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Almost 20 years have passed since the Navy’s bathyscaphe Trieste (facing page) descended nearly seven miles to the bottom of the Marianas Trench. But the Navy, its resources stretched, has shown no desire to pioneer the defense of the seabed. Who, then, shall do it?
be Coast Guard, traditional enforcer of Maritime law, or the Marine Corps in its c°nstabulary role? Or both?
The United States today stands reluctant and unCertain on the brink of a new age of discovery: the exploration, exploitation, and colonization of the seabed. It is curious indeed that the United States, a Maritime nation, should approach its oceanic future ^h such misgivings. Since the passage of the arine Resources and Engineering Development Act 1966, the nation has been on notice that “inner sPace, not “outer space,” is more closely allied to near-term interests. One need but review the 74 agenda of the Senate National Ocean Policy tudy to grasp the political, economic, maritime, ari|J military significance of the sea: marine fisheries, ^‘neral resources, coastal zone management, ocean transportation, pollution, Law of the Sea, education, 8°vernment organization, and budget. For the mili- |ary planner, these national maritime interests trans- e readily into inshore and offshore protection of Sources, offshore drilling and oil rigs, sea farming arM mining, merchant marine and coastal shipping, °Cean safety, law enforcement, research and devel- bment, command and control, and fiscal authority.
The United States, as an economic and technical uPerpower and a potentially explosive military Power, is pursuing the reality of the seabed slowly and without precise objective. There is, for example, no clearly articulated national oceanic policy or sense of organized priorities, despite the congressional authorization of the Interagency Committee on Marine Science and Engineering. As the reality of the sea mission closes in, it raises fundamental problems for economic and defense planners, not the least being the competitive aspect of Soviet activities in this area.
Is the exploitation of the seabed and the water that covers it feasible? The answer is “yes,” particularly in view of America’s recent, painful realization that it is heavily dependent on other nations for materials vital to national defense, industry, and the national standard of living. Offshore oil drilling, which has been in progress for some years in the Gulf of Mexico, is financially viable and is expanding off U. S. coasts. As technology advances, drilling in deeper and deeper water is inevitable, as is the search for cobalt, manganese, copper, and nickel, all found in seabed nodules. In addition to being a source of mineral wealth, the sea is also a major source of food. One sixth to one fifth of all protein consumed by man comes from the ocean. Aquaculture—the breeding, controlling, and harvesting of “herds” of fish—is under way. At present, the United States imports 60% of its seafood but produces only one fiftieth as much through aquaculture as does China. In response to this, mariculture—the raising of underwater gardens—is now in the early stages of development. Deep-water ports have already become a reality. Soon to follow will be the building of underwater nuclear power plants.
But does government need to be involved? In a 1966 Proceedings article, John Craven predicted that when nations begin developing ocean resources, national borders would be redefined to include zones of interest in and under the water.* One intriguing as-
*John P. Craven, "Sea Power and the Sea Bed," United States Navat Institute Proceedings, April 1966, pp. 36-52.
pect of this possibility is that the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than being separated by the Bering Strait, would share a common border under the water of the strait. New borders would establish a nation’s controlling interest in the sea for anything other than ocean transportation.
What would be the role of the military in this? Defense implications are obvious. New borders would best be defined by a series of military outposts located in the middle of the ocean and on the ocean floor. This presence would act as a deterrent against any other forces, either national or quasi-national, including terrorist groups. Even more so, they would assure corporate institutions that their investments would be protected against both military and legislative attack. In fact, the General Accounting Office recently reported that American industries are already seeking legislative and financial protection for their research and investments in the seabed. This protection, this assurance of government support, is presently absent.
By the year 2000, scientific exploration of the sea floor should reach a depth in excess of 20,000 feet. Ocean research technology, never financed in the NASA mode, has nonetheless moved forward. From the bathyscaphe Trieste, which in I960 was the first self-powered vehicle to carry man to the deepest parts of the ocean, to the Hughes Glomar Explorer was but 16 years. It was only nine years from the cancellation of the Navy’s Sealab and aquanaut experiments in 1969, because of expense, to the successes of the Pacific deep miner Sedco in 1978 and the presence of about 20 unmanned vehicles in the North Sea oil fields. The direction and drive are evident.
An analysis of the security requirements of the seabed suggests the creation of a new defense concept: the Coast Guard-Marine Corps team. The Coast Guard and the Marine Corps have always shared one most important characteristic—flexibility. Their histories reflect the changing missions necessitated by the flow of events through the years. As matters stand, the Coast Guard, a peacetime military lifesaving and law enforcement component of the U. S. Department of Transportation and a wartime member of the Defense Department, comes very close to being the lead agency in the Government’s protection of offshore resources, including the seabed. This is an evolutionary extension of present Coast Guard missions and responsibilities. First, there is the transportation primacy of the Department of Transportation, with its concerns for coastal transport corridors, transport of hazardous materials, Coast Guard offshore missions, national navigational systems research and development, and the increasing importance of the 200-mile fisheries zone. Second, there is the Coast Guard contingency responsibility for safety, protection, and security of man-made offshore assets, including deep-water ports. It is but a matter of time before the question of natural assets in the seabed is added to the arena of concern. Already, the Coast Guard possesses enforcement authority for offshore assets, and by implication there is the outline of a case for a limited peacetime role related to security. In wartime, coastal defense is a matter for the Department of Defense, including the Coast Guard. In sum, while the Navy, with its worldwide projection and its constrained budgets, has necessarily restricted itself in its concern for offshore assets and the seabed’s future, the Coast Guard has been slowly mandated new roles logically culminating in support of the economic drive to the seabed and its subsequent defense.
As the move to the seabed becomes a reality, the Coast Guard may have to make a conscious decision to avoid the new seabed-oriented responsibility below if its force levels are not sufficient to the task- The Coast Guard’s history shows, however, that ic has often changed or expanded its missions to meet changing situations and national priorities. It will need to use the flexibility in this case, since the Navy, already stretched in its resources, shows no strong inclination to pioneer the defense of the sea' bed.
The Marine Corps also has a history that stresses flexibility, adaptability, and determination to sut' vive. Illustrative of these Corps traits is the model emerging from World War I, during which Marines functioned side by side with the Army, as they later would again in Vietnam. The Corps took over active development of the doctrine of amphibious warfare- The age of large-scale amphibious landings is pass' ing, if not already past. Because of the dwindling number of ships, satellite and other electronic sut' veillance, technical improvements in mine warfare and pinpoint conventional and nuclear missilery, ‘l large-scale “classic” amphibious assault is unlikely However, quick reaction strikes by preposition^ units near a trouble area are still very much a poss1' bility and will continue as a Marine Corps missi°n into the foreseeable future. Becoming part of l^e military force on the seabed and offshore would g*ve the Marine Corps new responsibility, a return to ltS earlier constabulary role, and a chance to demonstrate once again its instinct for well-deserved survival-
Coast Guard-Marine Corps Role: Some activities shou^ start immediately, and others would be phased in aS time and technology allow. The Coast Guard’s dutieSln fulfilling its seabed mission would be an extension °f its present role as offshore enforcer of maritime laws and safety procedures and would center around transportation of marines and their supplies. It will have to develop new shipping concepts, surface and subsurface, including submersibles of varying sizes and capabilities. The marines, who once served on hoard the revenue cutters of the early Coast Guard, should oversee the development of modules allowing life on the border, on and under the water. This responsibility would be shared with the Coast Guard. The Corps would develop tactics for use against underwater intruders as well as techniques for carry- lng out its role as the constabulary of the seabed. Inherent in all of this is the need to train personnel t0 function on the sea floor. Together with the Coast Guard, marines must learn how to explore and map be seen as a potential threat to the Navy. For the marines to take on a new and important mission will disappoint those who are convinced that the country would best be served by the Corps’s dissolvement. And, of course, if an organization is formed to coordinate the move to the seabed along the lines outlined in this article, it will compete with other federal agencies already drifting toward this bureaucratically profitable area. Finally, it is quite obvious that none of this rather radical reshuffling of defense and organizational lines of authority will take place unless there is legislative, executive, and policy acceptance of the thesis, and this is by no means presently assured. Change is a fearsome thing.
Tactics: The heart of the tactical defense system will be, as in the Old West, a network of outposts. The
dynamics electric boat division
sea floor. They may even augment the Coast
Uard’s present police-type forces on the surface,
Us freeing Coast Guard personnel for service in
eir expanded fleet. The entire matter of seabed £ | *
‘ n*ng will take extensive research and calls for attention.
j. Outside of the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, must be learned besides tolerance. Congression- k ^ aPproved expansion of the Coast Guard’s resource ase, especially the addition of submersibles, might
Twelve years ago, an artist envisioned vehicles churning up minerals from the ocean bottom and pumping them through hoses into a domed processing plant to he transferred hy submarine to a distant surface port. It hasn't yet happened in this manner and it may never. But minerals will be mined from the seabed, and when they are, new laws will have to he made and enforced by the Coast Guard-Marine Corps team.
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munications will have to be by signal, by use
most obvious difference will be that the new frontier poses a three-dimensional problem, with outposts spread not only from east to west and from north to south, but also at varying depths. This tiered system would include outposts located on the surface, suspended between the surface and the ocean floor, and resting on the seabed itself. The size of the outposts, particularly in the early stages of implementation, will depend in part on the state of the art of aquatec- ture (architecture at sea). The surface outposts would be semisubmerged and held in place either by anchors or by power. The surface models would be the biggest and most powerful, would serve as base points, and would have both docking facilities and a helipad. The mid-depth outposts would include submerged docking facilities for submersibles and small personnel carriers and would also be held in place either by anchors or by power. The smallest outposts, those on the ocean floor, would have similar docking facilities and would be resting on and anchored to the seabed. All outposts would be movable to enable adjustment to changing political pressures or developing need, such as new international treaties, political compromises, or economic exploration.
Outposts may be hard-wired together for a communications link and may have power line hookups to enable backups for their primary on-board power source. The number of tiers, and the number of outposts in each tier in a particular “school,” will depend on the depth of water in that area, the political situation, and the amount and type of exploitation planned or in progress. Some missions would be shared by all types of outposts, including prevention of resource piracy; collection of scientific data and intelligence; service of sensors; reaction to intruders as appropriate or ordered; patrolling of designated three-dimensional areas; developing of tactics; and cooperation with corporate and private efforts. Specific type-oriented missions could include the following:
Seabed outpost:
^ Conducting short-range patrols using one- or two-man enclosed “seahorse” vehicles and powered sleds
► Exploring and mapping the seabed
► Participating in deep-sea rescue efforts
Mid-depth outpost:
► Conducting long-range (multi-day) patrols, carried or escorted by Coast Guard submersibles
^ Serving as decompression/compression stations for personnel in transit to and from the surface
Surface outpost:
^ Serving as command post for subsurface outposts in its school
► Serving as supply conduit, although most resupply would go directly to the requesting outpost
► Supporting all present Coast Guard missions
► Monitoring satellite and ocean sensor data gathering
► Direct command and control reaction of all outposts in its school to specific events.
The surface, or command, outposts would come under the direction of a joint staff consisting primarily of Coast Guard and Marine Corps personnel with Navy representation, since outposts would be capable of only relatively small-scale, conventional military action and would not infringe on the Navy’s traditional responsibility for surface action. The new team would, however, assume a significant share of the responsibility for its own close-in, subsurface defense- This will be necessary largely because of the Navys inertia, but, more importantly, because the concepts and techniques for defense of the outposts need immediate development and planning by the services which would put them into action.
The tactics needed for use underwater would initially borrow heavily from the aviation field, since, like fighter pilots, underwater cavalry will be figging in a three-dimensional element. Tactical com low-frequency pre-coded messages, or by laser. Lasers, one type of hardware that is not yet in appb cable development, may also find their way mt0 underwater weaponry. At present it appears that weapons will be either an evolution of today’s speaf gun or a directional electric charge.
An obvious area of concern will be the vulnerability to attack of these semi-static structures. All m coming ships will be detected by sensors or satelhte surveillance, and the Navy will be relied on heavily to coordinate the defense. Subsurface warfare may re quire that outposts be equipped with torpedoes- Man-delivered ordnance may also be an option.
To demonstrate the range of actions taken by °ut post personnel, three examples are suggested belo"’ Of course, the number of possible situations or rhe types of appropriate reactions may be greater, ^e pending on the situation.
Rescue duty: If a deep-sea mining effort with Per sonnel working on the seabed were to suffer a disastef of some sort, such as engineering failure, nuclear aC cident, or equipment breakdown, it would be de tected either through a hard-wired alarm system the nearest outpost, a low-frequency preset alarf^ signal picked up by any outpost, or by a perm ^ patrol check. The mining personnel could be res<me^ by outpost marines acting either as free swimmers
1919
usmg their vehicles in conjunction with Coast Guard subrnersibles. To avoid decompression problems, the mjured could be taken to the nearest outpost and Medical help brought to them.
Constabulary duty: Serving in their historic roles as “cops on the beat,” Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel would guard against crime. One possible crime would involve resource piracy. The constabulary could also check on compliance with 'censing provisions.
Military duty: If a terrorist unit, officially aligned V|'lth a national government or not, were to attack, c e responsible surface outpost would coordinate the ovements and actions of its personnel. The tactics, Weapons, and communications already described would be employed.
Assumption of the seabed mission will, of neces- !!ty’ require organizational changes for both the ^oast Guard and the Marine Corps. Closer liaison etween the two services would need to be devel- Cu^rn*nat*nS in a form of joint seabed staff. e Coast Guard should expand its research and dee °pment effort and begin determining needs for uew ship types, including subrnersibles. The organisational change for the Marine Corps would be more Carnatic, because it needs to begin work in totally ^eW areas, particularly the construction of outposts.
new type of unit will need to be created, possibly q° VlnS fo°m the present-day Force Reconnaissance.
. nce implemented, the seabed mission will occupy greased percentages of both forces. Their overall lesion would be to protect and further national erests in the defined ocean region.
C0Yet- *n spite of all the changes implicit in the tuHcept of a Coast Guard-Marine Corps team, its fu- nQte aPPbcaticm still seems inevitable. The concept is r“at remote from past or continuing roles of the fo°ast Guafo and Marine Corps. The Coast Guard, saf eXamPle> has always functioned as a seaward to etu and laW enforcement agency, and as an adjunct Qu'C e Navy ’n warrime. Seabed development re- Co ^ same application of roles. The Marine (j Ps ^*as a constant mission “to perform such other
Coast Guard. U. S. industry and multinational companies, looking beyond the 1990s, are bestirring themselves as the world contemplates mineral shortages at century’s end. Congress is on the verge of licensing U. S. sea-mining companies, and the Law of the Sea Conference is presently coping with the vast range of thorny political and legal questions as to who owns the seabed and how the resources of the ‘common heritage of mankind” are to be exploited and distributed.
It is accepted that the world, including the United States, will for common and individual interests exploit the seabed. National interests always subsume a legitimate and credible presence. However, prior to the realization of this military need, there exists an even more basic national need: the recognition that the United States requires a positive oceanic policy. Thus, we end where we begin. The nation needs a national seabed council similar in weight and influence to the space council and the domestic council. Only then can policy and structure be clarified. To buttress these concerns and to demonstrate preparedness and military credibility, it is time for the United States to innovate by example. The concept of a Coast Guard-Marine Corps team is feasible and practical. The parts, if not the whole, are already in place. But rational commitment must precede any progress, military or economic, in defining and implementing this mission of seabed defense. The time is ripe.
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Captain Delaney holds the Milton Miles Chair of International Relations at the U. S. Naval War College and is a specialist in terrorism, subversion, and related issues of public affairs. He was educated at Dartmouth, College of the Holy Cross, Boston University, and Harvard. He served for 20 years with the U. S. Foreign Service, with assignments behind the Iron Curtain and in Vietnam, where he was in charge of psychological operations. He is a graduate of the Naval Intelligence School, Counter Guerrilla and Jungle Warfare Schools, Combat Intelligence School, and the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg. Captain Delaney, a former member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, has recently completed a tour as Commanding Officer of the Naval Reserve's worldwide Attache Unit.
^es as the President may direct,” which is a direct ation to join in the defense of our seabed inter-
ests ,-p w 111 me dciciibc ur our sc3.dcg inter”
of^, Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered future °re defense needs, and special attention is being
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to sensors, sensor contacts, command and con
systems, deterrent systems, and weapon systems. he movement to the seabed has begun. The Na-
^ Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmos federe |has recently calletl for the creation of a new department consolidating all agencies dealing the oceans and the atmosphere, including the
Major Townsend s military career began with his commissioning upon graduation from Marquette University in 1963. Since then he has served three tours in the Far East, including seven months as commanding officer of the 1st 8" Howitzer Battery in Vietnam in 1968-69. Earning an M. S. degree in computer science at the Naval Postgraduate School preceded his four years with Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems (MTACCS) Test Bed. He met Captain Delaney while a student at the Naval War College Command and Staff Course in 1975-76. Major Townsend is currently the marine officer instructor at the NROTC unit at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts.
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