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Even during the 1880s, the idea of an isthmian canal for moving U. S. warships quickly from one ocean to the other was a familiar one. But the proponents of a Bake Nicaragua naval base went a step beyond advocating a strong U. S. squadron based in Nicaragua and ready to move in either direction, creating what ?night be called a two-ocean, one-lake navy.
By the 1880s, most knowledgeable Americans Were certain that a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans would soon be built. A French company headed by Ferdinand de Lesseps was already at Work on the Isthmus of Panama. Meanwhile, private entrepreneurs and some U. S. Government officials Were promoting routes across Nicaragua and Tehuan- tapec, Mexico. American leaders, sensitive to their constituents’ feelings about the Monroe Doctrine, declared that any canal built had to be under the control of the United States. The statesmen also moved to ensure that the sea-lanes leading to Central America were free of domination by any great power. In the mid-Pacific, the United States tightened its grip on Hawaii and Samoa, partly in anticipation of a canal and the increased flow of trade it would bring.
A policy of control and commitment was difficult to implement safely without a modicum of military power, which the United States, for all its wealth, did not possess. The nation held a considerable geographical advantage over Europe in the Caribbean and in the Pacific, but the disproportion of military forces more than nullified that advantage. No one understood this fact better than the leaders of America’s first line of defense, the Navy. Small, slow ships armed with old-fashioned weapons were the best the Navy had until the end of the 1880s. Even after America’s first steel cruisers went into commission, the United States remained well behind the great naval powers of the world, a situation which did not change until after the turn of the century. While waiting out the lengthy process of naval development, American naval strategists faced a seemingly insoluble problem: how to defend, with an inferior fleet, the vast coastline of the United States, plus the Caribbean, the Isthmus of Panama, Hawaii, and Samoa against hostile action. It was a strategic predicament that encouraged rabbit-out-of-the-hat thinking. Many solutions were proposed, but it was difficult to distinguish brilliant ideas from those that were merely eccentric.
One point on which virtually all naval officers and most expansionist politicians could agree was the need for overseas naval bases. The Navy was finally turning away from sail and relying extensively on coal, which was consumed rapidly on long cruises. Depots abroad where coal could be kept and ships repaired appeared to be a necessity. This was widely recognized in the service. Many naval officers had their eyes on their own favorite foreign bay or roadstead, which they described in glowing terms to anyone who would listen. For a time, the most enthusiastically boosted of these sites—although also the most anomalous, being remote from salt water and isolated from the sea except by a small, meandering river—was Lake Nicaragua in Central America. In the words of one true believer, William L. Merry: ‘‘Gibraltar, Aden, or the Bosporus do not compare with it in the value of its military position. Upon its bosom an iron-clad fleet may float in fresh water, in a delightful climate, surrounded by a territory producing supplies for fleets and armies.”1
This author was not alone in proclaiming the immense value of the lake. The idea of an American naval base in that inland sea” gained wide acceptance as Central America came increasingly into the spotlight.
The idea of an isthmian canal for moving warships quickly from one ocean to the other was a familiar one, of course. But the Nicaragua advocates proposed more than that. They envisioned a strong American battle squadron based in Nicaragua, ready to move in either direction, creating what might be called a two-ocean, one-lake navy. According to its proponents, the lake promised to be “a healthy and capacious water-fortress.”2 On the question of capacity, there was little doubt. Lake Nicaragua encompasses an area of more than 3,000 square miles, is more than 100 miles long, and averages about 45 miles in width. At some points it is more than 150 feet deep. The lake, if necessary, could have accommodated all the ships of the U. S. Navy and many more. However, the claim that Nicaragua was an absolutely healthful country was less persuasive. During the years of intense debate over the merits of a Nicaragua route versus a Panama canal route, it was the habit of the Nicaragua partisans to compare that country favorably to Panama. Like many of the arguments in the canal controversy7, this one rested on selective evidence. For example, history showed that no less a naval authority than Horatio Nelson, while still a young captain in the Royal Navy, had singled out Lake Nicaragua as "the inland Gibraltar of Spanish America”—wonderful testimony for the Nicaragua advocates to use, one would suppose. Yet the future Lord Nelson’s statements were never cited. The reason, apparently, was that the expeditionary force which Nelson led into the interior of Nicaragua in 1779 had been forced to withdraw, decimated by disease. To avoid exposing this awkward fact, the Nicaragua enthusiasts kept quiet about Nelson.
But there were other arguments at hand. In the fresh water, barnacles would die and drop off the hulls of ships based there, benefiting both the speed of the ships and the Navy budget. Lying many miles up the proposed canal from the ports of San Juan del Norte on the Caribbean and Brito on the Pacific, and sheltered by nature against attack from both sides, vessels in the lake could refit in perfect safety. But most importantly, the fleet could perform a vital strategic mission. In the words of Commander Henry Clay Taylor, U. S. Navy, it could stand ready “at a telegraphic sign from the home government to issue
For footnotes, please turn to page 60.
fully equipped from either entrance for instant service in the Atlantic or Pacific” to defend American interests.3
The naval base idea was usually presented in the context of a broader project—that is, as only one justification for constructing a Nicaragua canal. Several American business groups during this period sought canal concessions from the governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica (whose borders the lake also touched). The best known and most successful these was the Maritime Canal Company, which actually began construction on the basis of a concession granted in 1887. The members of this corporation and their political allies in Washington were effective publicists for an isthmian waterway, and as time passed and private capital proved inadequate for the project, they sought political and financial aid from the f-deral government. It was at this stage that their public relations campaign reached its peak. For several years, Congress considered various schemes for bailing out the Maritime Canal Company, while a primitive version of a “media blitz” extolled the charms of Nicaragua.
One of the most prominent publicists was William Merry, former president of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. Merry also acted as consul- general for Nicaragua in San Francisco and later as U. S. Minister to the nations of Central America- Merry catalogued the advantages of a Nicaragua Canal in several magazine articles, always stressing the naval station idea. In 1890, he envisioned an American fleet based in Lake Nicaragua, controlling the seas as far east as the Windward Islands and as far west as Samoa. Beyond a doubt, wrote Merry,
. . . the nation that . . . controls Lake Nicaragua will then control the destiny of the Western Hemisphere; it will be, in fact, a constant assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, securing respect for its requirements by peaceable possession of power
to assert them. The foreign policy of our country will become of greater importance every year. . . • The public demand for a modern navy indicates the will of our countrymen on this momentous
question.”4 , .
3 pamphlet published in 1890 by the Maritime Canal Company sounded a variation on the same theme:
“Placed thus advantageously [in the lake], one fleet would readily do the work of two, and with a naval depot thus conveniently located, the Pacific Coast and our Alaskan possessions, as well as our commerce on both oceans, would be as well- guarded as our Atlantic coast.
In the halls of Congress, important men were convinced. John Tyler Morgan, a powerful senator from Alabama and an ardent canal advocate, vied with the canal company in hyperbole. In 1887, Morgan told
senatorial colleagues that for a nation with a reasonably large battle fleet, the possession of La "e Nicaragua would confer more military povser than any other location on earth. Distrusting Morgan s theories, Senator Randall Lee Gibson of Louisiana replied that if there were a chance of war, he would not Place the Navy in Lake Nicaragua without the recommendation of every senior officer in the service. Gibson pointed out the evident danger of a blockade by the enemy. Senator George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts also foresaw the fleet becoming entrapped, and he singled out the British Navy as the probable Strapper.
Faced with this criticism, Morgan took several days to marshal further strategical arguments. These Were not altogether convincing. First, he declared that it would take two fleets to contain the one in the lake and that each opposing fleet would have to be at least as powerful as the American one. If the opposition closed only one end of the transitway say the Atlantic—the American warships might emerge on the other side, and the United States might "let loose the dogs of war” upon Australia or Canada. “But I will not detain the Senate by arguing this military question,” Morgan concluded. "I have the authority of some of the highest officers in the Navy ... in support of the proposition.Other senators also accepted the lake scheme. Senator Joseph N. Dolph of Oregon, for example, used the idea repeatedly in arguing for the Nicaragua canal.
Morgan’s assertion about some of the highest officers in the Navy is impossible to verify completely. But it is safe to say that without the backing of some influential naval authorities, the naval base idea would never have become popular. Indisputably, certain important naval figures did embrace the scheme.
Rear Admiral Daniel Ammen supported it, as did Captain Arent Schuyler Crowninshield and Commander Taylor. Ammen had been the chief of several Navy bureaus, and Crowninshield later became chief of the powerful Bureau of Navigation and a member of the Naval Strategy Board, which controlled operations during the war with Spain. Taylor became President of the Naval War College in 1893 and later succeeded to the Navigation Bureau. It is not surprising that such men won over many who were unversed in naval affairs.
What is surprising, however, is that able officers urged so unsound a scheme. In retrospect, the criticism of amateurs like Senators Gibson and Hoar appears much more reasonable than the effusions of Commander Taylor. Warships in the lake would have stood in constant danger of being bottled up by simple acts of sabotage. Even assuming that this did not occur, a substantial fleet there would have invited a blockade, which probably could have been effected by an inferior force. Warships emerging from the canal could have been engaged and destroyed one at a time. An example of a similar situation was the disastrous Spanish sortie from Santiago de Cuba in 1898. Nor could intelligence information have been depended upon to warn of the approach of a hostile force; the Spanish-American war would soon demonstrate how elusive large battle fleets could be. Much more time would have been required to pass out of the lake, through the canal, and into the open sea than would have been the case in leaving most harbors. Finally, “loosing the dogs of war” on Australia would scarcely have been adequate compensation for the bites that would surely have been received by coastal cities like New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, and by American shipping on the Atlantic. In sum, Nicaragua was a strange place to want to
put a large contingent of American warships—which were none too plentiful in any case. In 1898, when Crowninshield suggested putting battleships and cruisers there, the United States had only four battleships in commission.[1][2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] As a base for two or three smaller vessels assigned to police the Latin American nations, the lake idea might have made more sense. But the scheme seems never to have taken this form.
To understand how this picturesque scheme evolved, one must turn again to the larger issue of the Nicaragua canal, because a quasi-missionary zeal for the canal certainly led many to grasp the naval base argument as further ammunition for their cause. Many of the men involved had direct ties to the canal company. Ammen, Taylor, and Crowninshield were among the organizers of the company; Taylor was also vice president and general manager of the firm for two years while on a leave of absence from the Navy. William Merry had close political ties in Nicaragua which almost certainly colored his views. This is not to impugn the integrity of these men; they did hold stock in the canal enterprise, but not a significant amount. Like Morgan and other canal boosters, they were consumed by the need to push through a worthwhile undertaking in the face of carping opposition, some of which came from the transcontinental railroad companies, which saw their profits threatened. And these men did not put forth the Lake Nicaragua idea insincerely; they seem to have genuinely believed in it. In the heat of the canal debate, however, their zeal overcame their professional acumen. Convinced that a canal would benefit the United States, at the same time they desperately grasped at a way of defending American interests with inadequate naval resources.
Historians will probably never know exactly how much support the lake idea attracted in the upper echelons of the Navy, but it is clear that some important officers never endorsed it. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, while strongly recommending construction of the Nicaragua canal in several articles, invariably emphasized the commercial advantages of such a waterway. He did not suggest placing a fleet in the lake.[8] And as time passed, naval interest in the lake declined. Captain Crowninshield signaled this in an article he published in 1899. There, he played up the frantic voyage of the battleship Oregon around Cape Horn at the outbreak of the Spanish- American War, and he also concentrated on the importance of American warships being able to move rapidly from one theater of operations to another. He thus made a strong case for a canal, but Lake Nicaragua was not mentioned as important in itself The fresh water naval base idea was quietly dropped- By adopting this modification of their theory, the Nicaragua canal group retired to a more defensible position. Their problem thenceforth was that their argument worked equally well for a Panama Canal- When President Theodore Roosevelt “took the Isthmus” in 1903, it was the Isthmus of Panama that he took—and it contained no capacious lakes.
f Lieutenant Commander Wicks served active duty with the Navy on board the VSSAskari (ARL-30) and as a communication officer with OpMaV Telecommunications Center. He is currently a member of Naval Intelligence Support Command Unit 0166 in Suitland, Maryland. He holds a B.A. from the University of North Carolina (1968) and an M.A. from the University of Alabama (1973). ln 1978, he received a Ph.D. in history from the University of California at Berkeley, where he also taught. The author of several articles on diplomacy and military history, Lieutenant Commander Wicks now works as a political analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.
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The first Waves to embark for Europe during World War II were given specific instructions regarding security regulations, lifeboat drill, and shipboard conduct, including the wearing of government-issue clothing. One young Wave put on an seductive black chiffon nightie. When called down by her commanding officer, she retorted: “Well, suppose we’re torpedoed—who do you think will be rescued first?”
Audrey Pruneda
'William L. Merry, “The Nicaragua Canal: Its Political Aspects," Forum, February 1892, p. 723.
[2]Henry Clay Taylor, “The Control of the Pacific," Forum, June 1887, P415.
"Ibid.
[4]Merry, “The Nicaragua Canal," reprinted in U. S. Congress, Senate, Nicaragua Canal, 51st Congress, 2nd session, Senate Report No. 1944 (Series 2826), pp. 85-86.
’Reprinted in U. S. Congress, Senate, Nicaragua Canal, 51st Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No. 1944 (Series 2826), p. 71.
Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 2nd session, 1887, XVIII, Part 2, pp- 1444, 1579, 1584, 1722.
These were the Oregon (BB-3), Indiana (BB-1), Massachusetts (BB-2), and the Iowa (BB-4). The Texas, although originally termed a second-class battleship, was not a true ship of that class and by 1898 had been redesignated an armored cruiser. The Maine, which sank at Havana the same year, was similar to the Texas.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Isthmus and Sea Power," Atlantic Monthly, October 1893, pp. 459-472.