarine supply facility is under instruction. The Soviets do not buy 'C As the action opens, a Soviet task 0fce under Admiral Alex Kupinsky’s c°mmand steams toward Islas Piedras to expose U. S. plans and to force a withdrawal. An opposing task force, under the command of Admiral David Charles, is sent to hold Kupinsky off until the installation is complete—a matter of a week or two.
With the stage set, the novel flashes back. After commissioning at Annapolis, Ensign David Charles begins his naval career in the USS Bagley, a Fletcher-class destroyer that takes part in the abortive Bay of Pigs operation. A year later, in 1962, the Bagley surfaces a Soviet “Foxtrot" submarine in Cuban waters, thus humiliating her commander, Lieutenant Alex Kupinsky, stepson of Admiral of the Fleet Gorenko.
From there, the novel is written in parallel, alternating between 1984 and the past, following David Charles and Alex Kupinsky’s careers in their navies, their marriages, and their close friendship that began when they were both assigned embassy duty in London. As task force commanders, each is faced with the unnerving prospect of killing a friend.
Led by the Nimitz and comprised of several nuclear-powered cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, the U. S. task force is matched against the Soviet vertical takeoff and landing aircraft carrier Lenin and a heavily armed surface group. The show of force is short lived. A coordinated air attack— shore-based “Backfire bombers and Le»/»-based "Riga” fighters—is the first cat-and-mouse probing of the battle. Relying on an interactive computer lashup with the War Games Center at Johns Hopkins, David Charles defends his force and counterattacks, with the cool detachment of a tactical action officer in a shore- based trainer. However, soon after the initial engagement, the advantages of modern technology are lost, and the two task forces continue to close without additional orders—both commanders have entered a more primitive decision-making territory where they must rely on instinct, reason, and feeling.
Ashore, the situation warms rapidly and diplomatic jockeying begins as Moscow and Washington try to avert disaster and prepare for it at the same time. As the sea battle continues, ships are sunk and lives are lost. To say more would spoil the story; but suffice it to say, the Soviets ratchet themselves upward—again.
A straightforward, very readable, and imaginative future history, the book is not without faults. Some will understandably criticize the artificial symmetry of the book, the author’s simplistic expression of seapower, and the somewhat poetic dilemma that faces Charles and Kupinsky. Yet the action is conceived in realistic terms that will appeal to those whose careers may include a Show of Force.
By Ships Alone: Churchill and the Dardanelles
Jeffrey D. Wallin. Durham, NC.:
Carolina Academic Press. 214 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. $13.95 ($12.56).
Reviewed by Captain Paul B. Ryan,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
Captain Ryan is a former Deputy Director of Naval History at the Navy Department. He is the author and coauthor of several books dealing with seapoiver and diplomacy. He is presently at the Hoover Institution on War. Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University where he is completing a book on the U. S. Navy since World War II.
“What about Gallipoli?” For years before he became the indomitable leader of Britain during World War II, Winston Churchill was plagued by this taunt. The jeers of his political opponents stemmed, of course, from the disastrous Allied failure in 1915 to force a passage through the Dardanelles to Constantinople and to take the Gallipoli peninsula by assault. Not surprisingly, Gallipoli (like the more recent Pearl Harbor attack, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and, increasingly, the Vietnam War) has been dissected, scrutinized, and analyzed exhaustively.
Now comes yet another book, By Ships Alone. Jeffrey D. Wallin’s thesis is that history has not dealt kindly with Churchill for his part in the affair. Scholars such as Trumbull Higgins in his Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles (New York: Greenwood, 1963) criticize Churchill for unwarranted meddling in purely military operations. But Wallin says Churchill should be commended for his determination, in the face of a vacillating admiral, ro execute a brilliant coup that might have ended World War I and changed the course of history.
In 1915, the 41-year-old Churchill had been First Lord of the Admiralty (a post similar to the U. S. Secretary of the Navy before 1947) for some three years. In early 1915, the Allied and German armies were bogged in seemingly endless trench warfare on the Western Front. The Balkan states had not yet declared themselves. The beleaguered Russian Army faced a formidable Turkish foe in the Caucasus and had called on Britain and France for help. What better way to turn the tide of war than by a naval thrust through the Dardanelles, past the Turkish forts and minefields, to the Sea of Marmara?
The initial naval thrust by a British and French fleet failed, as did a subsequent amphibious assault on the peninsula forts. For months the Allied forces remained mired down in Gallipoli. The final unit was pulled out in January 1916, leaving the Turks and their German advisors as unquestioned victors.
Subsequently, a Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry sitting in London recognized that there was blame enough to go around; it did not single out Churchill. But because the assertive First Lord had taken a leading role in the direction of the combat tactics during the initial naval phase, he became fair game for his political opponents. Forced from office, the Sandhurst graduate donned his Army uniform and took command of a battalion in France. Lord Asquith likewise left the government to be succeeded by Lloyd George as Prime Minister.
Military readers will sense that, despite Wallin’s argument, Churchill invited future censure by taking virtual charge of a combat operation. Here is Churchill, in a message to the admiral commanding the fleet off the
Dardanelles:
“From the First Lord. Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ship alone a practicable operation? It is assumed older battleships fitted with mine bumpers would be used, preceded by colliers and other merchant craft as mine bumpers and sweepers. Importance of results would justify severe loss [of ships and men]. Let me know your views.”
As one critic of Churchill later suggested, the psychological effect of such a message to a subordinate can be imagined.
Ignoring the questionable propriety for the First Lord to take over direction of fleet operations, the author views approvingly of Churchill’s conduct. Wallin argues that Churchill’s plan to batter the forts and steam up the Dardanelles had the concurrence of his naval subordinates. The plan failed, he writes, mainly because Vice Admiral John de Robeck, in command of the fleet, lacked that “rare aspect of courage” to appreciate the magnitude of the political stakes to be won or lost.
Why does de Robeck emerge as the chief culprit? Wallin points to de Robeck’s “timidity” in deciding not to take the fleet through even though he was aware of the Turks’ lack of ammunition and the possibility that Turkish forts could be dominated by the fleet’s gunfire. Why then did de Robeck not push on? The principal deterrents were represented by the Turkish minefields and the initial absence (later remedied) of adequate British minesweepers. After de Robeck suffered the loss of three battleships sunk and one disabled, he had second thoughts of barreling through. By the time British destroyer- minesweepers were operating on the scene, the golden moment had passed so far as de Robeck was concerned. The admiral worried that if the fleet did get through, then its logistics ships would not, leaving the fleet without support. From there on, the operation became an army show with the fleet in a supporting role. Meanwhile, the element of surprise was gone, as German Admiral Merten and General von Sanders speedily bolstered the Turkish defenses.
Others familiar with the Gallipoli campaign may take issue with Wallin
for not discussing the ineffective British high command system that had much to do with the disaster. In 1915, the War Council approved of all major military operations. Surprisingly, this group, which included Asquith, Churchill, Secretary of SflM Lord Kitchener, and Lloyd George, approved the Gallipoli plan without even a staff study of what obviously was to be a major naval assault- Churchill became a sort of executive agent for the council, which may explain, if it does not justify, his direct participation in the operation.
Running a war by a committee or civilians (the War Council) has never proved successful in any war. Gallip0^ probably failed because there was no combined military staff to evaluate the odds, collect essential ships, arms, and men, and prepare a workable plafI' Additionally, Asquith’s government never gave wholehearted, concentrated support to Gallipoli; the ma'n interest was focused on the Western Front. Instead, men and ships were committed almost on a piecemea basis.
Wallin has written a well" documented book, but he is llP against stiff competition in matters o historical interpretation. To balance Wallin’s conclusions on where to p\'iCe the blame, the reader would do we to look also at Arthur J. Marders From the Dardanelles to Oran (London- Oxford University Press, 1974) an From the Dreadnought to Scapa Fl°u ' Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), and Eric Bush’s GaWP0'1 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975)-
The McDonnell Douglas Story
Douglas J. Ingells. Fallbrook, CA.: Aer° Publishers, 1979. 304 pp. Illus. Ind. $17.95 ($16.16).
Reviewed by Captain Walter ,
Spangenberg, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retire
Captain Spangenberg u as designated a naval aviator in 1950 and acquired an aeronaut*ct> engineering sub-specialty. He was involved >n project management in Nava! Air Systems Command and commanded VF-I43 i" Vietnam and the USS Monticello(L3/7-3^' In the April Proceedings, he reviewed books on Vnught. Grumman, and Consolidated Aircraft.
This book takes the reader from r e wood-and-fabric days of aircraft to the mo°n and back to our next supersonic transport design. The story comes in many pieces which fit together to de- tad the amazing diversity and mag- fitude of McDonnell Douglas’ achievements.
The author traces the professional lives of Donald W. Douglas and James S. McDonnell through the founding and activities of their separate companies to their merger in 1967. He continues with the story of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation UP to the time of writing.
The coverage is broad but uneven, 'vith Mr. Ingells clearly at his best when he relates the background and rat>onale for key management actions to men he has known or interviewed.
answers to design questions make fascinating reading, especially those listing to the Douglas responses over a 4()-year period to airline requests for new aircraft designs to meet specific Market needs.
Five of the book’s 22 chapters are devoted to the conception, develop- rner>t, and delivery of the DC-10 airliners> with ample text and pictures to §lve the uninitiated a good apprecia- tl0r> for the tremendous team effort required. Progress in structural testing ls dramatically illustrated by an early 930’s photo of a road roller being driven over a DC-1 wing to test the Wlng’s strength, and a recent photo of a DC-lo wing in a test rig full of hydraulic jacks which bent the wingtip upward 90 inches and downward 51 'riches. The book had gone to press Prior to the DC-10 crash at Chicago’s F* Hare International Airport; but abSent also are references to two earlier Dc-10 problems which were factors in Previous accidents. These omissions Seem strange after the complete deScriptions of solutions to problems w'th earlier aircraft.
Military aircraft are described in Varying detail, with some interesting background on the spiritual names 8'ven by “Mr. Mac” to the Phantom, Banshee, Goblin, Demon, and Voodoo McDonnell fighters.
VF-102’s first Phantom deployment was coming up shortly. Well aware of the numerous layers of bosses, coordinators, staffies, and assorted paper-shufflers between the squadron commanding officer and McDonnell Aircraft’s fine strut design engineers, we knew that a “squadron-style fix” was our only way out of the problem.
We flew to St. Louis on some pretext, tracked down the veteran strut designers at their drawing boards, and demanded that they fix our birds before someone got hurt. Several hours of rather heated and unresolved discussion later, a compromise was reached wherein a few of the most experienced design engineers would come back on board ship with us to inspect the operation at first hand. None had ever been at sea before.
Two nights later, after some very rough flight operations in heavy seas off the Virginia Capes, in which several of our anxious young pilots had really “planted” their Phantoms into the pitching carrier deck, one of the McDonnell engineers appeared in the ready room, eyed me strangely for a few seconds, and then softly said, “Well, I knew what you fellows did to my struts, but I never, ever, thought that you did that to them!”
The engineers left by COD the following morning. Within a matter of days, a series of beefy “fixes” arrived and were installed on our shaky struts. Soon after, we sailed happily off on the long deployment.
To the best of my knowledge, the Phantom has never had any serious nose strut problems since.
Struttin’ On Down
By Captain Gerald G. O’Rourke, U. S. Navy (Retired)
In the very early days of the F-4 Phantom’s illustrious seagoing career, our VF-102 pilots and landing signal officers (LSOs) were concerned about an unusually severe vibration which would occur in the nose wheel strut at the instant of touchdown on what was to us a “normal” carrier landing.
Modern carrier jets aren’t really “landed” on board ships. They are, quite literally, flown along a flight path which intersects the deck at a point where an arresting wire can snatch the plane’s dangling tailhook. In the case of the Phantom, this translates into about 35,000 pounds of airplane moving at airspeeds of 130-140 knots being slammed down and stopped within a few hundred feet. It makes for quite a smash, particularly when the carrier deck is heaving in heavy seas or when an anxious pilot “plants” his bird by diving for the deck at the very final instant.
The McDonnell Douglas Story is a birring account of the achievements and capabilities of a major aerospace c°mpany. In the words of a current commercial, “If you could see tomor- r°w as it looks to us today, you’d say lncredible!"
Zerstorer Unter Deutschen Flagge 1934 bis 1945 (Destroyers Under the German Flag, 1934 until 1945)
Wolfgang Harnack. Herford, West Germany: Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, 1978. 208 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. DM 68 (Approx. $35.00).
Reviewed by Norman Friedman
Dr. Friedman is a theoretical physicist currently concentrating on naval problems at the Hudson Institute. A Columbia University graduate, he has authored and coauthored articles and papers on the U. S.-Soviet naval balance, Soviet naval missile systems and tactics, and warship design.
The large German destroyers of World War II were the most heavily armed of their kind, with up to five cruiser (5.9-inch) guns. Their war was quire different from that of their British and American cousins as was their equipment. For example, they were most closely allied in concept to the big French super-destroyers, intended to fight surface battles in packs, primarily with guns, torpedoes, and mines. ASW was far less important in the German fleet than it was in the U. S.
This German-language book is probably the first attempt to tell the story of these German destroyers in a systematic and connected manner. It includes nor only the German-built and designed ships, already somewhat familiar from a variety of handbooks, but also those taken over from other navies. There has never been so complete an account of the design and equipment of the German destroyers. The class-by-class analysis is supplemented by sections on machinery, weapons, and electronics, while many sketches include some general arrangement and machinery arrangement plans. The book also contains much little-known information. For example, it appears that the primary ASW sensor of the German destroyers was a 36-element hull-mounted passive array; German attempts at an active sonar were apparently less successful. This had important tactical consequences for U-boat commanders early in World War II, as they strove for silence rather than a fast submerged getaway. The logic of those 5.9-inch destroyer guns (firepower superiority) is also explored.
Harnack goes through the details of German destroyer design evolution. If he is to be faulted, it must be primarily on the absence of body plans and information on stability and hull form. Such data are of more than academic interest in view of the relationship between modern Soviet and World War II German hull forms; one can also see an echo of the characteristic German underbody in some modern Western frigares. It should also be noted that the usual array of detailed sideviews has been relegated to the endpapers; Harnack has used the rather small drawings originally published by Erich Groener in his pamphlet on German warships of the Second World War (Die Schiffe der Deutschen Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe 193945, und ihr Verbleih, 7th edition. Munich: J. F. Lehmans Verlag, 1972.)
Harnack's approach to the operational history of the German destroyer force is to provide a chronology of its war service, with lengthy entries for significant engagements and, often, track charts. Tables of destroyer organization are interspersed with this text. This may not be the ideal approach, in that it is difficult to follow the career of any typical German destroyer; yet, there were relatively few German destroyers, and they deserve full treatment. Certainly the approach adopted here does make for a full appreciation of the scope of that war.
I have one small, but important objection which I suspect can be traced to the author’s rather literal use of "zerstorer," which means destroyer. 1° Germany, as in France and Italy, there persisted through World War II a distinction between full-scale destroyers and their diminutives, seagoing r°r' pedo boats. However, to an American, this is very much a distinction without a difference; the German i- combined tactically with their lafger brethren. It is unfortunate that Harnack chose not to combine them in his book. To treat both classes of seagoing surface torpedo craft together would have answered one of the questions or German surface ship development: why the German Navy continued through the war to build these two parallel classes, with no clear ractical rationale- On a more practical plane, ir aP' pears that the T-boats, far more than the destroyers, influenced Soviet postwar thinking. For example, major German T-boat plant at Elbing (Schichau) is now the Soviet Kalinin' grad yard—the home of Soviet fng" ates from the purportedly German- inspired “Kolas” through the current “Krivaks.” The destroyers came mainly from Bremen, Hamburg, afK Kiel—none of which the Soviets reached. It would, therefore, be most instructive to see the detailed d»' ferences between full-fledged zerstoi'd and T-boat, particularly as the Soviet connection makes the study of Get man destroyer design so interesting- However, this objection does not detract from the great value of the present work. I would recommend |C even to those who require dictionary assistance. It describes an important but little-known era in destroyer de velopment and operations—one whic may well have influenced postwar Soviet surface warship design.
A retired Navy captain and his wife, building their first permanent home, were at odds because the wife insisted that the house have two baths, while the captain, a staunch advocate of economy, felt that one would suffice. But shortly after moving in, the captain was forced to capitulate. Preparing to wash for an important engagement, he found that his wift’ already using the solitary bathroom, had tacked this sign on the door: “Two heads are better than one.”
Helen Livings^
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
^ Proceedings / July l9®®
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
N;
600fc
r'ces enclosed Prj,
Naval affairs
Battle of Leyte Gulf
^rian Stewart. New York: Charles Scribner's > 1979. 223 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $14.95 <*13.46).
^ British writer here offers yet another ^rative of the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
"“ugh well-written and accurate, it is es- Ser>fially a compilation of information rawn from Samuel Eliot Morison’s History ‘L S. Naval Operations in WWll (Vol.
and C. Vann Woodward’s The Battle 0r Leyte Gulf. Stewart’s bibliography cites °nly 15 sources, all of them secondary.
V German Raiders, A History of Ux>liary Cruisers of the German
95 ($12.75).
Is slim volume is a virtual encyclopedia ^ che surface auxiliaries of the German avy that, disguised as merchantmen, prvecl as commerce raiders in two World ars- Rather than a narrative account, j. Is *s a tightly packed compendium of in- rrnation on specific ships and the men j10 manned them. This English-language 1(ion is translated from a 1977 German Vtfsion and should serve as a useful refer- tnce Work for naval scholars.
ORDER SERVICE
by parentheses are member lc«. Members may order most books of other ""Alishers through the Naval Institute at a 10% 1Sc°unt off list price. (Prices quoted in this ^’k'rnn are subject to change and will be re- ected in our billing.) Please allow for delays *ken ordering non-Naval Institute titles. The ^>staSe and handling fee for each such special rder book of a U. S. publisher will be $1.75;
fee for a book from a foreign publisher will ^ $2.50. When air mail or other special han- is requested, actual postage and handling °st will be billed to the member. Books Barked m are Naval Institute Press Books. °°ks marked Q are Naval Institute Book ecdons. Use the order blank in this section.
prj The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918
Harold and Margaret Sprout. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1980 . 404 pp. Ind. $14.95 ($11.95).
Since 1940, this book has served as the standard reference on the history of U. S.
naval policy. Though dated by an obvious Mahanian bias, it remains the single most important volume on the subject. The Naval Institute Press has performed a great service for all those interested in U. S. naval history by publishing this reprint of the original 1939 edition. If the conclusions are sometimes disputable, the scholarship is impeccable, and every serious student of naval history should have this volume on his bookshelf.
The World’s Navies
Chris Chant, Editor. London: David and Charles, 1979. 253 pp- Ulus. Ind. 16.95 (Approx. $15.35) ($1.3.82).
Like the more-detailed Combat Fleets of the World and Jane's Fighting Ships, this volume provides summaries of the manpower and weaponry of virtually every navy, from Austria’s 27-man riverine force to the armadas of the United States and the Soviet Union. The characteristics of each ship type are included and the whole is well illustrated. The editor has added short essays on each of the larger navies.
MARITIME AFFAIRS The Folklore of the Sea
Margaret Baker. North Pomfret, VT.: David and Charles, 1979. 192 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $14.00 ($12.60).
Sea serpents, mermaids, sailing on Fridays, sailors’ slang, and sailors’ mascots ... all these make up nautical folklore. Margaret Baker has compiled an entertaining brief survey of these phenomena and offers some examples from past years.
The Voyage of Charles Darwin
Christopher Railing, Editor. New York: Mayflower Books, 1979. 183 pp. Illus. Map. Ind. $9.95 ($9.06).
This attractive volume contains selections from Charles Darwin’s Autobiography, his diary, and from the journal of the Beagle, all arranged in chronological order and accompanied by many color illustrations. It thus provides insights into the character and personality of Charles Darwin as an individual as well as the development of his virtually earthshaking conclusions. The editor was the producer of the BBC television series which inspired the book.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Iwo
Richard Wheeler. New York: Lippincott & Crowell, 1980. 243 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $12.95 ($11.66).
t>
97
The author of this account of the battle for Iwo Jima was himself a member of "Easy" Company, 28th Regiment, Fifth Marine Division—the company that raised the flag on Suribachi. But this book is not a simple memoir, for Richard Wheeler is also an author of some standing and has several successful histories to his credit already. By soliciting interviews and written responses, Wheeler has managed to create a mosaic of individual deeds and impressions that together tell the story of that hellish struggle. By relying on translated Japanese accounts, he brings human identity to the defenders and the attackers.
Rl Final Harbor
Harry Homewood. New York: McGraw Hid' 1980. 372 pp. $11.95 ($9.55).
Nazi Prisoners of War in America
Arnold Krammer. New York: Srein and Day,
1979. 338 pp. Ulus. Map. Append. Bib. Ind. 318.95 (117.06).
Here is all you ever wanted to know about German POWs in the United States during World War II. This is a well- researched, well-written, and well- illustrated history that follows German prisoners from captivity to release. Krammer successfully avoids sensationalism. Perhaps the most striking impression that resulted from this full-length study is the high quality of care received by the average German POW as compared with that dished out by the Nazis, particularly to their East European captives.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The Extraordinary Envoy: General Hiroshi Oshima and Diplomacy in the Third Reich, 1934-1939
Carl Boyd. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980. 236 pp. Ulus. Append. Bib. Ind. $17.00(315.30), $9.40(38.46) paper.
Carl Boyd has previously published several articles on the crucial role played by the Japanese envoy (and later ambassador) to Nazi Germany, General Hiroshi Oshima. In this book, he sums up Oshima's role in the prewar years. Oshima, who admired rhe Nazi regime, was a favorite in Berlin, and played a key role in encouraging the signing of the anti-Comintern pact. This book covers his career up to the invasion of
Poland; presumably Boyd plans to offer a sequel exploring Oshima’s wartime role.
Germany and the United States: “A Special Relationship?”
Hans W. Gatzke. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1980. 315 pp. Maps. Ind. $17.50 (315.75).
An eminent German-American historian analyzes German-American relations from 1776 to the present with a heavy emphasis on the period since World War 11. There is very little here that will be new to experts in the field, but this book offers a sweeping survey of the interaction of peoples and governments over two centuries and thus provides an opportunity for a better understanding of present German-American relations. Written in a style that is clear and crisp, this no doubt will be one of those rare books that is both scholarly and popular.
Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure
James Clay Thompson. Chapel Hill, NC.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 199 pp. Ulus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $14.00 (312.60).
This is the newest of several Vietnam postmortems to be published. By focusing on one specific aspect of the conflict—the bombing program—Thompson analyzes the governmental system that devised and applied strategic decisions. He reveals that covert reprisals began in 1963 and were institutionalized in OPLAN-34-A long before the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, and that'[2][3] coalition of opponents to a reprisal phh°s ophy emerged almost immediately Thompson's book, therefore, is about the decision-making process and the bureaU cratic struggle between the advocates 0 the bombing program and its opponent5'
Space Stations: International Law and Policy
Delbert D. Smith. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1979. 264 pp. Illus. Append. Ind. $25.00 ($22.50).
The initiation of the space shuttle program demonstrates that man’s effort to use «n even inhabit space continues. Since space is extra-national, questions of a legal ' mension are particularly complex. In t*115 volume, an international lawyer assesses the legal questions associated with sp* stations and focuses particularly on th°sc questions which are still unanswered.
FICTION
Final Harbor is a novel about America[4] submarines and submariners in the Pacl 1 in World War II. The story line fo!lo"'s rhe adventures of the fictional submarin^ USS Mako, her captain, and her crew- central theme is the unreliability of c explosive devices on American torpedo^ and the unwillingness of the "brass hats
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198°
^llval History Division. Washington D.C.: .'"vernment Printing Office, 1976. 751 pp. Us- *13.00 ($1 1.70).
0 admir their shortcomings. Except in
lect matter, this new novel cannot
^mpare to Edward L. Beach's classic Run
WL Run Deep or its sequel Dust on the
At,?
°tHer books received
pictionary of American Naval Fighting
ihiPs. Vol. VI (G)
ar, Morality, and the Military Session
^a|ham M. Wakin, Editor. Boulder, CO.: tstview Press. 1979. 531 pp. S13.50
(ID i=,
D) paper.
, 0rld Ocean Atlas, Volume 2, ''antic & Indian Oceans
p'T1 G. Gorshkov, Editor. New York: er8amon Press, 1979- .354 pp. (1 17 pp. Elation) Maps. Ind. $371.00 ($33.3.90).
H NAVAL INSTITUTE BOOK SELECTIONS AVAILABLE
Ultra Goes to War Ronald Lewin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. $ 12.95 ($ 10.35). Last order date: 15 August 1980.
The Third World War
Gen. Sir John Hackett. New 5'ork: MacMillan, 1978. $ 12.95 ($ 10.35). Last order date: 15 August 1980.
In Praise Of Sailors Herhert W. Warden, 111, Editor. New York: Harry N. Ahrams, 1978. $45.00 (136.00). Last order date: 8 September 1980.
Soviet Naval Diplomacy
Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell Editors. New 5'ork: Pergamon Press, 1979. $25.00 ($20.00). Last order date: 3 October
1980.
The Blue Angels
Cdr. Rosario Rausa, USNR. Baton Rouge, LA.: Moran, 1979. $ 14.50 ($ 10.35). Last order date: 6 December 1980.
The Men of the Gambier Bay
Edwin P. Hoyt. Middlebury, VT.: Paul S. Eriksson, 1979. $ 12.95 ($ 10.35). Last order date: 10 January 198 1.
Avenger at War
Barrett Tillman. New York: Scribners, 1980. $17.50 ($14.00). Last order date: 15 February
1981.
Modern Warship Design
Norman Friedman. New York: Mayflower,
1980. $22.50 ($18.00). Last order date: 1 May
1981.
Ice Brothers
Sloan Wilson. New York: Arbor House, 1980. $11.95 ($9.56). Last order date: 6 May 1981.
ShiPs Cargo, Cargo Ships
e!.nr' Kummerman and Robert Jacquinet, p |tors- Hounslow, England: MacGregor ^'cations, 1979. 288 pp. Ulus. $62.00.
Assault on the Liberty
James M. Ennes, Jr. New' York: Random House, 1980. $12.95 ($10.35). Last order date: 5 November 1980.
A Most Fortunate Ship
Tyrone Martin. Chester, CT.: Globe Pequot, 1980. $17.95 ($14.35). List order date: 15 May 1981.
The History of the Design, Construction and Operation
of the Royal Navy’s Monitors
List price: $19.95 Member's price: $15.%
BIG GUN
Monitors
% Ian Buxton
Ian Buxton’s definitive account includes technical data on each of the 42 monitors commissioned by the Royal Navy between 1914 and 1965, as well as their political and military background, design philosophy, financial aspects, construction methods, key personnel, operational performance, and ultimate fates. But this is more than a study of special ships built for bombardment of enemy-held coastlines, for they had a profound influence on fleet battleship design and construction. The intensive bombardments they carried out pushed the science of naval gunnery to its limits in terms of accuracy and sustained fire. 19801215 pages! 175 illustrations
A Naval Institute Press Book
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