Canada's Future in NATO

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Representing a country that was economically stronger than most other NATO nations, Canada’s civilian and military defense chiefs occupied the head of the table as U. S. Defense Secretary Louis Johnson hosted the first Meeting of NATO’s Defense Committee at the Pentagon in October 1949. Canada’s initial contribution to the alliance was in land, air, ^and sea forces. The need for ground and air ^roles continues today, but of greater ^Urgency—to both NATO and Canada—is an expanded commitment of ASW ships such as the “Tribal”-class Iroquois, seen here tracking ^a Soviet submarine.

There can be little doubt that the defeat of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal Party in last years elections was well received within Canadas Military establishment. It was almost exactly ten Vears earlier (April 1969) that the Trudeau govern­ment initiated a new defense policy which eventually ^Cut Canadian force strength from more than 100,000 ^t0 78,000 and brought on a deterioration of Cana­dian equipment in the land, sea, and air components the unified Canadian Armed Forces.

Although total government spending rose from billion in 1969 to $45 billion in 1978, defense ^^xpenditures went up from $1.8 billion to only $3-8 illion, or from 18% of the federal budget to 8.4%.' ^hile the last years of the Trudeau government did ^ring increases in defense expenditures, they re­mained below 10% of the total budget. In the ■[978-1979 fiscal year, $4.1 billion was spent on de- ^6fise out of a total budget of $48.4 billion, and be- ^^0r footnotes, pi fore its defeat in May 1979, the Trudeau government planned to increase defense spending to $4.3 billion out of a total of $50.7 billion.²

Prime Minister Joseph Clark and his Minister of National Defence, Allan Mackinnon, are expected to continue this upgrading and perhaps to increase de­fense expenditures. Beyond these tangible commit­ments, the election of the Conservatives is likely to ease apprehension in allied military circles about Canada’s continued belief in the need for collective defense and deterrence through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In a message to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council last May, Prime Minister Clark assured the alliance that NATO would continue to be considered “Canada’s first line of defence.”³

As well received as this support on the part of the new government may be, it is not at all clear that it will lead to policies beneficial to both Canada and the alliance. This is because the government is likely to continue to divide the Canadian contribution to NATO among land, sea, and air components. This would be a mistake, because none of the component parts is able to play a significant role in Western defense. The already limited defense dollar would continue to be divided among units in which no economies of scale are possible. And most of all, it would be a mistake because such a militarily insignificant and costly con­tribution will lead only to the kind of disenchantment with the alliance that has plagued Canadian defense policy since the late 1950s.

Although destined to become one of NATO’s smaller powers, Canada played a major role in the birth of the North Atlantic alliance. Canada re­garded the Soviet Union as a direct military and political threat to the security and independence of Western Europe, and hence an indirect threat to its own security. A war in Europe would involve the United States as well as Britain, which in turn would mean Canadian involvement. As in the United

States, NATO was viewed in Canada as a means of providing the West with that level of aggregated strategic assets sufficient to deter the Soviet Union and thus, also, to negate the political influence the U.S.S.R. sought to exercise over Western Europe.

In the early 1950s, Canada was economically stronger than most of its allies and therefore could make a significant material contribution. Moreover, as one of the principal participants in the formation of NATO, there was also a high symbolic value in Canada’s commitment. However, Canada opted to make its contribution in all three military fields: land, air, and naval. To be sure, in 1951 this was a logical approach, given the weakness of the Euro­peans. But Canada would maintain 10,000 troops and six tactical air squadrons in Europe until 1969, long after the Europeans had rebuilt military estab­lishments greater than Canada’s and long after the Canadian contribution could be considered anywhere near militarily significant.

The Royal Canadian Navy (after unification in 1965, Maritime Command) made a contribution to Supreme Allied Command Atlantic from the begin­ning. Until the late 1960s, this meant that Canada maintained a specialized force which largely concen­trated on an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) role both for the security of the North Atlantic and for conti­nental security. The Navy also had a relatively bal­anced general-purpose force for nonmilitary sovereignty protection. It is important to emphasize the logic of Canada’s early postwar maritime contri­bution to NATO. It was a logic not sufficiently ap­preciated at the time, on either side of the Atlantic. A small or middle power in alliance, with limited resources to allocate to defense, will usually offer its allies some distinctive contribution in the form of a particular strategic asset. In the view of G. R. Lind­sey, noted Canadian defense analyst, Canada’s most important strategic asset in terms of European de­fense was (and still is) geography. Convoys leaving Halifax or New York, destined for Europe, must pass for a thousand miles along the Canadian coast. Dur­ing World War II, Canada had played a major role in the Battle of the Atlantic, supplying a large part of the allied fleet and developing an expertise in anti­submarine warfare.

With the onset of the Cold War, and with the Canadian Government formally equating Canadian security with that of Western Europe, “. . . the maintenance of secure sea communications across the Atlantic was the ‘sine qua non’ ” of the Royal Cana­dian Navy. At that time, there was no sovereignty question apart from collective defense. The national, continental, and NATO tasks of the Navy were in practice the same. The predominat ASW capability of the Royal Canadian Navy was the “natural and logi­cal” contribution to the alliance and thus “. . . Canadian naval policy and experience meshed into the NATO strategy with an ease not present in other areas of defence activity.”⁴ Given the “ease” with which Canadian naval policy and experience meshed with NATO strategy, more attention ought to have been given to this aspect of Canada’s alliance contri­bution. Although the alliance’s ultimate deterrent would become the U. S. nuclear triad, the strategy of gradual escalation presumed that NATO would be able to control the North Atlantic.

From the strictly Canadian viewpoint, the frag­mented nature of its contribution would soon become a source of disenchantment to government leaders and to the public. As small as the forces stationed in Europe were, they had to sustain a level of sophisti­cation equal to that of their allies. In the late 1950s, Canada had planned to build its own jet fighter, but the project was abandoned because of high unit costs. Increasingly, Canada turned to the United States for large equipment such as tanks and jet planes, but even in these purchases, few economies of scale could be realized.

In addition, the United States expected Canada to arm its air and ground forces in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons. This led to a sharp disagreement between the Conservative government of the day (1957-1963) and the Americans. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was also concerned over the extent to which the United States was influencing Canadian defense policy as a result of the NATO commitment.

When the Liberals returned to power in 1963, they quickly accepted a nuclear role for Canada. In the naval sphere, a 1964 Defence White Paper empha­sized the antisubmarine tasks of the Canadian Navy. It called for the abandonment of plans for a general- purpose frigate in favor of converting the Restigouche class for a more specialized ASW role. Four of the seven ships of the class were converted to carry the advanced Canadian-designed SQS-505 hull-mounted variable-depth sonar unit, and the U. S. ASROC (antisubmarine rocket-launched torpedo). During the early 1960s, the St. Laurent class had been converted to carry the Sea King ASW helicopter. The white paper called for the construction of a new “Tribal”- class destroyer-helicopter escort (later the DDH-280). It also noted that “. . . careful study is being given to the possibility of building two or three nuclear- powered submarines, which are powerful anti­submarine weapons.”⁰ While it is doubtful that these were given serious consideration, an ASW hy­drofoil, the Bras D'or, was built.

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The 1964 white paper also called for a continua- |¹⁰ⁿ of the Canadian commitment to NATO in the ^and and air defense of Western Europe. NATO, how­^ever> was not to be the top defense priority. Instead, ^ernPhasis was placed on the development of Peacekeeping capabilities. It seems evident that de- ^sP*te its support for NATO, the Liberal government °f the day was looking to provide Canadian forces ^Wlth a more meaningful and distinctive role. Much ^{0 c}he reasoning behind the unification of the forces "as based on the belief that this would enhance their Peacekeeping potential. Thus, even before Prime mister Trudeau took power in 1968, there was a growing Canadian disenchantment with the alliance. As he sought to act on this disenchantment, Tru- ^au was also encouraged by the decline in the per- ^^eption of the Soviet Union as an external threat. In ^pnl 1969, he initiated his new defense policy and ^egan with a call for a 50% reduction in Canadian ^tr°op strength in Europe and the abandonment of the ⁿuclear role for Canadian forces. Trudeau argued that ,, ^{e ess}ential NATO deterrent rested with the United ^{ates a}nd that “. . . the magnificent recovery of the gnomic strength of Western Europe” had greatly ^anged ‘‘the ability of European countries them- ^elves to provide necessary conventional defence

The prime minister

Ejected the option of complete withdrawal, ap­parently as a result of the influence of Italian Foreign mister Pietro Nenni, who told him in January that Canada should remain in NATO because of ^0rganization’s vital political role in promoting ^^ente and arms reduction.⁷ It seems evident that

^rudeau regarded the small Canadian force to be left in P

^ , rope as merely symbolic, an indication of Cana­ls ^{s c}°ntinuing support for the purposes of the al- jr₎^ance’ rhe price Canada had to pay for having a seat ^ATo political councils. He made it clear that he

did not share the belief of previous Canadian gov­ernments that the Canadian forces were militarily significant and that ‘‘our . . . acts will have profound international consequences.”

The idea that Canadian forces were unimportant was apparently not shared by the European allies. Shortly after the Trudeau announcement, the Euro­peans, Germany and England in particular, voiced sharp criticism of the Canadian move. Canada did agree to limit its immediate force reduction to only one third, but it did not alter the general policy line. The United States, at the time, did not join with the Europeans. Reporting on conversations with presi­dential advisor Henry Kissinger, Prime Minister Trudeau remarked, “We were not made to feel that if we were nice on the military problems, they would be nice on the bilateral problems.” It seems likely that Kissinger and President Nixon, who would shortly initiate their policy of detente over the heads of the allies, shared Trudeau’s view that the Canadian reduction would not affect the East-West balance of power. Trudeau, in turn, would come to support the detente policy and use it as a further justification for his decision to reduce Canada’s NATO commitment.

The reduction in troop strength in Europe— reflecting as it did changed perceptions of the Soviet threat, of the need for conventional deterrence, and of the significance of the Canadian contribution—led directly to a reevaluation of naval commitments to NATO. The Maritime Subcommittee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence concluded that “. . . no need for convoy protection can be envisioned in any likely military eventual­ity.”⁸ In its new white paper, Defence in the 70’s, the government not only called for less emphasis on tac­tical ASW, it also noted:

“Although an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capa­bility will be maintained as part of the general purpose maritime forces, the present degree of emphasis on anti-submarine warfare directed against submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) will be reduced in favour of other maritime roles.”⁹

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These other maritime roles were those consistent with the foremost priority of the Trudeau Doctrine, the protection of national sovereignty, specifically protection from nonmilitary threats. At sea, this meant protection of fisheries, the environment, and oceanic resources. Such “judicial” sovereignty protec­tion was clearly to take precedence over military roles both in terms of North American defense and in the protection of the North Atlantic. For Maritime Command, as for other parts of the forces, the Trudeau policy represented a move away from the

traditional view of the military, which emphasizes its role as the state’s instrument of violence.

This reorientation of naval policy was also consis­tent with the overall thrust of the new foreign pol­icy. In general, the government wanted a more na­tionally centered policy instead of one that empha­sized participation in multinational political and se­curity organizations. Of key importance as well was the desire to use foreign policy, particularly eco­nomic policy, to enhance Canadian distinctiveness and independence from the United States. This was a time of growing public concern in Canada about con­tinental economic integration and the loss of political independence that this might entail. Associated with this view was a disenchantment with the close mili­tary ties Canada maintained with the United States, both because these ties seemed to prevent a more in­dependent foreign policy and because the U. S. image as the defender of the “free world” had been tarnished in Vietnam. Thus, to have Canadian naval forces primarily engaged in antisubmarine warfare operations was to have them oriented toward tasks integrated with U. S. needs and largely under U. S. direction. In addition, ASW roles would restrict the ability of naval forces to protect judicial sovereignty. Moreover, in the nonmilitary sphere, the United States could be said to represent a challenge to Cana­dian sovereignty. It was the transit of the American oil tanker Manhattan through the Canadian arctic in 1969 which first raised concern about the possible U. S. threat and led to a unilateral declaration of sovereignty over the arctic archipelago, despite U. S. Government protests.

Indeed, the extension of Canadian sovereignty over adjoining ocean spaces was a notable aspect of the new foreign policy. The establishment of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone in January 1977 increased the area of Canadian jurisdiction over adjacent waters from 55,440 square miles (under a 12-mile territorial sea) to approximately 1.1 million square miles.¹⁰ The Trudeau government believed that in order to fulfill its primary sovereignty role, the Maritime Command could do with less capability. At the same time, the government allocated more funds to civil­ian naval units, such as the Coast Guard, which come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trans­port. For Maritime Command, this approach meant stagnation and attrition, particularly in its ability to fulfill military commitments. In 1969, there were 17,000 men in the command; by 1978, the number had fallen to 9,500. In 1969, Canada had 20 de­stroyers (9 helicopter destroyers and 11 destroyer es­corts), 2 operational support ships, 3 conventional submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, and 1 ASW hydrofoil.

In addition, there were 32 Argus long-range patrol aircraft and 39 Tracker patrol planes.

By 1975, only 15 of the 20 destroyers were opera­tional, and the four new “Tribal” (DDH-280)-class helicopter destroyers, which had originally been de­signed as ASW ships, had been modified in construc­tion to serve such nonmilitary roles as fisheries patrol and environmental protection. While eight destroyer escorts were modified to carry helicopters, there was a cutback in Sea King patrol flights and pilot train­ing hours. In order to economize on fuel, ships were restricted to 90 days at sea a year instead of the pre­vious 110. No further hydrofoils were built; the one in operation was laid up in 1971 and has not been put back into service.¹¹

The number of planes was reduced to 44. With the scrapping of the lone aircraft carrier, all the re­maining Trackers were assigned to surface surveil­lance and control. One of the Argus squadrons was phased out and the remaining planes used extensively for judicial surveillance flights and “showing the flag” flights over the Arctic. The government did order 18 Lockheed CP-140 Aurora patrol planes (the U. S. Navy P-3C Orion airframe), but the original Canadian specifications placed as much emphasis on multi-tasking (nonmilitary roles) as on ASW.

Maritime Command tried to insulate itself from further cutbacks by having Canadian destroyers des­ignated as international fishing inspection ships. All 12 destroyers on the Atlantic coast were registered with the International Commission for the North­west Atlantic Fisheries (formed by Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic Community [EEC] to oversee compliance with rules and quotas). This tactic was apparently designed to provide a rationale for more money and increased ship-days at sea. While military ships were thus being employed in nonmilitary roles, the gov­ernment was increasing expenditures on the wholly civilian Coast Guard. By the mid-1970s, the Coast Guard had a larger fleet than Maritime Command, with 82 active ships, including 21 icebreakers.

The cuts in Maritime Command and its orienta­tion toward nonmilitary tasks were in line with what was happening in other branches of the armed forces- But Canada still wanted to remain within NATO, and NATO, by mid-decade, was becoming seriously con­cerned with the buildup of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe and the complementary increase it¹ Soviet naval activity in the Atlantic. The Europeans, who had never been reconciled to Canada’s 1969 re­ductions, were determined that Canada would do its share to meet the growing Soviet threat. This time, they had more leverage. As part of its efforts to de­Proceeding’s / January 19&0

^veIop economic ties outside of North America, Canada was seeking a contractual link with the EEC. During the negotiations, the Europeans made it clear that increased trade would be tied to an increase in Canadian defense expenditure and commitments to ^[he alliance. This time, the United States also joined ^fhe other allies in applying pressure on Canada.

However, the Canadian response in the naval ^sphere must be considered inadequate at best. The government did order the most sophisticated ASW Package for the new Auroras, but the 18 ordered will ardly be sufficient in view of the tasks the long- ^r<aoge patrol aircraft have to perform and the condi- ^t,0n of the remaining Argus planes. In terms of ship strength, the government did agree to upgrade the ^ar,tisubmarine capabilities of the “Trib .l”-dass frig­^ates. These ships are “. . . the most advanced and Sophisticated naval vessels ever built in Canada. . . .

^L Jrovided they operate in pairs or as part of an inte­grated ASW force, they are among the best ships of ^e'^r kind in the world.”¹² Despite the acknowl­edged superiority of the “Tribal” class, the Canadian °vernment’s new shipbuilding program will entail ^e design and construction of only six new frigates, cost of these vessels will be $2.3 billion. It is ^estimated that ten “Tribals,” for which the research ^and design have already been done, could be built for ^ls amount. It would seem that the government’s ^ectsion was based on the calculation that, with a ^Crew °f only 180, the frigates would have a daily payroll of only $2,500—about $1,400 less than the ^-man “Tribal.” In order to fulfill all its roles,

Maritime Command would need at least 30 de­stroyers and more submarines (perhaps nuclear pow­ered) as well as additional patrol aircraft of the Au­rora type.

Yet, the new Conservative government is unlikely to increase naval strength anywhere close to these figures. It is unlikely to do so because Canada con­tinues to fragment its NATO contributions and is al­ready pledged to a costly upgrading of its small land and air forces in Europe. Added to these capital ex­penditures will be the continued maintenance costs associated with stationing troops in Europe.

No matter how much is said about the quality of the individual soldier, the Canadian forces in Ger­many cannot be considered anything but symbolic and militarily insignificant. Even if, during a crisis, another 6,000 troops were brought in, it would be meaningless in terms of the overall balance of con­ventional forces. Beyond the military considerations, the continued maintenance of this small, costly sym­bol of Canada’s commitment to NATO will only lead to another Trudeau-style reevaluation of Canadian contributions to the alliance as the price of sym­bolism escalates. Thus, what seems to be in order, on both sides of the Atlantic, is a thorough and realistic consideration of Canada’s future in NATO, with a view toward an expanded maritime commitment.

The most important argument that can be made for an expanded Canadian maritime commitment is that such a contribution would be in support of an increasingly important aspect of Western defense. Given the growing imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, a credible maritime capability is vital to overall deference. Even if large-scale pre-positioning of arms and equipment is achieved, the need to maintain a convoy capability will remain. This is be­cause there is no way to know in advance how much conventional force will be required to keep a poten­tial conflict below the nuclear threshold. Since NATO will not be the initiator of a war, the onus will be upon the West to avoid nuclear retaliation, which it will be in a better position to do if effective ASW operations are maintained in the North Atlantic. As an officer of one of the NATO navies has written:

“In preventing a crisis from developing into war, or even in limiting a war to the conventional level, the NATO navies . . . might well prove de­cisive. They might even help induce the national leaders on both sides to meet at the conference table rather than take the alternative route of escalation. . . ,”¹³

The maintenance of this maritime deterrent is also essential in terms of allied cohesion. If governments in Europe, Canada, and the United States were to

Canada's present antisubmarine weapons include, at top, the St. Laurent-r/<m frigate Saguenay with a Sea King helicopter embarked. In the center photo is the new Aurora patrol plane, foreground, which replaces the Argus in the background. At bottom, the Restigouche-c/rfiJ frigate Terra Nova fires her ASROC.

begin to doubt whether reinforcements would get through, the political effect would be to “seriously weaken the cohesion and with it the credibility of the alliance.” This is particularly the case with the two Scandinavian allies, which, according to one Norwe­gian observer, would have to reevaluate their position if NATO did not emphasize the importance of keep­ing the sea-lanes open.

Soviet antishipping forces can be met in three ways: attacking the submarine bases near the Kola peninsula, impeding transit through the United Kingdom-Iceland-Greenland gap, and providing anti­submarine protection in the vicinity of convoy ships. Canadian geography and its present expertise in tac­tical ASW make it best suited to perform the latter task. In seeking to concentrate its NATO commit­ment in the naval sphere, Canada ought to be able to find support within the U. S. Government. In his 1978 posture statement, the U. S. Secretary of De­fense noted that, “There are no longer enough NATO forces to meet the requirements” of North Atlantic defense. He pointed out that at present the United States supplies 50% of these forces and that the shortage of ASW ships and planes could be eased by contributions from the allies. Also to be considered in Washington is the fact that an expanded Canadian Navy would allow Canada to contribute more toward the surveillance and detection of Soviet ballistic mis­sile submarines. In order to direct a first strike against American Minutemen and/or MX missile sites, Soviet submarines would not come in close to the North American coast, since very low or short- range ballistic missile trajectories would not be pos­sible for targets well inland. The submarine-launched ballistic missile can, however, be used in a short- range first strike role against military installations near the coast. An expanded Canadian maritime capability would assist the United States in meeting both the long-range threat against land-based mis­siles and the short-range threat against other targets for the simple reason that there would be more Canadian ships patrolling near North America and more available for long-range surveillance in the North Atlantic.

Proceedings / January 1980

J

An expanded Canadian maritime commitment to NATO would give Maritime Command a definite