Escalation Control

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By Commander Robert C. Powers, U. S. Navy “What should replace the carrier?” is like asking, “Have you stopped beating your wife?" The question implies that the utility of the carrier is past, and that she must be replaced with something new very soon. A fairer question might be, “What roles can the aircraft carrier (and all naval forces) perform when and if we ride the deadly escalator from routine presence missions up to and through total nuclear war?”

As long as nuclear parity is maintained and per­ceived by both sides, advantages in conventional or limited nuclear force could decide the military power relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such advantages will decide issues primarily through the threat of their use, but the possibility of actual conflict between the superpowers exists under certain conditions. The central concept of a strategy for nuclear parity must be the ability to decide issues in one’s favor at the lowest possible level of conflict. This central concept is defined as escalation control- Figure 1 shows a simplified structure for an escala­tion control spectrum. For example, if a nation can achieve its goals at the confrontation level by demon­strating to its opponent that the options for that op­ponent are limited at the conventional conflict level, then escalation control is being practiced. With esca­lation control as a central concept of strategy, sea control and power projection become supportive tac­tical missions.

Escalation control also has a component related to the distance of the issue being contested from the homeland of the nuclear superpower. The usability of conventional or limited nuclear force for escalation control will tend to increase as contested issues be­come removed in distance and intensity from issues of core value to the nuclear superpower.

Escalation control should be understood in terms °f national interests and how it could determine what forces are required to achieve those interests. Figure 2 shows a suggested relationship between the escala­tion control spectrum and U. S. interests. For ex­ample, it is postulated that limited nuclear war could

the maximum escalation level necessary to achieve mterests in the Europe/Mediterranean Sea area. If this is so, then the ability to control escalation in achieving interests in this area is directly related to ihe credibility of forces for limited nuclear war.

The “firing line” of Figure 1 separates the escala­tion levels that involve violent conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union from those levels that do not. Levels short of the “firing line” may involve violent conflict, but not between the super­powers. Since escalation control implies controlling conflict to remain below the “firing line” if possible, it follows that the most frequently employed naval tnissions will be those relevant to presence, deter- fence, intervention, and confrontation. These escala­tion levels represent the “front line” of escalation control. Soviet writings and actions seem to indicate that it is at these levels in Third World areas that the immediate threat to U. S. political influence, eco- ⁿ°mic stability, and national security exists.¹

The escalation control spectrum suggests that forces for different levels and interests should become coote specialized than they are now. The higher esca­lation levels generally call for more specialized forces. h°r example, any ship can fulfill the presence role (very general purpose), but it takes a nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine to fulfill the ^total nuclear war role (highly specialized). It follows chat forces for limited nuclear war should be more specialized than those for intervention.

Escalation control as a central concept for strategy ^ls relevant in determining how naval forces could be restructured and specialized to adjust to technologi­cal change. For example, general-purpose forces tend ^to be surface ships, and these are the forces most af­fected by changes in the technologies of weapons and surveillance. They are also the ones most subject to Prevalent questions of survivability.² This suggests chat forces designed to operate beyond the “firing hne ’ in the initial stages of conflict should be spe­cialized for higher survivability. An all-submarine force would have the highest survivability.³ How­^ever, submarines are expensive and not capable of the conventional power projection roles of launching air­craft or amphibious assault. Nor are they capable of

I p

°^r footnotes, please turn to page 56. Proceedings / January 1980

power projection forces.

Survivable surface forces should, therefore, be de­signed to operate with submarines in support of U. S. interests and at levels of escalation requiring sea control and power projection in a “firing” con­flict. The survivability of surface forces in an era of

Figure 1. The Escalation Control Spectrum

rapidly available surveillance information could be operationally acceptable if we employ numerous ships which are in the 6,000-16,000 ton range and armed with offensive strike weapons. They would need to steam dispersed, operate to deny classification, and be designed in ways which would enhance camou­flage and deception.

Escalation control as a central concept for strategy also suggests ways to structure U. S. forces to gain the initiative with respect to Soviet strategy. For ex­ample, since forces beyond the “firing line” but short of total nuclear war are concerned primarily with fighting the Soviets, they should be specialized to do just that. These “middle spectrum” forces should be specialized to acknowledge the strengths and exploit the weaknesses of Soviet naval strategy in the follow­ing suggested ways:

►   Adopt a theater nuclear warfare posture in Europe/Mediterranean Sea.

►   Create a credible threat to the execution of the Soviet land war in Europe and on the flanks of the NATO nations.

►   Provide maximum survivability against the threat of missile-firing, land-based aircraft and missile­firing submarines by attacking them at their bases.

►   Deny to the Soviets the ability to target and at­tack U. S. offensive power in highly concentrated form.

►   Provide the capability to target and strike the base of offensive Soviet naval power, i.e., the Soviet landmass in the form of naval bases, port facilities, and naval aviation bases.

►   Provide the capability to block choke points through which Soviet units must pass.

►   Provide a specialized capability to attack, destroy, and deceive the Soviet centralized command, control, and surveillance system.

Suggested U. S. Naval Forces: The aircraft carrier and other large surface ships are likely to evolve to­ward the general-purpose, “front-line” end of the es­calation control spectrum. Their flexibility and util­ity will be used to control escalation at the presence, deterrence, intervention, and confrontation levels. Naval strategy could come to recognize increased value in having general-purpose power projection forces more dedicated to this role. These forces will have a sea control and power projection capability suited to intervention. They will be capable of opera­tions against opposing surface, air, and submarine forces, but not in the concentrated form the Soviet Union can mount in the vicinity of the Soviet home­land. These forces will operate in support of U. S. interests at a distance from the Soviet homeland, ^either against other potential enemies or against less concentrated Soviet forces. They would be held in reserve in a conflict with highly concentrated Soviet force, relying on more specialized forces to deliver mitial strikes and to establish local sea control.

The credibility of general-purpose forces in con­trolling “front-line” escalation levels will depend on the development of specialized “middle spectrum’ forces for short conventional conflict, extended con­ventional conflict, and limited nuclear war.⁴ These middle spectrum” forces could be a mix of spe- ^Clalized submarines and widely dispersed small sur­face ships with offensive striking power that would evolve over the next 10-20 years. These forces would be specialized to operate and survive in areas of con- eerltrated Soviet forces and present a conventional Weapon and theater nuclear strike threat against Warsaw Pact forces engaged with NATO forces. This ^aPplies to the European central front and its northern ^and southern flanks. Strikes against land bases, Potts, and airfields supporting naval forces would aiso be carried out. The “middle spectrum” forces ^w°uld also be capable of gaining enough local sea control to permit the use of larger gerteral-purpose forces if an extended conflict occurred. The surface ships would be designed for enhanced survivability and could employ V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) aircraft for surveillance, targeting, anti­submarine warfare, and air defense. Submarines that are nonnuclear, run shallow, and share some of the characteristics and capabilities of surface ships (but are less detectable) are another possibility. Nuclear and conventional-warhead cruise and ballistic mis­siles could be the primary land attack and antiship weapon for these forces.

Other types of specialized forces could be devel­oped for concentrating specifically on the weaknesses of Soviet strategy. For example, submarines and land-based naval aviation could concentrate on laying mines and blockading the choke points through which Soviet naval forces must pass. Submarines with quick-reaction ballistic missiles could be specif­ically targeted against the Soviet centralized com­mand and control system. At the total nuclear war level, ballistic-missile-firing submarines should re­tain relevance. For the post-nuclear war level,

Figure 2. The Escalation Control Spectrum and U. S. Interests

Short             Extended      Limited     Total Post

Conventional   Conventional   Nuclear    Nuclear     Nuclear

* ⁼ Suggests the maximum escalation level which the United States needs in order to defend its interests, based on politics and power relations.

SlOr •                                                 • •

w -sea lines of communication.

general-purpose forces will have high utility for tak­ing U. S. presence and control into areas destroyed and disrupted by nuclear war.

It is completely wrong to assume that the aircraft carrier and other large, general-purpose forces can be focused on “front-line spectrum” missions short of the “firing line” in the immediate future. If it is to be, it will evolve over many years as the more spe­cialized forces develop. It is very important that naval officers continue to articulate the need for in­novative development without feeling that such de­velopment undermines the current credibility of air­craft carriers or any other asset that has a continuing and valuable mission.

Some critics tend to analyze the carrier on an “either-or” basis. It’s either the carrier or something else. They ask, “What should replace the carrier?” The implication is that the utility of the carrier is past, so she must be replaced with something new very soon. This is the wrong question. The correct question is “How can the Navy structure its forces so as to have sufficient offensive power in each incre­ment of the escalation control spectrum?” The an­swer to the first question implies a quick and final end for aircraft carriers. The second question seeks to formulate the future utility of aircraft carriers (and other forces) in the competitive modern political- military environment.

The primary impact of the strategy of escalation control is to recognize a need to continue the evolu­tion of new “middle spectrum” forces. These forces would be specially structured to be survivable in the face of new technology and concentrated Soviet force while retaining offensive power. The “middle spec­trum” forces would also be specialized to take advan­tage of weaknesses in Soviet strategy and force struc­ture. They would operate to deliver initial strikes and secure sufficient sea control to allow the opera­tion of large “front line spectrum” forces.

Summary. Naval strategy is changing to adapt to the modern environment, and new force structures will certainly evolve. The U. S. Navy’s strategy and force structure evolution will have to overcome in-j ternal institutional interests, the budget squeeze, the ; budgeteer’s aversion to untried ideas, and the critics r who debate the issues but do not have the responsi- ’ bility for ensuring that the Navy can meet its com-1 mitments to national defense.

The Navy is in a period of self-examination and transition. Its leaders are seeking to maintain naval , strength for the immediate future while developing , and analyzing long-term options that may be radi- > cally different. This is an extremely difficult task if 1 critics seize long-term, untried options and attempt to use them to challenge the forces the Navy needs for the immediate future. The challenge for the Navy is to find a central concept for a changing strategy and to use it to articulate the long-term evolution of naval forces. One central concept for such a strategy has been suggested herein. Other concepts are needed to stimulate strategic thought toward solving the problem of how best to maximize the contribution of naval forces for the future defense of the United States.

Commander Powers holds degrees from the Naval i. Academy (B.S.,      1960), Naval Postgraduate I

School (M.S.E.E., 1967), and George Washing' > ton University (M.S.I.A., 1977). He is currently j a Ph.D. candidate in international affairs at the I Catholic Univeristy of America. He has served in ! five destroyers, including tours as XO of the USS M Laurence (DDG-4) and CO of the USS Claude V. Ricketts F (DDG-5). Tours ashore have included U. S. Naval Forces Viet- f nam, Naval Ordnance Systems Command, the National Wa' ■ College, and the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-354)- ■ He is now military assistant to the Defense Science Board.

’Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces I in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), pp. 4-6, 63.

²R. James Woolsey, “Planning a Navy. The Risks of Conventional WiS' dom," International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1978). ³Vice Admiral George P. Steele, USN (Ret.) “A Fleet to Match Ou^f Real Needs,” The Washington Post, 16 May 1976, p. Cl. Vice Admiral Steele presents the case for the increasing relevance of a submarine navy. ⁴See Woolsey, "Planning a Navy,” pp. 24-25 for a discussion of the rolt of the Navy in crisis management and its needs to maintain credibility iⁿ such a situation.