Tomorrow's Fleet

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In a sense, the ships already under construction or on order, as listed in the table of the Navy Shipbuilding Program in 1979 (Table 3, pages 125-126), are more a part of today’s Navy than tomorrow’s.

The real future of the fleet rests in the hands and minds of a few key officials within the department of Defense, the Carter Administration, and Congress. In order to see how current construction fits into the long-range picture, and to understand some of the influences that have shaped and ^u’ill continue to shape the Navy’s future, it is instructive to look first at the gauntlet of planning, ^authorization, and appropriation of funds which must be run by each new ship destined for the fleet.

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"^er notch helped to tilt the balance to the CVN, and ^Slgns from the White House indicated that the presi- ^nt had decided not to continue opposing this ship, ^lch he had vetoed last year as an unneeded luxury. tl/^{n recent} years, when the different versions of the au- ^rizing legislation were sent to conference to be recon- ‘r, the houses have usually compromised by accepting ‘ ⁿ other’s deletions and funding cuts. This year they

Table 1 gives the five-year program of shipbuilding and conversion presented by the administration to Congress in c fiscal year 1980 Annual Report of the Department of ' cnse by Secretary Harold Brown. It should be recog- ^t^^{lat t}^^l'^{s ta}bd^e *^s completely unreliable as a guide to ^e figure, since the five-year plan has been changed, O'Uetimes drastically, every year since one has been pub- i ^cd- In fact, word was leaked in November that the 'Ministration envisioned presenting a substantially larger ^ense budget, including 18 or 20 new warships, for fis- year 1981. The reason for both the proposed increase 'ts early release was President Carter’s urgent desire to . ^In congressional approval of the SALT II agreement ^Wlt}^{1 c}b^e Soviet Union. Thus do strategic concerns and Pulitical realities impinge on the Navy of tomorrow.

Table 2 documents the effect of the political process on |y^st one year’s increment of the shipbuilding program, the 'Seal year 1980 submission. The administration entered e ^lists with a 15-ship new construction program C'ghted toward the low-cost, moderate performance end j ^cfi^e tuix of ship types. Cost-cutting considerations were I ^'uant in the proposal for a vertical or short takeoff and ^anding (V/STOL)-capable aircraft carrier (CVV) of about the ^l2e °f the old Midway (CV-41) class, elimination of con- tiled developmental funds for the 3,000-ton surface ef­_f^{ect s}b'P (SES), and deferral of the dock landing ship LSD-41 0 ^Sorr>etime after fiscal year 1984. Both houses of Con- b.^ress countered with proposed increases in the authoriza- Q°ⁿ bill, only partially offset by deletions in other areas.

Particular interest was the change in the type of aircraft airier to an updated Nimitz (CVN-68)-class nuclear- ^otvered carrier in the House bill and to an updated John ’ Kennedy (CV-67)-class conventionally powered carrier in p 1 Senate. Actions by some nations of the Organization of _a^^truleum Exporting Countries jacking the price of oil up

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made known a new mood by agreeing to most of each other’s additions. The only casualties were two sonar sur­veillance ships (T-AGOSs) and the Charles F. Adams (DDG- 2)-class guided missile destroyer modernization. In both these programs, construction would have been delayed anyway because of material problems.

Further evidence of support for a stronger Navy came in the form of a supplementary appropriation for fiscal year 1979- The administration had initially requested funds for one more DDG and an additional FFG, but revised these requests in favor of procuring the first two of the four destroyers under construction for and cancelled by Iran. The House at first wanted to acquire these two as pro­posed and the second pair under the fiscal year 1980 pro­gram, but ultimately all four were covered by the supple­mentary bill. Little opposition to the procurement was ex­hibited in either house of Congress.

As this article was going to press, the authorization bill had cleared Congress but had not been signed by the president. However, with the new fiscal year already in its third month and the armed services operating under emergency funding, the appropriation bill was stalled in the Senate until 6 November by a classic struggle for political spoils. It will be noted that the seven or eight FFGs authorized each year have been apportioned among three building yards. With only six ships in the fiscal year 1980 program, Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Wash­ington received vibrations that the Todd yard in Seattle would be left out when contracts were awarded, and at­tempted to slip wording into the appropriation bill requir­ing that each yard be assigned two vessels. When other senators declined to go along with a gentleman’s agree­ment to this effect, Magnuson, who chairs the Senate Ap­propriations Committee, simply bottled up the entire bill. In a two-step solution to the problem, the Navy con­firmed its intention to split the six-ship construction plan between the two coasts, and the chairman of Todd Ship­yards assured Senator Magnuson that his company would build two of the three West Coast frigates in Seattle and one in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles yard will reportedly receive extra Navy overhaul and repair work. Thus do the needs of the armed forces give way to the parochial inter­ests of the senator from the state of Washington.

FY 80-84

FY 80 FY 81 FY 82 FY 83 FY 84 5-Year Total

Trident (Ballistic

*SLEP—Service Life Extension Program.

Table 2 Stages in the Enactment of the FY 1980 Shipbuilding Program Adminis-

Construction has continued on the Carl Vinson (CVN-70), and the ship is now about two thirds complete, de­spite festering labor strife at the New­port News shipyard. It is a foregone conclusion that the newly authorized CVN-71 will go to this same yard, since no other shipbuilder has the ex­perience or current capability to han­dle such a ship.

The logjam in the carrier Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) has fi­nally been broken with congressional agreement to let the first ship in the program, the Saratoga (CV-60), be overhauled at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard over the stubborn opposition of the Virginia delegation (which wanted the ship assigned to Newport News) and government officials who felt that cost savings and other advan­tages favored the private yard. The Navy’s need for work in its own ship­yards and the many unknowns inher­ent in a project of the scope of SLEP ultimately proved decisive. The Saratoga modernization is now sched­uled to start in fiscal year 1981.

Interest in V/STOL carriers, while at a low level in the Department of De­fense, remained active in Congress de­spite the rejection of the CVV. Repeat­ing its action of last year, the Senate called for the conversion of an LPH to a V/STOL carrier, and this time the House went along as well. A slow ship like the LPH is no substitute for the proposed CVV, and her role as a V/STOL carrier is unclear, so the future of this conversion is still in doubt.

CRUISERS________________

The only current representative of this vanishing type, about which con­troversy has swirled for the last five years, in the new construction pro­gram is the Arkansas (CGN-41). Long- lead time procurement funds for CGN-42 of the Virginia class were au­thorized in fiscal year 1974, but were canceled in 1975. Long lead time items for another CGN were authorized in fiscal year 1978. At that time, this ship was envisioned as a repeat Vir­ginia (CGN-38)-class vessel. Now, all cruiser-type ships have been elimi"

made by the company in pre­times. The builder proceeded construction under protest as to contract price, while the redoubt-

nated froin the five-year plan and dis­cussion of the type was pointedly ^0rnitted from Secretary Brown’s latest ^annual report.

dispute also persisted between cwport News and various echelons of ^e Navy since the very award of the rkansas contract as the Navy’s ex­ercise of an option under a multi-ship

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the able Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, among others, insisted that Newport News should yield its full pound or more of flesh by being held to the original bid, however unrealistic it had become. This August, the Navy finally settled with the company, thus eliminating about the last of a series of major contractual disputes which had soured relations between the govern­ment and its major shipbuilders for several years. The Arkansas was launched in October 1978 and may be completed late in 1980 if not further delayed by strikes, material problems, or late change orders. The cost of the ship, including her nuclear propulsion plant, is now reported as approxi­mately $337 million. The role of pro­viding antiaircraft protection for car­rier task forces as the existing cruisers become obsolescent will apparently be­taken over by the Aegis class of guided missile destroyers, which re­portedly will be redesignated as cruis­ers (CG-47s) in the near future.

^DESTROYERS & FRIGATES

scuss them as more or less inter- ^ar>geable in an operational sense. ^ ^eed, if the Navy gets involved in ^ostiliti_es it will have to use these P^s wherever they are needed at the foment, regardless of the specialized ^nctions for which they were de­igned.

d . ^{06 on}S^lnal Spruance program of 30 stroyers is now close to completion.

program’s last ship, the Fletcher ^92), which was named for carrier

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j^miral F. J. Fletcher of World War , ^rjther than for the famous flush- Fletcher (DD-445) class whose

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mers are still performing useful . ce m a few foreign navies, was punched in June. The Litton/Ingalls o_u^^ard has been popping these ships . °f hs automated construction olities at a rate of better than one y two months; seven were com- 1 'ssiongj _ancj fj_ve l_aurlched during Will ^^owever’ ^th‘^s production rate soon drop as the ex-Iranian de- y^ers are completed and construc- _foll" *^s limited to the DDG-47 and °W'-on ships of the same type. ”25 Spruance destroyers in com- (^^ISs‘⁰ⁿ as of the end of the year, the ^and^ *^{S ra}P'dly acquiring operational . ^shiphandling experience with ^e,r highly responsive gas turbine °puIsion plants. (See “Handling a "—Class Destroyer,” October _re ^ Proceedings, pp. 124-126.) Few _r ^rts °f their combat capability have (S ”, ^c^^e public press, however. ^Ce The LAMPShip Team,” March

pp. 154-158.)

The major development during the past year was the acquisition by the Navy of the four modified Spruance- type destroyers under construction for Iran. Following the collapse of the Shah’s imperial regime, the revolu­tionary government cancelled the or­ders for these ships in February and March. After some backing and fill­ing, Congress authorized the acquisi­tion of all four under a supplementary appropriation. Recently the Navy re­classified these ships as DDGs but re­tained the original DD hull numbers. Even though the ex-Iranian ships do not have some of the latest U. S. weapons and fire control equipment, they are viewed by outspoken retired Vice Admiral John T. Hayward as having "a fine weapons suit” in some aspects superior to that of the standard Spruance-c\ass ships. (See “Kidd-Class Destroyers to Join the Fleet” in this issue, pp. 96-98.)

Future destroyer procurement is now focused on the Aegis-equipped DDG-47 class, built on a slightly enlarged version of the Spruance hull. These will be 8,910-ton ships with an overall length of 563 feet, a crew of 343, and a main armament of Mk-26 missile launchers backed by a maga­zine capacity of 88 rounds of Standard or ASROC missiles. Ten follow-on ships are currently shown in the 1980-84 fiscal year programs, but 24 would ultimately be required if this type is intended to assume the role of providing antiair protection to carrier task forces. (See “DDG-47: Aegis On Its Way to Sea,” January 1979 Proceed­ings, pp. 101-105, and “The U. S. Navy” features for the April and June 1979 Proceedings issues, pp. 119-121 and 121-122 respectively, for more on the Aegis weapon system.)

Another destroyer development this year was the award of a single-ship construction contract to Litton/Ingalls for an additional Spruance-type ship. This is the ship that was authorized in fiscal year 1978 as the “air capable” DDG, but her intended configuration will be as a standard Spruance.

The Secretary of Defense has de­clared that block obsolescence and re­tirement of destroyers and frigates dur­ing the 1980s will result in “the risk then of having less two-ocean, surface-based ASW and AAW ships than would be desirable,” and that force levels for these types constitute a “most serious naval weakness.” Plans to cope with this problem include the two-step modernization of ten newer DDG-2- class ships with Harpoon missiles, new radars, improved communications equipment, air target tracking and gunfire control equipment, thereby ex­tending their service lives to 35 years. The modernizations will take place during the next two scheduled over­hauls of DDGs 15-24, rather than as single long industrial yard periods. This approach is not funded by limited shipbuilding dollars. Also mentioned for the future is a new type destroyer (DDX) described only as “capable of supporting a carrier battle group.” Current procurement emphasis is focused on the guided missile frigate

program. Forty-two of these ships are now in service or on order, including the three for Australia. Seven launchings and six new keel layings were recorded in 1979. The second ship of the class, the Mclnerney (FFG-8) went on sea trials starting in Septem­ber and is scheduled to be the vehicle for the technical and operational evaluation of the long-awaited LAMPS III helicopter antisubmarine system in 1981. Of the three shipyards now building frigates, the Todd Seattle yard has been particularly prompt in getting its hulls into the water. In­terestingly enough, this yard has been launching its ships bow first in con­trast to the traditional stern-first pro­cedure used at Bath and San Pedro.

A major controversy erupted early in 1979 when Senator William Prox- mire and the General Accounting Of­fice (GAO) attacked the FFG design as lacking in survivability and the pro­gram management for making altera­tions after delivery of the ships and for permitting costs to grow. The unfair­ness, if not the speciousness, of these charges drew a strong rebuttal from defense officials as well as the ship­builders, for the program has been a prime example of good management, cost control, and adherence to sched­ule. As for the vulnerability of these ships to damage, the limitations of their design have been well known from the outset. In effect, the GAO and Proxmire were criticizing them for being only what they were in­tended to be. Naval critics have chal­lenged the FFGs on operational grounds for having only a single screw, inadequate speed to cope with nuclear attack submarines, and an in­effective sonar. But they have recog­nized that these features resulted from deliberate trade-offs in the design pro­cess and have given the project mana­gers good grades for cost-effectiveness and production control. Commander David G. Clark, for example, credits the FFG-7 with being “. . . the finest ship which could have been designed for the NATO environment—under a restrictive constraint on procurement cost and by a bureaucracy which could not accept any greater change ... in meeting the urgent need for ships.’’ (March 1979 Proceedings, p. 27.) As a result, he continues, the Navy is run­ning the risk of “building ships for a mission which will never be assigned and finding them less than acceptable for. any other.” This is strong criticism, but addressed properly to those who imposed the restrictive con­straints rather than to those who are carrying out a possibly flawed pro­gram in a highly competent manner. As has always been the case, the Navy has to live with the ships it is given and use them as best it can to meet whatever challenges it must face.

SUBMARINES _____________

The first Trident submarine, the Ohio (SSBN-726), was launched in 1979 from the Electric Boat Division’s land-level construction facility at Gro­ton, Connecticut, which was tried out in 1978 with the launching of the Jacksonville (SSN-699). (See “To Build Trident,” October 1979 Proceedings, pp. 117-120, for a good description of this facility and the construction methods being used. However, earlier production methods were by no means so inefficient as the author indicates. Also, submarines comparable in size to the Tridents were designed as far back as the early 1920s and could have been built with the technology exist­ing then.) Simultaneously, a keel lay­ing ceremony was held for the fourth Trident, named the Georgia (SSBN- 729). Since ships are not ordinarily named at keel layings, this must be characterized as a media event staged for first lady Rosalynn Carter. The third SSBN, almost two years ahead of the Georgia in construction, remains unnamed.

Problems in the Trident program gemming from a poorly trained work ^orce> material delays, design changes, strikes, and management errors have ^een largely overcome, but cost Over­tons are probable, given continued in- ation. Plans call for 13 of these huge submarines through fiscal year 1984, ^ut the ultimate total number has not ^yet been determined. It is possible at the program could be affected ^a ter fiscal year 1982 by alternative ®^signs now under study with the aim reducing costs and introducing competition into the shipbuilding Ptogram. Cost advantag es are claimed ⁽’^r a ship with 14 missile tubes rather ^an 16 as in the earlier ballistic mis- ^Slle submarines. Competition would Presumably be obtained by assigning ^SSBNs to Newport News, since it is Unlikely that either the Portsmouth or ^are Island naval shipyards would be ^assigned new construction.

The Trident I missile is already op­tional and will be retrofitted into a ^02en of the latest Poseidon sub­marines. The first of these, the Francis ^Cott Key (SSBN-654), deployed in Oc­tober. A f_ew months earlier, Sub­marine Squadron Sixteen with ten [_ef_t gp_aj_n f_or j_{ts new} Base _at ^tngs Bay, Georgia. The increased •stance from effective patrol areas ob- ^v‘°usly means a reduction in coverage Provided by these submari nes.

I having suffered from labor prob- ms and production delays at both cctric Boat and Newport News, the '•tack submarine construction pro- N^am j_s f_urther behind schedule even ^ °ugh most of the problems seem to ^aVe been overcome. The Department Defense now admits that the P ^anned 90-ship force level cannot be cached within the time frame con- crnplated. So much for that force

level! One SSN was commissioned and four were launched in 1979, including the first in the current Newport News series, the San Francisco (SSN-71I). The fact that this ship is ahead of nine others with lower hull numbers at Electric Boat is not a reflection on either yard but merely a result of block ordering in past years for pur­poses of economy and stability of workload. An example of the advan­tages achievable with multi-ship or­ders is the automated facility being constructed by Electric Boat at Quon- set Point, Rhode Island, for the fabri­cation of hull frames and cylinders.

The Navy’s study of smaller and less expensive alternative designs has been completed but not released in

full. A 5,000-ton version of the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class design seems to be the most active contender for further consideration, although some decrease in operational effectiveness would have to be accepted in return for cost savings.

A milestone in the progress of nu­clear propulsion will be marked this year with the inactivation and de­commissioning of the famous Nautilus (SSN-571). The historic submarine will be moored at the Washington Navy Yard as a national memorial with an honor crew of 26. Other locations which sought the ship were ruled out at least in part by considerations of secu­rity for the nuclear reactor and as­sociated machinery components.

U.S. NAVY (W. WICKHAM

Michigan (SSBN-727), keel of Georgia (SSBN-729), and Ohio (SSBN-726)

^AMpHlBIOUS warfare ships

With the commissioning of the ^assc,u (LHA-4), only the Peleliu (LHA-5) err>ains under construction within the ^a?Pb‘bious category. There was some °^rt within the Senate to add another ,^A j_n fi_scaj y_ear 1979, but such a ^tVel°pment is highly unlikely. A ^c°ntract design for the LSD-41, which ^as awarded to Lockheed, has been

completed, but production of the first ship was postponed beyond fiscal year 1984 by the Department of Defense on the grounds that further assessment of air cushion landing vehicles was needed. Note, however, that Congress added advance procurement funds for this ship. The new design calls for a well deck capable of holding four air

cushion landing craft (LCAC) and a flight deck to service two helicopters at a time. The ship is to have a bul­bous bow for speed and seakeeping, and medium speed diesel engines, not previously used in U. S. Navy ships, for fuel economy. Accommodations would be provided for a crew of 376 and 402 Marine Corps passengers. The

basic design could be adapted to the I.PD configuration with more helicop­ters and fewer landing craft. Six to eight of the new ships would be needed to replace the Navy’s eight oldest LSDs.

Two experimental prototypes of the LCAC are now under test. JEFF(B) was delivered a year ago by Bell Aerospace and was tested operationally with the Spiegel Grove (LSD-32). The 48-foot beam of the LCAC was successfully ac­cepted into the mother ship’s 50-foot well. This year the second craft, JEFF(A), was turned over to the AALC Experimental Trials Unit at Panama City, Florida. Initial procurement of production units is not anticipated prior to fiscal year 1982.

In a somewhat related development, the Army is procuring a dozen am­phibious air cushion lighters (LACV-30) from Bell Aerospace for the rapid dis­charge and delivery of vehicles and cargo at landing sites. The lighter is described as a stretched version of the commerical Voyageur ACV developed by Bell’s Canadian division. It will have a 30-ton payload and be driven by two Pratt and Whitney engines of 1,400 to 1,800 horsepower each through twin propellers.

SMALL COMBATANTS _______

The patrol hydrofoil (PHM) program moved ahead with the laying of three keels during the year, although the program’s history to date is a classic horror story of interference and delay- The development was initiated in 1971 as a NATO effort, but Italy and West Germany ultimately dropped out, leaving the United States to con­tinue alone. The Navy contracted with Boeing for two ships, but funds ran out and only the Pegasus (PHM-l) was completed, while work on the half­finished PHM-2 was stopped. After ex­tensive testing, the PHM received a fa­vorable operational evaluation in June 1976. Production funds were appro­priated in the fiscal year 1975 pro­gram, but DoD systems analysts de­layed release of the money until Janu­ary 1977. Even as a contract was being negotiated, the incoming Carter Administration stopped the program and requested rescission of the funds. Congress refused to go along, so the

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^ <JS were reluctantly released in Au- ^^Ust 1977. By the time a contract ^°^uld be let, inflation had eroded the unds to the extent that PHM-2 was ^r°pped to the end of the program ^ane be delivered unarmed. It will ^{Ust c}^^e armament purchased for the ^original phm-2. In the face of such grudging support, the future of the ^ as a type does not look promising. ^ Interestingly enough, the British ^{ave tur}ned to Boeing for an ocean pa- hydrofoil, HMS Speedy, a 90-foot, 7-ton craft based on Boeing’s com- ^rncrcial Jetfoil design.

Production on the missile-armed gunboats and submarine chasers for _fi^dLul< Arabia has moved ahead. The rst pcg was ]_aunch_ej _at Tacoma _p^0atbuilding Company and the lead 'O at Peterson Builders. An artist’s rawing of the PCG shows a charac- ^t(-‘ristic subchaser hull with a blocky ^SuPerstructure surmounted by a Oestle-Iibg antenna mast. A low stack

^AlJXlLIARIES ______________

, . ^^ere were three completions in ^ls category during 1979. The sub­marine tender Emory S. Land (AS-39)

. ^s Placed in special commission for ^tr,P from Seattle to Norfolk where ^Went into full commission on 7 (See “Taking the Land to Sea,” ^Unc 1979 Proceedings, pp. 114-116.)

^ship is the plan to include up to y women in her complement.

service with civilian crews under ^e Military Sealift Command. These 'Ps resemble offshore oilfield service ^raft with clear fantails and very low eboard aft, high superstructures, ^atlcl tandem stacks forward.

‘Wo Cimarron (AO-177)-class fleet °*lers were launched last year. These *^fe 26,110-ton ships—small as tank- ^rs go—592 feet in length with a •j5^arn of 88 feet and a 31.5 foot draft. _r ^ey have a capacity of 120,000 bar­. ^s of ship and aviation fuel plus lim- ^,tetl cargo and passenger space. Their ^'ssion is to deliver fuel in bulk to well aft indicates gas turbine propul­sion. The vessel’s armament consists of a single gun forward, possibly of 76-mm. caliber, and a cluster of Har­poon or similar missiles aft. Few de­tails of the PGG are available.

No progress has been reported on the 3,000-ton surface effect ship awarded to Rohr Marine in 1976. The Department of Defense keeps trying to terminate expenditures on this proj­ect, but Congress keeps it going with modest research and development funding.

The Coast Guard’s “famous cutters” class of 270-foot medium endurance cutters is of some interest because of its mobilization potential. (See “Fu­ture War and the U. S. Coast Guard” May 1979 Proceedings, pp. 182-199.) These ships, of which as many as 26 may be projected, will displace 1,630 tons, have diesel reduction gear pro­pulsion plants of 7,000 shaft horse­power driving twin screws, and be fin fleet replenishment ships as well as to conduct underway replenishments themselves. They have a single screw powered by fully automated steam turbine plants of 24,000 horsepower at sustained speeds of 20 knots, and are manned by a crew of 200.

Four destroyer tenders are now on

stabilized. They will be armed with a single Mk-75 76-mm. gun with an Mk-92 fire control system, also two 40 -mm. guns. Their helicopter plat­form is designed to accommodate the LAMPS 111 as well as current Coast Guard aircraft. Space and weight are reserved for the wartime installation of Harpoon missiles, the Phalanx multi-barreled gun, and TACTAS towed sonar. Unfortunately, their 19-knot top speed seriously limits their potential usefulness as antisub­marine ships. The keel for the Bear (WMEC-901) was laid in August at Tacoma Boat, and the Tampa, Harriet Lane, and Northland complete the first increment ordered under the fiscal year 1977 program. A special feature of these ships is the COMDAC elec­tronic unit which provides automated navigation, ship control, combat in­formation center, and communication functions.

order at the National Steel shipyard in San Diego, two of which were launched this year. These ships are modified versions of the Samuel Cam­pers (AD-37) class, 651 feet in length and displacing 19,800 tons at full load. They will be a welcome addition to the destroyer force to service the

new Spruance DDs and Oliver Hazard Perry FFGs now entering the fleet.

Another addition to National Steel’s workload was the cable repair ship T-ARC-7 awarded to the shipyard in August. This is the Navy’s first cable ship to be built as such from the keel up, the other ARCS having been con­verted or acquired from the Army. This one will be 512 feet in overall length by 75 feet in the beam, with a crew of about 125. A speed of 15 knots will be obtained with a diesel-

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS _

Last year was not a smooth one for the Navy. Personnel relations were marred by racial incidents involving Ku Klux Klan activities in a few ships, and there was a flurry of sabotage af­fecting at least eight ships. Fires of apparent incendiary origin caused minor damage to the Capodanno (FF- 1093), McCandless (FF-1084), Puget Sound (AD-38), Charleston (LKA-1I3), Iwo Jima (LPH-2), and Forrestal (CV-59). Extensive damage was suffered by the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) under overhaul at Norfolk, when 13 separate fires caused the death of one civilian and necessitated $7.5 million of repair work. In addition to the fires, some­one deliberately damaged the reduc­tion gears of the Tuscaloosa (LST-1187).

Under pressure from the cost ac­countants, the Navy initiated an ex­periment with a crewless overhaul of the Conyngham (DDG-17) at the Bath Iron Works. The ship will be un­manned for a full year while shipyard work is in process, and an essentially new crew will have to take over near the end of the overhaul. The British have used a similar system for many years, but U. S. naval personnel have mixed feelings about the idea. Many crewmen are convinced that close in­spection by the ship’s company is necessary to assure the proper comple­tion of most jobs, and cost savings are likely to disappear when civilian workers have to be paid to perform all the odd tasks traditionally handled by the crew. Although sailors dislike many of these shipyard duties and the living conditions that must be endured, they are not enthusiastic about losing the time ashore. The con- electric power plant of 10,000 shaft horsepower. A special feature of the ship will be equipment to facilitate precise position keeping at work sites. The award to the San Diego ship­builder has been protested by the General Dynamics Corporation, which claims that the ship could be built more economically at its yard in Quincy, Massachusetts.

The only other class of ships in the auxiliary program is the T-AGOS group of sonar surveillance vessels. At the stant erosion of fringe benefits, how­ever minor they may appear to the cost cutters, is beginning to tell on the morale of undermanned and over­worked crews.

The steady decline in the size and capabilities of the Navy finally seems to be causing national concern. Secre­tary Brown himself declared that “whether the U. S. Navy, in con­junction with allied navies, is power­ful enough to execute its essential non-nuclear missions remains a matter of controversy . . . time has become a scarce and precious commodity for the United States. It no longer permits us the luxury of badly unbalanced forces.” Unfortunately, Brown’s statement appeared in a document supporting the administration’s budget and force level proposals, and it devolved upon Congress to initiate an increase. As late as August, in­formation leaked to the press raised suspicions that further cuts were being contemplated in the already emascu­lated five-year shipbuilding plan. The sharpness of the reaction plus other indications of a new congressional and popular temper may have thwarted such an action. As previously noted, later word from the Pentagon prom­ised an increase in the naval construc­tion program for fiscal year 1981. The extent of congressional support for a stronger Navy was evidenced by a let­ter to President Carter from Represen­tative Floyd D. Spence containing the endorsement of 152 congressmen.

Chairman Melvin Price of the House Committee on Armed Services offered this analysis of the reasons for our continued naval decline: “. . .a beginning of the year, Secretary Brown stated that orders for the first two would be placed late in 1979, while five more were being requested to permit an orderly construction sched' ule. The Navy encountered problems during the system tests on the towed hydrophone array to be used with these ships, and there is no need to push construction of the relatively small and simple craft until their “main battery” of sonar equipment is under procurement.

lack of suitable long-range planning within the Department of Defense, which appears to place overriding priorities on supporting the NATO contingency—to the exclusion of other plausible and more demanding uses of American naval forces" and “. . . the annual legislative process (in which) Congress . . . tends to approve naval investment programs on the basis of a one-year snapshot. . . . h takes many years for a navy to run down—and even longer to build one up.”

The editor of Jane's Fighting Ship>■ Captain John E. Moore, Royal Navy (Retired), sized up the problem pat' ticularly astutely. “In the USA,” he wrote, “this position appears to stem from a lack of unity in decision­making. The professional advice of the Pentagon is interpreted so very dif­ferently by the Executive and Congress that the naval programmes are not only suffering from suspension be­tween two stools but also a continual fluctuation of views from those tW° supports, which should be the founda­tion of a long-term strategy and secu­rity policy ...”

That is putting the blame exactly where it belongs instead of carping over inflation-driven cost increases, contract terms, and design limitations forced on the Navy in past years. To­morrow’s Navy is going to be short of practically every type of ship. The time has come to start building mor^e of almost any type and to stop the seemingly endless quibbling over marginal—and incalculable—degrees of cost-effectiveness.

Hull No.          Name          Program Builder                  Status

PATROL COMBATANT MISSILE (HYDROFOIL)

FLEET OCE A N TUGS (MSC)

CABLE REPAIRING SHIP (MSC)

T-ARC-7                                                        79 National Steel Ord. 16Aug. 79

Hull No. Name                   Program Builder

AUXILIARY OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SHIPS (MSC)

Lau. 11 Jun Lau. 15 Aug ' Lau. 15 Sep-^T

U. S. COAST GUARD MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS

WMEC-901 Bear WMEC-902 Tampa WMEC-903 Harriet Lane WMEC-904 Northland

Notes

Status

11

1. DDH-997 authorized in FY 78 program as a modified Spruance with an^en hangar and flight deck. Late in 1979, a contract was awarded for the deu¹¹ and construction of a single Spruance-type destroyer which, because of ris*¹¹-¹'

will be the 31st standard Spruance.

2.    Originally ordered for the Imperial Iranian Navy. DD-995 was °^r‘⁷, I designated DD-996 and DD-996 was originally DD-998; hull numbers

23 Mar. 78. Contracts for DD-995 and 996 cancelled 3 Feb. 79; those f°^r pf and 994 on 31 Mar. 79. Acquired by U. S. Navy 25 Jul. 79- Reclassified^aS on 8 Aug. 79.          J

3.    Ordered for the Royal Australian Navy. Australian pennant numbers*'¹ * 02, and 03.

4.    Long-lead time procurement for this ship authorized in FY 79- J

5.    Originally ordered in FY 73 under the lead ship construction contract, ⁸ j

30 May 74, but construction suspended when 40% complete. Reordered as of the five-ship production contract.      j

6.    Hull numbers 181-185 assigned to Military Sealift Command tankers¹

7.    AS-39 in commission special as of date indicated; placed in full conu”'¹

Jul. 79.                                                                                                                                             J

8. AS-40 in commission special as of date indicated; will be placed in full^c sion in Feb. 79.

* Planned date as of time of writing.

4

CORRECTIONS TO THE JANUARY 1979 TOMORROW’S VL&J