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Although the Soviets are no longer convinced that the next war must go nuclear, they still hint that it might. And they are preparing for that possibility; those are Soviet sailors in those radiation su'its—not Americans—practicing cleaning up after a simulated nuclear battle. Our own planners seem to want to deny the existence of tactical nuclear weapons altogether. Before it is too late, we had better start giving some thought to the “unthinkable. ”
Xn Fhe General, his brilliant novel of World War I, C- S. Forester portrays a generation of military leaders ur>able to recognize and accept the changes in warfare brought about by technological advances such as barbed wire and the machine gun. These leaders—brave, competent in the old style of war, dedicated, and loyal—had prepared for battle in the belief that technological change could not alter in any fundamental sense the manner in which they would be called upon to fight. Although a few writers did foresee the impact of rapid-fire weapons ar|d protracted trench warfare, most of the military leaders of Britain and France were convinced that elan ar>d the spirit of the offensive would compensate for any minor” changes wrought by new tools of war. They were wrong, and millions died in a war that was nearly lost before the leaders could adapt to the Imperatives of the modern battlefield. Today, in our sophistication, we smile indulgently at the military commanders of 60 years ago. Surely °ur modern, forward-looking, electronic Navy could n°t fall into the trap of failing to appreciate the impact of technology. Surely there could be no weapon, Particularly one in existence for years, which we w°uld systematically ignore in our planning. But our confidence is misplaced. We too have consistently ailed to consider a factor which might radically alter 'Te character of a future war—the existence of tactical nuclear weapons. Despite repeated declarations in the Chief of Naval Operations’ annual posture statements that it . . is essential that the U. S. Navy Maintain a capability to use tactical nuclear weapons u the United States is to be able to fight and win at Sea> we have given little serious thought to the naval implications of tactical nuclear war.1 There are many illustrations of our neglect. The senior course at the U. S. Naval War College—an institution whose stated mission is to “enhance the professional capabilities” of future military leaders and to develop advanced strategic and tactical concepts for the futUre employment of naval forces”—contains essentially nothing on any aspect of tactical nuclear Weapons employment. Sea Plan 2000, now enshrined as the principal articulation of the Navy’s vision of a uture war, pictures a global contest between the mted States and the Soviet Union in which nuclear Weapons play no part. Debates on aircraft carrier vulnerability almost invariably focus on only conven- 0r footnotes, please turn to page 33. | tional attacks. Senior officers, discussing the possibility of war and the course such a war might take, speak of the need to hold violence below the point at which the war “goes nuclear.” We speak and act as though war could have three possible outcomes: we win, we lose, or the war “goes nuclear.” But what happens once that nuclear boundary is crossed is a possibility we have set aside in our thoughts and in our planning. The Navy is not alone in ignoring the impact of nuclear weapons on war at sea. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, for example, spent nine pages of his Fiscal Year 1980 Report to Congress in a discussion of tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Exactly 3.3 words are devoted to fleet systems. A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office, Planning U. S. General Purpose Forces: The Theater Nuclear Forces, totally ignores nuclear war at sea. The silence extends to unofficial writings as well. The Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals publishes an annual index of articles appearing in 77 different journals specializing in military, naval, or general defense matters. An examination of this index for the past five years fails to reveal a single article remotely related to tactical nuclear war at sea. The U. S. Navy’s lack of serious examination of the naval aspects of nuclear war is all the more disconcerting because it contrasts sharply with the approach taken by the Soviet Union, the only power remotely capable of challenging the United States at sea. Soviet military thinking is no longer dominated by the assumption of 15 years ago that any war between the two superpowers must rapidly escalate to an all-out strategic exchange. Indeed, a senior Soviet official writing in Red Star in 1976 warned that a conventional war in Europe “carries with it the constant danger of being escalated into a nuclear war,” and implied that such escalation may be avoided.2 But even though the Soviets no longer assume that any war must inevitably be total, they clearly believe that consideration of the use of nuclear weapons is an essential aspect of military planning. One recent U. S. study of published Soviet military writings drew this conclusion: “One of the striking aspects of Soviet military literature is the heavy emphasis given to nuclear warfighting and the minute detail with which certain of its combat aspects are addressed. . . . The net impression is that the Soviet military has faced up to the reality of nuclear warfare, focused on it in their military schools and academies, and at |
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least worked out the theory of how it should be fought and won. There is abundant evidence that the Soviets have designed and structured their forces in accordance with the theoretical writings. . . ,”3
The Soviets place particular stress on the importance of destroying those U. S. forces, both submarine and carrier, which have the capability of conducting nuclear strikes against the shore. For example, one Soviet writer notes that “naval missile carrying aviation armed with nuclear missiles can employ its weaponry while beyond the limits of the carrier force air defense” (emphasis added)4. There are, however, at least two restraints evident in the literature on Soviet use of nuclear weapons at sea. One is the “apparent inability of Soviet military theoreticians to come to grips intellectually with the concept of escalation,” an inability which would inhibit the Soviet Union—as it would the United States—from taking the tactical nuclear step lightly.5 The second restraint is the preeminent position of the land battle and hence of the Red Army in Soviet military thought. This probably means that the use of nuclear weapons at sea would be considered unlikely, except when such weapons are also being used at the theater level in a land battle. But should these inhibitions be overcome, Soviet doctrine appears to include naval use of nuclear weapons as well.
All this is not to suggest that the conviction that a future war at sea will be fought solely with conventional weapons is incorrect. It may well not be. Predicting the future, especially the nature of a future war, is risky, and it is not possible to foresee in any detail how a major war with the Soviet Union might develop or what restrictions on the combatants such a war might entail. However, we should at least be thinking about the implications for the Navy if a future war is not limited to conventional weapons. Bernard Brodie, one of the most respected civilian American strategists, has warned us against accepting “. . . the assumption that the same forces that are organized, equipped, and trained to fight a nonnuclear war are capable of shifts at a moment’s notice to a nuclear posture.”6 His warning seems particularly cogent for naval forces. Whatever form a future conflict assumes, we should be prepared for it. The war we don’t prepare for is the one we are most likely to have to fight, and the consequences of attempting to fight a naval nuclear war without having thought about it in advance are frightening to contemplate.
One reason for the paucity of detailed examination of the naval aspects of nuclear war is the complexity of the problem. Despite a significant body of technical data on nuclear weapons, the potential impact of their tactical use at sea is uncertain. But it is at least possible to sketch some of the considerations which might arise from the introduction of this new factor into naval warfare. There are several features of nuclear explosions which might have significant implications during a naval battle. The first, and most ~Z, obvious, is the blast effect of high-yield weapons on I ship survival. For example, a 125-kiloton blast f within slightly more than 1,000 yards would sink i most ships.7 Of equal importance is the derangement of weapon systems caused by a blast; this could in- ] » elude loss of antennas or other disruption of equipment. The same 125-kiloton weapon might cause serious impairment of shipboard weapon systems at . ranges of perhaps 5,000 yards. The blast would not be the only source of this impairment; electronic equipment would also be vulnerable to the large electromagnetic pulse (EMP) associated with nuclear bursts. One standard text notes that “solid state components are particularly sensitive” to EMP.8 For low-altitude explosions, the range of significant EMP effects is roughly comparable to the range at which blast damage can result in weapons degradation. However, for very high altitudes, high-yield EMP effects may be significant at much greater ranges, leading to disruption of computers and other sophisticated solid state systems. Hardening against this nuclear effect is “generally difficult for existing systems but can be built into new systems.”9 Combat effectiveness in a nuclear environment also may suffer because of fallout; although U. S. ships have water- washdown systems installed, exposed aircraft might be rendered temporarily unusable by contamination. The final tactically significant aspect of nuclear explosions is the prospect of severe distortion of communications in a nuclear environment. In the presence of multiple nuclear bursts, high frequency signals can be blacked out for periods lasting from seconds to hours; VHF communications, including satellite communications, may be degraded for tens of minutes. Communications effects are sensitive to yield and height of burst with high-yield, high- altitude bursts having the greatest probability of significantly degrading communications signals.
The degree of change wrought by nuclear weapons obviously varies among the different fields of naval warfare. Perhaps the most dramatic change is in U. S. ability to defend carrier battle groups. Most analysts agree that Soviet hopes for destroying U. S. aircraft carriers rest on a massive, coordinated missile strike from both missile-firing submarines and land-based aircraft. All of the probable launch platforms now deployed—“Echo”-, “Juliett”-, and “Charlie”-class submarines and “Badger” and
Backfire” bombers—are generally credited with the capability of carrying nuclear-armed missiles. Our defenses against a coordinated strike are based on a combination of maximum destruction of launch plat- 0rrns prior to missile launch and destruction of mis- s‘les in flight. But still, at least one or two missiles can be expected to reach the carrier. The ability of a*rcraft carriers to absorb several conventional hits ar>d still retain an operational capability is generally acknowledged; their ability to remain effective fightIng ships after even a single near miss from a high- y*eld weapon is far more questionable. Thus, the outcome of the “battle of the first salvo,” so important >n Soviet naval tactics, is far more likely to be Unfavorable to U. S. forces in a nuclear environment.
Two additional factors complicate the problem of carrier air defense. One is the possibility that the oviets either have developed or are trying to develop a tactical ballistic missile. This missile, the 300- nautical mile SS-NX-13, was expected to reach the deployment stage several years ago, but its development appears to have been curtailed. Should work on this tnissile resume or should other Soviet ballistic missiles be employed tactically, existing U. S. defen- s.1Ve systems, which are not designed to counter bal- 'stic trajectories, would probably prove inadequate.
*s in turn means that high-yield weapons capable 0 causing significant weapon system derangement at ranges of up to a few miles might be delivered with 'mpunity. Some evidence that the Soviets have incorporated such a tactic in their planning may be ound in the 1972 statement of the Soviet defense minister that the Strategic Rocket Forces had allotted some missiles against “naval groupings” at ■ Une extensive study of Soviet military literatUre concluded that “the only escalation boundary ev'dent . . . seems to be nuclear strikes into the homeland.”11 Thus, even in a war employing tactical nuclear weapons, naval commanders might be constrained to treat Soviet Naval Aviation bases as sanctuaries for fear of escalation to a strategic exchange. This enforced restraint and the strong air defenses in Soviet base areas mean that the best method of dealing with bombers—striking them on the ground before takeoff—may be unavailable.
Anticarrier warfare is not the only naval operation which might be significantly altered by nuclear weapons. Although the overall impact is not completely visible, the entire field of antiair warfare would almost certainly be modified by the use of nuclear surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Nuclear SAMs would increase the kill radius and thus the probability of destruction against any specific incoming aircraft or missile. However, the employment of nuclear air defense weapons will require care to avoid inadvertent damage to our own systems. A particularly difficult question for U. S. antiair warfare is the degree to which air defense coordination, which is heavily dependent on communications, would be degraded by the effects of the explosion of the first few nuclear SAMs. At first glance, the use of nuclear weapons might seem to offer roughly symmetrical benefits to attacker and defender, with the increased ease of destroying incoming Soviet missiles or U. S. strike aircraft being matched by the inability of either side to tolerate even a single weapon’s escaping destruction without running a major risk of losing a ship. Closer examination, however, may show that the advantages of an increased kill radius obtained from nuclear SAMs cannot be obtained except at the price of loss of the coordination essential in defending against a massive Soviet strike.
A separate matter in the use of nuclear weapons may be the adequacy of point defense systems based on the so-called Gatling gun approach. These extremely close-in systems might be unable to protect the ships on which they were mounted, since weapons detonated outside their range could still result in ship kills.
Other areas of naval warfare would also be changed by the active use of nuclear weapons at sea, but probably not as radically as antiair and anticarrier warfare. High-yield, high-altitude bursts, if employed, could drastically reduce any form of communications between supporting battle groups. Mine warfare and
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difficulty; thus, we have been unable or unwilling to make adequate mental and physical preparations for it. But sooner or later we must face the implications of naval nuclear war. We may consider several preparations:
amphibious warfare would seem to be minimally affected, assuming that the opposed amphibious landing has no place in any major war with the Soviet Union. In antisubmarine warfare (ASW), nuclear weapons would reduce the precision required in preattack localization. They would also require greater standoff distances for self-protection; this means that their greatest benefits would come to those units having a long-range detection capability or to airborne units. The use of nuclear weapons in ASW would probably be to the net advantage of the United States, because it is generally accepted that the Soviets’ biggest problem in countering U. S. submarines is initial detection, not localization or kill. For either side, the extensive reverberations that would follow a nuclear depth bomb would render sonar useless, making redetection difficult if the attack failed or confirmation of its success almost impossible.
Finally, the side equipped with nuclear weapons would be substantially superior in endurance. If only a single round is required for a kill, then for a given magazine size, a ship with nuclear weapons will be able to fight longer, if she survives. This advantage would apply to both sides, but its effect would -probably favor the Soviets, who are considered to have more of a conventional weapons endurance problem in their ships.
It has been more than three decades since the last large naval battle between opposing fleets. Even without the advent of nuclear weapons, a modern engagement would differ considerably from the great Pacific battles of World War II. Missiles, electronics, satellite communications, and surveillance systems all would shape the outcome in ways we cannot totally foresee. The addition of nuclear weapons would add yet another dimension to any future war. Such a war would be so different from our past experience that we can picture it only with great
► New U. S. systems should be hardened to the maximum degree practical against blast and, above all, EMP. This is most immediately applicable to the Aegis air defense system but also has broader applications.
► U. S. air defense doctrine should be reexamined with the view toward improving our ability to conduct antiair warfare and defend carrier battle groups in an environment where communications are severely degraded.
► The utility of close-in weapon systems based on gunfire should be reconsidered, because weapons bursting outside their engagement range may still result in ship losses. We should not forget that, because of Soviet concern with defending their own nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, our ASW frigates may be high priority targets and will need to be able to defend themselves.
► We should reconsider our present forward deployment policy, particularly in the Mediterranean. We must almost certainly grant the Soviets the first blow; preemption is not the U. S. style. Our confidence that our carriers can survive this first strike rests, in part, on the assumption that the war will be conventional, at least at its outset. It might be a wiser policy to keep one of the two Atlantic Fleet carriers now deployed to the Mediterranean out of range of Soviet land-based air, despite the obvious political and operational problems associated with such a redeployment.
► We should think through what action we might take in time of crisis to counter the threat of the “Charlie"-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine. This anticarrier platform, equipped with short range (30-nautical mile), submerged-launched SS-N-7 missiles would presumably be assigned to shadow carriers in times of tension. While the mass provided by Soviet Naval Aviation is the most severe threat in a nonnuclear war, the short time of flight of the SS-N-7 makes the “Charlie”-class submarine a major threat in case of a preemptive tactical nuclear attack. With destruction of the missile in flight essentially impossible and so-
Proceedings / January 1980
called ‘‘soft kill” (decoying) difficult, the loss of several carriers at the war’s outset is not inconceivable. We might therefore consider what ways, if any, are available prior to hostilities to keep such a submarine 0ut of range, even to the point of announcing that ships within a certain distance of our forces will be attacked and driven off. The consequences of this are, °f course, exceptionally serious, and we may well decide that the drawbacks outweigh the gains. But we need to think about it nonetheless. ^ We should consider developing a defense against tactical ballistic missiles. The fact that the Soviets appear to have ceased work on the SS-NX-13 may or may not be s'gnificant. There was a hiatus in Soviet development °f the ‘Alpha”-class submarine, presumably to resolve engineering problems, so interruption of a pro- for the Soviets does not necessarily mean its a andonment. Developing a counter to a tactical bal- 'stic missile system cannot be undertaken lightly in v*ew of the questions it raises with respect to the ^972 antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty which anned, among other things, sea-based ABMs. Still, although the Soviets would clearly not. be pleased ^h the deployment of such a counter, the treaty . nes an ABM as “a system to counter strategic bal- !stlc missiles” (emphasis added) and thus an antitac- tlcal ballistic missile system is probably legal.12 In any case, we should not leave ourselves with no de- ense for 0ur vital carrier forces, in case the Soviet nion should actually deploy some form of tactical ballistic missile. Finally, we should spread out our offensive power by eclUlPping as many surface ships and submarines as possible U"h cruise missiles for both antiship and land attack. hls is not a call for us to abandon the carrier’s Preeminent place in the fleet. Our investment in car- flers makes such a course impractical, and the unParalleled flexibility of sea-based aircraft in a wide ^Pectrum of conflicts makes such a course unwise. ut concentrating our offensive power in a small number of high-value ships may make the use of nu- ear weapons at sea more attractive to the Soviets, Particularly if they lack the ability to counter the carriers with conventional weapons alone. Proliferat- nk platforms with offensive punch should lessen vict incentives for using nuclear weapons and improve our prospects if they do. Any of these suggestions may have fatal flaws or ^h^backs in cost or loss of flexibility that outweigh e Presumed benefits. They are not offered as final j utl°ns but as springboards for discussion. What es seem incontrovertible is that the Navy must tUW m detail the effects of nuclear war at sea. wenty-three centuries ago, the Chinese philos- | opher Sun Tzu opened his classic work, The Art of War, with these words: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”13 Today’s world would be incomprehensible to Sun Tzu, but his advice continues to ring true. For too long, the Navy’s study of war has excluded the very real prospect of tactical nuclear war at sea. But if we are to deter all forms of war, we must be ready to fight all forms, and to prevail. Without a change in our willingness to face the prospect of a different kind of war, we will not be ready. Nearly 35 years after Hiroshima, it is not too soon to face up to the reality of nuclear weapons and their impact on naval strategy and tactics. Captain Brooks, a 1959 graduate of Duke University, received his commission through the £3ESsSf NROTC program. He has served in billets as.. I' sociated with the submarine force for the past 15 years, including service in both attack and ballis- ^B tic missile submarines and three years in command of the USS Whale (SSN-638). Ashore, Captain Brooks has served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and as an instructor at a nuclear prototype. He holds a master’s degree from the University of Maryland and is a 1979 distinguished graduate of the U. S. Naval War College, where he was awarded the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Prize for professional writing. Captain Brooks is currently assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ‘Thomas B. Hayward, CNO Report: The Fiscal Year 1980 Military Posture and the Fiscal Year 1980 Budget of the United States Navy (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 13. Identical statements have appeared in earlier annual CNO reports. 2R. Simonyan, “Wars in the Eyes of the Pentagon,” quoted in BDM Corporation, The Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine for Theater Nuclear Warfare (McLean, Virginia: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1977), p. 10. 3Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine, p. 22. 4V. Germanovich and N. Klimov, “The Destruction of Large Surface Ships at Sea by Aviation,” Morskoy Sbornik, quoted in Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine, p. 28. 5Soviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine, p. 15. “Bernard Brodie, “Introduction,” in National Strategy Information Center, Toward a New Defense for NATO: The Case for Tactical Nuclear Weapons (New York: NSIC, 1976), p. 8. 7All discussion of weapon effects are based on Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington: U. S. Dept, of Defense, 1977), except that blast hardness for weapons impairment at sea is drawn from Charles R. Jones, “Weapons Effects Primer,” Proceedings, June 1978, pp. 34-42. “Glasstone and Dolan, p. 521. 9Ibid. 1 “Quoted in Norman Polmar, “Thinking About Soviet ASW,” Proceedings, May 1976, p. 126. 1 xSoviet Navy Declaratory Doctrine, p. 13. 12“Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” May 20, 1972, Article II, Paragraph 1. 13Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 63. |