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Protection of aircraft carriers against missile attack becotnes easier when the number of carriers and escorts increases, as it did for the Indian Ocean task force shown here. For the most part, though, U. S. carriers and their associated task groups operate individually, and it is then that they are most vulnerable. We must increase the antiair firepower of these task groups, for the air-launched missile is the carriers' foremost threat.
There is no doubt, especially in certain areas of tl>e world, that deployed aircraft carrier task groups face a substantial threat from coordinated missile attacks- Until recently, the U. S. Navy has not given th,s threat the consideration it deserves. This has been true in ship construction programs; in the developin£ and acquiring of proper defensive weapon systems U sufficient quantities; and even in the composition 0 deployed task groups. Even so, a highly effective fense in depth against precision guided missiles can be readily available by equipping existing U. S. 'vaf ships with requisite numbers of defensive weap°nS and electronic countermeasure devices. ,
60
Proceedings / July l9®®
Soviet missiles can be divided into short- an long-range threats. The former can be fired from UP to about 25 miles. The weapon is guided againSt targets acquired by its own sensors—radar, electr0' optical, laser, or infrared—and normally agai°st targets positively identified by the launching shiP’ submarine, or aircraft. For long-range threats, tke enemy ships or aircraft are not in visual contact’ target location and identification require sensors frorn
a'rcraft, ships, or satellites to provide information to C e firing platform and in some cases also to provide ^'d-course guidance to the missiles.
The short-range threat is undoubtedly the more angerous, except for possibly massive or continuous c°ordinated long-range air attacks that might satu- fate the defenses. A large, coordinated short-range attack could occur only in an all-out preemptive str'ke by the Soviet Navy. This is the type of strike U. S. Navy is now least able to defend against.
The aircraft of our carrier task groups have extent capabilities for reacting offensively to a fT'tmptive Soviet Navy attack, provided there are e^°ugh carriers operating together. The carriers have to e able to provide enough fighter, attack, and anti- S|Jfc>rnarine warfare (ASW) aircraft to counter all po- teritial Soviet threats so that their weapon-launching CaPabilities will be reduced to a minimum. HoweVer, the surface Navy’s capability to participate in atl immediate offensive reaction is indeed inadequate. c consists of small numbers of 5-inch guns, Standard and Terrier missiles, and a very few Harpoon missiles. There is thus an urgent requirement for early Harpoon installations on all deploying carrier escorts and for the procurement of guided projectiles for the ships’ guns.
Having covered the offensive response to a preemptive Soviet close-in attack, let us look at the defensive capabilities. It is here that the U. S. Navy has significant weaknesses that need priority improvements. To begin with, the carriers themselves have very few self-defense weapons, in most cases consisting of three Sea Sparrow launchers each. Other major surface ships are even worse off, most having only one or two 5-inch guns to use in self-defense. A few have also been equipped with one Sea Sparrow launcher. Standard missiles could be used in a surface mode against enemy ships but will be only marginally effective against missiles fired at close range (less than 5 miles).
In the threat situation the U. S. Navy faces today, every surface combatant and auxiliary ship needs her own point defense system for use against sea skimmers and short-range surprise launch targets that cannot be detected far enough out for area defense. The point defense systems would also be for missiles that leak through the area defenses. Three systems are available for this close-in defense: Sea Sparrow, Phalanx, and Sea Wolf. Sea Sparrow batteries are being installed on the U. S. Navy’s major surface combatants at a less than urgent rate and in less than required numbers. Each battery includes a launcher with eight missiles and two radar fire control systems. A battery is able to take under fire only two missiles at one time. Both for carriers and their escorts, there is little doubt that more Sea Sparrow batteries are required than those now on board or planned for installation.
To oppose targets that penetrate the Sea Sparrow defenses, the Navy is installing the very effective Phalanx, a 20-mm. “Gatling” gun with a high rate of fire. The slow rate of installation (already four years behind schedule) and the number of installations call for speedup and augmentation. The Royal Navy has developed and is installing Sea Wolf close- in antimissile systems on its ships. Sea Wolf uses both radar and TV tracking modes and is highly maneuverable. The British naturally consider it the best of the available close-in systems, especially against maneuvering and very low-level (sea skimmer) targets. Sea Wolf repeatedly has been able to shoot down high-performance test missiles and gun projectiles in heavy clutter environments with over 85% engagement success.
As a matter of fact, Phalanx, Sea Sparrow, and Sea Wolf have all shown impressive kill results in test firings. Priority acquisition of all three systems should be undertaken by U. S. and allied naval forces for expedited installations on all surface combatants and auxiliaries in numbers and combinations that will provide each ship with an effective close-in antimissile defense.
Two new weapon systems, Ram (rolling airframe missile) and the guided projectile for 5-inch guns,
able RAM (in excess of 20 Gs) is a “fire-and-forget system, so that it is possible to fire successive missiles from the same launchers at different target without delay.
The U. S. Navy plans to install five of these missiles in each of two cells (there are eight cells altogether) in the Sea Sparrow launchers. The German and Danish Navies are planning on 24-missilc launchers. This highly promising program deserves r high priority development and procurement. The . guided projectiles for 5-inch guns will also markedly IT improve the capabilities of the task force, especially M against preemptive missile attack. The two modes() guidance (infrared and laser) will provide a vast improvement for gun systems with this capabil'T against all types of targets.
are scheduled for an initial operational capability around 1981-1982. Both will add to the effectiveness and the versatility of a ship’s close-in defenses. Ram is a joint U. S.-German-Danish system designed to provide a quick reaction defense against highly coordinated antiship missile attacks. This system will complement the Phalanx gun systems and the Sea Sparrow in the short-range defense role. The missile is based on the Navy’s AIM-9L Sidewinder and the Army’s Chaparral missile, using a dual mode guidance (passive radar homing and infrared) to ensure an all-weather capability. It will be designed particularly to combat the low-level attack missile which provides very little warning. The highly maneuver-
Until these gun and missile defenses exist in suffi cient numbers, there will be an added burden on PaS sive defense systems. After the sinking of the de' stroyer Eilat in 1967, the Israeli Navy (in contrast tlj the Israeli Air Force) learned its lesson and instahec on all its ships the proper electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment. As a result, during the 1973 ^otfl Kippur War, although more than 50 Styx miss*leS were fired against Israeli ships, their ECM device5 were 100% effective in jamming or deceiving Styxes’ active radar terminal guidance systems so tha^ no naval ships were hit. In contrast, the Israel's Gabriel antiship missile was highly effective agair>st Syrian warships which had no ECM protection.
Although the U. S. Navy was able to use this les- s°n to push for a modern, automatically actuated Ecm system to neutralize the Soviet missile threat, Installations have not yet been completed on many 'Sh-value ships. Currently, most installed ECM sys- j|ertls on U. S. ships are not automated and do not ave the broad spectrum of jamming and deception evices required to handle the present threat from guidance systems on the Soviet missiles. Most of Soviet missiles use active radar terminal homing |Vlth a home-on-jam capability and/or a terminal in- fared seeker. In addition, newer Soviet missiles are COrning out with passive anti-radiation homing, laser j>u'dance, and electro-optical command link homing ^milar to that of the now-defunct U. S. Condor fissile) which will require still more up-to-date c°untermeasures.
Many ships are waiting for the installation of ^aytheon’s new AN/SLQ-32 antiship missile defense eiectronic warfare suite. It is capable of frequency c°verage in A through J bands and will provide alert Mining of incoming missiles, identify and track p err>, supply the bearing and identification of the lr,r>g source, and display a threat-oriented PPI (plan ^sition indicator) picture. In automatic mode, the ^NSLQ-32 computer selects the best combination of ^ectronic countermeasure responses to each threat, 3ct*vates them, and controls their use. This can in- cMde designation to the Standard missile and close- ln Weapons, activation of active jamming ^uipments, and launching of chaff and infrared ares. This system will also be integrated into the ^avy tactical data system (NTDS). When used in a rrianual mode the system recommends actions to the °f>erator, who then controls the engagement. It is operative that this fine system receive priority acquisition and installation funding.
Most aircraft carriers are also waiting for comparable protection from the Hughes AN/SLQ-17. An even more sophisticated ECM system for defense against cruise missile attacks, it is designed to detect, track, and identify cruise missiles and to jam or deceive their guidance systems. Finally, most ships are waiting for installation of the Mark 36 Chaffroc launchers (RBOC—rapid bloom offboard countermeasures). They can launch containers which rapidly form a large chaff cloud or infrared decoys or a combination of chaff and infrared cartridges.
To delay the acquisition and installation of these countermeasure equipments could threaten the survival of major U. S. naval combatants in a shooting war. Further, these ECM systems should be kept up to date with all new Soviet electronic warfare threats. As an example, it is reported that the radar seekers of all Soviet radar-guided weapons employ some form of frequency agility. To counter this capability would require a computerized automatic rapid frequency agility response from a defensive ECM system. This puts increased emphasis on intelligence support to all levels of electronic warfare (EW) activities. Recently, NATO’s intelligence organization has been reorganized to provide improved intelligence support for EW, and EW sections are being formed on all major NATO command headquarters staffs.
After the initial day of hostilities between U. S. and Soviet naval forces, the close-range antiship missile threat will have been reduced substantially. There might be an occasional “Charlie”-type submarine, or—even less likely—a group of Soviet tactical aircraft such as MiG 27 “Floggers,” Su 17 “Fitters,” and Su 19 “Fencers” might penetrate the task group’s outer defenses and employ short-range missiles.
The primary threat at that point would be from long-range air-to-surface missiles carried by Soviet naval bombers—“Badgers” and “Backfires.” The surest way to stop this threat as soon as possible would be to attack the bomber bases inside the Soviet Union. However, to do so requires a very accurate long-range standoff weapon such as the conventional Tomahawk missile. Only such a weapon would avoid the need for U. S. tactical aircraft to try to penetrate the Soviet air defenses and possibly incur
to
Phoenix missiles in stock on board the carriers
unacceptable aircraft losses as a result. The highly accurate land attack, 1,500-mile version of Tomahawk, with a newly designed conventional warhead, reportedly has a destruction capability approaching that of a small nuclear warhead. Hence, one can view with alarm (especially if one is concerned with the defense of naval task groups against mass bomber attacks) any delay in the development, purchase, and deployment of this weapon.
In the U. S. Navy’s fight against Soviet bombers with their long-range air-to-surface missiles, it will receive some help from outside sources. For example, the NADGE (NATO air defense ground environment) system stretching from Norway to Turkey should provide the Navy task group commander with advance warning of bomber attacks and in some cases would be able to attempt intercepts of the bombers both going and coming. A gap in this system that would have allowed Soviet bombers flying at low level to proceed undetected around Northern Norway and into the North Atlantic has recently been sealed by the assignment of an AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft patrolling the G-I-UK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) gap. F-4 aircraft based in Iceland and Tornado aircraft soon to be based in the northern United Kingdom will be available to aid in intercepting Soviet bomber flights attempting to penetrate the Iceland-U.K. gap.
In the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, studies show that three carriers are needed in order to be sure of countering the Soviet Navy and air threat in times of tension, but a third carrier may not be available because of higher priority tasks. Indeed, the second has been drawn away in recent months to operate in the Indian Ocean. The stationing of a Marine Corps air wing at either Sigonella, Sicily, or a base on Crete would significantly improve the Sixth Fleet’s chances of successfully obtaining sea and air control of these vital areas. This air wing would then be in place to assist the Sixth Fleet in any projection of Marine Corps power ashore on NATO’s southern flank.
In the northwestern Pacific, early warning of Soviet bomber attacks would come from Japanese ground radars, augmented by recently acquired E-2C early warning aircraft. Possible interception of the Soviet flights by Japanese or U. S. Air Force fighters as they fly by Japan would help reduce the fleet air defense problems in this area.
The primary defense against the Soviet naval bombers remains with U. S. E-2C early warning planes and F-14 fighters armed with Phoenix missiles. These two planes undoubtedly form the world’s best interceptor combination. The Soviets, however, have a national doctrine of integrated electronic warfare and can be expected to mount a campaign to targ£t the Navy task group’s primary detection, command and control centers for the defense of the task force—the E-2Cs. The Soviets may attempt to (a) janl the plane’s radar (very difficult for them to aC' complish), (b) jam its data link and communicati°n channels, and/or (c) attack the E-2C itself, either with air-to-air missiles or long-range fighter aircraft. B0^1 the Navy and Air Force are funding programs in th1* area which should ease the threat to data link an communication jamming. If unjammable data hn^ and/or communication channels are available, the11 the E-2C will have its own task group F-14 fighterst0 ward off any attempted attack on the E-2C itsel ■ Further homing in with long-range anti-radiati°n missiles on the E-2C’s radar signals is a difficult pr°b lem because the wavelength of the UHF antenn3 makes it a difficult target for an anti-radiati0(1 weapon. However, general prudence should provi^f the E-2C with a jamming, chaff, and infrared sel defense system.
The F-14 half of the Navy’s defense agai°st bomber/antishipping missile attacks is also admiral/ suited for the task. Its high-powered radar is capabb of burning through most jamming and of reliably detecting targets out to 100 miles. It has a fire-ana' forget system capable of simultaneously firing its S1 Phoenix missiles against six different targets. Phoenix has demonstrated successful launches againSt targets simulating “Backfires” with protective jillfl ming, against Mach 2-plus targets over 80,000 feet simulating “Foxbats,” and against sea skimmer cruise missiles flying at 50-200 feet.
Programs are currently under way to improve hot the plane’s radar and the Phoenix missib 5 capabilities to operate successfully in a severe eleC tronic countermeasure environment. Wartime plafb ning should also ensure sufficient numbers 0 meet the initial threat without depending on re plenishment missiles.
With an E-2C early warning aircraft orbiting 11 50-100 miles from the force in the direction of c^e threat and the F-14 combat air patrol orbiting nearby’ any bomber formation approaching the task f°fCe will be intercepted by the F-14/Phoenix missileS ^ well over 200 miles from the force, very probaP i prior to the launching of missiles. The attriti011 caused by 10-16 F-l4s from each of the two or thr^ carriers operating as a task group will be consideraP against almost any size bomber force the Soviet might be capable of coordinating. Obviously recog nizing this threat, the Soviets are reportedly devel°P ing a 500-600-nautical mile Mach 3.5 air-to-surface
fissile. It would be carried by the “Backfire” to re- Ptace the Mach 3.0 AS-6 "Kingfish,” which has a J^nge of up to 150 nautical miles. The new missile as been tested but is not yet operational.
Undoubtedly, some Soviet bombers will be able to Penetrate the E-2C/F-14 defense net to reach the mis- S,U launching point. However, picking out their targets and providing mid-course guidance to their ^'ssiles will remain problems, since their radars and C°mmunication links will be subject to jamming by
EA-6B aircraft and to deception by shipboard electronic countermeasures devices. Studies of effectiveness of air-launched missile attacks on ships show that being able to select the correct target (the carrier) and to coordinate attacks so that enough missiles arrive at the target at the same rime to saturate its close-in defenses are two of the more important factors contributing to the success of an attack. With EA-6Bs jamming the Soviet bombers’ radars and communication systems and with F-l4s shooting the bombers down, the large confusion factor should be able to make an effective coordinated attack most unlikely.
Assuming some Soviet bombers are able to penetrate the outer defenses and launch their missiles, then an important part of the defense falls on the intermediate and long-range surface-to-air missiles of the task group. It is here that the carrier task group
The heart of the carrier air group's threat against Soviet bombers lies in the combination of the F-14 fighter (here firing its Phoenix missile) and the E-2C early warning aircraft, shown flying in formation near the Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69).
COURTESY VAW-121
theif
missiles. The concept of including in carrier taS|j groups frigates with either no or only one Stands missile launcher and capable of only 27 knots speeU (they can’t begin to keep up with the carrier’s 33 knoc seems unsound to begin with. It also seems unnecessary when the Navy has 27 guided missile cruisers and i guided missile destroyers. On a one-for-three depl°/ ment basis, this would permit two antiair guided a1'5
sad1 The
the Soviets were to employ nuclear warheads on
needs major improvement both in the quantity and quality of its defensive missile systems. The Standard II (SM-2) missile now becoming operational on the Navy’s major surface combatants has demonstrated itself to be a good weapon against difficult missile targets. When the SM-2 has replaced all existing Terrier, Tartar, and Standard I missiles, the quality will be there. It is the quantity that is woefully lacking to meet the threat and merits high priority improvement. The Navy must increase the number of Standard missile launchers to a minimum of two on each carrier escort ship, and there should be adequate magazine space for the stowage of at least 40 missiles per launcher.
One has only to look at the two task groups which were operating in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1979 to wonder about both the Navy’s ship designs and its deployment policies. We are talking, after all, about an area more likely than most in which to have an encounter with Soviet naval and air forces and an area where perceptions affect the deterrent posture. One of the carrier task groups had a Virginia (CGN-39)-class cruiser with two dual Standard launchers, a California (CGN-36)-class cruiser with two single Standard launchers, a Garcia (FF-1040)- class frigate with no missile launchers, a Brow1 (FFG-l)-class guided missile frigate with one Stands launcher (16 missiles), and a Knox (FF-1052K*aSS frigate with no missile launchers and only a Sea Sp3f' row launcher for self-defense. The other task gf°aP had a Leahy (CG-l6)-class cruiser with two du3 Standard launchers, a Spruance (DD-963)-class de' stroyer with no missile launchers, a Charles F. Ada,ll! (DDG-2)- class guided missile destroyer with one tw,n Standard launcher, a Coontz (DDG-40)-class guided mlS' sile destroyer with one twin Standard launcher, and3 Knox-class frigate with Sea Sparrow.
Because of the number of missile launchers and f,re control radars available, the first task group’s esc°ft ships could shoot at only ten targets at once and the second, at only eight. This limited capability won not be able to stand up to the threat in such areas as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea. 11 importance of adequate numbers of effective area 1 fense missiles would become even more significant1
sile cruisers and three guided missile destroyers forea' group of the four deployed carrier task groups- 1 ^ additional ships required for antisubmarine defense5 the carrier task force should be destroyers, not frig3^5' The four Kidd (DDG-993)-class guided missile e stroyers originally destined for Iran are about to joinr fleet. They have both the ASW and AAW capabilit*eS^ make good task force escorts. Consideration should given to converting the Spruance (DD-963)-class stroyers to a similar configuration.
lyP
Antimissile defenses will be even better with c addition of systems now in the research and devel°P ment or building stage. The first of these is the Til0>1 deroga (CG-47) class of cruisers now under construct!0^’ the first ship is scheduled to enter the fleet in 19 j Aegis, with its new AN/SPY-1 radar and Standard missiles, is a fully automated system, capable of ^et?C|e ing, identifying, tracking, and engaging mult'P targets at long ranges. Since Aegis will provide a c°° spicuously enhanced air defense capability to the cart task group, means of expediting its arrival in the f*e in numbers should be explored. Perhaps the Na could parallel the CG-47 building program with c backfit of Aegis installations on some of the ne"'
er quantum improvement in carrier group enses will be the advent of the F/A-18 replacing the ^ attack planes on board carriers. When equipped ^‘th the new advanced medium-range air-to-air mis- S|^e (AMRAAM), scheduled to replace the AIM-7F in the '^'d-1980s, the F-18 will significantly enhance a task Coup’s defensive capabilities. However, in no way S °uld the F/A-18 be considered as a replacement for the '•4 in the air defense role. It is just not equipped to be ^nsidered as the primary air defense weapon system. Tent plans to equip only 9 of the Navy’s 12 carrier
nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers. Unfortu- "ately, the reverse seems to be happening. The latest IVe-year defense plan calls for CG-47 class acquisition to substantially reduced because of budgetary constraints.
Anothi def(
Cu:
a,r groups with F-14 squadrons should be changed in V|e\v of the continually growing air and missile threat ln aH ocean areas.
There are several other new technology devel- 0ptnents destined for the U. S. Navy in the near future as close-in air defense weapons for large ships. Recent ttsts have shown considerable promise with high- energy laser beams destroying high-speed antitank rtllSs*les in flight. Its developers are already touting it as a most attractive near-term candidate for use in e‘ense of large ships against missile attacks, and a 8°'ahead has been given for the development of laser "eapons with $195 million in research and develop- j^ent funds requested in DoD’s fiscal year 1981 ^udget. Another new system is the charged particle eam weapons. Propagation tests are scheduled in late
° 1 to determine whether such a weapon is feasible for eployment on Navy ships in the mid- 1980s. Initially, f Would be used against Soviet cruise missiles and u ^mately against ballistic missiles as well. The beam Capons development program has now become a high ^Tority national program. In the field of countermeaSUres the new, fully automated ECM systems should c°ntinue to be installed on an urgent basis and should be updated as required to meet new threats. New sophisticated infrared jammers have been developed to emit powerful rays which overload the infrared missile’s seeker and cause it to lose lock on the target. Systems to defeat laser seekers and electro-optical seekers are also under development. All these should be acquired and installed on the task group ships as they become available. Finally, an effective airborne communication jammer that will interfere with Soviet command and control systems for use in the EA-6B aircraft is required. “Compass Call,” under development by the U. S. Air Force, or the ALQ-149, under development by the Navy, should handle this task.
In summary, the aircraft carrier and her accompanying task group can be successfully defended against the threat of Soviet antishipping missiles, provided the Navy assigns the necessary priority to equipping its ships with the required systems. Less emphasis should be placed on building frigates and destroyers for escorting convoys across the Atlantic—a highly unlikely mission at best and an impossible one without control of the air. More emphasis should be given to ensuring the survival of the carrier in a high-threat missile environment. The carrier remains the one weapon system that ensures retention by the West of maritime supremacy. Her defense should be accorded a commensurate priority.
Captain Lacouture, a 1940 graduate of the Naval Academy, served in fighter and attack squadrons prior to commanding the USS Diamond Head (AE- 17) and the \3$>SSaratoga (CVA-60). He was assistant director of Tactical Test at the Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center, first program manager for the F-4, SACLant’s representative in Europe, chief of staff to Commander Task Force 77, deputy director of the Naval Aviation Plans and Requirements Division of OpNav, and Commander Fleet Air Lemoore. Following his retirement from active duty in 1970, Captain Lacouture worked for LTV Aerospace and recently completed a period of study in England at the University of Cambridge. He lives in Bethesda, Maryland.
.Arms and the Man
At Pearl Harbor during the early months of World War II, armed enlisted men were used a fiessengers to pick up and deliver classified documents around the huge Navy yard. ^en> in an effort to meet the needs of its rapidly expanding fleet, the Navy decided that e enlisted men could be assigned to sea duty and be replaced ashore by Waves. But Sotr>eone had goofed, for Waves were not permitted to carry weapons. The solution? An rrried enlisted man was ordered to accompany each Wave on her rounds.
Audrey Livingston
Kb.
Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)