Professional Notes

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Kidd-QXzss Destroyers to Join the Fleet

By Captain A. M. Osborne, U. S. Navy

The Spruance-class destroyer, now being delivered to the fleet in num­bers, has proved to be what has been called the best surface antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ship the U. S. Navy has ever built. The Aegis cruiser (desig­

nated initially as a destroyer—DDG- 47) appears to be at least one answer to the air threat that can be anticipated through this century and beyond the year 2000. In the interim, the DDG- 993-class guided-missile destroyer is being added to help maintain carrier battle group integrity and offensive power during a time when overall ship numbers are barely able to meet ex­panding commitments and the in­creasing threat.

The DDG-993, soon to be the USS Kidd (DDG-993), and her three sister ships—Callaghan (DDG-994), Scott (DDG-995), and Chandler (DDG-996)— combine the quiet, effective ASW plat­form of the Spruance and the antiair warfare (AAW) capability of the Virginia-class nuclear cruiser. The new guided-missile destroyers are fitted out quite nicely to meet the present threat, and in company with the Aegis command and control capability, will be able to help meet the AAW threat for the next two decades.

If the DDG-993 is such a capable platform, why then hasn’t the U. S. Navy requested them in the five-year shipbuilding plan? The answers are simple: affordability and priority. Ship­building costs have at least kept pace with or have exceeded the nation’s in­flationary rate for a number of reasons, including new environmental safety standards. Concerning priority, a general-purpose destroyer must com­pete for procurement funds with such essential and highly visible programs as Trident submarines, nuclear attack submarines, carrier construction (or service life extension of our older car­riers), amphibious ships (to preclude block obsolescence of our entire am­phibious force by 2000), and in par­ticular, other battle group-capable ships. In an effort to maintain a bal­anced Navy in the face of constrained budgets, difficult decisions regarding priorities and how to best spend the limited dollars available require a care­fully composed plan.

The Navy establishes these priorities and then defends them through the critical review of the De­partment of Defense, Office of Man­agement and Budget, the White House, and finally, four congressional committees before a plan is authorized and funded. The closest scrutiny is provided at each level of review. That the Navy would rather buy more ships is undeniable; but can it afford more? And if the Navy could, would general- purpose destroyers necessarily head the list of add-ons?

But opportunism is another matter- When Iran reordered its national priorities, after Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s departure, the U. S. Navy was given the opportunity to purchase ships already under construction at a most significant savings. Iran had placed its order for the Litton de­stroyers in 1973, and the contracts were in 1973 prices. To order these same ships today would cost over half again as much and they would not be delivered until at least 1983 or 1984- The ships are now at various stages of construction, with the lead ship more than 60% complete and the fourth ship about 20% complete. Al* four ships will be delivered in 1981 -

⁰ cancel the Iranian contract, which ^Was negotiated by the U. S. Navy for Iran, would have produced a substan- ^tlal U. S. Navy loss with no material gain whatsoever. The authorization ^and appropriation of funds to buy d’ese ships are a testimonial to the fact that the system can react to proper stimulus when required.

What has the Navy now acquired? J das gotten Spruance hulls powered y General Electric gas turbine ^engines capable of producing 80,000 ^s aft horsepower which drive them at ^sPeeds in excess of 30 knots. These ^s *Ps are armed with two 5-inch/54 ^Cahber deck guns; port and starboard triple tube Mk-32 torpedo launchers; Harpoon surface-to-surface missile launchers; Phalanx close-in weapon system for last-ditch defense against incoming antiship missiles; and Mk-26 missile launchers fore and aft, each capable of firing surface-to-air or antisubmarine ASROC weapons. The ships are equipped with the Mk-53 long-range, low-frequency sonar, SPS-48 air search radar, and other ap­propriate search and weapon control radars, and will be capable of carrying two LAMPS I or III ASW helicopters. The DDG-993S will have the latest Model IV Navy Tactical Data System installed, which, when converted from

Persian specifications, will interface with other Navy AAW and ASW ships.

-H>©

fo°o~| --------

Only minor modifications are re­quired to convert these ships to American standards. Persian crews were relatively top heavy in rank, and consequently, fewer officer and chief petty officer bunks will be installed than the original plans called for. Of­ficer bunkrooms will be replaced by two-man staterooms. Persian type­writers and certain electronic equip­ment will be replaced by American equipment. Satellite communications equipment and updated electronic warfare equipment will also be in­stalled.

The DDG-993’s Tartar D system is the most capable AAW system pres­ently in the fleet. It is a fully digitalized, solid state system, with reaction and target designation times exceeded only by the Aegis system which will soon join the fleet. The Tartar D system will be able to re­spond fully to tasking by Aegis ships in company, and so will contribute a most potent, although relatively short-range AAW area defense capabil­ity to the battle group. Spruance-class ships will provide the concentrated ASW capability to the battle group. Aegis will perform long-range, anti­jam AAW defense as well as command and control for the battle group. And DDG-993S will join the AAW cruisers and updated Charles F. Adams-class DDGs in providing the area AAW de­fense, in addition to contributing an antisubmarine warfare capability equal to the Spruances’.

One of the more significant features of the DDG-993S is their commonality with other ships being introduced into the fleet. The Kidd class is basically the Spruance class with a much greater AAW capability. The four gas turbine engines provide much needed redun­dancy and are the same as those in the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, the Spruance class, and the Aegis cruiser.

All four DDG-993 destroyers are named for U. S. Navy flag officers who perished in action on the bridges of their fighting ships during World War II:

Kidd (DDG-993) for the late Rear Ad­miral Isaac Campbell Kidd, U. S. Navy (1884-1941), who died on the signal bridge of the Arizona (BB-39) during the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.

Callaghan (DDG-994) for the late Rear Admiral Daniel Judson Callaghan, U. S. Navy (1890-1942), who was killed on the bridge of the San Fran­cisco (CA-38) during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on the nights of 12-13 November 1942.

Scott (DDG-995) for the late Rear Ad­miral Norman Scott, U. S. Navy (1889-1942), who perished on the bridge of the Atlanta (CL-51) as she went down in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.

Chandler (DDG-996) for Rear Admiral Theodore Edson Chandler, U. S.

Navy (1894-1945), who succumbed to battle injuries the day following a suicide bomber hit on the flag bridge of the Louisville (CA-28) in Lingayen Gulf, Philippine Islands, on 6 January

1945.

Although these four ships do not drastically alter a long-range ship­building plan, they do add numbers to a plan that cannot in itself sustain present force levels in the face of an increasing threat. The opportunity to procure additional ships, at bargain rates, occurs rarely. The United States is showing extraordinary flexibility in the bureaucratic process, during peacetime, to take advantage of this remarkable opportunity.

Captain Osborne is Head d

tthe Surface Warfare Program⁵ and Budget Branch on the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for SurfaC^e Warfare. His duties entail ensuring the proper prioritize tion of funding of surface warfare programs to ensure continuation of the strongest possible surface Navy within existing fiscal constraints-

An Alternative to Rotating Radars for Aircraft Carriers

By Vice Admiral Gerald E. (Jerry) Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired), and Roy J. Biondi

In late 1941, the members of the U. S. Naval Academy Class of 1942 were preparing for accelerated gradua­tion, scheduled for 19 December. Be­cause the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor sank many of the ships to which the prospective ensigns had been assigned, some of these new offi­cers found themselves at the Mas­sachusetts Institute of Technology, studying a new technique called radar. It was the first time any of them had heard the term.

As the war progressed and the fleet struggled to exploit this new technol­ogy, two significant problems emerged. The first was the difficulty in shifting control from radars which could detect targets at good distances (detection or search radars) to radars that could determine range and bear­ing with more precise accuracy (fire control or track radars). The second problem was the difficulty in handling multiple targets. As the number of targets and their speed increased, combat information centers became overburdened with raw data. The problem was particularly acute for air­craft carriers, which were the main targets of the enemy and in which more radar systems were installed than in any other type.

Despite the many advances since that time in radar and in the data- handling systems associated with combat information, the World War II problems are still with us. And the information problem has been com­plicated by more high-speed tar­gets, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). These advances in threat weapon technology must be offset by further advances in shipboard radars- This is especially true for the carrier radars, because of the many facets of carrier operations:

►  Battle Management: The embarked commander must make many deci­sions rapidly while encountering friendly and hostile aircraft and mis­siles in a heavy ECM environment.

►  Tactical Operations: Targets must be designated and interceptors vectored to counter them.

►  Carrier Self-Defense: Carrier weapons must be assigned to targets which are able to penetrate the battle group⁵ outer defenses.

►  Flight Operations: Air operation⁵ must receive positive support under all ECM and weather conditions.

Although many naval analysts argue that the days of the aircraft carrier are

will

eral

types. The United States cannot

port

Q^Uarar>tee security of the Indian

ect_IVe

in performing these missions

limited, a review of U. S. overseas ^,r>terests and how the United States

protect those interests shows the

^Carner as a system that must be with ^Us for a long time. Our ever-increas- ^lng requirement to import oil and other natural resources makes it evi- ^ent that we must keep the sea lanes ^stcure. Our ever-decreasing number of overseas shore bases and the increasing teat to free passage over the waters ⁰ world argue for the develop- otent of sea-based air platforms of sev­^rely on the "Forward Bare Base” con­^CePt, which requires constructed and Retire airfields scattered throughout ^e world, without aircraft or resident ^opport personnel. Moreover, the cost the airfields constructed by the ⁿ'ted States and left behind in Viet- ^narn far exceeded the cost of maintain- ^ln8 the carriers and other ships on sta- ^tl0n during that struggle.

^ Further, a most significant feature

⁰     future sea-based warfare is that it Probably will not be so much naval

^rces pitted against naval forces, but involve naval forces against land- ^^ased air. As the U.S.S.R. continues ^expand its overseas base structure ^atl^ to develop and deploy more Sophisticated air weapons, such as the ^ackfire" bomber with air-to-surface ^Jissiles, the requirement for the ' S. Navy to defend against the

^{1       n}o-based air threat receives high Pfority.

th^^{eCaUSC t}^^le ^^{est s neec}^ f°^r °il>

k ^e ^ⁿ^*an Ocean/Persian Gulf area has ^ec°me a focal point for future con- ^^ern- The U. S. Middle East Force has strengthened, and calls for a th Fleet increase in intensity. The ^ePloyment of a U. S. carrier in that to^ ^°^{Ses a} highly significant threat ^t^^le Soviets. In addition, there is no _a.^6tter system than sea-based tactical ^to show military and political sup­^t0 our friends in the area and to

^c^an/p_ersj_an G_uif _sea lanes, ho carrier, however, cannot be ef-

^{ess s}he is capable of doing battle. ^arrier combat readiness demands ^ ^ateness of the changing military _t^^feat and constant effort to match ^at threat with the latest technology.

The defense of the fleet and battle group management place a premium on sensors that provide rapid and ac­curate detection of a threat in all environmental conditions. Because of equipment limitations, paramount of which is a suitable radar, considerable controversy has evolved regarding the methods by which the officer in tacti­cal command exercises his authority. Arguments for decentralized or cen­tralized control cannot be satisfactorily answered unless equipment and proce­dures are improved and the primary radar performs the functions of detect­ing and tracking targets at sufficient ranges to provide the time for the bat­tle group commander to react. "Les­sons learned” from fleet exercises re­garding our force defense concepts will have to be relearned in the future un­less the underlying causes of the prob­lems are corrected. In addition, devel­opments in threat technology are out­stepping the capabilities of existing shipboard radar systems.

The combat system consists of bat­tle management capabilities which in­clude sensor (radar, identification friend or foe, electronic warfare, elec­tronic support measures) integration, weapons control, and tactical opera­tions. Radar performance is important to each of these areas. The typical car­rier topside configuration includes a large number of electronic systems which introduce problems of mutual electromagnetic interference, data coordination, and radar-to-radar target handover.

During the electronic and structural topside design process, radars must compete with one another and with other ship functions for a location af­fording the highest unobscured view in all directions. Because antenna loca­tion is an iterative process, com­promises are made in coverage and radiation patterns. The positioning of rotating antennas is especially difficult because whole sectors of coverage may be blocked from sensor view by the mast, island structure, or other radars. The already excessive level of ECM vulnerability associated with present- day radars is further aggravated by radiation pattern distortion caused by these structures. In particular, these distortions greatly increase the radars’

susceptibility to standoff jammers.

Many of today’s shipboard radars were not originally designed for auto­matic target detection and tracking. The after-the-fact addition of auto­mated detection and tracking capabilities and adaptive features is only partially effective, and still re­sults in a requirement for a large number of operator and maintenance support personnel for each radar sys­tem. All of these considerations have led to a recognized need to reduce the number of radars by using multipur­pose radar systems.

The Navy has embarked on a pro­gram of surface fleet improvements which embrace combat system im­provements, including updating radars with automatic detection and tracking (ADT) capabilities. However, one must question whether these im­provements are going to eliminate ECM vulnerability and electromagnetic interference problems, solve the pro­liferation of radar systems, and correct current deficiencies in reliability, maintainability, and resistance to bat­tle damage. Because these im­provements are on individual pieces of equipment, rather than an integration of the whole combat system, the bat­tle manager may well be without adequate data to permit optimum use of his defensive assets. In fact, the bat­tle manager may not be much better served than he would have been with early post-World War 11 detection and data handling processes.

To ensure consistency with the other proposed major combat system enhancements, it is appropriate for the Navy to examine the inventory of pro­duction radars and to select a system of radars which will optimize radar ef­fectiveness. A recent Naval Sea Sys­tems Command study examined this problem and configured a radar system for carriers which replaces several of today’s rotating radars with a fixed phased-array radar. An integrated radar and control system can provide significant capability enhancements while eliminating most of the undesir­able side effects which are inherent in today’s multitude of rotating radars on board ship.

The precedent for this approach has already been set. As early as the late

Table 1 Conventional and SPY-l Radar Suite Comparison

Function                                              SPY-l Combat System Role

1950s and early 1960s, the Navy demonstrated a willingness to adopt new designs by the introduction of the AN/SPS-32 and -33 radars in the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and USS Long Beach (CGN-9). These early fixed-array radars were somewhat in advance of the state of the art and were introduced into the fleet without thorough test and evalu­ation. Nevertheless, they demon­strated superior capabilities in certain areas (e.g., reduction in mechanical maintenance) over rotating systems.

Battle Management: Includes deci­sion-making in a heavy ECM envi­ronment, without relying on data links and with the airspace contain­ing a confused mixture of friendly and hostile aircraft and missiles.

Tactical Operations: Includes com­mand and control, airborne target detection, identification, and track­ing, aircraft vectoring, and threat evaluation/target designation/weapon selection.

Carrier Self-Defense: Includes the utilization of the carrier’s self-defense assets.

Flight Operations: Includes aircraft launch/recovery, waveoff/bolter con­trol rendezvous, marshalling, and en-route control.

The value of the systems was ques­tionable because these radars were lim­ited to a single function (air search). Also, because they were limited to only two ships, the Navy encountered those difficulties in long-term train­ing, logistics support, and mainte­nance which would be expected with two-of-a-kind systems. In the early 1970s, the Navy added engineering modifications to the SPS-33 on the Long Beach (making it an SPS-331V]) to im­prove “performance,” which further

SPY-l provides the battle manager with accurate, reliable, unambigu­ous, and ECM-resistant data on targets in a hemisphere about the carrier, permitting optimum use of defensive assets.

SPY-l supports all tactical operations and would enable three dimensional (3D) vectoring of interceptors and ac­curate 3D designation of targets to the individual interceptor fire con­trol systems.

SPY-l would provide rapid accurate detection and tracking of leakers, pop-ups, and other hostiles, en­abling quick-reaction designation of carrier weapons.

SPY-l would provide control of friendly aircraft, data for collision avoidance, and support all air opera­tions except landing.

complicated the logistics support, maintenance, and training problems. These problems ultimately led to the decision to replace those radars.

Now, the Navy has another, and better, opportunity to take advantage of the superior characteristics of multi-function fixed-array radars. This opportunity is made possible by the Aegis program, which provides a tan­gible, tested, integrated, in-produc­tion phased-array radar which is able to perform air search and long-range tracking, and enhance marshalling control, accurate air intercept control, short-range self-defense, quick-reac­tion identification correlation, and battle management. This phased-array radar system has been designed, de­veloped, and tested for the Aegis DDG-47 program, and has been ver­ified through five years of Navy sea trials on board the USS Norton Sound (AVM-1). In addition, it is continu­ously being tested and demonstrated at a Navy Combat System Engineering Development Site. This radar provides all the advantages of an established logistics support, maintenance, and training support program.*

The AN/SPY-1A radar system is a computer-managed, search-while- track, digital radar system providing hemispheric coverage under console- operator supervision. In addition to i^tS role as a surveillance radar, the AN I SPY-l A also acts as the fire control radar for the entire DDG-47 combat system. For this reason, it is equiva­lent to hundreds of tracking radars sharing common physical radar re­sources. An interactive man-machin^e interface capability exists whereby th^e radar parameters may be adjusted to the changing operational environ­ment.

In the past, a complex system °> this kind would have been considered to be very difficult to maintain. Th^e AN/SPY-lA, however, features built-*¹¹ automatic fault detection and isola­tion, multiple data channels, and re­dundancy to ensure a high degree ^ot system availability. These feature* were designed into the radar from *^tS

*For background information on Aegis ‘‘DDG-47: Aegis on Its Way to Sea” (Janu*^ 1979 Proceedings, pp. 101-105).

even

all

th ^re^^{:UfS can} accomplished while _o^.^{e ra}tiar is operating by replacement ^a computer-identified faulty mod- b K ^*^nce AN/SPY-ia must also be ca­^e of operation in a severe coun- ttteasures environment, it is ^ecluipped with a much more com- ^re ensive anti-ECM capability than ⁿy other shipboard radar.

. ^he typical carrier radar suite con-

^‘^sts of: AN/SPS-48C, AN/SPS-49, AN/ SPS-₆₅₎

tadars

palysis shown in the Naval Sea Sys to ^S ^^ornmand report, it is possible ^aPply the SPY-1 to perform simulta- _and^Us‘y the typical carrier air-control r- , ^COrr>bat-operation function identi­^fied> Table 2.

y Performed for the Naval Sea Sys- ' Command. This report also illus- b ^s the feasibility of such a ship- (se_e ,^lnstallation, including physical _tj_o^e figure 1), electrical, and func- ^a Warfare considerations.

B,

new

th

^Very inception, in response to system pliability requirements demanded of * ^e AN/SPY-ia by the Aegis Weapon ystem. These requirements are far ^rTl0re stringent than those required of j*ⁿy ^system of comparable capability, fcause the AN/SPY- 1A is the only ^{fa ar} 'ⁿ the DDG-47 to support the ^Weapon system. As a result, almost no ^Slngle part failure or group of failures ^Wl 1 cause total system failure. In ^Sorr>e cases, a single failure has no de­ferable effect on performance, if it is ^repaired before a second similar fail­^Ure- In other cases, a failure may cause ttunor degradation, often undetectable to sensitive instruments. Nearly

AN/SPN-43A,

del,

as shown in Table 1. From the

carr °^{St c}^^e characteristics of the ^ler version of SPY-1 are inherent in tad ^^£S'^ⁿ the basic Aegis SPY-1A _tj ^r' A few system changes to op- _w '^2e the Aegis SPY-1A for the carrier d involve minor modifications, to ^1I|^{nated at} approximately 2% of the Pin ^ecl^u'P^ment and 10% of the com- _stud^r Program, as cited in a recent

^tem.

^ecause the installation impact for a ship will be considerably less than _Ca ^lrnpact for retrofitting an existing ^r> the prime candidate for the first carrier application of SPY-1 is clearly the new carrier included in the fiscal year 1980 Defense Appropriations Act.

Continued free use of the sea lanes by the United States and protection of global national interests may well de­pend on the effectiveness of the air­craft carrier as a principal tactical and strategic weapon system. If the carrier is to meet this challenge, she must be equipped with the best equipment technology can provide. This particu­larly applies to a carrier’s radars, which are critical to the ship’s success­ful performance of wartime missions. The tested and proven AN/SPY-1A phased-array radar provides an alterna­tive to rotating radars and offers the chance to upgrade the carrier’s radar suite by orders of magnitude, produc­ing a basis for tactical improvements that can meet the threats of the next several decades.

Mr. Biondi is presently the ^             Head of the Combat Support

iWB                  Systems Integration Branch at

-jljJp                 Naval Sea Systems Command.

He recently directed and com- ^ ,®P   pleted a study which examined

If                      carrier applications for phased

array radars. He was Radar Branch Head NAV- SEC, Hyattsville, Md., and was instrumental in the development of shipboard radars such as the AN/SPS-48(V) and AN/SPS-49.

^Oc

Surface Warships: The Bigger the Better

By Commander Timothy J. Keen, U. S. Navy (Retired)

Since the Israeli destroyer Eilath was sunk by “Styx” missiles in Octo­ber 1967, the U. S. Navy has ini­tiated a number of programs aimed at countering the antiship cruise missile threat. Most of the programs have concentrated on intercepting ap­proaching cruise missiles. The Navy’s “defense in depth” is built around long-range interceptors which are ex­pected to destroy a significant number of the attacking enemy’s aircraft or missiles; relatively long-range antiair missiles, fired from defending surface ships, are expected to intercept another share of approaching cruise missiles; medium-range antiair mis­siles will likewise do their part; and, finally, the various close-in defense systems are to finish off any stragglers.

There are several problems with this scheme. First, it is much easier to produce, field, and fire an antiship cruise missile than it is to intercept one. The missiles are hard to hit, rela­tively inexpensive, producible in sub­stantial numbers, and capable of being launched from almost any type of plat­form. In contrast, weapon systems de­signed to intercept such missiles are more complex, difficult to deploy if the enemy uses surprise measures, and do not have a high probability of suc­cess on a missile-to-missile basis.

Another problem is that nothing short of 100% intercept effectiveness can be accepted. If the antiship cruise missile functions, it is very likely to hit its target. For this reason, no “leakage" in the defense is tolerable.

Although sophisticated, the anti­ship cruise missile technology is widely available. Missiles are being produced by many countries, and pro­ducer nations are selling the weapons to nations which cannot produce them. In its simplest application, one needs only to aim a missile in the de­sired direction and push a button. The U. S. Navy must either cope with this threat or find an alternative to a sur­face ship navy. The latter option is not acceptable because of our dependence on the sea lanes of communication. We have no choice but to neutralize

the antiship missile threat.

Since we must assume that a large number of weapons can be in the sky in a given attack and that some pene­tration through the best of conven­tional defenses will occur, we should evaluate approaches to reduce the problem.

Offensive Capability: Using the “strong offense is the best defense” philosophy, and making a maximum effort to get to the enemy before he gets to us, we greatly enlarge our capability to strike early at his re­sources used to support an antiship cruise missile attack against our fleet. If successful, we reduce those forces so as to make the task of countering the enemy’s launchable threat manage­able. Because the success of this ap­proach cannot be assured, other meas­ures must also be developed and ex­ploited.

Defensive Weaponry: If we could create surveillance and weapon systems of such capability as to make our perimeters impenetrable, the result would be the ultimate level of “de­fense in depth.” Unfortunately, the perfect defensive system cannot be achieved if for no other reason than evolving technology is constantly ad­vancing the capabilities of antiship weapons.

Tactics: One option always open to a naval commander is the exercise of such tactics as he deems appropriate to accomplish his assigned mission while minimizing the danger to his own force. It is possible that where his own systems capabilities are superb, and the enemy weapon assets are less than the best, the mission may be per­formed with acceptable casualties. Against a well-equipped enemy, how­ever, it is likely that the damage to be sustained would reach intolerable levels before the commander could ef­fectively carry out his mission.

Toughness: Another parameter in having our surface navy survive anti­ship cruise missiles is increased toughness. This is the “dreadnought” concept. A ship is so designed that she can sustain a reasonable number of

cruise missile hits and be tough enough to continue to perform. This is an old naval philosophy with many historic examples. Unfortunately, naval mission accomplishment no"’ depends heavily on delicate topside equipment. Modern warships have forests of antennas and many of these are of extremely intricate design, hardly amenable to armoring. It is not apparent that the electronic systems essential to modern naval warfare can be toughened to the degree required.

Redundancy: Modern electronic

components and new super-small, super-capable computers, combined with the extraordinary capabilities of electro-optical data transmission, can allow us to have far more system re' dundancy than has been practical in the past. A decision must be made, however, to use the new technology to build redundancy rather than to ex­pand systems capability. If such a phi­losophy were pursued, the operators would reject new capabilities in favor of second channels or fallback dupli­cates of the original features. They would insist that the attributes of neW technology be exploited to make ship⁵ more reliable and more able to take punishment than they are now.

Bigness: All of the foregoing avenues for improved ship survivability are recognized and do fit within the tradi­tional goals of warship design and construction. A completely untradi­tional option, which offers the oppor­tunity for exploitation of most of the foregoing options, is simply to in­crease the physical dimensions of sur­face warships without expanding their t functional missions.

The essence of using bigness as an avenue to increased survivability is to make the ship extremely large in phys­ical proportions while holding do"’⁰ the total equipment list for the ship to that which would be suitable for ³ much smaller ship by traditional arm­ing standards. For example, the com­bat equipment of a guided-missile de­stroyer might be placed in a tanker hull sized for 100,000 deadweight tons (DWTs).

of ^*^{S ma}^ ^souncl I'kc a wasteful way ° ^Us'ⁿS a ship and an extremely costly ^{Way t0} P^ut to sea a relatively modest ^c°rnbat system. However, it is not ex- 2'^vely expensive because the hull it- ^need not dominate the cost of a ^rship. fhe weight of steel in er-type ships is only about 20% of _t ^{tlr DWT} capacity. Twenty thousand ,^{<)ns st}eel can be transformed into a len               ship ^over 1,000 feet in

^ength; if the design is kept extremely . P^Ie with few curves, mostly square junctions, very few bulkhead penetra- ^^ns’ ^an<^ *^^ent*^ca^ cross-section detail . ^rnost of its length, the construc- ^{n cost} per ton can be very low. ^.^rection of steel into a floating plat- is a relatively straightforward J'ocess. Two hundred thousand-DWT ^<n'ers are built for much less than ^$1°0 million.

Bigness can lead to survivability primarily because the effective damage radius of a conventional warhead is limited. The largest warhead expected to be encountered by way of an anti­ship cruise missile is about 2,000 pounds. The damage radius of a con­ventional high-explosive warhead falls off by an inverse cube power, and against conventionally constructed ships, it might be considered to be on the order of 100 feet for severe damage. If a ship is 1,000 feet long and her weapon system elements are distrib­uted evenly in heavily armored pock­ets with “empty” spaces in between, it is not likely that a single warhead could demolish more than one element of the weapon system. If the concept is carried further to provide uninter­ruptible power for the various seg­ments of the weapon system—and if some of the vast load capacity of the ship is used for armor (probably in the form of concrete or water)—then the damage radius effectiveness of a 2,000-pound warhead can be even further diminished.

What is proposed is a very large hull, rigged with whatever flotation scheme might be appropriate to keep it from sinking even though damaged in many places. The Navy can proba­bly have an unsinkable and effective fighting platform for less money than is currently spent on a conventional missile destroyer. Further, such ships could be built to have the weapon sys­tem modules completely replaceable with a single crane lift because of the design flexibility allowed by a large platform with low equipment density.

A counter argument to this ap­proach is the problem of accommodat­ing these ships in naval shipyards and in naval ports. The solution lies in having these superships remain at sea most of their lives. The Navy would take advantage of technology and facilities developed for the very large crude oil carriers (VLCCs) to keep the bottoms reasonably clean and to ac­complish necessary maintenance on propulsion plants. We would have to abandon the practice of having naval ships enter port for prolonged periods of upkeep and so forth. We might even adopt the approach developed for the fleet ballistic missile submarine force with "blue and gold” crews. The crews could be rotated by helicopters or other means to keep the ships at sea. Ultimately, the Navy might do with fewer ships since only a fraction would ever be in port.

If the Navy seriously approached the idea of using very large hulls for moderate capability combat systems, the same weapons packaging technol­ogy could be applied to wartime mobilization of merchant ships, mak-

ing use of VLCCs and various types of container carriers. Serious attention to the use of modular weapons with in­dependent sensor systems and uninter­ruptible power supplies could lead to modules that could easily be placed on board a tanker or a containership and provide a unit of defense on that par­ticular ship.

One of the vexing design conflicts in warships is the demand for in­creased habitability which must be traded off against combat capability. If the Navy should go the route of the very large combat ship, habitability would vanish as a problem. Theaters, gymnasiums, swimming pools, bas­ketball courts—all could be accom­modated in the great volume of the ship. Accommodations for male and female crew members could also be handled with ease, with each person having a private room and bath if necessary. Even family quarters could be considered.

The very large combat ship compli­cates the enemy’s requirement for long-range surveillance and targeting. The shooter must know, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, ex­actly what he is shooting at. He has to classify as well as locate his targets. Using radar and sonar, an observer can gain information on physical size, propulsion characteristics, and possi­bly other features to aid in distin­guishing ships by type. If we should move in the direction of a one-size- ship navy—and that size was compa­rable to the VLCC fleet—we would surely compound the enemy's target­ing problem. At least we would not aid the enemy in sorting the combat ships from the carriers and cargo ships. He would have to come closer to select his target, and that would be to the defender’s advantage.

While the supership approach un­doubtedly has its problems, this is one solution to the survivability dilemma. Since we will never have a perfect de­fense or offense, we must expect our ships to be hit by missiles. So, if we work from the givens of a few hits, none greater than 2,000 pounds, we can move in the direction of a plat­form so large and tough that she can­not be totally destroyed by such hits and will probably survive to carry out her mission. The very size of the ship may allow her to carry sufficient mate­rials to repair herself. Evolution of the concept would lead to distributed propulsion and steering systems, use­fully sized hull-mounted acoustic ar­rays, and whatever else becomes prac­tical because of a very large hull.

We would have such ships being re­supplied by long-range helicopters, as well as conventional replenishment ships, perhaps operating STOL aircraft for combat and logistics purposes, and possibly moving cargo if required. I⁽ would surely be a new kind of Navy-

0 Commissioned at the \ROT-

in 1946, Commander completed his last sea tour as > missile officer. This was fol­lowed by three years as Special Technical Assistant to the D¹" rector of the Surface Missile Systems Project Since his retirement from active duty in 19^5- Commander Keen has continued to be as­sociated with Navy research and developmen¹ through employment with a major Navy con­tractor.

Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles _

By Lieutenant Colonel William D. Siuru, Jr., U. S. Air Force

The famed McCann Rescue Chamber, developed in the late 1920s, was used in 1939 to save 33 of the 63-man crew of the submarine USS Squalus (SS-192) as she lay cn the bot­tom of the ocean near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Although a major innovation for its day, it was limited to depths of 850 feet and eight sur­vivors. Yet the McCann chamber was the Navy’s only fully operational res­cue system into the 1970s.

With the advent of the nuclear submarine and the fleet ballistic mis­sile submarine which can operate under water for long periods of time and at great depths, it became neces­sary to have a rescue craft that could perform its lifesaving role without being tied to a surface vessel. The McCann diving bell had to be reeled down from a rescue ship on the surface to the hatch of a disabled submarine

which had to be located directly below.

Immediately after the tragic loss of the USS Thresher (SSN-593) in 1963, the Navy formed a special Deep Sub­mergence Systems Review Group to examine the capabilities it had to op­erate well below the surface of the sea. The group’s findings showed some­thing better than the McCann diving bell was needed. The review group also noted that the Navy needed the capability to find and recover large and small objects from the ocean’s floor and that more information was needed on man’s ability to live and work on the bottom of the ocean. In June 1964, the Navy established the Deep Submergence System Project which, by 1966, reported directly to the Chief of Naval Material.

By 1966, the technology of deep submergence craft had progressed to the point that the building of a deep submergence rescue vehicle (DSRV) wa⁵ quite feasible.

Construction on the first DSRV was started in June 1966 by the Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMS⁽-) which won out over two competitor⁵ to build a DSRV. This first craft, chris­tened the Mystic, was launched ¹¹¹ January 1970. About a year later- DSRV-2, named Avalon, was launched- The next few years were spent testing the craft, developing rescue tech­niques, and training crews. Mean­while, during this shakedown period both submersibles could have be^ used for rescues. Fortunately, the) never had to be called upon. In Ia^rt- 1977, the Mystic and Avalon official!) joined the U. S. Navy as operation vessels.

The problem of rescue beneath th^e sea is very challenging for not ord) must the rescue craft be able to with­

.^tand the great external pressures, but

ab|^{fnUSt a}*^{so                              t0} locate the dis-

^ed sub, actually mate with her, and

diff ^trans^^{er f}^^{e crew}- This is most ¹ !cult because the underseas rescue ta t has to contend with unpredicta- .^{e sur}8^es in underwater currents and ^almost zero visibility.

The DSRV’s crew compartment is a _t^^essur*^2e<J vessel that can withstand ^tremendous pressures experienced ^at depths of up to 5,000 feet—the ^ximum depth at which the DSRV °P^erate. This pressure vessel is _s ^{3 e U}P of three interconnected,

Jen-and-one-half-foot diameter

^P eres. The two DSRV operators con- jj° craft from the forward sphere. J ^t0 24 rescuees as well as the other ⁰ DSRV crew members ride in the _ca'ddle and aft spheres. While the _s*f^su^^es are normally kept at atmo- , ^er*^c pressure, the mid and aft _at ^eres can be pressurized up to five jh^^Phcrc'⁵ ro prevent the bends if • ^{6 res}cued men had already been sub- _w, .| ^t0 higher than normal pressures ' ^e rrapped in the disabled sub. ca ^1Ca^ P^ersonnel and supplies can be th ^r,e<^ *^{n tbe DSRV} d" rhe condition of ^fc.^SUrviv°^rs warrants them. _s , ^ttached to the mid sphere is a half _ac ^Cre d^r protrudes downward. The rhis * ^Crew transfer is made through tit] ^dorne~hke device, appropriately _Sp^^{e c}h^e mating skirt. The three res as well as the mating skirt are j_Q^{a e} HY-I40, a very high-strength Sa^ ^We’8ht alloy steel. A margin of desi ^V °^{f 5}°^% is incorporated into the _Ca^SlSn; This means the pressure vessel pj^{1 w}*rhstand pressures up to 3,300 _Vtr^Unds P^er square inch. Weight was a y important design factor since the

> had

to be transportable by air.

The rr c ■                     -                 '

raft weighs 70,000 pounds when

^ready for

Th

air travel.

tiad '^e °^{Utside hul1 the DSRV is} hb ^{6 one}~^t!^uartcr inch laminated _tita^Cr8^lass panels reinforced by 0Ute'^{Urn and a}*^urn'^nurn frames. This 8-f ^{f S}^'ⁿ 8'^ves the 50-foot long, sh ^{0t dlarne}rer craft a streamlined the ^{6 t}^^{lat a}il°^ws it to glide through '^Vater. Much of the space between i_s °^uter hull and the pressure spheres

the

fh ^iiied with almost four tons of L°^ana'like ^bu°yancy.

material to improve

VARIABLE BALLAST TANKS TRANSFER TANK TRIM TANK -SONAR DOME

FIND

THRUSTER DUCTS

BATTERY BANK BALLAST TANK TOROIDAL TANK

A conventional stern propeller is used for cruising and high-speed (4.5 knots) travel. A movable shroud is placed around the aft propeller and is used for steering.

To provide a precise maneuvering capability for underwater searching and docking with a disabled sub­marine, the DSRV has four ducted thrusters. These are smaller propellers located in tubes that go completely through the outer hull. Two are lo­cated in the aft section and two in the forward section. One forward thruster provides thrust in a vertical direction and the other thrusts horizontally; and the same arrangement exists with the aft thrusters. Thus the DSRV can move up-down, forward-backward, and pitch and yaw. Roll control is pro­vided by a trim tank that holds mer­cury and is located in the hull of the craft. The DSRV can even hover in the water just like a helicopter can hover in the sky. The propulsion system’s propellers are driven by electric motors that get their power from bat­teries.

Because underwater navigation and detection is such a difficult job, the DSRV has sophisticated electronic gear. The DSRV has more than a half dozen different sonar systems with which to detect objects and obstacles ahead, to the sides, or below the craft as well as to locate the exact location of the dis­abled submarine’s hatch. These sonars also are used to determine the craft’s precise altitude above the ocean’s floor and beneath the surface, and can pre­

cisely measure the DSRV’s movement. A special directional listening hydro­phone allows the DSRV to home in on sounds from the disabled submarine or from the ships that serve as the DSRV’s tenders.

There are also about a half dozen television cameras located outside the hull. Several viewports are located in the forward and midship pressure spheres. Spot and strobe lights are used for illumination.

The brain of the rescue submarine is the integrated control and display system (ICAD). The ICAD receives in­formation from the sonars, a miniature inertial guidance system, and other sensors and translates it into data that are displayed on the dials, gauges, and screens in front of the DSRV’s pilots. In turn, the ICAD takes the crew’s commands and translates them into movement of the vehicle in the desired direction. The ICAD also monitors the life support and other critical systems on board the DSRV and gives the pilots a warning if there is a problem or mal­function.

As soon as the message that a sub is in trouble is received by Submarine Development Group One based in San Diego, the crew of either the Mystic or Avalon launches into action. In many cases, this means loading the DSRV onto a U. S. Air Force C-141 transport and flying to an airfield nearest the underwater disaster. Then the rescue craft is trucked to a nearby port using a special trailer that is flown in on another C-141 Starlifter. A third C-141

•>o_c

carries a mobile support van and other equipment as well as the DSRV’s crew. [Note: all of this could be carried in a C-5A Galaxy and a single C-141.]

Once at the port, the DSRV is loaded on board either a catamaran- based submarine rescue ship or a nu­clear submarine which will carry it to a location near the stricken sub. (The Navy has two Pigeon-class submarine rescue ships. These catamaran-type ships can carry and support the two DSRVs and can serve as command posts during rescue operations. The catama­ran design provides a large deck area and a stable platform, and the DSRV can be raised and lowered between the twin hulls. Currently, the Navy has 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines with special modifications to serve as the mother ships for the DSRVs durinf rescue operations. An additional '' submarines will be equipped to p^et' form in this role. Within 24 to $ hours of the time the distress messag^e is received, a DSRV can be in actio*¹ and the rescue under way.)

Once launched, the DSRV makes i^tS way to the disabled sub. When ^l<t close proximity, a remote-control^¹¹ manipulator can be used to clear 4^e' bris and cut any cables that may o^£ obstructing the disabled submarine⁵ escape hatch. Then the DSRV startsⁱ slow descent toward the submarine ^s° that the mating skirt fits over the e^s cape hatch. Once over the hatcb’ water is pumped out of the skirt ⁵¹ that the hatches can be opened and tl*¹ rescuees can climb on board the DSP^' To maintain a constant buoyancy dition, the DSRV pumps water into disabled sub equal in amount to ^ total weight of the rescued men.

Prior to opening the rescue hat^

^{1 e DSRV}’s crew can pierce the hull of ^e submarine with a special explosive stud gun in order to sample the at- ^m°^sPhere inside. If the crew inside has

fter 24 men are on board the the hatch is closed and the ^v is detached to start the return ’P back to the mother sub or rescue P- After the rescuees are transferred safety, the DSRV is readied for a re­

'jot been contacted, it might be ^angerous to open the hatch because ^{r e} sub may be filled with high tem­perature, high pressure, or even toxic gases. The DSRV is able to complete a rescue even if the disabled sub has ?^{rae t0} rest at angles of up to 45° ^r°rn the horizontal.

turn trip if there are still more men to save. (For example, it would take seven trips and about 17 hours to res­cue the entire 150-man complement of a Polaris or Poseidon submarine.) While the rescuees are being dis­charged from the DSRV, its batteries are recharged and life support and bal­last systems are replenished. The DSRV’s life support system can sustain the four-man crew for about 96 hours, and with the addition of the 24 res­cuees, it is good for up to 13 hours.

One of the DSRVs is always on alert. The other is either undergoing main­tenance or being used for lower prior­ity missions. These latter missions in­clude DSRV crew training, search and recovery of lost objects, and research. Hopefully, the DSRV will never be used for its primary mission, but it is ready if the need should ever arise.

■ Lieutenant Colonel William A D. Siuru, Jr., is currently the ■1 Chief Scientist at the Frank ].

[ v wi tfnj i                                              ^J

\ r jW | Seiler Research Laboratory lo- \ cjjk. cated at the U. S. Air Force Academy. Previous assign­ments have included duties as an Assistant Professor in the U. S. Military Academy's Department of Engineering, plan­ning for advanced space and rocket propulsion systems, and work in technical intelligence. He has authored articles on a wide variety of subjects and has coauthored two books—Skylab, Pioneer Space Station and General Dynamics F-16.

T-44A and Contract Maintenance

^{By Com}mander Curtis J. Winters, U. S. Navy

ch ^{n                     w}^*^{en c}h^e U. S. Navy pur-

as^aSC^ ^{tBe Beec}hcraft H-90 King Air ^{a re}placement for the TS-2A multi- _c ^^{lne tra}>ner, a new concept in air- •j.^{3 t} /maintenance for the Naval Air gaining Command was also intro- g ^Ced. Under a five-year contract, _t.^eeck ^Aircraft Corporation (BAC) B ^r°*^^B '^{ts w}holly owned subsidiary, ^^erospace Services Incorporated na ¹ ’ ^a^^ree<^ ^t0 P^rovide all mainte- _s ^Ce. ^servi^ces> spare parts, and line

'ring associated with the aircraft.

"many, but the central issue is per- management. The Navy,

^serv

Tjj'

r contract was a sharp departure

^rr°rn Tr e M                   •

_tj_Ce ■ Navy maintenance prac-

^s and squadron organization, th • ^{6 reasons ant}i philosophy behind j_n ^ec‘sion for contract maintenance _ar; ^e Naval Air Training Command

^s°nnel

the ^ ^{0tBer serv}ices, is not attracting ^rr>tet^nUrn^^>er P^ersonnei needed tc th* manpower requirements. Since the ^nUrriBer 18-22-year-old males in market is forecast to decline ⁰ Norther in the future, alternative f_0u^^{S t0} fid Navy billets must be Wa    Parrial solution, under

^an<f evident, is to recruit more tract^Cn ^^notBer alternative is to con- rrj_ar^ f^f°m the civilian community as y tasks as are practical. th_e f.^0re discussing the provisions of avy/BASl maintenance contract, a

brief history and description of the aircraft is useful. On 2 September 1975, the Chief of Naval Operations defined the requirements for a re­placement aircraft for the venerable S-2 in its role as a multi-engine trainer. The requirements specified an exist­ing, proven design with a life-time capability of 12,000 flight hours. On 17 May 1976, the Chief of Naval Ma­terial requested approval for service use for three candidates to be used in selecting the new trainer which was then known as the VTAM(X). Sub­sequently, the Beech Aircraft Corpora­tion entry—a version of the Beechcraft King Air—was selected, and a contract was signed specifying delivery of three aircraft in March 1977 with a follow-on order for a total of 61 aircraft. At this time the trainer was designated the T-44A. On 5 April 1977, the first T-44A arrived in Corpus Christi, Texas. In July of that same year, the first student training in the T-44A commenced.

In the T-44A, the Navy received a design which had already flown more than seven million flight hours in 1,500 commercial King Air aircraft. Turboprop engines and a pressurized, air-conditioned cabin ensure quiet comfort along with excellent perform­ance at both high and low altitudes. The avionics are all solid-state, integrated-circuit devices with the light weight and high reliability that are characteristic of this kind of equipment. Throughout the aircraft, the systems are designed to be as sim­ple and reliable as possible. The result is a trainer with very high availability and at the same time low maintenance and operation costs.

The student pilot is introduced to the latest navigation and communica­tions equipment in the T-44A. The T-44A is equipped with VHF and UHF communication transceivers, tactical air navigation system, automatic direction finding, and dual VHF omni­directional radio/instrument landing system (ILS) navigation receivers. A three-axis-coupled autopilot has ILS approach capability in addition to al­titude hold, heading hold, and auto­matic navigation capability. Other equipment includes dual compass sys­tems, dual flight directors, and a radar altimeter. The NCS-31A computer gives the T-44A area navigation capa­bility with ten waypoints, ground speed, heading, and estimated time of arrival readouts.

The aircraft is powered by two PT6A-34B turboprop engines down rated to 550 shaft horsepower. Maximum takeoff weight is 9,650 pounds, and service ceiling is 31,000 feet. The flight controls, nose wheel

steering, and trim tabs are simple me­chanical links. The landing gear and wing flaps are actuated by electric motors so there is no hydraulic system other than that for the unboosted wheel brakes. The cabin air con­ditioner is an electric-powered freon unit that provides full cooling with the engines at idle on the ground. A nickel-cadium battery system with a battery charger-monitor system and a starter/generator unit on the engine provides a self-start capability so that no external ground equipment is re­quired for normal flight operations.

It follows that the T-44A should be an easy airplane to maintain. The ab­sence of extensive hydraulic, arma­ment, and tactical navigation systems gives the aircraft a maintenance advan­tage over most military aircraft. Con­tinuing production of new King Air aircraft assures a supply of replaceable spare parts. In addition, the contractor has seen fit to stockpile a large inven­tory of spare parts in the on-site sup­port center at Naval Air Station Cor­pus Christi to support the T-44A. Be­cause the T-44A was to be used by only two Navy squadrons (VT-28 and VT- 31), both permanently based at Corpus Christi, it was a logical candidate for contract maintenance.

The maintenance contract was signed in 1977 and specified services through September of 1981, at which time bids will be taken and a new contract negotiated. The present con­tract is based upon the predicted number of aircraft on board and the flight hours required for each quarter.

The final projected number of air­craft at Corpus Christi is 55 with an additional 6 anticipated out of service for testing, industrial-level mainte­nance, and reserve. The 55 T-44A air­craft “on line” are projected to fly 65 hours per aircraft per month for a total of 10,725 hours per quarter or 42,900 hours per year. The contractor receives a fixed payment for maintaining 55 aircraft, termed “squadron mainte­nance,” and a fixed payment for flight hours, termed “squadron materials,” with adjustment fees if either 55 air­craft or 10,725 hours per quarter are exceeded. Excess fees are calculated and paid on a quarterly basis. If less aircraft are on board or less flight hours are flown, the contractor still receives his fixed price.

In addition to squadron mainte­nance and squadron materials, the contract covers a category of services consisting of “conditional mainte­nance” and “conditional materials.” Conditional maintenance is defined as those maintenance functions and pro­cedures whose cost/risk/volume factors militate against firm fixed-price acqui­sition. This maintenance is limited to repair of crash damage, engine inspec­tion, and repair caused by improper use by government personnel (over­temp, overspeed, and overtorque), in­corporation of NavAir technical direc­tives, assistance in recovery and inves­tigation of aircraft crashes, and dam­age induced by hail, fire, windstorm, hurricane, vandalism, or uncontrolla­ble acts of nature.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the T-44A contract is the incentive and penalty portion which rewards the contractor when more than a projected number of sorties are flown and penalizes the contractor when less than 80% of the aircraft are available for flight.

The T-44A contract has provisions for yearly adjustments based on the U. S. Department of Labor “Whole­sale Price Index” and the “Gross Aver­age Hourly Earnings of Production

U. S. NAVY (COURTESY NAS CORPUS CHRISTI PHOTO LAB)

Workers in the Aircraft and Parts In' dustry.” The contract specifies formU' las by which correction factors based on the above statistics are applied.

The most important question, & course, is, “what are the results? After two years of operations, during which time T-44A aircraft have been delivered to the Navy at the rate o* about three every two months (the operating number of 55 was reached in July 1979), some observations can be made. The operation has thus fa^f exceeded the Navy’s most optimist^ expectations. During the first tv'⁰ years, the average operational read^[1]' ness has exceeded 97%. Because of^a lower student load than anticipated, the number of scheduled sorties ha⁵ consistently been less than the numb°⁽ of available aircraft. This enable pilots who find “downing” dB' crepancies on preflight inspections be quickly assigned replacement art' craft, thus resulting in very few sort)⁰* cancelled for aircraft discrepancies The T-44A enjoys the highest aircraft operational availability in the Na^v) today, and consequently the two T-4^ squadrons enjoy the highest sorti^£ completion rates of any squadron ^1,1 the Naval Air Training Command. A¹ this point, the contractor has not paid any penalty fees, and the Navy has n^ot paid any incentive fees.

What is in store for the futut° Will the lightly constructed T-^ stand up to the constant punishmen¹ of training naval aviators? Will BASI maintenance continue to produ°^£ a high operational readiness when tH^c aircraft is five or ten years old? Tb^e answers to these questions are ^ufl’

Contract maintenance has taken Navy personnel out of the hangars and provided high levels of aircraft operational availability.

Wh

^c°ntrai is

Table I T-44A Maintenance Work Hours

nown, but the T-44 contract antici­P^ates some of the problems. The con­^tract specifies that regardless of the ^continuous maintenance” provisions ° federal Aviation Regulations, at 'ⁿtervals of not less than 2,100 flight ,°^Urs or more than 2,700 flight '^)Urs, the aircraft will be cycled ^r°ugh a full series of structural and fictional checks. In addition, the ^ech maintenance requirements I ^ecify a complete replacement of the j⁰ *ⁿ8 gear, including struts and _t^{nve s}y^stem, and the flap drive sys- after 5,000 landings. The first ^A to undergo this replacement was _t°mpfeted in July 1979. The first T-44 undergo the airworthiness inspec-

Adrl^,W^1 ^occur ‘^{n t}^^{le s}P^rtⁿS 1980. a ...'^tionally> the T-44A engines receive ^ °t section” inspection at 1,250 °^Urs and are replaced at 2,500 hours.

^iat then has the Navy lost with ^ct maintenance? The first item ^en f^^'the-clock flexibility that ^cs squadrons to operate 24 hours

a day and on weekends. Contractor maintenance is available outside of normal working hours but at higher cost. The T-44 A contract specifies maintenance work hours—see Table 1.

Also, as TS-2A training squadron maintenance departments disappeared, the number of enlisted personnel as­signed was reduced from over 300 to 20. Extensive use of contracting will adversely affect enlisted sea-shore rota­tion. The absence of a squadron main­tenance department impacted the tra­ditional ground jobs available to squadron pilots, and squadron organi­zations were altered to reflect this change.

On balance, contract maintenance appears to be a wise choice for the T-44A. As a T-44A flight instructor remarked, "Is shore duty with free weekends a necessarily bad thing?” ^{[2] I}

Case for a “Can-Am” Carrier

By a

• Maconochie

*9705

there was every indication that

the ^lIlete was every md ^e Canadian Navy’s close

*ith

of

and

At

*ith

that

0v_er ^naVa* ^av*ation stretched back for Oio* ^{a centur}y to the concluding

saw f-f, •        ,              —                   -

^ne introduction of many of the e_as i             *

and much of the basic carrier

j,. ben the Canadian aircraft carrier ^ Bonaventure (ex-British Powerful) i_n*. ^commissioned in the early

association antisubmarine warfare by means carrier-borne, fixed-wing aircraft faval aviation was over for good.

time, Canada's association ^s of World War I. That war

Idea

^I11UU1                                                  II1C UdMC CctlliCl

_a , ⁿ°logy which was later developed \j/, ^Came into full play during World _ari^^r 11- Much of this has been refined r_e ^er,larged upon subsequently as a tn ^U u the endeavors of the NATO ^enibers to prevent World War III. b_e ^rn°ⁿ8 these developments should p₀ ^{3 ret}urn by the Canadian Armed _v>i._irp^tS (^CAF) to participation in carrier tio ^are ^ means of a closer associa- c_a ^{n w}'th the U. S. Navy—hence, the ^Se for a “Can-Am” carrier.

Canada’s main defense orientation since 1949 has been toward western Europe as a result of its commitment to NATO. One of the consequences has been that Canada has sometimes seemed militarily to be a United States or Great Britain in miniature. Over the last decade, Canada’s mili­tary equipment has gone from few and good to less and obsolescent, except possibly for its antisubmarine escort vessels.

If anything has kept Canada in­volved as an integral part of NATO and NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) planning at the higher levels of command, it has been the high quality of its personnel and the overall expertise of the Canadian Armed Forces. While these forces have been stretched to fulfill their duties in western Europe and North America as well as in the North Atlantic, they have also gone from possessing a nu­clear weapon capability to a totally conventional weapon-equipped force.

In other words, Canada’s strike power has diminished.

It would appear, however, that over the last two or three years there has been some considerable reappraisal by Ottawa in defense of Western interests and home defense requirements. A significant increase in funds will be expended over the next several years to upgrade CAF equipment. The ques­tions are, “What strategy will Canada adopt, and what equipment will result from that choice?” There appear to be three choices in strategy:

►  A continuation of the current gen­eral, but minor, participation pre­dominantly in western Europe

►  A more or less complete with­drawal to a home defense-centered posture

►  A radical reorientation for the three CAF components on land, sea, and in the air in the geographical region of the northwest Atlantic.

To date, two major purchases of equipment—the West German

Leopard I tanks and the Lockheed CP-140 Aurora (the Canadian version of the P-3 Orion)—give little indication of what Canada’s strategy might be. The selection of an aircraft to replace Canada’s aging tactical aircraft may more closely outline the new strategy. Although six fighter and fighter bomber aircraft have been examined, the choice appears to have been nar­rowed to two aircraft.

►  McDonnell Douglas F-18 Hornet: A single-seat, twin-engined, multi-role aircraft, the Hornet is a carrier-based aircraft. Developed from the Northrop F-17, the Hornet is about twice the F-I7’s weight. The U. S. Navy and the Marine Corps expect to purchase ap­proximately 1,400 F- 18s by the end of the 1980s, and other countries have expressed interest in purchasing the aircraft.

►  General Dynamics F-16: A single- engined, single-seat fighter-bomber, the F-16 has been adopted by the U. S. Air Force for combat in western Europe in particular, and by Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Nor­way. In these four countries, more than 300 F-l6s are expected to go into service with much of the construction done in Europe rather than in the United States.

Canada is actually in a position to play a greater role at the grand tactical-caw-strategic levels than ever before. When Canada began its par­ticipation within NATO, the major Soviet threat was by means of ground forces and tactical air forces. Although this is still the major, immediate threat, the Soviets have built up a naval threat of considerable magnitude in the 1970s and are expected to in­crease it into the 1980s. While stand­ing forces in western Europe are a necessity to withstand the initial onslaught of a surprise attack, rein­forcements from North America will be an absolute necessity even in a 30-day war. Even with the stockpiling of equipment in continental western Europe and Great Britain, plus air- transported personnel, further reiⁿ forcements and their heavy equipm^e(l1 as well as fuel and replacements equipment lost in combat will have ^(l go by sea.

At present, Canada’s contribud⁰ ' to NATO are spread across several d* ferent geographical areas: grot>ⁿ forces in Germany, ASW patrol aircf³* in eastern and, spasmodically, nort^ ern polar Canada, and, finally, ^sP^eC‘., airborne forces in eastern Ontario. ^p the purchase of the F-18 Horn⁶' Canada could embark upon a rati°^fl alized and much more effective con^tfl₍ bution to NATO’s grand tactical ^a<1 immediate strategic defenses and ¹¹ " ■ reenter maritime aviation as pat¹ the carrier forces required in ¹ North Atlantic Ocean.     ₍

It is frequently overlooked that ¹ major ports of New York, Bost°^r, Montreal, and Halifax lie well s⁰^ of western Europe—e.g., Edinbn^r? is 700 miles north of Montreal. ' means that most convoys (or fast, denendentlv sailing vessels) travel *^!>