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For several years, Ingalls was turning out Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers on a regular basis. Now that the class is nearly finished, perhaps a new approach to naval shipbuilding would provide needed vigor to both the Navy and the nation’s shipyards.
The Navy needs ships—lots of ships and different types. On the one hand, post-World War II experi' ence shows that they need not all be sophisticated- On the other hand, if a major conflict does occur, |C will involve sophisticated technology, so quality—-a5 much as quantity—might determine the outcome- To get more ships for the immediate future, U. S- shipyards should turn out what I’ll call “common hulls” and do so on a constant, almost assembly line, basis. However, since they do not necessarily have to
50,000.
ton hull for cruisers and amphibious warfare
gested
using the Spruance (DD-963)-class hull for a
r8e H. Miller, "Crisis and Commitment," Sea Power, January 1978,
jn ,®°Ph*sticated immediately, they can be “phased • Then, when called upon for duty on short lce> they can be given “quick fixes.” Let’s ex- these concepts, one at a time.
Bu.ld Common Hulls Constantly. There are three ap- bu°u^eS W*tb Potent'ak One author has called for 5o'n bas*c design hulls” such as an “ultra-large” su ' ^~t0~ 100,000-ton ship for aircraft carriers and S(wertransf>orts; an “intermediate” 10,000-to-
_i . *vyc tiuiatn auu aiiipmuiuua Wdnait
*ps’ and a “small” 1,000-to-10,000-ton hull for 3 er combatants.1 Ingalls Shipbuilding has sug
tyJjOj i< ° null lUi a.
b ° e family” of variant types. Finally, there have fQen Sequent calls for using “modularity” designs b mterchangeability and modernization; the Navy ‘nitiated a SEAMOD (sea systems modification and eJn,2ation by modularity) concept for this pur- off& ^bese three ideas, taken together, seem to et the best approach. That is, build and then use t- U ar concepts for interchangeability, moderniza- °w and what this author calls “phase-in.” c the DD-963-class destroyer is not the only
mon hull possible, it is the best for illustrative ^ Poses. The variations include the following:
. y) Antisubmarine Warfare (DD-963)-class ^ ,e ASW is the primary mission of the “baseline el which carries two 5-inch guns and no missile ^ tn, antiair and antisurface capability is limited.
' ' Gunfire Support Model—At least 17 ships of ^ *5*5-963 class were scheduled to be retrofitted
for ^"'nch guns and would have been very useful b- naval gunfire missions now that the last of the thcruisers has retired. Because of lack of funds, bu-'retaliations will probably not be implemented, variation is listed here as a “type” to show lhis eXibility using common hulls. In addition,
“ l Ic^ea W'P become important when discussing ^Phase-in” principles.
fo ^ ^ntiair Warfare Model—This refers to the r Kidd (DDG-993)-class guided missile destroyers
Ge,
?• 23
t-han an^er i' V. Jolliff, USN, and G. D. Kerr, "Designing for 8e- Present and Future," Proceedings, July 1974, pp. 30-38.
originally intended for Iran but since purchased for the U. S. Navy. These are simply baseline ships with two twin Standard missile launchers.
► (4) Helicopter Model—Three years ago, Congress authorized funds for a version that could have carried four helicopters and perhaps even a vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) plane, but this ship has since been reprogrammed from DDH-997 to DD-997, the 31st ship of the Spruance class.
► (5) Aegis (CG-47)-class Model—This is an ultrasophisticated antiair warfare ship designed to deal with saturation raids. She will have the SPY-1 phased-array radar and twin Standard missile launchers fore and aft.
► (6) “Modernized” Model—She would carry one twin Standard missile launcher, one NATO Sea Sparrow, and two four-tube Harpoon canisters.
► Cl) “Converted” Model—This ship would be similar to the “modernized” version but would have two Standard missile launchers instead of one.
► (8) “Enhanced Combatant” Model—She is described as a “general-purpose” destroyer with provisions for a vertical-launch missile system and other combinations of guns and missiles.
y (9) “Stretched Hangar” Model—This enhanced version of the former DDH-997 would provide for up to seven V/STOL aircraft or ten LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) helicopters. y (10) Flight Deck Model—This type would include a 330-foot runway forward and a 75-foot landing area aft. The ship would be capable of carrying up to 8 V/STOL planes or 14 helicopters.
► (11) Sea-based Air Model—Of all the variants, this is the most theoretical, not yet having been committed to the drawing board state. It is envisioned as a means of accommodating the basic DD-963 hull to future types of sea-based aircraft.
► (12) DDGX Model—This lightweight (7,000-ton) version uses the basic DD-963 hull with a combat system that includes a multifunction phased-array radar. The rationale for the design is to provide a less costly AAW ship than the CG-47 without producing a completely new design.
Consideration might also be given to a (13) “Flag” model. With the retirement of the cruisers Albany (CG-10) and Oklahoma (CG-5), the Sixth and Seventh Fleet flagships for the first time are now noncombat-
ants. The Spruance hull is large enough for more electronics and communication equipment, and most commanders would rather have a “warship” than a communication ship. Moreover, a Spruance type with an 8-inch gun forward and perhaps missiles aft would have more “presence” than any noncombatant.
Finally, but for the purpose of this article, the most important model is the (14) “SeaMod” variant, which is essentially a stripped-down DD-963 built to accept different modular weapons and/or electronic suites after construction. Figure 1 shows this concept. This would be the basic model that would be used for the second principle to be discussed, “phase-in.”
While the DD-963 class with at least 14 different variants is the best example for building common hulls constantly and then providing for their use, there are many other possibilities. Space precludes listing them all, but they might include such diverse types as frigates, Coast Guard cutters, mine countermeasures ships, amphibious warfare ships, fleet auxiliaries, small aircraft carriers, and even nuclear- powered submarines.
There are undoubtedly many reasons for not using common hulls for different types of ships, the most obvious being the variety of missions they must perform. A V/STOL aircraft carrier (VSS) is not the same as an amphibious assault ship (LPH), and a mine countermeasures ship (MCM) has a different mission than a Coast Guard cutter. Even so, it might be bet-
ter to concentrate on the common features first and worry about differences second. Also, some of these common types might make more sense when I explain the phase-in idea.
Phase-in: While the end goal for the fleet of the 1980s must be sophisticated ships, an individual ship could be phased in to first perform less sophisticated but still important missions. The progression might be as follows:
► (1) SeaMod Hulls—Since the huge mothball fleet which grew out of World War II has now all but disappeared, building a few ships for that purpose could be useful. A more practical phase-in could be to build a few ships without weapons or sensors and operate them as engineering schools. The gas turbine is fast becoming a standard engine type for U. S- warships, so a few on each coast for engineering students could serve a useful purpose.
y (2) Gunfire Support Models—A few ships with just one gun apiece could be useful for gunnery training, but better for fleet service would be two-gunned DD-963S, especially if they carried 8-inch guns. Building at least six of these gunfire support types would allow keeping one with each deployed amphibious group.
► (3) “Double-Enders”—Another option would be to build a few ships for antiair missions with just missile launchers.
► (4) Two-Gun/Two-Missile—At the first major overhaul, the missiles could be added to the gun ships and vice versa.
► (3) DDGX—Finally, during another major overhaul, the Aegis II system (which, I hope, will be in a more modular form) could be added, giving the fleet a fully sophisticated ship.
In other words, a DD-963 variant could operate for the first few years as a “gun platform.” During her first overhaul, she would get missiles, and at the next major overhaul, she would receive an Aegis II system. The whole phase-in might take ten years.
Besides the example above, there are other combinations with helicopters, Harpoon, Phalanx, Tomahawk, and various sensor combinations. For instance, first-phase gun ships might not get their full radar facilities until the first overhaul. Frigates could also be phased in, and a stripped version might find export possibilities to allied nations as a “Standard Frigate.” A phase-in scheme has also been suggested for mine warfare ships and Coast Guard cutters. They would operate first as Coast Guard ships and
3See Lieutenant Rex A. Buddenberg, USCG, Proceedings, October 1979' p. 24.
phased
ln as mine ships. Until the debate over
TODD SHIPYARDS
\
,t n ^an<^ perhaps only if deemed necessary) would be
Uiuu ixiv. ui-L/aiv. u*ci
is finally settled, a common ship could first e used as an LPH and later as a VSS.
CQ common LSD/LPD (amphibious landing ship) u go through at least three phases. First, a TwPPeU cou^ be used for training purposes, k 0 or> each coast for training would be welcomed sJ h e anc^ Marine Corps. At the second phase,
c ,!St'Cated sensors> communications, and weapons LSD a^e<^’ mahing her a fully "deployable”
^ ' flna%, there could be a third phase in which we ,^e^toPter (°r perhaps even V/STOL facilities) °u be added, making the ship an LPD. Similarly, 0nini0n AOE/AOR fleet replenishment ships could be ated for a few years simply as AOs and at the CaeXt -ai°r overhaul get their “E” and "R”
■ Pa *kties. Merchant/auxiliary types could be a ,, ln by first operating them commercially
add °r ^ Mllltafy Sealift Command ships and then sensors and weapons for use as naval auxiliaries and if necessary.
ad eack rype obviously has different
phaabuity for "phase-in,” there are at least three Caj,Ses any ship can go through. These might be Ph C C^e "k°me fleet” phase, the "deployable”
‘‘h^6' an<^ t^len cbe 'fully deployable” phase. The hu,-^eet phase could range from building some p,at* or cbc mothball fleet to making them training fhe \jrrnS C° a Pos*r*on of giving them first to
tHeava^ Reserve Force. The whole process of giving &ettreSerV*StS sbips could be reversed with them and,nS new ships, albeit ones without full sensor wVVeaponry capacity. The “deployable” phase w mvolve giving the ships enough sensors and Se P°ns to make them good backup ships for the and Third Fleets with some limited Sixth and a DDth ^^eet capability. Would it be better to have Um-^3 with only guns (preferably 8-inch) but no a(. a„ S*le^os screening an amphibious group, or no ship giv F‘na'ly. t*le bally deployable” phase would be ^ H a ship a complete weapons, sensor, and com- 'cation suite to operate in all forward areas.
stud 0t*ler P°'nts should be mentioned. First, sh *eS FlaVe sb°wn that approximately 30% of a C°St ^°eS t0 electr°nics. For the price of one CH 7> about three baseline DD-963S could be pur- So^e ‘ Another point is personnel costs. With per- HU(,nt taking up the largest part of the Navy °tt:’ every ship with fewer weapons and sensors Ans cbat fewer personnel are required.
Cent P°‘nt to consider Is that, to a certain ex
’ Cbe Navy is using “phase-in” principles already.
J
BATH IRON WORKS
Under the present system, sister ships such as the George Philip (FFG-12) and Samuel Eliot Morison (FFG-13) are built on opposite sides of the country. The author proposes that an individual type would be the specialty of a single yard building ships constantly.
The LAMPS 111 helicopters planned for the Spruance and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) classes will not be available for years, and weapon systems such as the Phalanx and Harpoon are being phased in on ships already built.
Quick Fix: With common hulls being built constantly and phase-in taking up to ten years, there is an obvious risk. At some point, a war can start, and not all ships will be in the final phase. Therefore, the Navy must be prepared for quick fixes. Since even the simplest ship takes about four years to build, there are obviously no quick fixes for building ships. But if hulls are available, especially hulls with readily acceptable modular units, there are some quick fixes that could turn any hull into a fairly formidable ship in a very few weeks or even days. Some of these include the following:
► Helicopters Any helicopter would at least add line-of-sight capabilities; even a fairly unsophisticated helicopter can drop a sonobuoy or a homing torpedo. Army helicopters could be used in an emergency.
\ V/SIOL This could also be done quickly, at least for some ships.
► Harpoon Four Harpoon missile canisters can be placed on anything from a small hydrofoil to the largest ship. In a few days, they could give the most unsophisticated ships an antiship missile capability.
► Phalanx This self-contained close-in weapon system can also be placed on quite easily and, in fact, took only three days to install on a test ship.
\ Tomahawk—These cruise missiles will be extremely flexible weapons for use in everything from planes to submarines.
► Black Boxes”—Electronics experts would argue
that the most important “weapon” any ship will have is sophisticated electronic countermeasures, and they can be readily added.
► Sophisticated Ammunition—Depending on the threat expected, antiair missiles can be changed for antisubmarine or even surface-to-surface missiles as the case may be. Even gun ammunition can be changed. There are some exciting projectiles being developed such as laser guided and rocket assisted.
Conclusions: There are certainly disadvantages to the program suggested. First, there is a natural reluctance to build less capable ships, and/or fears that they may never be “phased-in” or that even the “quick fixes” will not be built in sufficient quantities. These are real fears and should be considered. However, there are also many advantages, which, in this author’s opinion, outweigh the disadvantages:
► Quantity—The first advantage and the main purpose of the whole program is to build up the size of the fleet. Building common hulls constantly should do just that.
► Quality—Eventually, the end goal is sophisticated ships. Along the way, there is capacity for growth so we aren’t stuck with permanently “low” ships as in a “high-low” mix.
► More types—Under current plans, the Navy will be receiving very few, if any, flagships, amphibious warfare ships, minecraft, or V/STOL carriers. Building common hulls constantly could add some of these.
► More flexibility—Both the Navy and Marine Corps would like some gunfire support ships, but there are simply not enough ships to go around. However, a phased-in ship that operated as a gunfire ship for a few years could satisfy both concerns.
► Toward a “balanced fleet”—When a navy has quantity, quality, and more types with more flexibility, it is a truly “balanced” fleet. That would be the real goal of the program.
► Cost—If built “constantly,” warships should end up being cheaper. The “on again, off again” or "stretching out” programs to save money for one year do not end up saving money in the long run.
\ Maintain industrial base—With one yard building DD-963 variants constantly, another a common LSD/LPD, another AO-types and a fourth merchant/ auxiliary ships, that should halt the decline of U. S- shipbuilding and help maintain a base important for both economic and military reasons.
The Navy’s shipbuilding program is in serious trouble. Because of the Iranian crisis and the commitment to NATO for an increase in defense spending there could be a slight increase of funds for the next few years, but the long-term outlook for the 1980s will probably still have a fleet shrinking below 400 active ships while that of the Soviet Navy will be almost twice as large. Clearly, something has to be done. The proposal put forth here does, at least, present a system. There will probably always be debates over large versus small ships, nuclear power versus conventional power, large aircraft carriers versus V/STOL carriers, whether to build high-technology ships, and so forth. But there is one point that about all can agree on—the Navy needs more ships.
______________________________________ Good Neighbor ------------- —----- —_________________________
Because the Navy is “dry,” many foreign Naval officers have had experience with U. S. officers wangling invitations to come aboard their ships in the hope of getting a drink.
During the Korean War, a U. S. destroyer on patrol duty along the North Korean coast was anchored near a Canadian destroyer which had proven far more alert at spotting suspicious activity ashore than the American ship, even though we had at least twice as much radar equipment.
Thinking this was an opportunity to learn from experts, the American captain sent off the following message: “Request permission for commanding officer and gunnery officer to come aboard to discuss operations.”
Back came an immediate reply: “Come aboard, under any pretext.”
D. Dolphin
(The Naval Institute will pay $15.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
In
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C,
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In
Lieutenant George was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1961 and served in several ships be- __ fore being retired because of cancer in 1967. He
has since earned an M.A. (1969) and Ph.U
[2] \ c (1972) in international relations from the Univer-
^^fA M-1 s'ty of Maryland and has done postgraduate work As* at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. Since 1974, he has been a professional staff member in Congress. He is now on the staff of the House Government Operations Committee and lives in Derwood, Maryland. Lieutenant George was the winner of the Naval Institute’s 1978 General Prize Essay Contest and first runnerup in the 1979 contest. He edited Problems of Sea Power as Vde Approach the Twenty-first Century, published by the American Enterprise Institute.