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The officer of the deck reacted prompt/' captain and the exec. Prepare for hedge
"011 atta«
who
U> i
A CO11
ported c
w upcncu, ic^aiucu ^ j-jjf f
second attack. This time, one hedgehog vj£jerice 1 ploded at 130 feet, but there was no n°'^
damage. Down below, Commander auSjng B , knew what kind of weapon we were ^^eJ.s) i'n ^ hedgehog was still fairly new in up °l[
that we were sure of our contact. He o rn1'1
1 pQf ^
course and tried to hide in our wake.
On the evening of 13 May 1944, in Truk Harbor in the Caroline Islands, Lieutenant Commander Yoshitaka Takeuchi watched impatiently as a file of seamen struggled up the gangway of the 1-16. Each man was sweating under the load of a 75-pound bag of rice in a sealed rubber container. As one of the largest submarines ever built in Japan, the 1-16 provided ample stowage space, both belowdecks and in a tunnel-like structure designed to accommodate a retractable-wing floatplane. The submarine got under way at 0800 the next morning, bound for Buin on the southeast tip of Bougainville. Her mission was to supply a battered garrison on the verge of starvation. Takeuchi estimated his arrival time as 2000, 22 May.
This estimate, addressed to Commander Submarine Squadron Seven on Saipan, received wider distribution than the sender intended. Intercepted and decoded by CinCPac intelligence and promptly forwarded to Admiral William F. Halsey, it resulted in a priority dispatch from Commander South Pacific Area to Commander Escort Division 39, in Tulagi Harbor, Florida Island. ComCortDiv 39, Commander Hamilton Hains, in turn issued orders to his tactical command—three recently commissioned destroyer escorts, newly arrived in the Solomons. Two of the ships, the USS George (DE-697) and USS Raby (DE-698), were in his division. The USS England (DE- 635), of which I was executive officer, was a part of Escort Division 40.
Our three little ships sortied on the afternoon of 18 May and began heading toward the position—5° 10' South, 158° 10' East—designated in Admiral Halsey’s message for our rendezvous with the unsuspecting 1-16. The next morning, the crews of our three ships enjoyed one of those incomparable days that the South Pacific occasionally puts on exhibit. The sky was clear, the wind was from the east at a gentle force three, and the sea seemed to be serenely at peace. The illusion of peace was shattered in an instant. In the early afternoon, as the England was preparing to enter the search area, Soundman John D. Prock announced, “Contact! Bearing 305°, range 1,800 yards.”
the
ck-
wa5
Tell the OTC [officer in tactical commanm ^ ^ Commander Hains on board the George] c ^ afe impossible submarine on the starboard boW- the
vestigating.” Having been told, I scram e ^ combat information center (CIC) to set ^ (lit reckoning tracer (DRT) plot, then &to0k °vef open bridge. Ensign A. D. ("Gus ) ^al the
as recorder operator. The captain and ^ tjnie conn on the bridge during attacks. B> arrived, the range was 700 yards. ft
“Hedgehogs ready to fire,” came the rep the forecastle. ’
“Echoes sharp and clear,” Prock rep° dently. “Believe target is submarine. £jie sk’P
“This will be a nonfiring run, ordere jt is *1 per. “Keep a sharp eye on him. Let s be eer jS) the sub.” The England surged ahead. At N°"
target turned hard left and kicked bet sc^ ^ q\1 we were sure. We opened out and non £»£
that we had a definite contact. He or^er^0 cjrde land to attack and the George and Raby' 1 ^
2,000 yards, ready to assist if needed an ^ c0pt»ct' submarine surrounded in the event we This became standard operating procedure ^ a fir The time was now 1337. We headet 1 ^get- ^ ing run—our first against a live enem> y»r^s' 1340, the bearing was 180° and the range o
At 1341, the England fired. The ^ vl
hedgehogs arched away and dived into t 4 waited and listened but heard n0tjoje uO^ hedgehog was designed so it wouldn t exf Sifl| it hit a submarine. No sound meant no^ )
the target was moving hard righfi we . £ |eft. failed to lead her enough and missed to t^^ y0f ou We opened, regained contact, and rurn^ and
but ^ aring with an estimated depth of 200 feet,
J ' eStim
-he the Fa
rnakr-- °^rtb run was a bow attack. Takeuchi was
Fathometer showed 325 feet.
ut^s h
tact’ | 6 SUcceeded. Then at 1410, we regained connote ?ar*nS 218°, range 740 yards. We fired on a i r bearino- :____________________ j _ .u inn
Ur estimate was wrong. As we passed over the
The fourth
fr°mn^ak°Ut t*lree knots and throwing his rudder We tj,- e t0 s‘de erratically. He fooled us, and again als0 hn ®ut if Takeuchi knew more about us, we learnejew m°re about him. And, with what we had garoe \yWe dec*ded it was time to put an end to the kil| q e °Pened out, turned, and came in for the the 0^^ ’n^0rrnation looked perfect, and at 1433 With b Sa*V° Was UP and awaY- After a few seconds t° Six hated.breath> we heard it—V-R-R-OOM!—four sitooi lts *n such rapid succession that they seemed
CT-- Bull's-eye!
ginnj minutes later, when the cheers were just beg t0 die down—WHAM! The England shud
dered. The fantail was lifted a full 6 inches, then plopped heavily back into the water. Men throughout the ship were knocked off their feet, and the talker in CIC lost his headphones. The concussion was felt almost as sharply on board the George and Raby a mile away.
We had, with cataclysmic certainty, heard the last of one Japanese submarine. Sobered, and more than a little taken aback by that final blast, we no longer felt like cheering. But we did stand a little straighter. The England had made her mark, and we new boys were no longer quite so new.
The tremendous underwater explosion must have occurred deeper than 500 feet, because it was 20 minutes before the first debris appeared. First, there were many shreds of cork. Then came some deck planking and some pieces of finished wood that appeared to be the remnants of cabinets. These were followed by a prayer mat with Japanese characters, a
chopstick and some bits of wood with grains of rice embedded, along with traces of blood. Finally, and most conclusively, up came a sealed rubber container with its expected bag of rice. Almost an hour later, a small oil slick appeared. It grew steadily in size, and at sunset oil was still bubbling to the surface in quantity, along with more debris. By the following day, the oil slick was 3 miles wide and 6 miles long, mute evidence of the England's first encounter with the enemy.
On 20 May 1944, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, issued the order, “Prepare for Operation A-Go.” His plan called for Japanese naval units to draw together and, in effect, ambush the American fleet during its next offensive. The point of concentration chosen—Tawi Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago—and the other dispositions taken indicated that the Japanese expected an American line of advance in the direction of the Palaus—along the path that Admiral Halsey’s carriers had, in fact, taken on two previous raids into the Western Pacific.
Among the recipients of the “A-Go” plan had been Rear Admiral Naburo Owada, Commander Submarine Squadron Seven, headquartered on Saipan. His reaction was recorded in his war diary: “In the A-Go operation, the greater part of Sub Ron 7 will be concentrated in the area south of the
trols, rec0snk
Caroline Islands, and will engage in pa1 naissance and surprise attacks against e
forces and invasion forces.’
tas'
d,
With Submarine Squadron Seven s role i jonS- Admiral Owada had already made his prePa ^Q(Ce He would establish a patrol line and bloc -lt1
Cap
tail1
across the assumed path of enemy advance- ^.^jon
Ryonosuka Kato, Commander Submarine
ci ___________ j _____ ■ r___ nn 17 1 1
m
51, was ordered to sortie from Saipan on 11 ^ the R0-105, with R0-104, RO-109, RO-U2’ afljerS had in company. At the same time, separate °rc ^.fUh been issued to the R0-108 and R0-106 to ePa on 15 May and 16 May, respectively. jatesc
All seven boats thus deployed were o 1^ ^42 type of Japanese fleet submarines, built be a
and 1944. Slightly over 200 feet in lengr a
20-foot beam, displacing 525 tons, they tof' crew of 40 and were armed with four 2 1 ^ pedo tubes and two paired 25-mm. antiaircra^ radar They had no radar, but did have a very uS^g s0un^ detection device. They also had very effec£1 g. gear and could tune in on, and range ,„nC>0«ec!ly
sound frequencies. Safe diving depth was ^____ .alrnOst
only 246 feet, but this was frequent y
routinely—exceeded.
al or
Early in the morning of 20 May, the t0 e*'
dered the formation of “Scouting ’ gaSt cO
tend from position 01° 30' North, 150 sld
position 00° 30' South, 148° 30' East.
/ M»roh 16
faring.
dispatchWere t0 0n stat‘on at 0000> 21 May. This let^M a^S° received unintended, unauthorized, and Coms0p ^r°mpt distribution. From CinCPac to its xvav ,C t0 ComCortDiv 39, the message went on feceiVp 1 ate *n the afternoon of 20 May, the England following:
r,,. ,en Japanese submarines are believed to be repari
tXVeen
1 ating to form a scouting line in a position be- destf0 ^anus ancl Truk. Seek out—attack—and ^ C^e five submarines in our territory. Do Make°SS ^*ne un^ess *n fiot putsofi °f sure contact.
fh.
e"do
report until entering port.”
^as tke .. not cross” line referred to in this dispatch Area> 'ne which served to divide the Pacific Ocean ^°uthtyg er Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, from the MacASt Pacific Area, under General Douglas ^ere fajrUr' fife five submarines in “our” territory Womd ^arrie- The two in “their”—or, as some
fidd
as
ll> “his”—territory were forbidden fruit.
reri._ seetned at the time, and even more bizarre
prn^ect’ tfese targets were off limits. But, with ^Ot diSf,Sf'eC^ve birds in hand, ComCortDiv 39 was
fr«PosJdOSCd- C° cluibble about two in the bush. He Japan^Ulte s*mPty t0 start at rhe northeast end of Seetl wKnCSC *'ne an<f worf down it—leaving it to be
Suit
UlQ,
what
" Sh.
might develop in the way of “hot pur- 0rdy after dark on 20 May, he had his ships
0r> the morning of 22 May, Commander uSrnall fleet” was on a base course of 32 1°, in (7eo^ear*n8» at 4,000-yard intervals. At 0351, tange £ reP°rted a radar contact, bearing 303°,
a,ns
une
s '
of b,
, 8e 8 m i - ~ -
^tietai lles- Thirty seconds later, as we went to
SCteen jfi'|larters> we had a blip on the England’s
')rderfvJ C, °°fed like a surfaced submarine. The OTC
to
'hi
erecj , ‘v'-u nKe a surracea suDmarine. ine oil
0pen ^ e George and Raby to close and the England
'at a: °ut t0 the northeast, to box the target from
The rtl0n- .
|atdSi s^°r8e Passed in, and at a range of 4,000 'Sht. p.e filnminated the target with her search- ^igehjron bridge °f the RO-106, Lieutenant Cra$h ^fia> whose radar detector had failed him, toWer After a fleeting glimpse of a conning
'ach tQlts Way under the surface, the George swung attackPOrt’ picked up sound contact, and went in bissecj ‘ At 04l5( she fired a salvo of hedgehogs, C^en ^ost contact-
11 his anfier Hains, with some edginess apparent SuVar-0lCei asked if the England knew where the fitter e was. We answered briefly, if not com- "'e th0u °nestly. “Affirmative.” The truth was that a r ° c We knew where she was. Fortunately for S°1 icj Cq'V minutes later, we did. At 0425, we had a ntact, bearing 193°, range 2,500 yards. We
went in with echoes sharp and clear but missed with our first covey of hedgehogs. We opened, turned, and headed back in quickly. Lieutenant Uda, changing his tactics, reversed course and came to meet us, bow on. We were betting that Uda, like Takeuchi before him, had gone deeper—250 feet. At 0501, after continuing to track the target, we fired a full salvo. V-R-R-OOM! Three or more hits, at 275 feet. Five minutes dragged by; then as we regained contact and started another run—WHAM!
For the next hour, the three ships combed the area thoroughly. As day broke, with violent rain squalls, we saw what our noses had already smelled—a heavy slick about 600 yards in diameter, with oil bubbling to the surface in a steady flow. The George reported debris, cork, and deck planking. The rain became heavier. With visibility obscured, we took our departure. The next day, one of our patrol planes out of Manus reported the slick still there and still increasing in size as the shattered hulk of the R0-106 continued to bleed.
Thinking it probable that, like the R0-106, the other submarines in the “NA" line would be surfacing after dark, we recommended to Commander Hains that we broaden our radar search by opening our night scouting interval to 16,000 yards. Henceforth, we operated at night on a line of bearing that measured from flank to flank, 16 miles. At dawn general quarters, we shifted back to a sound search formation, with 4,000-yard intervals.
On the morning of 23 May, it was still dark when I came on the bridge to take star sights for celestial navigation. Shortly after 0600, I called the captain to ask permission to go to general quarters. As Lieutenant Commander Pendleton arrived to take the conn, we were steaming up the “NA" line on a base course of 036° with the George as guide 8 miles away on our port beam and the Raby another 8 miles beyond her. Anticipating the OTC’s order to go to day formation, we were ready to shift our helm at his word. But when the first sound crackled over the radio, it was from the Raby: “We have a radar contact bearing 085°, range 8,000 yards.” The OTC ordered the Raby to attack, while the George and England were to close at best speed. With 16 miles to cover, we rang up flank speed and hoped for something even faster.
As the Raby bored in, Lieutenant Susume Idebuchi, on the bridge of the RO-104, was more fortunate than his friend Uda. His radar detector picked up the Raby’s emissions, and at a range of 6,000 yards, he pulled the plug. Her radar screen gone blank, the Raby forged on and, at 0610, made sound contact. Seven minutes later, she fired her first salvo
n^s 1 March 1980
was
of hedgehogs—and missed. There were three more runs, three more salvos, and three more misses. We listened to the reports, cranked on more turns, and held our breath.
After almost an hour of patient observation, Commander Hains decided it was time for a change. He called off the Raby and sent in the George. At 0707, the George fired her first salvo. She not only missed but lost contact as well. When the England at last arrived on the scene, the George and the Raby were circling and echo ranging anxiously. Two hundred feet beneath them, the alert Idebuchi guessed what had happened, ceased pinging, and began making his quiet way the hell out of there. Heading away at five knots, he almost made it. Then, three minutes after we took our place in the ring, the George regained contact. The submarine was outside our circle and slipping off to the northwest.
Again, the George attacked, and again she missed. Between 0730 and 0810, she made three more firing runs and each time came up empty. Like the Raby, she found herself baffled by an opponent who was tricky, elusive, disconcertingly sharp—and lucky. After two frustrating hours, Commander Hains yielded to what was beginning to appear as the inevitable. With a touch of exasperation, he ordered the George to sheer off and give way to the England.
We missed on our first firing run, then went back for another attack. At 0834, the hedgehogs plunged resolutely into the sea, and in a few seconds, we were rewarded with a V-R-R-R-OOM! of unprecedented and magnificent proportions. We estimated 10-12 hits, at 300 feet. The first ripple of hits was followed, in the next half minute, by several more minor explosions. Then, three minutes later, came the now-to- be-expected WHAM! Once again, a crashing underwater explosion sent the England reeling.
At 1045, the first debris began to bob to the surface, along with a steady flow of oil. We lowered a boat to collect the grisly evidence. After half an hour, we had sufficient wreckage, plus oil samples, and I decided go go below for a cup of coffee.
Our third success had produced a muted response: some grim satisfaction but little jubilation. We were, it would seem, beginning to take time for second thoughts. And when, on my way to the wardroom, I was intercepted by a young seaman, I could sense what was coming.
“Mr. Williamson, he asked, “How many men on those submarines?”
“It depends on the type of sub,” I replied, “Somewhere between 40 and 80.”
“Sir, how do you feel about killing all those men?”
I gave him the only answer I could. Sher ^ right. And the real hell of it is, once we are^ we have no choice. Or a bleak one kill or
I had taken the first option—without
apology
killed' but
X 1UIU LaIVC. 11 Lliv 1UOL -------- *•
not without compassion. Any further jucl£ onj his as I told him, beyond my province, and as well. I believed it then, and I believe it n
young inquisitor seemed relieved. rA,,v thanked me. But somehow, when I pn ^ good the wardroom, that cup of coffee didn t taste
as I thought it would.
arch
The three destroyer escorts continued to sutjng the area until dusk, then formed a nig ^ line and resumed their sweep to the southwa
the Engl**d*£
At 0815, 23 May, about the time launching her first attack on the RO-106, on^ jd Submarine Squadron Seven received a reP^r intercepted message from a U. S. Pat ^ “Submarine sighted in position 149 i eLci»w E.,01 degrees- 25' N.” Admiral Owada, co ^ ^ that this might be one of his boats, slight Y ^,jl)
tion, issued an order at 0852: “RO-106, secretly shift to line of bearing 135 degrees, ment distance 60 miles.
By this time, the RO-106 had already sll‘* g0-^ tion, 2,700 fathoms straight down, and r tjnati°n' was 20 minutes on her way to the same e* , toO
The R0-105, if she received the order, e 7 0f 2^ long in executing it. At 0120 on the naorrn^
■ ~ - cfl(icf
depl0)"
shifts tf
lUUg 111 CACLUUllg 11. Ill OUO -- ...
May, with the George, Raby, and England st* ing southward, the George reported a ra [0
dead ahead, range 14,000 yards. All ships ^
20 knots and began to close in on the g°l
RO-116, Lieutenant Commander Takeshi with word from his radar detector operator an > 0i(\l
George 9,000 yards away, crash dived. At r ^ tb£ the England was 8V2 miles away to the east’ target bearing 274°. At 0147, we reache c s0Vjrv and Raby, reduced speed, and joined in z •
search. At 0150, we had a contact beari^n range 1,750 yards. Immediately, the targe evasive tactics. g c0fl'
Commander Okabe, 200 feet beneath ^itb tinued to kick one screw and then the 0cloSet frequent shifts of rudder. In addition, as w^ range and shortened our pinging interval, ^ ^ ol'r ping with his sound gear, thereby fouling echoes. He heard the England pass overhea |gtcd firing and followed up her wake. After we c° ^ jul1' a second run without firing, we believe , .pt)
a second run without firing, we
d
O9 M P
marine was turning left. But when we ^ headed for her, the target swung aroun a for us. At 700 yards and closing fast, we c0
S”8«
yards. 'T’l >ngand
Iret] at n->, ,no ^ast-minute maneuvering. When we
the
interval normally used for 1,000 worked; there was no counter-
Sf°Pped ru ’ t^le tar8et appeared to have just about The • ^ t0 ^*ve hedgehogs exploded at 180
The England’s skipper, Walton B. Pendleton (left), and her exec, John Williamson (right), are shown with a February 1944 photograph of their ship.
feet
'^ffiedi i *tIa v-R-R-R-OOM! was followed almost ^‘nor e te,^ ^y tumbling noises and several more *°t the e ^ °S*0ns' But as we hauled off and waited C0,lt‘nuecl CtC^ conclusf°ns> we heard nothing. We S'~ Search the area, without avail, until at
A we saw the confirming evidence. But I Paratively sparse—a few small patches of
s>fni
rise
. ^as
arid som a j ~t------------------ ” ~- ■■ ------ i--------- —
"’as the C planking. Another confirmation
presence of manv many sharks in and near
oil
area !vh'sence °f many’
l’^arks jnCre We found debris. We had seen excited £°t U[tdereVer^ s*nkfn8 excePc the first. At 0817, we uWay t0 resume the patrol. We returned to
atea th resume tne patrol, we returnea to
!>t ^ C following morning, and any doubts we
Oris Ve had
Picked uered
lr,S Wit^ lSamples and retrieved some deck plank- ^ahogajj1^ C ^°lts embedded, a chopstick, a piece of ^facters^' SOrne varnished wood with Japanese > and a pair of oil-soaked gloves.
^Partjn (May- at about the time that the RO-116 was Ct'Ved C^e area the hard way, Admiral Owada re- lr* vie^ aJ8nal from the R0-109, informing him that, V r*16 livelihood of discovery in the area of
were now removed. The oil and dean area of several square miles. We
line
harture 1S Unauthorized, but highly judicious, de- ^atinp ahly saved the Japanese Navy one sub-
'Hr. • e- Mr J ^ 3
%i
'fth.
she was withdrawing 60 miles due
or.
. itseanwhile, a new American force was mak- rtieo] n^ranee. On 22 May, Admiral Halsey had
^rri6r ^ Unter-killer group composed of the escort 534) °^att Bay (CVE-75) and destroyers McCord (hA iaZelw°od (DD-531), Heerman (DD-532), and
(hb.
K ,
C (dd-
This group, with Captain W. V. !Nd "theHoggattBay as OTC, was ordered to ^OctiQf,t0 t^le vicinity of the "NA" line and, in con- i'Vte t^eWlth our three destroyer escorts, to com- Sitjce rniSs*°n of “Seek out and destroy.”
0rnrnander Hains had, as ordered, made no
reports, Captain Saunders arrived on station early in the morning of 26 May with no knowledge of what we had been doing. Commander Hains consequently detached the England at 0200, with orders to rendezvous with the Hoggatt Bay at dawn and convey a full report. We reported as directed and at the same time notified Captain Saunders that ComCortDiv 39, with all three ships extremely low on fuel and ammunition, had been ordered to the nearest friendly port for replenishment. The nearest friendly port being Manus in the Southwest Pacific Area, Admiral Halsey had, as required, obtained permission from General MacArthur for our “intrusion” into his bailiwick. We were to head for Seeadler Harbor, there to meet with the USS Spangler (DE-696) en route from Purvis Bay with more hedgehogs.
Presented with this opportunity to cross the “do not cross” line lawfully, Commander Hains decided to make the most of it. Instead of making directly for Manus, we would take a course that would, quite by coincidence, run down the southwestern extremity of the “NA” line, then veer eastward. This exercise of initiative paid off. At 1930 on the evening of 26 May, the submarine hunters formed a night scouting line on base course 220°. At 2303, theRaby reported a radar contact bearing 180°, range 14,000 yards. One minute later,> the England had contact. We went to general quarters and made preparations for illumination by star shells, main battery fire, and torpedo attack. At the same time, we discontinued echo ranging, hoping to approach undetected. I had always wanted—ever since I had learned of antisubmarine warfare—to sink a submarine with a torpedo. As we changed course to head for the target, she changed course toward us. I planned to launch our torpedoes at 3,000 yards, but on board the RO-108, Lieutenant Kanichi Kohari fi-
81
nally got a warning. Just as we came up on 4,000 yards, our target disappeared.
We headed for the point of submergence and began echo ranging. At 2318, we had a good sound contact, bearing 211°, range 1,700 yards. In CIC, where we had been conning the ship, issuing star shell elevations and fuze settings, and giving directions for torpedo attack, we shifted into the more familiar routine, and I headed for the bridge. As the salvo of hedgehogs flew through the darkness, I waited with what I hoped looked like confidence but was actually closer to desperation. With this pattern gone, we would have exactly one more shot of hedgehogs left in our locker. It wasn’t needed. Four to six hedgehogs exploded at 250 feet. Twenty seconds later, we heard several more underwater explosions, followed by loud rumbling noises. The elapsed time from first radar contact to final explosion was 19Y2 minutes. The long night passed, and at daybreak we put a boat over to collect the usual evidence. The debris, with scattered patches of oil, covered 2 square miles. Near the center, a fountain of oil bubbled to the surface.
The three destroyer escorts arrived at Manus at 1500, 27 May. That night and the following day, we took on fuel, provisions, and ammunition. At 1800 on the 28th, with the MSS Spangler (DE-696)—also of Escort Division 39—added to the company, the group got under way to return to the “NA" line and resume the hunt.
Meanwhile, on 26 May, ComSubRon Seven on Saipan received an intercept of a plain language transmission from an American plane, reporting an attack on a Japanese submarine.. As a result, the admiral issued an order for his entire line to shift 60 miles to the west. But of the seven submarines addressed, four were no longer around to receive the order, one had already departed the area, and one, the R0-105, either did not receive the message or chose to ignore it. The only boats to report arrival on the new station were the R0-109, which had taken its own head start and called in on 30 May, and the RO-112, which arrived on the 31st.
In the early morning hours of 30 May, the pace began to quicken for the American ships on patrol. In Captain Saunders’s hunter-killer group, the Hazelwood, screening the Hoggatt Bay, picked up a radar contact at 0156, bearing 230°, range 10,000 yards. On board the R0-105, Captain Ryonosuka Kato (ComSubDiv 51) and the submarine’s skipper, Lieutenant Junichi Knoue, received prompt information. The Hazelwood had just started to pick up speed when the radar blip disappeared. A few minutes later, the Hazelwood achieved sound contact and made
a depth charge attack. She missed. -n the
Our group of destroyer escorts was c the
general area but outside of radar range- ^ pjjins Hazelwood asked for our position, Comman ^ offered our assistance. Since the George an ^ Q() the closer to the spot, he ordered them to c o ^ g!. Hazelwood, while the England and Spang t'r ^ ^ dered to continue to patrol down the l>ne with extreme regret—from our standpoint were excluded. For more than six hours ’destroys shortly after 0400, the destroyer and t chargeS’ escorts attacked with hedgehogs and dept sajd “It seemed,” the frustrated Commander the>h later, “that no matter from what direction •
- - • behind a
was made, the contact was always
was
that
hi*
ets-
What Hains didn’t know at the time ^mar*0^' opponent was one of the senior Japanese su ^ and determined to use every bit of his expet ^ j<^[0 cunning to the bitter end. And with CaPc giving the orders, this was only the begin ^ fite hours passed. The Raby and George continu^ £&$) their hedgehogs and continued to miss. jjt. cats-and-mouse game went on through the ^ ^nd While all of this was occurring, the ^ion Spangler were continuing to patrol in routin We had run to the end of the submarine ^ly
the
line and were now returning. At 0300 *n^e pi morning of the 31st, as we approache ^gan tl' where the George and Raby had left us, we hear voices on the radio. But we couldn t W
contact and had no idea of their l°ca ^rn1’
gathered from the snatches of conversation ^ tact^, through to us that they had a submarin j " were actively stalking. Desiring t0, bL „ oositi^ called in to offer our services and ask fo roba^ \ Our polite gesture evoked a rude (an 9 Ja) unauthorized) answer. The respondent, a ^ n°c
and a night of stress and disappointment,
6 3ed bacK ^f£.
,oifc
only tired but irritable. He snappy- nantly: “We are not going to tell you w f t0 . We have a damaged sub, and we are g0^ af him. Do not come near us.” Rebuffs , w^ t0 pa any idea of crashing the party and retUf^rate ^c trolling. Then fate, acting through a eSP ji0Llrs 0 tain Kato, took a hand. After almost deep submergence, with only a few snatc oSjti°( the R0-105 had to have air. Calculating to a nicety, Kato suddenly surfaced, mi vva the George and the Raby. confaCt’ ^
Both ships immediately obtained ra ar Kat 2,000 yards. The alert, but now weary a ^^road1^ and Lieutenant Knoue maneuvered their ^ ^ tl>e!' to remain between the two destroyer .(!SCComni;in * would be in each other’s line of •
Sim
k
P0|
rt of c agonizing hours, had gone to her Final , Ueparp ’ dedant to the last.
scene late in the afternoon of 3 1
ne foi
nains i
luminatfC T,re<^ ^'S S^*PS t0 c^ear the line of fire, il- the Engl 1 / su^mar>ne> and open fire. Fate now led ftaby " t0 the scene. As a seaman on board the train jton a 24-inch searchlight and started to ^rd 'p|1-IS ^an<^ slipped and the beam tilted up- Vertical *rt^ mdes to the northwest, we saw the at best J3enc** hght in the sky and began to close ^tsitabl ^ ^ Nelson could turn a blind eye to an tUrn a Jeaj °rder’ we figured we were entitled to in any ear particularly to a message that was, The Rol’ best '8nored-
utesi 5 remained on the surface for five min-
their ljnee c^e George and Raby maneuvered to clear ^^15 °h bfe’ t^len sub>merged again, unscathed, tty) dry e regained sound contact and made ttss. anc^ one hedgehog attack, with no suc-
retainjng tbe OTC decided to hold off while
(he ^V«^ntaCt’ C^en resume attacking at dawn. As met . an<J Spangler bore down at flank speed, ^ an°ther, but somewhat gentler, rebuff. *°r ordersaS ed t0 stand off, at 5,000 yards, and wait
fir *
"'ith the'r*8^’ tke °TC went hack on the offensive, ^649 [j eorSe making the first run. She fired at no hits. The Raby followed and anglershe also missed. The OTC called in the sdv0 0p °r her debut. She gave it her best, but the (J^29i £ ed§ehogs disappeared with no effect. At Sa'd tesi 0rrirnancler Hains picked up the mike and We;8nedl y > OK, England, it’s your turn.”
^Sed fe ready. When the signal came, we had "’ent ,n0 ^>000 yards and had a good contact. We ^ring’s i"1 Stern chase, pinging through the sub- seconW,ake- At 0736, our salvo was on its way. A ^Moded S ^ater—V-R-R-R-OOM! Six to ten charges j0rr>rnandat feet- C^e ht'dge of the George, 0 Vou £r. ^a*ns also exploded: “Goddamnit, how ^hter f‘
UsUal ^JVe tf'nutes and 43 seconds, we heard the eep. p The explosion was violent and very ^tface •p^rSt’ not even a swirl of water came to the °untajn f£n’ as we continued to comb the area, a ^attack°-p°^ bubbled up, 500 yards from the point lotyerejke debris gradually followed. Once more, ^eck r^i a b°at and recovered oil samples, pieces Jhetit 0f .anh*ng, shreds of insulating cork, a frag- Q|le 'vithlnter'°r wood Pa*nted red, bottle stoppers rtl°re, tQa Japanese label) and a bar of soap. Once afte°’ We Saw dozens of excited sharks. The RO- httiod 0f withstanding 21 separate attacks over a
Ur destroyer escorts resumed patrol. But
with six submarines destroyed (including the foodcarrying 1-16), and two beyond reach (the RO-109, for unknown reasons, left station and departed for Truk that same day, and the RO-112 was safely in sanctuary, across the line) the remainder of the cruise was, in a word, uneventful.
The epitaph for Submarine Division 51, and the final comment on the 12 days of the England, was provided on 13 June 1944. As the U. S. forces moved in for the invasion of Saipan, Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi sent an urgent appeal to Admiral Owada. All the available strength of Submarine Squadron Seven was to be immediately stationed east of Saipan, to intercept and destroy the American carriers and transports “at any cost.” Admiral Owada replied, “This squadron has no submarines to station east of Saipan.”
On 25 June, the RO-104, R0-105, R0-106, R0-108, and RO-116 were posted as missing, presumed sunk. Captain Ryonosuko Kato was posthumously promoted to rear admiral. In the United States, the feat of the England went almost unnoticed, save for a message from Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. With unaccustomed flair, the admiral announced, “There’ll always be an England in the United States Navy.”
Captain Williamson was graduated in 1939 from Birmingham-Southern College with a degree in mathematics. He entered the Navy in 1940 and subsequently served on active duty during both World War II and the Korean War. While an instructor at the Sub-Chaser Training School in Miami, he helped devise the Williamson Turn maneuver for recovering men lost overboard (See Proceedings, October 1979, page 89). He served as both executive officer and commanding officer of the USS England (DE-635); for his Pacific theater service, he was awarded the Legion of Merit and Silver Star. After the war, he worked for General Motors, then in 1956 formed his own management consulting company, now Williamson, Merrill, Taylor & Darling. Captain Williamson lives in Birmingham, Alabama.
Mr. Lanier is a 1940 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. After teaching in the Department of English, History and Government at the Academy, he took command of the USS PC-450 in 1941. In 1942, he became assistant gunnery officer of the USS Beatty (DD-640), and the following year he completed flight training at Pensacola. In the closing years of the war, he was air officer of the USS Shipley Bay (CVE-85) and assistant air officer of the USS Bataan (CVL-29). He resigned from the Navy in 1946 as a lieutenant commander and since 1947 has been with the McGraw- Hill Company. He is now McGraw-Hill's director of planning and lives in Larchmont, New York. This is his sixth Proceedings article.
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