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Needed: An Xtra XO
“Span of control,” one of the most important of all the criteria used in organizational design, is grossly violated by many major commands in today’s Navy. Simply stated, span of control demands that, when elements in an organization require frequent interaction to do a job, a spanning unit of no more than five to seven subordinates should be assigned to the supervisor of those elements.
Violations of span of control abound in the Navy. For example, a block diagram for the formal organization of an aircraft carrier shows 12 or 13 departments directly responsible to the ship’s executive officer. Additionally, block diagrams of a Naval Support Activity at Naples, a Naval Air Field in Sicily, and a Naval Air Station in California depict ten or more departments directly below their respective executive officers.
But do these commands, indeed do any naval commands, fall under the requirements of span of control?
Consider the interaction factor. Naval departments, designed around functional specialities, cannot independently provide all the services required by their command. If a command is to properly use these services, the departments must provide their unique functions in a coordinated manner. Thus, stemming from the functional design of each department, the requisite frequent interaction implies that the span of control maxima do generally apply to naval activities.
But departments require more than mere coordination, for if the coordinated elements combine their unique functions in a unified way that remains contrary to the overall needs of the command, then the command’s missions could be seriously degraded. What these departments need in order to ensure that their functions stay useful to the command and its overall mission is integration.
As immediate senior in command to the department heads, the executive officer is the logical point for integrating departmental functions. The XO disseminates the command’s goals to each department. Furthermore, the XO receives the feedback information that will measure how well each department is performing vis-a-vis its goal. Because of this, much of the flow of information among spanning unit elements will travel from department to department via the XO.
It can be reasoned that, as a result of this flow of information, the second limiting factor determining the optimum size of a spanning unit is the supervisor’s ability to properly process information in a timely manner. The number and complexity of two-way communications between a supervisor and elements in a spanning unit increase geometrically for each additional element. As the spanning unit increases, the XO, limited by time, energy, skill, and expertise, rapidly approaches a saturation point beyond which he cannot process the information received in a timely manner.
Next, consider the limited total time available to an XO for management purposes. If an XO’s time is constantly interrupted by the geometrically inflated communications of an overextended spanning unit, vital management functions (planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and training) will likely suffer. Crisis management results, planning is degraded further, and even more crises are precipitated by these manifestations of an overextended spanning unit.
Finally, just how much technical knowledge can be absorbed by one person? A solitary XO can no longer fathom everything there is to know to supervise a command in today’s high-
W/.'fh the
echnology environment, w
rend to more and more comp eX , jza„ he need for more and more speCI‘ ion becomes apparent.
The executive officers time, e.^j :rgy, skill, and expertise are hmi rhus, the size of his or her span mit should also be limited. .
What can be done about reL£^ceeii ng naval commands when he span of control maxima. inswer—add a second executiv ^ :er to the organization. Then, s ^ lircraft carrier might have an X ^ )perations (XO[opsJ) and an XO >ersonnel services (XO[pers])-
With two XOs, specialization ^
omes more likely because o c ^ ower spanning unit for each, proved in-depth technical expet ^ ^ hould result. In addition, :ommunications flow to each vould be geometrically reduce^^ ewer interruptions from subor lepartments should free each to :entrate on the traditional, long nanagement functions.
In the February 1975 Proceed' jn lieutenant T. C. Schelin suggf lis article, “Attack Carriers. jon duman Equation,” that the s0 jf. o the span of control violation iraft carriers should include r e corli- ion of super departments fro111 >inations of the more tradition ier departments. This plan, las two major drawbacks. [Tl0re
First, contrary to the neec 0 je.
penalization, the requisite suj ^ ^
wtment head is forced to aSSU e(tc ess specialized, broader manag^ posture of expertise. Again, 0 nuch can one person absorb. _
Second, and possibly most i ^
ant, the establishment of SL'^rjje,
jartments creates one more u >ne more level of hierarchy m ,
,u_:_ _______ l Farh level ml j
88
Proceedings
I APril
198°
Pressing important information. jesj n t*le other hand, the double-XO ad<J'kn ^ac^’tates communications by ^ *"g a second channel to the com- tfcrn officer. It also avoids the fil- ad(jan^ deky Problem by avoiding the p|5tlon °f another level of hierarchy. f]Cu|St’. while avoiding the inherent dif- sch leS C^e suPer department rne> the double-XO command
enjoys the benefits of adhering to the span of control maxima.
The appeal of this design is that it can be done with little change to current, traditional alignments of the departments found in today’s Navy. Furthermore, this double-XO design is more than just a theory; it has been successfully used by other military organizations. For example, at Camp
Hanson, Okinawa, the Marine Corps successfully used a deputy camp commander and a regimental executive officer who handled much the same functions as the suggested XO (pets) and XO (ops), respectively.
Now, it only remains to implement such a double-XO organization in those naval commands that exceed the span of control dictum.
Book Reviews
ScaPe From Laos
u'eter iv ,
Pres$ 'ngler. San Rafael, CA.: Presidio ($9 gg)^9. 211 pp. plus. Map. $10.95
'wvie
VVL’d by Edward J. Marolda
^Urrentl
His,or ^ ' a s,aff historian with the Naval MarJ,D'vision, Washington, D.C., Air. 'Glided 1 Sm‘ce w‘th the U. S. Army *SsitrooP command in Vietnam and "gazin'* ta t^>e Staff Military Review official ^ 'S coau,hor of Volume 11 of the tile Vj SCr'es United States Navy and “tticle CtnaiTI Conflict, and has written Kt„ S and hooks on World War II and the *8"' War.
Di
*eter Dengler’s work is a useful thet0 the growing literature on
aU<J
met
in
>al
experience during the con- Southeast Asia. The author, a
>dron
(cv
A-,
aviator flying with Attack
6l) ;
45 from the USS Ranger early 1966, recounts his
in
‘attjgj
C<w ex*stence as a prisoner of the hall ri1Un'sts ‘n Laos. The work ini- treats the shoot-down and crash
of
Kjini^S A_1 Skyraider in the Ho Chi cha^,. rah area of Laos. Subsequent
aPtet!
Sari
Crs ^eal with his capture, inter-
r()6«tion j ■ r . .
rtiern- I ’ and six-month lmprison-
y che Communist Pathet Lao. tver1,1 °st enthralling segments, how- teniptt<)nCern Dengler’s desperate at- throt0 escape from his captors La0$ ^ 1 rhe lethal jungle of southern ^'th his against-all-odds rescue
‘Pof . »ticesdeta‘ls
"°°k
on ordering books and special See the Book Order Service note in the Interest department.
s of
in July 1966, he became one of the few naval aviators to escape from Communist captivity during the war.
Dengler’s account is highly readable. The torment of his existence in primitive prison camps, where disease, malnutrition, and inhumane treatment by guards were the rule, is vividly recreated. His description of the mountainous and jungled terrain of Laos brings the steamy hell to life. The difficulty of negotiating this tropical forest was attested to by the fact that three weeks after fleeing the POW compound near Hoi Het, Laos, Den- gler was still only five miles from the camp. The escapee’s fight to survive the depredations of mosquitoes, leeches, and snakes, as well as the unrelenting pursuit of his Laotian and Vietnamese trackers, is clearly told.
Yet Escape From Laos is ultimately unsatisfying. Unlike Jeremiah Denton’s When Hell Was in Session (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1976), Dengler’s work lacks reflection on the larger meaning of the war and his part in it. His views on the effectiveness or wisdom of the air war over Laos, or whether he believed in the policies for which he fought and suffered, are absent. Similarly, the reader searches in vain for the author’s introspection on his plight as a prisoner of war or that of his fellow captives. The deep expression of religious faith represented by Howard and Phyllis Rutledge’s In The Presence of Mine Enemies (Old Tap- pan, NJ.: Fleming H. Revell, 1973) or the paean to patriotism and mili
tary professionalism of Robinson Risner’s The Passing of the Night (New York: Random House, 1973) are not found in Dengler’s work. Given his unique perspective as a childhood refugee from war-ravaged and occupied Germany, it is surprising that Dengler offers so little insight into his obvious determination to be free.
For all its omissions, however, Escape From Laos is an absorbing account of a naval aviator’s unceasing efforts to escape from his enemies and from the smothering embrace of the Southeast Asian jungle. Dieter Dengler’s unquenchable will to survive is an inspiring example of human endurance.
Air Forces Of The World: An Illustrated Directory Of All The World’s Military Air Powers.
Mark Hewish. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. 264 pp. Ulus. Maps. Append. Ind. $24.95 ($22.46).
Reviewed by Captain Don W. Rightmyer, U. S. Air Force
A graduate of the U. S. Air Force Academy, Captain Rightmyer is currently assigned to the Southeast Asia Branch in the Office of A ir Force History, Washington, D.C. Flying for five years in the F-4 Phantom II in more than 15 countries, his operations have included experience with Great Britain's Royal Air Force and the Imperial Iranian Air Force.
This book will be a welcome addition to the bookshelves of both military professionals and students of air
Ce«di
lnSS / April 1980
89