This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
China now has an operating nuclear- powered submarine (“Han” class), a proven ballistic missile technology (land-based), and the experience of several nuclear detonations. The world should not be surprised but rather expect the launching of China's first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in the near future.
r
\_y hina.( National Objective: At considerable expense and sacrifice, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is establishing itself as one of the world's leading military powers. Its military buildup was undertaken as a necessary step in the realization of several national objectives.
Among the PRC objectives which require a strong military are these:
► To establish territorial security
► To achieve “superpower” status within the world community
► To be identified as the model for other Asian and developing countries and to be recognized as the leader of Third World countries.
In any discussion of China’s territorial security it is not necessary to show imperialistic intent on the part of the United States or the Soviet Union, but simply to show that China sincerely believes a threat exists. The locations, deployments, and defensive nature of China’s military forces, its all-out and sustained effort at developing nuclear weapons, and Peking’s public declarations leave little doubt that China still fears for its territorial security.
In keeping with its objectives, Peking seeks what might be called “nuclear security.” A feasible and cost-effective means of achieving such security is the development of a retaliatory capability which could survive a preemptive nuclear strike and inflict politically unacceptable damage upon an adversary. Such damage could be inflicted by a small, inferior force, so it is not difficult to imagine that Peking believes that even a small Chinese nuclear retaliatory force would deter the “paper tiger” nations.
It should not be inferred, however, that a viable nuclear deterrent would eliminate China’s need for a significant strategic offensive capability. A retaliatory capability is a requirement for superpower status and substantially enhances territorial security, but only the threat from a Chinese strategic offensive system I could eliminate interference from other superpowers in “local disputes” and wars of national liberation. Thus, such a strategic offensive force is required to open new frontiers for Chinese influence and exploitation in underdeveloped countries.
PRC Naval Strategy in Support of National Objectives: China’s emphasis on building a large, strong navy is historically justifiable, since the humiliating invasions which the Chinese have experienced during the past 150 years have occurred almost entirely by sea- Today, Soviet ships roam freely off the China coast and become more at home in the Indian Ocean. Japan has the potential to once again become a great naval power, and the impunity with which U. S.
warships steamed off the Chinese coast during the Korean War, Taiwan Strait Crisis, and Vietnam War have been continual reminders to Peking that its seaward borders require the protection of a powerful, modern navy. China’s present naval strategy continues to be that of coastal defense, which it inhered when the Soviets departed in the late 1950s. However, as the nation’s naval forces become more powerful, technologically advanced, and experienced, lts options will increase, and Peking will find other strategies more suitable to its purpose.
It is particularly important to note that there is no compelling reason for the growth of China’s naval power to follow in the footsteps of other naval powers. Peking has expressed the opinion that to follow che old path of technical development is to crawl after others, and therefore China must break conven- tIQn and learn from the advanced experiences of others as much as possible.1
Role of the Submarine in PRC Naval Strategy: The PRC submarine force has progressed from its inauspicious beginning with eight obsolescent Soviet submarines to a primarily indigenous force of more than 70 vessels." This submarine force remains, for the time being, a defensive one and must still be considered in the traditional concept of a weapon system used by an inferior naval power in an attempt to cope with a more powerful naval force. The fact that Peking places major emphasis on the production of submarines does not, however, imply satisfaction Wlth its inferior naval position. The successful use of uuclear-powered submarines has destroyed the tradi- tlonal concept of submarine employment because uuclear-powered submarines are not just effective offensive weapons but are also the main strength of superpower navies. The deployment of nuclear- Powered submarines by the PRC may be the event which initiates the nation’s change in naval strategy horn defensive to offensive.
From a conceptual standpoint, the rationale for the envelopment of a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSNj) force has historically been a combination of the ollowing factors: defense in depth, interdiction of Sea"lanes, protection of ocean commerce, countering che nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBiq) threat of potential enemies, and prestige. Let Us now discuss these factors in light of Peking’s naval strategy and political objectives.
£ defense In Depth. Chinese submarine operations ave taken place almost entirely within 100 miles of
China News Agency, 28 December 1969.
John E Moore, editor, Jane's Fighting Ships: 1978-1979 (New York: rankiin Watts Inc., 1978), pp. 95-96.
mainland China. The water depth there reaches a maximum of about 500 feet and is generally much shallower than that. Shallow water increases the danger of high-speed submerged operations because of the dangers of bottoming and places significant limitations on the otherwise remarkable capabilities of a modern nuclear-powered submarine. Furthermore, coastal operations require neither the endurance nor ranging capability of a nuclear submarine. As a result, the cost-effectiveness of such a program is open to serious question.
The capabilities of a medium-range, diesel- powered submarine such as the Chinese-built “Romeo” class are considerable. A “Romeo” on a covert patrol (submerged/snorkeling) could easily travel a distance of 3,000 nautical miles and remain at sea for 30 days. A routine patrol (considerably less than a maximum capability) might be in an area 1,200 miles from home port with up to 600 miles of “loiter time” within the patrol area. Allowing six days transit time in each direction, such a patrol would permit 18 days on station. Range arcs from naval bases at Shanghai and Yulin enclose the entire Yellow and South China seas, more than half the Sea of Japan and Philippine Sea, and extend into the Indian and Pacific oceans. These patrol areas could be further expanded if the PRC chose to develop a submarine base on one of the islands in the South China Sea. However, any further expansion, by virtue of the geographical areas encompassed, almost in itself implies offensive operations.
The idea of employing a fleet of SSNs to provide defense in depth has most likely been postponed by Peking until it becomes necessary to expand submarine operations beyond the inherent capability of conventionally powered submarines.
► Interdiction of sea-lanes is an offensive tactic and probably not of primary concern to the PRC except for those sea-lanes within its defensive perimeter. All these could be controlled by “Romeo”-class submarines. On a larger scale, a fleet of Chinese SSNs maintaining a presence in the vicinity of U. S. Seventh Fleet ships could be assessed as a threat which requires the United States to maintain or even reinforce its presence in the Western Pacific. Such reinforcement would be counterproductive for Peking, which views a U. S. withdrawal from Asia as a necessity for fulfillment of Chinese political ambitions.
\ Protection of Ocean Commerce. The PRC merchant fleet is growing in size, expanding its operations, and becoming more modern in response to Peking’s attempt to spread Chinese influence and prestige around the world. This expansion requires a degree
The commanding officer conducts blackboard training for enlisted men on board a “Romeo"-class submarine.
of freedom and security of international sea-lanes which would overtax the PRC Navy of today. Such security would require the combined efforts of powerful, long-ranging surface vessels, an air capability which would at least deny air superiority to an enemy, and a long-range submarine force. The PRC does not appear intent upon developing the requisite surface and air forces for such a task, and it is unlikely that China would build SSNs for such a role without them. For the present, China appears satisfied that the parity between superpower navies will keep the international sea-lanes open for all to use.
► Countering the SSBN Threat of Potential Enemies. For the PRC to build, maintain, and man a fleet of SSNs which could seriously contend with the Soviet or U. S. SSBN threat is highly improbable. Peking’s only countermeasure against such a threat (actual or imagined) is deterrence. Peking is aware that neither the Soviets nor the Americans have been able to deploy an SSN force capable of neutralizing the other’s SSBN force and is realistic enough to avoid trying.
► Prestige. In view of the absence of a strategic or tactical requirement, we are left with “prestige” as the motivating force behind a Chinese SSN building program. It may be concluded that the prestige derived from the implied operational capabilities of an SSN is largely because of her nuclear propulsion system. While this prestige would apply equally well to any nuclear-powered submarine, it would be substantially enhanced in the case of the SSBN.
The Case for the SSBN: One of Peking’s problems is the level of economic resources and gross national product allocated to military programs at the expense of agricultural production, light industry, and consumer goods. The quickest, easiest, and most economical avenue toward fulfillment of China’s military-oriented national objectives is with an SSBN force. Because of its value as both a strategic deterrent and offensive weapon system, such a force would maximize the cost-effectiveness of capital and resources, provide a forceful backup in the event of nuclear blackmail, and elevate China’s international status and prestige to a level far above the actual strategic value of such a system.
The area which could be targeted by a submarine deploying from a PRC naval base and equipped with a 2,000-nautical mile missile system is considerable. It
is significant to note that European Russia can be targeted from the Indian Ocean and that Hawaii and the continental United States are within 2,000 miles of an area readily accessible from the Chinese mainland. China’s economic and military (more specifically, naval) aid to Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan takes on added dimension when viewed in the light of those nations’ potential for making available friendly ports from which the Chinese might conduct SSBN operations in the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese View of the SSBN as a Deterrent: It is generally accepted by Westerners that a deterrent force can be effective only if its capability is known to potential adversaries and its effectiveness is con- ■ tinually proven. However, from the xenophobic viewpoint of the Chinese, a paucity of information available to potential enemies will not necessarily reduce credibility and indeed might well result in 3° overestimation of Chinese capability. To assume that a lack of publicity concerning nuclear submarine production, submerged-launch ballistic missile system, etc., implies that Peking is neither interested nor developing such systems would be an error. Similarly, any suggestion that such a system would not be employed as a deterrent until its capabilities are “proven” would be a costly mistake.
I believe that in the Chinese view, the deployment of an SSBN, even of unproven operational capability and carrying missiles of unknown potential, would
create sufficient “apprehension” in U. S. and Soviet minds as to effectively end the era when either could make nuclear threats against China with impunity. The high survivability of the SSBN has unquestionably established her credibility as a strategic deterrent t0 hostilities. This “defensive” connotation can be exploited by Peking to avoid unfavorable publicity ar>d is consistent with PRC claims that the Chinese w‘ll maintain a position of “no first use” of nuclear Weapons and that the development of such weapons ls strictly for defensive purposes. Typical of these claims is the statement following the two nuclear tests in September 1969 when the Chinese assured fhe world that their development of nuclear weapons would be entirely for the purpose of defense and for breaking the nuclear monopoly of the two superpowers- At no time and in no circumstances, Chinese °fficials indicated, would the PRC be the first to use nuclear weapons.3
Why Mot Rely on Land-Based Missiles or Conven- tt(>nally Powered Submarines? For a nation to have an effective nuclear deterrent its total system must deter both limited and massive nuclear attacks. The addi- tlon of this requirement makes the acquisition of a variety of weapons and delivery systems a necessity. Similarly a variety of deterrent systems is necessary to ensure that no one defensive system or technological breakthrough will eliminate the basic capability of Ouclear retaliation. The multiplicity of launch areas available to an SSBN provides a variety in itself and generally makes it more difficult and costly to defend against the system than for the system to place a Warhead over a target. Although land-based ballistic missiles fit into an overall deterrent package, they are neither sufficient by themselves nor can they, by sbeer numbers, replace fleets of nuclear-powered bal- bstic missile submarines.
A deterrent force based on conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBs) would be unacCeptable, because Peking would lose the international Prestige that comes with the deployment of nuclear- powered vessels. In addition, the range and er>durance capabilities of the conventionally powered system would be severely limited. To produce conditional missile submarines as an interim deterrent force is not likely because it would considerably ffssen the international impact of the eventual nOclear-powered missile submarine deployment and Place undue strain on the Chinese economy. It is believed that the sole Chinese “Golf”-class SSB is a research and development vessel and that additional sbips of the class will not be produced.
China News Agency, 4 October 1969.
The “Han"-Class Submarine: There is sufficient risk of failure in a country’s initial application of nuclear propulsion to a newly designed, streamlined submarine hull that the probability of success need not be further reduced by adding the first indigenous, naval ballistic missile system to the same vessel. If the propulsion plant of the “Han” does not prove satisfactory, additional hulls may be constructed until an acceptable, high-powered, long-endurance propulsion system is successfully tested. Thus, the "Han”-class SSN is assessed as a research and test submarine for a nuclear propulsion system, not the prototype for a force of attack submarines. The point is that China’s goal is the deployment of a fleet of SSBNs, and the interim launching of one or more SSNs should be interpreted as a logical step toward that goal and not a change of strategy.
Summary: The PRC initially inherited a defensive naval strategy from the Soviets and with minor adjustments molded its naval force into a logical extension of Mao Tse-Tung’s “guerrilla” force, the People’s Liberation Army. Submarines, gunboats, and missile boats provided this army with a naval force which could operate in accordance with Mao’s hit-and-run guerrilla theory. It is considered most likely that the decision to progress directly from a guerrilla-type naval force to a strategic, nuclear deterrent force was made shortly after the Sino-Soviet rift and that the PRC has been working on the various phases of an SSBN program since the mid-1960s. Such a decision would be in keeping with Chinese national objectives and economic capabilities. Progress has been interrupted by political turbulence (Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao Affair, and Anti- Confucius Campaign), unforeseen economic events, and most recently the death of Chairman Mao himself. However, the validity and logic of the argument for SSBNs have endured in the eyes of the Chinese. How much longer will it be until we see the submarines themselves?
^^■■1 A I960 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, Lieuten- W 1 ant Commander Pariseau has an M.S. degree in opera-
■ tions research from the Naval Postgraduate School and is writing his dissertation for a doctorate in business ~ |H administration (DBA) from George Washington Uni- versify. He has served on board destroyers and four nu- luL clear submarines, both attack class and Polaris, includ
ing tours as engineer officer and executive officer. He had a tour as admiral’s aide to Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 11 and shore duty at Naval Field Operational Intelligence Office, where he was head of Asian Navies Branch for two years and head of Anti-Submarine Warfare/Undersea Warfare Branch for two years. He is now serving as Director, Advanced Submarine Programs at the Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia.