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“At current trends, by 2000 the Soviets will be outspending our Navy every year by 50 percent.” If this is so, how should the U. S. Navy shape itself for the new century? It must replace ships such as the Reeves (CG 24), for this very month she is marking her 16th birthday and soon the threats to the ships she was built to protect will be beyond her power to overcome. But for the Navy to do so, it must give up some things it now has. The photograph opposite shows the Reeves moored fore and aft at Port Louis, capital of the Indian Ocean island-state of Mauritius. Formerly, U. S. task forces seldom visited the Indian Ocean. Now they are always there. Something must be given up for that, too, and right away.
.he nucleus of the fleet in the year 2000 exists today. If no combatant ships were built between now and 1999, we would still enter the 21st century with over 300 ships in the fleet. So for th£| most part changes to the force structure will be marginal and evo-J lutionary, not massive and revolutionary.
Moreover, the future of the U. S. Navy will not be determined! by any individual, agency of the executive branch, or committee off Congress. The Navy will evolve in accordance with the national mood; and even now the mood of this nation is not one of gravitfl as regards the country’s security. Soviet naval investment exceed*! ours by from 20 to 40 percent.1 This is not to imply that the moodj is frivolous. It certainly is not. Many serious-minded and influeO'l tial Americans, however, do not perceive our naval forces as facinjl a long-term problem, They sincerely believe that, whatever may b£P the size of the Navy’s budget, or the numbers of ships authorized! any potential problem could be averted if the Navy were to manag£ itself more sensibly or more frugally than it does.
For a host of reasons, particularly the Vietnam experience'] America has attempted to withdraw from its world responsibilities-1 Some threats posed to important U. S. interests have been ratiofl'1 alized away. Obviously, if there is no threat, there is no need f°T capable military forces. Sped on by events in Iran, Afghanistan! and elsewhere, the mood may be changing. The debate in the Set1'] ate on SALT II revealed our military inadequacy. And, in Decembb 1979 President Carter announced that he would ask Congress for' five percent increase in defense spending for the next (FY 198* budget and those to follow. Nonetheless, because of the intractably lead times inherent in generating new naval forces, the impact °l this on the Navy during the 1980s will be slight.
In Secretary Brown’s military judgment, “the fleet will contineL to grow stronger.’’ In President Carter’s military judgment, 0^1 Navy is “second to none” and the future military balance will be least as favorable as it was in 1977. Nonetheless, the CNO, Admir^ Thomas Hayward, has persistently said that, given current trend5! by the mid-80s we will lose our naval superiority. We will becon11 second to one. But previous CNOs—Admirals Holloway, ZuF1'* wait, Moorer, and even Burke—expressed similar gloom about d1^ future. The professional military man is never, in his own jud#l ment, fully prepared to fight. On the surface, DOD and the Na^l seem to agree on a comprehensive set of naval missions (Chart llj Disagreement lies in the assessment of risk and of the fightw
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Western Europe. We seek to do this by injecting an element of grave uncertainty into Soviet calculations of the net worth of military action. According to this logic, even if the Soviets believed they could prevail in either a conventional war or a nuclear one, what stakes in a crisis would impel them to such drastic and possibly mortal action? So a third point to beat in mind is that nowadays, rather than real strength, the dominant impetus of U. S. defense budgets is to provide a talisman of U. S. sincerity. Otherwise would not tolerate the fact, as the CIA keeps pointing out, that the Soviets are outspending us in military forces by over 45 percent a year—and the gap is growing.
Perhaps best known for his work on the Navy’s “Sea Plan 2000” in 1978, “Bing” West currently holds two billets at the Naval War College. Not only is he a professor of management, he is also the director of strategic research. He went to Vietnam both as a marine platoon leader and as a civilian correspondent. Later he worked at the Rand Corporation and then was special assistant to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Georgetown University and a master’s from the Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.
The Trends in Resources
ability of the naval forces we can construct with the budgets we anticipate.
Such disagreement is not unusual. For instance, when President Nixon took office, he commissioned a study of our global military strategy, called National Security Study Memorandum 3. The study recommended a basic change in strategy. We had planned forces supposedly adequate to fight simultaneously against both the Soviet Union and China, plus a contingency—the “2 & Vi War” strategy. The new Nixon strategy was to plan to fight either the Soviets or the Chinese—the “1 & Yi War” strategy. However, the funds and forces the Defense Department’s civilian analysts believed adequate for “2 & Vi wars” were held by the JCS as barely adequate for “1 & Vi wars.” The point is that while determining strategy alone will not determine how much is enough, one cannot budget without a strategy.
Of course, our forces are adequate if one ignores the trends in Soviet and U. S. naval fighting capabilities. Deterrence, rather than winning a war, is the major consideration in our force planning. We are designing forces which we think will inhibit the Soviets from using their forces, especially against
CHART 1 U. S. Naval Missions —To Deter Nuclear War —To Maintain a Worldwide Naval Presence —To Contain Crises
by Superiority at Sea by Projection Ashore
—To Be Able to Protect Ships at Sea
—To Be Able to Reinforce Our Allies
—To Be Able to Place Pressure Against the Soviets
In order to combat inflation, President Carter de cided some years ago to limit real defense growth i*1 spending from 1977 through 1980 to an average of about one percent per year. As we have seen, of course, that changed in 1980. Nonetheless, in preps' ration for the anticipated defense budgets of the ’80s- funding had to be found for the MX missile, for thefl' ter nuclear modernization, for airlift for land forces- and for NATO stocks. To assure funding for thes£ programs, some others, especially those for nav^ forces, were denied any growth in 1977, 1978, an<f 1979. On several occasions President Carter foiled- or tried to foil, congressional efforts to increase oU( naval capabilities. In 1978 he vetoed that yeaf* defense authorization bill on the grounds that fund* for another nuclear-powered carrier were bettd applied to NATO stocks as well as to a smalls cheaper, conventionally-powered carrier for th£ Navy. Many in the Navy applauded that decision &\ cost-effective. There was less applause, however, fof| the President’s initial decision in 1979 when the ne'1 government of Iran offered to sell four modified and improved DD 963 class destroyers, called DDG 993s’j under construction in the United States. The price the United States per ship was 40 percent under U5! cost. President Carter was adamant that at least tv^w of the four ships should be scrapped rather than puf't X chased. It required a personal visit by Senator JoW Stennis (D., Miss.) to persuade the President othef' wise.
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Although faced with a steadily maturing threa1 this nation, acting as a nation has chosen to redu<? steadily the portion of its wealth devoted to the i^ surance of our national security. In I960 the De' partment of the Navy received 2.5 percent of th1 gross national product. By 1980 the Navy’s shafC
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and that, so as to be able to buy ships on a de- C^as'ng overall budget, the Navy has cut its R&D * °rt by 15 percent. It is suspect to claim we can use °Ur technological superiority to compensate for
had dropped to 1.5 percent, a reduction of 40 percent. Unless the President’s recent proposal is something more than a slight bump in the trend, by the year 2000 that portion of the GNP devoted to the Navy and Marines will be one percent a year. There may have been a little real growth for the Defense department as a whole in the past three years, but n°ne of it reached the Navy. These statistics are not 'rrelevant. They show that we are asking our naval orces and all our defense forces to cope with an increasing threat, but to do it while using less and less the national income. Today the Soviet Navy sPends more, as measured in U. S. dollars, than does e U. S. Navy. The result, so far as one can tell, is \ at ’n the 1990s the Soviet Union will have six or ei8ht or more VSTOL (and perhaps conventional) car- r'ers 'n addition to those it now possesses, 300 or so Supersonic Backfire-type bombers, a number of underway replenishment groups, and about twice as ^any nuclear-powered attack submarines as we will ave- Just as we, Soviet naval forces will probably be operating from overseas bases. At current trends, by " 00 the Soviets will be outspending our Navy every ytar hy 50 percent.
^ Any argument that this gap is acceptable because 1 S- technology permits us an increase in capability 0 four percent per year—to match Soviet growth— flt 2ero increase in real input resources is false. The acts are that college board intelligence scores in this country have dropped over the past decade, that pro- ctivity per man is increasing only slightly or not at
Soviet material superiority when we are in fact reducing our technological base along with the fleet.
In 1980 there are about 540 ships (including about 60 civilian-manned auxiliaries and Naval Reserve training ships) and 5,400 aircraft in the Department of the Navy’s active inventory. To ensure the same size and type of fleet by 2000 the President’s shipbuilding request must hereafter be about 30 percent higher than that for FY 1980. The longer we wait, the less likely such increases will occur.
For the past five years, the influence of domestic politics has been the strongest single explanation for the sharp ups and downs of the Navy budget and of the shipbuilding account in particular. In 1975 President Ford fired Defense Secretary Schlesinger, allegedly because the latter urged too high a defense budget. The Schlesinger budget anticipated an average annual shipbuilding request of about $8.7 billion. Yet Secretary Rumsfeld then developed a slightly higher shipbuilding budget plan. Upon assuming office in 1977, President Carter kept his campaign pledge to reduce defense spending. As part of this, the shipbuilding (SCN) request for FY 79 was cut to $4.8 billion. This apparently was too deep a cut, for in FY 80 the SCN request was raised to a five-year average of about $6 billion. Senator Sam
Four still-modern ships of the Pacific Fleet maneuvering in the Western Pacific three years ago, the Wichita (AOR 1), Constellation (CV 64), Brooke (FFG 1), and Buchanan (DDG 14). If not replaced by the beginning of the new century, the newest of these ships (the Wichita) will be 31 years old. Flow, with the funds likely to he available, will the Navy replace them? Or, like the Navy’s ships of 100 years ago, should they just be patched and sent back to sea irrespective of their potential opponents' power?
Nunn (D., Ga.), however, said he would not vote for SALT II unless the defense budget was increased. In December 1979, the President said he now favored an annual real increase of five percent in the defense budget. So, there is a good chance the FY 1981-85 shipbuilding budget requests will average about $6.5 billion. That for FY 81 is for $6.1 billion.
However, no SCN request in recent years has passed the Congress without being changed up or down at least marginally.
The disposition of Congress is toward the shortterm, since ships and aircraft are authorized on an annual basis. How Congress relates its annual deliberations to overall force goals is not clear. It is clear, however, that there are many shipbuilding preferences represented in those two houses. Vexing as it must be to any defense secretary, Congress annually
Three of the giant new Ohio class ballistic missile submarines, in various stages of construction, are visible in this view. The Ohio herself (SSBN 726) lies in the drydock, foreground, with the Michigan (SSBN 727) looming above her on the construction pier. The circle barely visible behind the crane is the beginning of the Georgia (SSBN 729). Reportedly displacing 16,600 tons on the surface, each of them is larger than the battleship which previously bore her name. And each is so expensive that with the money remaining the Navy can afford to build few other ships.
changes the mix of ships requested by incumbent administrations. This is the prerogative of the Congress.
The point is that, in the absence of a clear and present danger, the pull and push of politics have been allowed to substitute for a prudent long-haul plan for the U. S. Navy. The fiscal trend now appears to be, if not up, at least not down. It was if 1978 that the Navy hit rock bottom in funding' Now it appears that for the foreseeable future, $d billion, or perhaps slightly more, will be availabk every year for shipbuilding. The issue to be discussed herein is how to allocate that funding.
Future Naval Missions and Forces at Current Budget Levels
Will missions assigned the Navy change, increase, or decrease in the future? If they were to keep pae£ with the trend in the country’s naval power, the)' would decrease. But no one wants to urge that. In' stead, there are proposals for new and different nav^ forces. For instance, Senator Gary Hart (D., Colo-) has urged the building of a VSTOL fleet of aircraft fof use on small carriers. This would cost an addition^ $15 to $20 billion. Admiral Zumwalt has urged tb£ same, plus arming of all U. S. combatants wit*1
The Tomahawk cruise missile, launched from a submarine lurking beneath the Pacific, begins a flight which might end hundreds, or thousands, of miles distant. This new weapon's virtues are impressive. So are its vices. Whether it will ever get into the Fleet remains in doubt, not least because “in 1976 Dr. Kissinger had a Soviet agreement allowing the weapon.
Today the Navy has no such agreement. ”
^u‘se missiles. Add another $5 billion. Admiral ayward has been equally enthusiastic about cruise missiles and about surface action groups without carriers- To implement such ideas, where is the money t0 come from, if the Administration holds the Navy t0 little or no real growth? It is relatively easy to Su8gest a future fleet, if the budget goes up. But if it 0esn t, the task is no longer easy.
Lhe remainder of this essay will be devoted to j^hat the Navy can do if the budget does not increase. 'Ve as a nation are determined not to match with stantially higher budgets the increasing threat P°sed by the USSR and if U. S. technology cannot e assumed to solve our problems, what should our [!avy be like? And how would that differ from the eet we have and expect to have?
Let us look in turn at each naval mission and assisted set of forces, beginning with the most important.
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0 Deter Nuclear War
Lhe Soviet Union espouses a set of values and rriany objectives antithetical to our own. This will ^rnain the case and lead to future crises. In the 1962 an Missile Crisis, the essence of American lever- rested upon enormous superiority in long-range r. c ear weapons. If there were to be an exchange of lre> the damage to the Soviet Union would far ex- u that to the United States. Some writers have do • t^lat 0Ur ^oca^ naval superiority played the ■ ^'nant role and surely its contribution is not to be °red. But during this same period the United wates was manifestly inferior locally in Berlin. Yet th? ^aCe<^ down a Soviet threat by bluntly warning at the Soviets would have to face the consequences
of a nuclear conflict if Berlin came under attack.
A decade later, because of Soviet initiatives and American restraint, the two countries were about equal in the destruction each might expect to inflict upon the other in a nuclear war. 'Many civilian and military officials in this country had encouraged the Soviet ascension to that level, because American “adventurism” would be deterred by Soviet power and Soviet paranoia and hostility, provoked by a quest for security, would be subdued. When neither side could intimidate the other by the threat of nuclear forces, the security of both would be enhanced. This theory had a fatal flaw: The Soviets did not believe it. Instead, the Soviets developed a force which climbed beyond “essential equivalence” toward superiority over the Americans, as measured by a growing disparity in the urban and industrial damage each country would suffer from a Soviet-initiated nuclear war. Secretary Brown, emphasizing “the impending vulnerability of our ICBM force,” has found “troublesome the degree of emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on a war-winning nuclear capability, and the extent to which current Soviet programs are related to the doctrine.”2
The trend in the vulnerability of American ICBMs is of serious, not crucial, concern to our military and civilian policy makers. Our plan is to develop and deploy at a measured pace the MX, a mobile missile ashore, so that by 1989 we will correct the Soviet advantage. The clear implication is that we can tolerate the Soviet nuclear advantage for nearly ten years. The Soviet advantage is not serious enough to interfere with military or procurement business as usual.
71
for the Year 8000: Future Force Structure
President Carter and Dr. Brown decided upon the MX rather than either a common land- and sea-based missile or the Trident II. The latter would be a weapon with more range, accuracy, and throw- weight than its predecessor. Under current DoD budgetary arrangements, if the Navy wishes to develop Trident II, it will have to be funded by reducing the Service’s general purpose forces. One very senior naval officer said: “The United States cannot afford not to deploy Trident II; and the U. S. Navy cannot afford to deploy it.” The United States lacks a coherent policy for nuclear forces and, unlike the Air
Force, the Navy has not developed one of its own. The official naval policy is that DoD has set no requirement that submarine-launched missiles be able to destroy hard targets or, for that matter, any other military targets. Therefore, there is no rationale for Trident II. It is neither to the Navy’s credit nor in the national interest that we lack a thoughtful analysis of the future “strategic” nuclear balance and how systems deployed at sea can contribute to maintaining that balance.
Due, then, to the absence of appropriate doctrine and of plain political muscle in the Navy, one should expect the SSBNs to remain countervalue rather than hard-target counterforce weapons. This assumes that our SSBNs remain relatively invulnerable and that we actually build the MX, a system which in turn will threaten Soviet fixed-site ICBMs. This should drive the Soviets to a mobile missile system, or to negotiations to limit MX. If the President remains firm in his MX decision, the Navy will have neither the money nor the permission from the White House to develop Trident II. Although the number of submarine-launched reentry vehicles may increase by the year 2000, the number of SSBNs will drop from 41 now to about 35 then. If the Navy decides to do without Trident II, it probably will propose building smaller and cheaper SSBNs than the 19,000-ton Ohio class. The current one-per-year construction of the Ohio class, armed with Trident I missiles, costs about $1.5 billion annually in 1980 dollars. A cheaper ship with the identical armament might cost $1.2 billion.
However, the future of the MX is uncertain and the potential worth of the Trident II missile is high. Trident II would enable our SSBNs to be used in a controlled way against hard military targets. So the Navy might decide to spend more, not less, on its SSBN force (already 25 percent of the shipbuilding budget) and to develop a more flexible and responsive doctrine than we now have for their employment. This might well entail continued construction of the Ohio class, which can accommodate the large Trident II missile (an accomplishment which a smaller submarine might not manage cost- effectively).
A second naval-related nuclear issue is the future of the long-range (beyond 600 kilometers) sea- launched cruise missile, or SLCM, which can have either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. In signing SALT II, the President pledged not to deploy any SLCM until after 1982. Privately, many defense officials say the Navy will never receive the SLCM in significant numbers. The Navy talks a fair to good fight for the weapon, but it also agreed to SALT II without seeking any assurance about SLCM from the President. In 1976 Dr. Kissinger had a Soviet agreement allowing the weapon. Today the Navy has no such agreement.
Such a weapon would help deter Soviet nuclear strikes against our ships at sea by threatening retaliation from the sea against both Soviet systems ashore and those afloat. Because SLCMs are intended to be launched from surface ships and submarines far at sea, obviously there would be no collateral damage to any civilian populations or territory resulting from Soviet nuclear attacks against those ships and submarines. Conversely, the vulnerability of the launching ships is low, as compared to land-based systems- So is the cost of the weapon. And because of their high accuracy and low yield, SLCMs can be used against military targets on land without causing vast damage to nearby civilian property. Placed in 60 submarines and 100 surface combatants, these missiles would complicate greatly the Soviets’ targeting problems and reduce the gain they might perceive from striking first.
The cruise missile is a nightmare in terms of verification of arms limitations. Its range cannot be verified within a factor of three or more, short of inspection of the missile itself. Yet the Soviet Union has insisted in SALT that cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers be forbidden, regardless of hoV they are armed or even if, like drones, they are unarmed. That country has deployed or stockpiled thousands of cruise missiles which can be launched from hundreds of ships, submarines, and aircraft' Some, like the SS-N-12 on the Kiev and the AS-4 of the Backfire bomber, are much larger than our cruise missiles. The Soviets claim none of these missiles cal’ exceed 600 kilometers in flight. But they will be developing and deploying new such weapons whose range can exceed 600 kilometers. Deployed in sub' marines, these missiles could threaten targets such as SAC bases well inside the continental United States' So an additional reason for opposing SLCMs is to r£' duce this potential threat.
Given these factors—the agreements already negotiated, the problems of verification, existing and potential Soviet systems, and probable opposition from the budget bureau and the arms control agency—if the Navy does not fight as hard for SLC^ as the Air Force did for MX, SLCMs will never be deployed in large numbers.
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In addition to SSBNs and SLCMs, a third aspect of nuclear deterrence is “strategic ASW,” or the ability of the U. S. Navy to destroy Soviet SSBNs. Dr- Brown has said the United States’ ability to do th’s contributes to Essential Nuclear Equivalence.3 2000, if not by 1982, this ability will probably hav£
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eer> lost. Even now, the range of the new Soviet Missiles, such as the SS-N-8, enables the Soviet missile-launching submarines to remain in home Waters, presumably behind multiple ASW barriers, if 'Var seems imminent.
sum, if the U. S. SSBN remains a counter-city Weapon, its cost may be reduced slightly. But there ls a good chance its role will be enlarged and its costs ^*11 increase. The issue is whether the United States decide to place at sea a weapon able to destroy arge Ohio class submarine may be needed to accommodate the large Trident II missile.
P "hhe SLCM has promise for nuclear deterrence (and k r conventional uses, to be explained shortly). But ^cause it creates problems for arms control, it may e severely constrained.
Finally, whatever may be our current ability to Slnk SSBNs, it will fast fade as the Soviet SSBNs in- Crea.se the range at which they can fire.
0 Maintain a Worldwide Naval Presence ^ >s against the backdrop of the nuclear balance at the daily events of the Soviet-American competi- n take place. The importance of that nuclear bal- QCe can never be forgotten or taken for granted.
nce> however, that condition for stability has been p ls‘ted, other conditions must be fulfilled. The ^jrernost of these has been a set of naval forward de- ynients in order to reassure allies and to deter rrtled aggression in sensitive areas. Our statesmen
act upon the belief that there is a strong and causal relationship between the presence of our naval forces and the stability of the region they are in. Under the Carter Administration, the geographic scope of the Navy’s presence role has increased. In 1979 naval forces were dispatched ostentatiously to the Caribbean following the discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and, following the seizure of American hostages in Iran, to the Indian Ocean.
For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely there will be any overall reduction in naval forward deployments, despite the attendant maintenance and morale (time away from home) problems. For years we have said we have a “two-ocean navy.” We now have “three-ocean commitments.” To maintain credible naval forces in the Indian Ocean will require using portions of the two carrier battle groups which nor-
mally sail in East Asian waters. In addition, to permit more flexibility, NATO’s insistence that two carrier groups of the Sixth Fleet remain within the Mediterranean must be relaxed, as it was briefly in January 1980 when the Nimitz and two cruisers were sent to the Indian Ocean.
To Contain Crises
A primary use of the battle groups, as well as land-based patrol planes, attack submarines, and underway replenishment ships, has been to ensure our possession of overpowering potential to control the local sea at the scene of a crisis, dampening any Soviet disposition for involvement and setting the stage for projection of American air or ground power. However, on the one hand, the numbers and capabilities of Soviet VSTOL carriers and cruisers with long-range missiles are increasing. On the other hand, we are not diversifying our naval striking power. If they are to have any offensive firepower, each of our battle groups must contain a carrier. No U. S. combatant has a really long-range anti-ship missile. Harpoon, now appearing on our ships, has a range of about 60 miles. This is much less than that of anti-ship missiles borne by many Soviet warships. If this state of affairs persists, with all the U. S. Navy’s offensive firepower riding on twelve carriers, there will be occasions in the mid-80s and beyond when the Soviets can both have strong forces where we too are strong, such as the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean, and be strong elsewhere, where we are weak, by dispatching surface action or VSTOL groups, each with dozens of long-range missiles. Moreover, we have locked ourselves into a deployment straightjacket in order to please our NATO allies, who take fright at the thought of fewer than two U. S. carriers in the Mediterranean. This limits our ability to respond to events elsewhere, while the Soviets, suffering no such restrictions, send their increasing number of powerful ships where they will.
Our current commitments are in our national interest and should not be abandoned. But if we are also to protect our interests in other areas, for example, in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, we must have other naval capabilities to apply in such places. Under present budgetary levels we do not and will not have the ships to do both, and no amount of shifting peas under shells will disguise that fact from either friends or enemies.
One means of diversifying U. S. naval power is to arm many surface ships and submarines with cruise missiles. Their weapons may be targeted against ships or, in either a conventional or nuclear mode, against objects ashore. Another means is to build small conventional or VSTOL carriers which, while not as useful for nuclear deterrence as missile-armed ships would be, could provide both air defense for other ships (albeit with something much less than F-l4s) and a significant strike capability. Cruise missiles, however, are much less expensive than airplanes. But ships carrying them must have some means of detecting, identifying, and localizing targets, either on-board helicopters, land-based aircraft, or remotely piloted vehicles (drones). With or without carriers, battle groups and other formations must have some form of defense against any barrage of missiles from a Soviet task force. This entails the presence of at least one CG 47 Aegis class ship with her phased-array radar guiding SM-2 surface-to-air missiles. For ASW, it would be prudent for any U. S- battle group to have towed arrays on surface combatants and one or two SSNs in direct support.
One purpose in deploying U. S. battle groups in t crisis is to show our control of the sea even in the face of Soviet battle groups. Another purpose is to project air power and marines ashore. Whether out marines would then confront Soviet land forces h still a moot point. In essence, the issue is whether wf should plan forces and spend money on the presump' tion that a limited—rather than a global—war h possible between the United States and the Sovie1 Union. Defense Secretary Brown has said: “I consider a conventional conflict with the Soviet Union tha1 does not involve U. S. allies quite incredible.”4 Tfo5 certainly implies that if we fight the Soviets it wil* be a global war. Yet in the 1973 Middle East War* our allies were not to be seen, let alone involved- Also, Secretary Brown said in his February 1979 De' fense Report that a Soviet attack against Iran “could well require a U. S. response.”5 Late in 1979 tfo Administration announced it planned to spend billion for a “rapid deployment force” so that U. S- marines and soldiers could, at the least, disembafo from aircraft in a crisis-torn nation before aggressor5 could advance upon that nation. President Carte5 implied the rapid deployment force was intended, among other things, to respond to any move by tfol Soviet brigade in Cuba, hopefully deterring Sovie11 adventurism in the Caribbean. The implication i5l that we must be prepared to confront the Soviet mili'l tary outside the NATO context. World events and tfol growth of Soviet projection power are gradually mod'I ifying the defense strategy of the United States. Tfol creation of the rapid deployment force acknowledge* I that the United States has interests outside NAf^t which are so vital we must be prepared to mo^l quickly and without allies, even if the Soviets afe| involved directly. Ten billion dollars for lift (eigfol
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atine Corps, the maritime prepositioning of at least ngade’s equipment seems advisable. According to
Marines, by 1988 the Defense Department plans 0 EuilJ and operate 15 civilian-manned ships, which are enough to support three brigades. In essence, this ^ a resurrection of the aborted FDL (Fast Deployed °8*stics) ships of the 1960s. The ships would pro- e equipment and supplies for 30 days, with the ?len c°ming in by air. By this means the Marines in
would possess more mobility than they do in
illion for aircraft and two billion for ships) is not adequate if we must confront the Soviets in the Middle East. But the rapid deployment force is a step in ehe right direction.
Equally as important, the rapid deployment force rnust pose a deterrent to aggression on the part of °^Eer nations (e.g., Cuba, North Korea, South etT>en, or Iraq). Given the armaments of many na- j-fons, if our force is ro have a credible combat capa- Ulty> stocks must be prepositioned on land or at Sea- Airlift simply cannot transport the amount of equipment needed in modern land warfare on a large ^ale. A shift in the focus, but not the importance, of e EJ. S. Marine Corps seems inevitable. If the brines are to remain a primary and premier “force readiness,” there must be a substantial increase in j eir equipment kept at sea. Currently three ’^00-man marine battalions are afloat, one in the editerranean and two somewhere in the vast Pacific an<J Indian oceans. A battalion is a modest, if not ^fniscule, combat unit.
0 increase the credible combat readiness of the M:
a b the 1990
^98(). "phe basjc concept js t0 Jeter aggression by aving tjle akiiity t0 jnsert combat-ready American °Ps into a crisis-torn nation. Until enough of the in cE3rePos‘tioning ships are ready, which should be roj we sh°uld employ amphibious ships in this c 'n order to ensure the presence of land fighting
equipment in the Indian Ocean. If a rapid deployment force is needed in 1987, it is also needed in 1980.
It should be stressed that this concept neither requires nor provides an assault capability on the part of our amphibious forces. Maritime prepositioning can be staged in commercial ships which can be modified satisfactorily for administrative landings at perhaps one-half the cost of building assault ships of equal lift. So on a constrained budget, maritime prepositioning competes for funds with assault shipping, however much one might protest that this is comparing an apple and an orange. Assault shipping is intended for the recapture of territory or the outflanking of an enemy after war has begun. Maritime prepositioning is intended to prevent the loss of the territory and to deter the aggression in the first place. If forced by budgets to choose, maritime prepositioning should be developed, even at the expense of assault shipping.
However, not only must the United States be able to respond adequately in crises or minor contingencies, it must also have naval forces adequate to prevail in a conventional war of global proportions. Should World War III come, other kinds of naval forces, less relevant in crises than are carriers and marines, will be needed. The most publicized of these are those for the protection of merchant ships.
To Be Able to Protect Ships at Sea
This mission, mainly one of ASW, is generally divided into area ASW and convoy defense. Area ASW centers on a network of hydrophone arrays (SOSUS) fixed to the sea bottom to detect submarines, ship- borne hydrophone arrays for the same purpose, mines, patrol planes with sonobuoys and torpedoes, and submarines, both diesel-electric and nuclear. Area ASW would employ barrier and station techniques to destroy enemy submarines transiting to or from the major shipping routes. Convoy defense centers on patrol planes, frigates, and destroyers (many with ASW helicopters and some with antimissile defenses), and some Allied submarines.
The Administration is placing heavy emphasis upon defense. The guided-missile frigate (FFG) used to protect convoys is, at $200 million a copy, the least expensive deep-water combatant in the U. S. Fleet. Unfortunately, although many of our expensive cruisers and destroyers face obsolescence in the 1990s and costs to buy the technology to meet the threat are soaring, the FFG is not the ship to replace them, for, just as they, she lacks the potential to contribute effectively to the defense of a battle group against the threats our ships will face in those years. There are about 100 cruisers and destroyers in the current fleet, about half of which will retire by 2000. Most of those which will have been discarded by then are armed with medium or long-range SAMs. Few of those likely to remain are so armed.
With this condition looming before us, one thing we could do, while still building new patrol planes for convoy defense, would be to stop building FFGs. The money saved would be spent on fewer but bigger and better ships for a different mission. Presumably the major convoy route in World War 111 would be across the mid-Atlantic to the Benelux ports. The battle groups would be used to reinforce our allies and to threaten those Soviet forces on the northern flank, in the Mediterranean, in the Persian Gulf, and in the Northwest Pacific. The rationale for curtailing the U. S. role in convoy defense is threefold. First, U. S. ASW is improving. Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor has referred to “sophisticated detection devices and computers” such that “the qualitative edge we hold over the Soviets in both equipment and personnel is awesome.” Second, antimissile defense for the battle groups in high threat waters is poor. The cruiser and destroyer force must be modernized to take advantage of promising new antimissile technology. Third, convoy protection assumes a NATO war with our allies fully involved. Collectively, our allies in NATO have about 180 frigates, while we are building up from 65 frigates today to 90 or so. Because the allies also haveR several in-shore missions for their frigates, it is gen-10 erally assumed they would escort seven convoys in the first month of a war and we would do the same.
If we curtail our FFG building program at where it stands now, we are essentially reducing our planned contribution by 25 percent. We could either provide fewer escorts per convoy or we could ask our NATO allies to increase their shipbuilding. For the past several years, however, we have urged them to increase their land forces, implicitly at the expense of their naval forces. We have assured them that our ship' building program was robust and fully funded. Since they have voiced suspicions to the contrary, our curtailment of the FFG program may confirm their suspicions.
On the other hand, it may not. Since the Administration has no stated goals and no plan for the U. S. Navy, it cannot be accused of changing it® plan. Our ability to protect convoys against submarines is in better shape than our ability to carry out other naval tasks. It is also a highly unlikely task, since it assumes a global, conventional wa( which persists beyond one month. It is prudent of the United States to have such staying power if NATO. By curtailing the FFGs, we pay a cost in the form of greater potential shipping losses. But, given a fixed budget and a growing threat, some decrease in net capabilities for some missions must be expected. The most probable security threat to America is not a conventional World War III. Rather, it i® ineptitude at influencing or controlling critical world events. Of course, this is only partially a military problem. The military part is ascribable to a deterioration of our net nuclear power and a shortage of useful conventional forces, including ships. The current trend is to strengthen our convoy escort forces a1 the expense of our amphibious forces, battle group®' and attack submarines. What I am proposing is tha1 this set of priorities be altered because our amphibious forces, battle groups, and SSNs are more useftd than the escort forces for containing crises, for directly challenging Soviet forces, and for reinforcing our allies.
To Be Able to Reinforce Our Allies
Distinct from the protection of shipping is the reassurance to our allies of American reinforcement' The protection of convoys to Europe and Japan cal’ be planned collectively as a set-piece battle. The H® of force requirements, however, would be staggerin? if one sought to cope in set-piece fashion with tbe potential crises and needs of our allies worldwide Instead, we have designed naval forces whose mobd'
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Iry enakes them useful in many theaters. These forces IT|ust be able, among other things, to defeat Soviet •ssile-carrying aircraft.
ft: can be argued that convoys also face a threat °tn Soviet naval aviation. Our force planning, however> should be consistent with our negotiated afTeernents. In SALT II the Soviets agreed not to reel the Backfire bomber or to “increase its radius of Jtion,” presumably by constructing bases on the 0 a Peninsula or overseas. Since the Soviet Navy is positioning to an all-Backfire fleet, surely we will . lect if their pilots are trained in refueling tech- jpues. Given the location of current Soviet bomber ^ases, unrefueled Backfires are not a prime threat to ^Pping in mid-Atlantic, while near the European P°rt terminals, land-based aircraft can defend the c°nvoys.
fn most other oceans bordering Eurasia, however, e Soviet naval bombers are the most serious threat 0 fbe reinforcement of our allies. To counter them, pher fixed air bases at blocking points or mobile air ^ases (carrier battle groups) are needed. Both must e defended, since both would be prime targets for Ppmption. While the costs, techniques, and Preble of battle group defense have been studied ex- austively, the costs and techniques for the defense of !r ^ases ashore are less well understood. We know at the ability of the F-14 to destroy Badgers is ex- ent. Against the Backfire the results may be less factory. Due to the Backfire, there is serious °ncern that the Soviets, through coordinated air 3|ds, will launch so many missiles that shipborne ‘missile SAM and gun defenses would be satu- ed- The CG 47 Aegis ship, with her phased-array aprworking with inertial-guided SM-2s, is as much fo rea^t^lrough for antimissile defense as the F-14 was °r long-range air-to-air interceptions in an electronic
warfare environment. Shipborne point defenses also promise remarkable improvement.
However, the Aegis ship is very expensive compared to simpler systems. For instance, the DD 993 class guided missile destroyers built originally for Iran were priced at about $400 million a copy. The CG 47, with roughly the same hull, is priced at $800 million per follow-on copy. Unfortunately, such prices mean that the bulk of the fleet’s antimissile firepower will lie in very few ships. But the conceptually preferable alternative of antimissile firepower effectiveness dispersed equally among many ships is even more costly. So, until we can think of something better, Aegis must remain a priority item because it can cope with a stream of missiles, while simpler, cheaper systems cannot. A goal of 24 Aegis ships in the 1990s would not be too ambitious. It would provide two first-line antimissile ships per carrier. Thus, a nominal battle group in the late 1980s ought to consist of a carrier, two CG 47s, two DD 963s, and perhaps a DDG. Alternatively, a CG 47 might serve as the nucleus of a task-organized surface action group. Such groups would need cruise missiles to be effective. Initially, cruise missiles could be mounted on both existing and authorized combatants, using money saved from curtailing the FFG line. Eventually ships (like the DDX) could be designed to maximize cruise missile effectiveness.
The Administration is determined to retain at least twelve deployable battle groups through 2000. But many assert the naval future lies with land-based aircraft because carriers are too vulnerable to being found, hit, and sunk. Therefore, this reasoning goes, to invest in antimissile systems so as to reduce ship vulnerability is to throw good money after bad. It is true the U. S. Navy has chosen to institute by budgetary priority the sea-based jet aircraft as the heart of its battle fleet. The carrier battle group represents over 40 percent of our naval force investment. In turn, the battle group has proven to be of enormous value in peacetime missions, in non-war crisis displays of force, and in limited wars. It is also true that in a third of a century no nation has chosen to challenge the United States at sea. It is, then, unknown how such battle groups would fare in a war against the Soviet bloc. In the opinion of this author, the classified evidence supports the position the U. S. surface forces are survivable at reasonable investment levels—say, those of the United States in the 1950s or 1960s. If we are determined not to invest at such levels and if Soviet trends continue, then sooner or later we will fulfdl the prophecy of surface force vulnerability. However, even if it is doing so on constrained budgets, the Administration is investing prudently in antimissile systems, electronic warfare, and point defense. Additional antimissile modernization programs and new tactical concepts are also needed.
To combat our battle groups, the Soviets are deploying faster aircraft than they ever did before, carrying missiles which can be launched from farther away than ever before. In a war, those aircraft cannot be permitted to stand off and shoot and shoot until they score hits. They must be intercepted before they begin to shoot. The F-14 is designed for such antiBackfire intercept missions. How the F-18 will fare in this role is unknown. If it performs poorly, then either a very long-range shipboard SAM or another interceptor will be required in the 1990s.
Early in a conventional war, it would be necessary to mass about four battle groups to combat Soviet naval aviation’s bombers. This limits us to one heavy task force in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. One misstep would severely wound, if not cripple, our naval strike power and prevent the reinforcement of some theaters with armies and land-based air forces.
To hedge against this, an increase in carriers would be prudent. However, the immediate and pressing need is not for more big carriers. It is for more and better antimissile defense and for a dispersion of naval striking power. The latter task is related to applying pressure against the Soviets or any other potential enemy.
To Be Able to Place Pressure Against the Soviets
Admiral Hayward has repeatedly said he wants a navy which is “offensively capable.’’ The reason is to place the enemy’s naval forces on the defensive, thus making easier the tasks of getting resupply convoys to their destinations and of reinforcing our allies.
Secretary Brown views things differently. He has said “the test of sufficiency . . . of U. S. and allied navies is (whether they) can protect the key lines of communication to Europe and Asia . . . support NATO on the flanks, and contribute simultaneously to a lesser contingency,” (e.g., a Soviet attempt to seize Iran).6
Secretary Brown’s concept doesn’t sound all that different from Admiral Hayward’s and it has several strong points. It is clear, succinct, and easily understandable. It is concrete and can be linked to specific quantitative measures of effectiveness. It b linear—Mission A relates to B, B to C, and so on So by summing the parts one can display a total naval force structure comprised of least-cost force5 designed to carry out, at an acceptable level of risk, the missions.
But the concept suffers from several problems. lc is based on specific scenarios which are related to the geopolitics of 1978, not too sound a base upon which to design naval forces for 2000. It separates nucleaf war from conventional. It can be interpreted as de' fensive and reactive. It seems to define naval powef solely as auxiliary to and dependent upon land cam' paigns. It does not inquire into how or where the current U. S. advantage in naval power could used to deter or to penalize the Soviets, whose advan' tage still lies in land power.
For instance, Admiral Hayward repeatedly ha5 stressed that the United States should build a flee1! with the offensive power to carry a war to the Soviet I and to conclude that war with a substantial U. $1 edge in residual naval power. Secretary Brown ha51 not endorsed this idea, probably for fear of the pr°'l curement costs which might be associated with it. I(1l the opinion of this writer, the maintenance of somel clear fighting advantages over the Soviets enhance* deterrence and provides us some leverage in control'I ling crises. A key U. S. fighting advantage lies lI1| our nuclear attack submarines which, together wib1 °ur SSBNs, are the most survivable ships in the fleet. A prime wartime employment of the SSN should be ln waters where and when allied air and surface units cannot be employed. This means our SSNs—because they are so expensive—must be able to achieve large and favorable exchange ratios in waters where the Soviets are conducting coordinated subsurface, sur- ace. and air ASW. So far, Soviet nuclear submarines SL>ffer from comparatively high radiated noise levels, °f which our SSNs, employing advanced acoustic technology, can take full advantage.
^et in the FY 80 budget the request was for only ooe attack submarine per year, leading to an absurdly °w long-term force level. Apparently plans are fairly complete for a new class of SSNs to replace procurement of the SSN 688 class, whose costs are climbing °Ver half a billion dollars per copy.7 If a new SSN can COrne in at close to $300 million per copy, we should aim for an annual authorization of two or three such Subrnarines. Some money from curtailment of the J Program can be allocated here too.
A second means of placing pressure upon an enemy is by the use of carrier-based strike aircraft.
he present inventory of about 5,400 active Navy and Marine aircraft will decrease sharply over the next two decades. In FY 80, the Administration’s re- Snest was for about 100 aircraft. This will barely c°ver peacetime attrition and is far short of any readable replacement program. Many believe, however> that U. S. naval air is ample and indeed too mphisticated for the crisis management task or for 01'ted wars, while being too vulnerable and too ^fall a force for a global war against the Soviet ni°n. But if properly applied, sea-based aircraft c°uld play a significant role in a global war.
If all NATO nations keep their word to fight for fj*6’ t^len *n such a war the Soviets, who are not ten ^et tall, would have to fight simultaneously on three fropean fronts (Norway, Germany, and the editerranean). They would have to protect Pet- ^°pavlosk and cope with U. S. naval actions in the ac‘fic- A standard view is that we would employ
battle groups to reinforce allies where the fighting was fiercest. While that may well be the case, we should bear in mind a complementary case. The optimum strategic use of mobile air power is to dislocate the air forces of the other side and strike where they are weak. In a global war, by D+20 the loss of land-based aircraft, especially for the Soviets, will probably be very high. Turned thereafter against a particular theater, the battle groups represent a threat which the Soviets would take very seriously. The mobility of battle groups also enhances deterrence because they increase Soviet uncertainty of success: The Soviets cannot presume they could complete a campaign in any theater before the battle groups arrived. This most particularly affects the force balances in the Persian Gulf and on the flanks of NATO.
Any campaign on the northern flank places Allied strike aircraft within attack range of the Kola Peninsula, the richest expanse of military real estate in the world. There are significant general purpose military and naval targets on the Peninsula which cannot be hardened in time if we apply current DOD force planning guidance that war begins with less than a month’s preparation by the Soviet Union. Submarine tenders, SSNs in port, HF/DF sites, generating plants—these stand exposed. Also, Soviet naval bombers must mass in order to strike the battle groups. When they do mass, they in turn become a target for land attack cruise missiles and, depending on the range, for manned aircraft. Soviet nuclear systems as well can be degraded by conventional at-
“A key U. S. fighting advantage lies in our nuclear attack submarines. . . . Yet in the FY 80 budget the request was for only one attack submarine per year, leading to an absurdly low long-term force level. ” By 1990 fewer than 60 of our SSNs will he less than 20 years of age. At that time this one, the Sea Devil (SSN 664), shown beginning a dive into the Atlantic, will be 21. If we continue as we have been, by the beginning of the new century the situation will have worsened.
tacks. To name some targets: SSBN facilities, SSBNs in port, missile handling and storage facilities, and perimeter radars.
Whether in an actual war U. S. decision-makers would so use our power is one issue. Whether for deterrence we want to keep open our options is another issue, one that is implicit in such discussions as the positioning of Marine A-6 aircraft in Norway, in the procurement of land attack cruise missiles, and in Dr. Brown’s 1978 statement that “we are still going to send naval forces to . . . Northern Norway (and) the Norwegian Sea.”8 In this context the application of the firepower of battle groups would be taken by the Soviets as a very serious matter. Before we allow our naval strike capability to atrophy, we should ask by how much we are relieving the Soviets of a defensive burden, simplifying their force planning, and encouraging their view of the correlation of forces.
In addition to nuclear attack submarines and strike aircraft, technology is offering us the opportunity to apply military pressure against an enemy by the means of many, comparatively cheap ground- launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. They enhance nuclear deterrence and permit us to disperse conventional naval striking power of a kind useful against both surface combatants and many kinds of targets ashore. This dispersal strengthens our ability to respond to crises. In a global war sea-launched cruise missiles might most hurt the Soviets on the first day, while we have good targeting information and before they apply a learning curve and harden to offset the weapon’s payload. Later in the war this type of missile appears as if it would be extremely useful in attacking exposed Soviet naval bombers and in pinning down interceptors while U. S. strike ait' craft are inbound with heavy bomb loads. Some people call the conventional cruise missile the Silver Bullet, because, compared to iron bombs, for example, it is expensive and one can’t afford to shoot i[ except at targets highly valued by the enemy. Dr. Brown has questioned the worth of carrier aircraft ofl the grounds that one dollar in Soviet defense might offset five dollars in U. S. offense. Using the measure of one dollar to destroy the equivalent of five dollars in Soviet systems, the target list for a conventional cruise missile (irrespective of its launching platform) is large indeed. If we want to diversify our naval offensive firepower at comparatively low cost, the cruise missile is the way to go.
In summary, at $6 billion annually, our shipbuild' ing (SCN) budget is inadequate.
We should harbor no illusions. At that budgetary level, the trend is toward a smaller combatant force Even if we extend the service lives of all our existing surface ships and submarines, to maintain the 19^ fleet of 540 ships would require at least $7.5 billio11 in SCN each year, not the $6 billion the Navy get5 for that purpose. In 1975 DOD projected such an SCN budget. In 1976 DOD increased that figure to $8 bib lion. However, assuming about $6 billion is all thef£ is going to be annually for shipbuilding, our Navf will be smaller and less able in 2000 than it is in 1980. Chart 2 summarizes the qualitative argumefl1 of this paper. As long as the Navy tries to cope wirf an increasing threat on a constant budget, its abifitf to carry out some missions must decline. The curreo1 trend is to improve the Fleet’s ability to proted shipping while accepting a weakening in the power* of our amphibious forces, attack submarines, an^
CHART 2
Effect of Proposed Alternatives Upon Naval Missions
• Mission
To Deter Nuclear War
To Maintain a Worldwide Naval Presence To Contain Crises
—by Superiority at Sea —by Projection Ashore
To be Able to Protect Ships at Sea To be Able to Reinforce Our Allies
To be Able to Place Pressure Against the Soviets
Effect of Alternatives
Increased if Trident II is procured Increased by SLCM
Increased by Surface Action Groups
Increased by SAGs with cruise missiles
Increased by commercial shipping for U. S. Marines
Decreased as assault shipping atrophies
Decreased by curtailing FFG escort procurement
Increased by CG 47, antimissile systems, and EW
Decreased as carrier air atrophies
Increased by SLCM
Decreased as Soviet AAW improves
Decreased if Soviet ASW improves
6.15
.5
.15
.25
.35
15
en the current shipbuilding program and the cost options discussed in this paper. The cur- th' C f>roSram will lead to a numerically larger fleet a° would the program here proposed. On the other
CHART 3
Illustrative Quantification Of This Paper's Central Themes Current Annual
CHART4
Fiscal Priorities Measures As Percentage OfSCN Budget1
$7.5B
| Shipbuilding |
|
| Per Annum | S6.2B | $6.26 | |
___ | Trend | Option |
| to Maintain | FY80 | Alternative | |
| (FY 1980-1984)' |
|
| Current Fleet | SCN | SCN | |
| # | $B | # $B | SSBN | 13% | 24% | 24% (+ Til?) |
SSBN | 1 | $1.5 | 1 $1.5 (Til?) | CVBG2 | 42% | 41% | 43% |
SSN | 1 | .45 | 2 .7 |
|
|
| 8% SLCM |
cv | SLEP | .5 SLEP .5 | SLOC SSN/FF | 25% | 22% | 8% | |
CG47 | 2 | 1.7 | 2 1.7 | AMPHIB3 | 19% | 8% | 13% |
Antimissile
Mods
ffg
dd/ddx2
SI-CM Mod3
Mcm
FJRG/Support Amphib Assault4
.5
'Due to rounding, the columns do not sum to 100%
2CVBG includes 25% of SSN force in direct support, 75% of CG/DD force and 75% of URGs.
3It was assumed 25% of cruiser/destroyer force would protect the amphibious force. These percentages do not include the $2B proposed in FY 81 over five years for maritime prepositioning. If that amount is included, the annual SCN budget is 16.6B and the amphibious share of the SCN account is about 20 percent.
1.0
.6
.15
.25
0
6.15 11
^ e ^ 1981-1985 budget was released after submission of this essay. c the exception of the ships for a rapid deployment force, the FY 81 will not be much different from that for FY 80.
3 Clu^s 10 DDG-2 modernizations and one DDX. ssumes no new ships.
0es n°t include the rapid deployment force proposed for FY 81. If that is cluded, the annual SCN budget rises to $6.6B and the amphibious line
ga«ns$.4B.
battle groups—just the forces most useful for crisis rnatlagement, for reassuring allies, and for placing Fissure against the Soviet Union. This paper proposes trying a change. The author holds we should ^CePt a decline in our ability to protect shipping oping our allies will pick up the slack). We should vance our acquisition of sea-launched cruise mis- ^es and of antimissile defenses, even though the lat- are very expensive. Atrophy of the amphibious Ssault forces must also be accepted in order to in- ^ease our ability to make unopposed landings 0ugh maritime prepositioning. This paper also omrnends, if the MX missile procurement program ^counters problems, that naval general purpose jafCe funding be further reduced to procure a sea- Unched ballistic missile with the throw weight and ^uracy needed for the destruction of hard targets.
, art 3 is an effort to quantify the differences be- tWeer
equal rent
hand, the alternative here proposed would provide the Navy with more offensive ships, that is SSNs rather than FFGs; more amphibious lift; and more dispersal of striking power through the construction and deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles.
In the aggregate, these trends and alternatives may be judged by the reader to be disadvantageous to national security. Chart 4 compares in terms of fiscal priorities a $7.5 billion annual SCN budget designed to maintain the current fleet and the two lower SCN budgets set forth on Chart 3- On a fixed shipbuilding budget of six billion dollars a year, the constraints are many and opportunities are few to hold for the long haul superiority over an opponent who is investing much more and who has the easier strategic task of sea denial rather than sea control. My guess is that we as a nation will decide—probably after an unpleasant shock to increase the investment in our naval forces. In the interim, we face hard choices.