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Nuclear Weapons Capability?
I recently resigned from the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and consequently the position of ASW officer on board a Spruance-class destroyer. The decision was entirely my own and based on what I perceive to be flaws in the Nuclear Weapons Program.
First, there is considerable inconsistency between the various inspection/ training teams. (In fact, these two functions are not always clearly distinguishable—not even to the teams themselves!)
Second, the program’s “standards” are often subject to individual interpretation.
These points were brought home to me in my very early experience with the program. I reported on board an old guided-missile destroyer, and had not been there long when the commanding officer decided to do me a favor by having an assist visit. I was not ready. When my anxiety became apparent, I was told not to worry, the team was coming to help me. The assist visit rapidly developed into an attack visit. The “senior attacker” put everyone at ease while he rapidly gave us a stringent inspection. No discrepancies involving weapons handling were noted, but there was an alleged security violation. Luckily, my commanding officer was knowledgeable enough to know that the “violation" was debatable. I listened in awe as the CO and the inspector discussed the finer points of the governing directive and their possible interpretations. I knew that my career was already in jeopardy and depended upon the “sparring” ability of the CO. I was baffled and angry.
I learned never to trust an assist team. Its information was supposed to go no higher than my commanding officer, but had somehow reached the admiral level. A simple request for training, in order to aid a new ensign, had placed the credibility of the whole command in extremis. The commanding officer’s talent for debate and "friends in high places” had saved the command. That assist team did not understand its function. (Or, did we not understand?)
There are always incidents when one team gives you a standard that is totally shot down by another team. In preparing for my recent inspection on board the Spruance-class destroyer, my handling team received at least three different opinions on how we should rig for over the side handling from three different teams.
One of the few humorous discussions I had with a team member concerned his notion that all of our guards surrounding the handling area should face out, rather than in. (I had to admit that no other team had told us that!) To further confirm the identity crisis that some teams have, one assist team on the Spruance destroyer failed to perform needed assistance because its members could not decide whether to strictly maintain an inspection posture or provide ship’s company with training.
Semantics are tricky. What is meant by "custody” or “control?” Is it appropriate to sub-custody? If so, to whom?
I think my two main points have been made. There is considerable inconsistency among the various teams, and our “standards” are often subject to interpretation. The implications of these insights are huge, and can be summed up in a remark made to me by the “senior attacker” of my early experience. He said he could walk on board any ship in the U. S. Navy and find reason to fail the crew on a nuclear weapons inspection, if that were his aim.
So much for standards! It seems that inspectors, not standards, determine whether or not a U. S. naval vessel is nuclear capable. The result is an emphasis on showmanship rather than the ultimate goals of safety and security. Pretty folders, coffee, and “southern hospitality” geared toward impressing inspectors are major inspection-passing tactics. The golden rule must be followed: “Thou shalt not anger the inspector be he right of wrong.” In a program of supposedly stringent standards, how well a ship is graded depends on whether the ship is visited by inspection group A or inspection group B.
In my recent inspection on board the Spruance destroyer, we were graded quite highly. However, our inspection team left with some comment to the effect that we “came close,” although it noted no major discrepancies. It seems to me that in the area of nuclear weapons, you are either SAT or UNSAT. There should be no such thing as "coming close!” If it is thought that a particular area was outstanding, it should be noted. If an inspection team has any reservations that a command can handle nuclear weapons safely, that command must be UNSAT. That one offhand comment was totally disillusioning to me and a source of disgrace and embarrassment to my senior enlisted personnel, as well as myself- It turned an officially glowing report into garbage.
This program is losing sight of the primary issues: Can the weapon be handled safely? Is adequate security provided? What does the team do in the event of a real problem?
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I hope this is not viewed as the simple ravings of a disgruntled naval officer. I have felt much anxiety within the program, and I no longer desire to be a part of it. In fact, the command anxiety created in complying with extra security measures (a simple evolution like taking magazine temperatures can require up to IV2 man-hours), personnel screening procedures, constant attention from seniors, and added inspections should be evaluated and weighed against the actual tactical (and strategic) advantages gained by having a nuclear weapons capability.
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Proceedings / January 1980