Two Anchors in the Pacific: A Strategy Proposal for the U. S. Pacific Fleet

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The Pacific is a big ocean, and for a long time it has been guarded by a big fleet. But now, with the Pacific Fleet smaller than it has been for years, it has not one ocean to guard, but two—the Indian as well as the Pacific.

The Fleet must develop two strategies for the two oceans, and for each a portion of the Fleet must be assigned, a “high” portion for the higher latitudes, and a “low” portion for the lower ones.

In the view of the globe (oppo­site) Pearl Harbor, once the ad­vanced base of the Pacific Fleet as it faced westward, is left far on the eastern horizon. To the west lie the new boundaries of the Pacific Fleet’s field of responsibility, the eastern shores of Africa and the Middle East. The main naval threat to all this comes from the Soviet Pacific Fleet, based in the north at Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan and Petropavlovsk near the Bering Sea.

T, central question for American defense planners is: Ho"| does the United States cope with a Soviet Union that cannot or svn not stop spending on armaments? This essay will suggest that ³ system of collective security is necessary, particularly in the Pacific- and that within that system the U. S. Pacific Fleet has a prerni^ef role to play by assuming an offensive, strike-oriented posture ¹¹¹ order to reassure our partners, to be ready to prosecute any "'^af aggressively from the start, and to keep the Soviets on the strategy defensive in peace as well as in war.

Given the Soviet inclination to keep investing in arms, on th^e strategic plane there is no alternative to negotiating parity or, fa^' ing that, to matching Soviet growth so that neither side attains aO overwhelming advantage. On the conventional plane the history ⁰ Soviet-American relations since the late 1940s strongly sugg^eStS that the American response to the Soviet challenge will have to b^e both global and peripheral. Global because the pressures exerted by the Soviet Union are no longer confined to Eastern Europe but no" extend to Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Far East- And peripheral because the Soviet Union holds the interior positioⁿ on the Eurasian land mass, requiring an American response to be based on naval superiority, an insular strategy, and military partnerships.

The Need For Collective Security                                                                   „

Since it got its start in the late 1940s, collective security ha^s worked satisfactorily for the NATO Allies, while America itself h^aS carried the brunt of the military aspect of containment in the F^af East. But events since 1962 have changed the worldwide balance- The NATO Alliance still stands in Europe but given our many othe^f commitments the growth of Soviet ambitions and influence elsewhere have overtaxed American ability to cope unilaterally around the globe.

No longer does the United States by itself directly match Sovi^et military spending. Moreover, the United States no longer has cctd^e blanche to rush in anywhere in the world to protect even its nno^st legitimate interests or to stabilize even the most volatile situation⁵’ especially when the locale in question is adjacent to Soviet terr¹ tory. For example, it is difficult to see how the United States act

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ing unilaterally could militarily prevent Soviet domination of Iran if the Soviets really want to exert their influence there.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and its allies or quasi-allies are now uncomfortably adjacent to all too many regions around the world, many of them re­gions where the United States has vital political and economic interests.

Surveying the globe, one realizes that the largest region, the Pacific, is also one in which the United States maintains the most powerful potential partners. On the eastern edge of the Pacific, likely bedfellows or not, Japan and the People’s Republic of China are potentially the strongest powers in Asia. Together with the United States they could exert suf­ficient political, economic, and military strength to delay or forestall entirely Soviet adventures elsewhere.

The Containment Policy and Forward Strategy

The concept of containment through collective se­curity has been reasonably successful in Europe over the course of three decades. The containment policy originated in the thoughts of George Kennan, then a Foreign Service Officer serving as Acting Ambassador to Moscow. In his famed telegram to the Department of State in February 1946 Kennan said that: “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term vigilant con­tainment of Russian expansive tendencies. . . . The Russian pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and polit­ical points, corresponding to the shifts and maneu­vers of Soviet policy.”¹

Kennan was advocating economic and diplomatic weapons as well as military force to contain “Russian expansive tendencies,” but by the turn of the decade “containment” had developed strongly militaristic overtones. The onset of the Korean War solidified this transition by assuring the adoption of NSC-68, the National Security Council’s draft proposal entitled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” which proposed a major buildup of America’s conventional military power.²

Out of the militarization of containment came the defense policy called “deterrence,” a policy which has appeared in several guises during its long existence. Originally envisioned as the military side of the con- ‘For footnotes, please turn to page 14 1.

tainment policy Kennan advocated, deterrence soon evolved through confrontation and brinksmanship until, by the end of the Eisenhower administration, it had come to connote almost exclusively the use o “strategic” nuclear arms to halt Soviet attempts at expansionism. The Kennedy administration’s “Flex*' ble Response” doctrine was the result of a logical swing of the pendulum back towards more conven­tional (and presumably more rational) means of de­terrence. But the militarism of deterrence was not to be undone, and eventually it led us into the Vietnam quagmire. Finally, the Nixon Doctrine signaled a stepping back from the notion that America’s mil*' tary strength was a cure-all for international prob­lems. In its place Nixon and Kissinger sought to es­tablish a worldwide collective security system by which nations would, acting in concert according ^t0 their common interests, be substituted for exclusive U.S. efforts to underwrite local efforts at halting th^e spread of Soviet influence.*

American defense policy has remained relatively constant throughout this postwar period in its adhef' ence to a “forward” strategy consisting of the de­ployment of naval forces and the basing of groun and air forces hard against the frontiers of Soviet im­perialism. In fact, the far-flung American military establishment which emerged victorious from Won War II provided the toehold for the continuer* American presence overseas. In the Pacific the Seventh Fleet never was withdrawn from Asia¹¹ waters after the war, and the occupation army ^,fl Japan metamorphosed into the 2nd Infantry Division which remains in South Korea until this day.

In many respects the forward strategy was, am¹ still is, taken for granted, almost as a “given,” since we never had to justify its implementation, only ^)tS continuance. Arguments in its support usually ha^ve either been rather vague, such as claims that n^s “most important contribution is in the perception 0 U. S. power and the perception of U. S. resolve, or all-encompassing claims that forward strategy’ more or less by virtue of the fact that America¹¹ forces are there at all, contribute to national goals ¹⁽¹ every conceivable way such as by providing visible evidence of our commitments, providing security U. S. economic interests, deterring the expansion ⁰ Soviet military influence which in turn leads to lib¹' iting Soviet flexibility, and so on.⁴

The problem is that these sorts of broad platitude in favor of a “forward strategy” do not really provide anything in the way of specific plans for maximizing the effectiveness of routine day-to-day operations i*¹ either peace or war towards any specific goals. It ¹⁵ more a general description of what exists than it is **

P ^an of action. For that reason the whole concept ^rni£ht more appropriately be called a “forward pos- ^Ure for it is not really a “strategy” at all. How, for ^cample, above and beyond just sort of being there, _fo^{es a m}ilitary force, in particular a naval fleet, affect ^reign perceptions of our power, resolve, and com- •tment? Specifically, how can a fleet act on a con- ^Ulng basis so as best to deter not just war but the ^xpansion of unfriendly foreign military influence? ⁿ how can U. S. military forces most effectively ^mit Soviet flexibility and options? It will not be J'^10ugh merely to conclude that the United States st convince China and Japan to cooperate in coun- _reJⁿ& Soviet influence. Developing an effective cur- ^nt day American strategy in the Pacific will also HUire the strategist to have a concrete idea of how ^^Ward-deployed U. S. military forces affect for­° ^ln particular Soviet—perceptions of the j. wide balance, and how they can best be used to ^rn,t Soviet influence as well as to protect American ^nterests directly.

—Setting: A Problem of Distances

foreign relations and the military strategy which un­derwrites them often tend in the final analysis to be determined as much by geography and the availabil­ity of forces as by rhetorical statements of policies and interests. Since the overwhelming geographic feature in the Pacific is the great distances encoun­tered there, some method of dealing with these dis­tances is necessary to the execution of a successful Pacific policy. Only navies can provide the access, operating radius, and endurance required to support policy across such a broad reach. As one analyst ob­served long ago, “The enormous expanse of the Pacific makes base power and large steaming radius the dominating factors in the strategical problems of that ocean.”⁵

Distance is a fundamental consideration in naval strategy in more subtle ways than these however, in­cluding transit times, steaming radius, time on station, effective range of land-based air cover, and response time.⁶ But above all, great distances inher­ently impose great logistics constraints. Conse­quently, the geography of the Pacific has had a direct impact on the amount and type of naval power which can most effectively be employed there.

A naval force operating thousands of miles from its home bases requires a highly complex system of for­ward bases, replenishment units, and repair facilities. More than that, it requires in each of its ships the qualities of sheer endurance, of being able to main­tain and repair themselves while under way, and of survivability under high winds and seas. Even with all these qualities in abundance, ships still need to be rotated out of “the front” periodically both for major upkeep and for crew rest. Long practice has sug­gested that, year in, year out, for every unit at the front two others must be in home ports, shipyards, training areas, or in transit.

Distance is also a major consideration with respect to the type of naval force required. In essence what one wants from a navy is raw yet relevant power, flexible means for its employment so as best to sup­port one’s interests, and the endurance to maintain itself where it is needed over long periods. Advanced bases ashore provide such means, to be sure, but they

“Great distances inherently impose great logistics constraints." Without advanced bases and a multitude of ships for the maintenance, repair, and supply of others, powerful fighting fleets will he effective only very close to home. Here, on a rainy day in the Western Pacific, a CH-46 helicopter picks up a load from the flight deck of the combat store ship White Plains (AFS 4). An ammunition ship of the 20,500-ton Kilauea class crosses astern.

Nautical Miles

On 135° E between 30° and 40° N

Most ships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are based at Vladivostok and do the better part of their steaming nearby in the Sea of Japan. The rest of that fleet, notably the ballistic missile submarines, are based at Petropavlovsk, where they have free access to the open ocean. In any major war, one of the most important tasks of the LJ.S. Pacific Fleet will be to keep these powerful Soviet forces from venturing beyond familiar waters

are seldom available exactly where or in the quantity in which one wants them; are immobile, with a fixed radius over which forces operating from them can be effective; and are subject to shifts in the political winds of the proprietary government. An aircraft car­rier, on the other hand, possesses most of the desir­able characteristics of an advanced base without its constraints and limitations, and it is mobile. The aircraft carrier is the primary element in expanding the radius of the fleet through means of her long- range airborne surveillance, her ability to strike at a considerable distance, and the flexible options for its use. If one can conceive of the aircraft carrier as a mobile air base at the end of a long hose which ** attached through a series of fixed points to a centra base, he will have captured the essence of the nava formula the United States has developed in Pacific. To make this formula effective requires ait' craft carriers along with their escorts in carrier tas groups or “battle groups,” an amphibious assauk force to secure additional fixed bases, and replenish' ment ships to provide the “hose” from the most ad' vanced base .to the battle group. In outline, this d^e scribes the makeup of the U. S. Pacific Fleet’s f°^r' ward deployed element, the Seventh Fleet.

Comprised most often of two aircraft carriers (C^^s with their embarked air wings, two amphibio^uS ready groups consisting together of seven or eigh^c large amphibious vessels with their embarked Maritk amphibious units, about twenty cruisers and dc stroyers, and about a dozen replenishment ships ^t0 give the fleet a self-sustaining capability, the Seventh Fleet patrols the entire Pacific and Indian oceans.⁷ addition, to sustain itself indefinitely that fleet f^e quires some land-based aircraft, some logistics stag ing support, and some major repair facilities. It h®⁵

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j_Caj ^ese- Since the end of the Vietnam War, its typ- operating pattern has been to keep each battle the • °F^>erat*ⁿg independently, one centering around and ^airCra^^{c carf}ier homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, ba ,j^t^^{e ot}^^er' which is rotated from among ships the p°^{n r}^^e ^^est Coast, staging out of Subic Bay in jj_as ^dippi_nes Thus deployed, the Seventh Fleet _te . ^{een a}ble to contribute significantly to the pro- b_y ^{0r a}dvancement of American interests affected ^e multitude of wars and crises all around the ^Phery of the Asian mainland. ^rant *^{S s}^^ort'⁰Cwar employment of naval power war- S_tat* ^Sorne elaboration, for since 1945 the United Vol ^{eS Nav}y bas been used frequently to help control p ^{1 e} situations and otherwise help maintain a _Cas^^{e u}b stable world order. In 177 of some 200 have *^{n C}^^at P^er‘od, when American policy-makers tu_e ^{e c} compelled to use some form of military _0ther^{Ure t0 a}ffect the behavior of decision-makers in Pow ₈^natl0ns’ they have reached for sea-based (j ' Many of these cases involved units of the c_ean ^eventh Fleet. From its participation in the Ko- ^ar and its operations in the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s, through its involvement in the South China Sea in the 1960s, and finally to its involve­ment in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and the Kenya crisis of 1976, the Seventh Fleet has been a tool for which policy-makers have reached repeatedly when they felt American diplomatic efforts required an appropriate stick.

Two Sets of Interests

The Commander in Chief Pacific recently used the analogy of “two anchors” to describe the current American strategic position in the Western Pacific.⁹ In fact this analogy provides a convenient jumping- off point for examining America’s historic approach to naval policy in Asian waters. Ever since 1898, the United States has used Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines as the fixed points with which it has countered the problem of distance in the Pacific. As it turned out, the 7,000-mile-long sea line of com­munication supported by these points has served a succession of purposes. At first it was a gateway to China, enabling the United States Navy to act as an equal with the European powers and Japan and thereby support the American “Open Door” policy. Following the annihilation of the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905, the concentration of the German and British fleets in the North Sea, the subsequent end of German interest in Asia, and the onset of a series of crises in American-Japanese relations, this southern route became important to American plan­ners as the means by which the Philippine Islands might be recovered following their almost inevitable loss to Japan in war. When war came, the Islands were lost, as was Guam. But they were recovered in large part by U.S. forces working westward along this route. Finally, the islands on the route provided the staging point for the last drive which resulted in the conquest of Japan.

Since 1945, American strategy in the Pacific has continued to depend on this route, using the Philip­pines as the southernmost of its two vital anchors. The rationale for continuing emphasis on the south­ern anchor has been apparent, including, in turn, support for the Nationalists on the Chinese main­land, the protection of Taiwan from the Communist Chinese, assistance to the French in Indochina and, finally, as the major staging point for the American naval effort during the Vietnam War. More recently, the Philippines have taken on a new role, that of the U. S. Navy’s principal gateway to the Indian Ocean. With more than 90 percent of the Middle East’s an­nual oil production having to traverse the Indian

Ocean to reach the industrial economies of the world (including 80 percent of Japan’s total requirements), America’s long-term interest in maintaining the southern route across the Pacific can hardly be said to be diminishing. Still, the withdrawal of American ground forces from Southeast Asia and the reduction of American treaty commitments in that region have by and large liquidated America’s political interests south of Taiwan. Access to the Persian Gulf oil fields now stands as virtually the sole sustaining rationale for continued American emphasis on the southern shipping route. The maintenance of the southern an­chor must be considered in terms not only of re­sources, logistics difficulties, and the probabilities of success, but also in terms of opportunity costs. That is to say, American strategists have to consider not just the desirability of keeping the southern anchor

well planted, but whether naval resources might b^e employed more efficiently elsewhere in some othcf capacity.

Since the end of World War II, the United State⁵ has maintained a second strategic anchor in the Western Pacific, planted in the north. There- American interests have been predominantly politic^ in their nature. These interests include a commit' ment to help preserve the independence of South Korea, the maintenance of friendly and profitable re' lations with Japan, and a stake in maintaining China’s independence from (if not antagonism to' ward) the Soviet Union. Since 1970 this region, lik^e so many others, has been undergoing considerabl^e changes. The most significant of these have been th^e growing Chinese-American rapproachment, th^e evolving Chinese-Japanese trade relationship, and th^e increasing Soviet capability to project influent abroad by use of its own navy.

In sum, over the course of the 1970s America¹¹ interests in the Pacific have gravitated into tv'° groups distinguished by type and by geography. ^ the north they focus on support for Japan and South Korea, and on the encouragement of China’s inde' pendence from the Soviet Union. In the south tU United States is more concerned with the safe move' ment of oil through the Indian Ocean and with th^e support for those states adjacent to (and largely d^e' pendent upon) the tanker routes, such as Indonesia' Singapore, and the Philippines. It is worth asking

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witnessed increasing use of the other Soviet fleets to­ward exactly such ends in the Eastern Mediterranean, and on both flanks of Africa. In a region where sta­bility and order above all are vital interests of the United States, the prospect of the Soviet Navy routinely operating “out-of-area” (i.e. beyond the Sea of Japan) can hardly be well received by American strategists. Every effort should be made to influence the Soviets to keep their surface fleet in home waters.

The key to how that objective might be ac­complished is in the penchant of Soviet planners to think defensively when they are being pressed upon by what they perceive to be potent hostile forces. The United States must act—and in the Pacific that essentially means the Pacific Fleet must act—in a manner which will encourage the Soviets to continue to think defensively. The Pacific Fleet must avoid doing anything which would allow the Soviets to conclude that they have succeeded in solving their defense problems. With that in mind, one step the United States could take in the Pacific would be to act, speak, posture, and arm itself in a manner which suggests to the Soviets that in any worldwide con­frontation it is the essence of American Pacific strat­egy to strike early, strongly, and directly, by any and every means at the fleet’s disposal, at Soviet military bases and industrial complexes.

Keeping the pressure on the Soviets in this manner would cause them to rethink the problems of strategic defense and would play upon their tendency to protect the homeland. There would be less im­petus on their part towards overseas adventurism (particularly in regard to any attempt to establish a naval base in southeast Asia), more reason for them to continue to invest heavily in systems designed primarily for defense such as long-range aircraft and oceanic surveillance systems (necessarily at the oppor­tunity cost of more offensive and exploitive systems like amphibious ships or sea-based air), and a strong inducement for them to keep their naval forces in home waters, that is, to maintain their present de­fensive operational pattern rather than venturing out upon the high seas.

Other Factors Favoring a Northern Strategy

China There are several other reasons why the United States might include a northern strategy in its Pacific naval policy. For one, in a war against the Soviet Union, only China can provide enough of an army to assure the sustained pressure upon, and attri­tion of, Soviet forces to make the U. S. Navy’s strikes against vital Soviet interests meaningful. When used in conjunction with a substantial army, American aircraft carriers, Marines, and submarines not only can damage Soviet facilities, but they can divert or outflank the Soviet forces on the ground.

The army of the People’s Republic of China al­ready has the needed numbers. It is largely deploy^e^ along the Soviet border and trained for use against the Soviet Union. By its very existence it keeps th^e pressure on the Soviets. It prevents them from mov­ing their own divisions on the Chinese border either to some other place in the Pacific, or to Europe.

To maintain this desirable state of affairs, rhe United States needs to prevent a Sino-Soviet tap- proachment. Usually, despite rhetoric, nations act pragmatically when they find themselves facing ^un' tenable military situations. Unless the United States can offer on a continuing basis some viable, credible and perceptible means of assisting any future efforts of the Chinese against the Soviets, it is altogether possible that we might see a new accommodation be­tween them. The U. S. Pacific Fleet can play a key role in this respect by demonstrating capability well as resolve to the Chinese. American nava strength can at once keep the Soviets from using their own fleet to outflank China, halt the shipp¹⁰^ in which supplies and reinforcements might come to the aid of the Soviet armies, isolate the Soviets fr^olT1 any would-be allies in southeast Asia, and tie do"¹¹ Soviet striking forces in Vladivostok and Petropa^v losk. It can, as Vice Admiral William J. Crowe, J^r-’ Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, stated to Congress last year, “■ • ‘ have a direct impact on the political outlook of • ■ ' the People’s Republic of China, and this in turn, can affect Soviet freedom of action in any NATO/Warsa" Pact conflict.”¹⁹

Japan Similarly, with Japan as a participating American wartime efforts against the Soviets won certainly be improved. Many of the factors affecting China’s perceptions would also affect Japan’s. Tb^at country also needs to know that her shipping will b^e able to sail, and that the U. S. Pacific Fleet will not vanish if Japan is threatened directly. The advantage in keeping the Japanese assured that we mean to d^e fend them if they are attacked is self-evident. bl°^C the least of these is that we would be fulfilling ^oUJ alliance obligations, doing what we said we won* do. Others are the continued use of air and nava bases exactly when and where we need them most’ well suited to the containment of Soviet forces in th^e Sea of Japan; the help of the Japanese Maritinn^e Self-Defense Force in the protection of Japan’s ship­ping and ours; and the help provided by Japanese indus­try before, during, and even after a Soviet-Americ^ war. If the United States is to keep Japan a vital an

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International Perceptions of Power The final factor favoring the adoption of a northern strategy concerns national morale and international perceptions of the worldwide power balance. When one is accustomed to naval superiority, depends upon it for the protec­tion of one’s national interests, and has just proved again (in Vietnam) that it is not really being chal­lenged anywhere on the open reaches of the Pacific, it is discordant to hear, as one did in the mid-1970s and occasionally still does, that there is no guarantee the fleet could protect shipping west of Hawaii (let alone be used offensively).²¹ “Image” may be as im­portant in the international political arena as it is for political candidates. Part of being a winner is in thinking like one, acting like one, and talking like one. The U. S. Pacific Fleet is the most capable naval force in the world; there is no reason for its own leaders or American policy makers to think, act, or say otherwise.

Implications To give to a northern offensive strategy at least as much emphasis in the Pacific as is now given to the southern defensive strategy, as is being advocated here, implies major changes in fleet doc­trine. Five important items come to mind.

(1) Offensive War. Since more than half of all American trade is with Pacific nations, to win in Europe but to lose in the Pacific would be not to win at all. Whatever is happening in other theatres, American naval forces in the Pacific must be firmly committed to go on the offensive upon the outbreak of hostilities. They must not be used as reinforce­ments elsewhere. A two-front strategy would rein­force Chinese and Japanese resolution, tie down most if not all of the Soviet forces already in Asia, and provide the United States with an opportunity to seize the initiative in one important theatre until the tide could be swung in our favor elsewhere.

(2) Force structure. Primary emphasis for the pro­curement of naval forces for the Pacific must clearly be on offensive, strike-capable platforms. The fleet must have aircraft carriers configured more for attack and air defense than for a multitude of purposes (CVA rather than CV). It should also include surface ships and submarines armed with the Tomahawk cruise missile, and with enough of the latter to prosecute warfare aggressively close to enemy territory.* Sec­ondary emphasis must be on ships that can support offensive operations directly; that is, the CGs and DDGs with their AAW missiles and their data systems specifically designed to work with the carriers and their aircraft. Tertiary emphasis must be on the abil­ity of the striking forces to maintain themselves in­definitely if necessary in position to strike, and to do so at great distances from basing support of any kind. Sufficient replenishment forces would be one obvious possibility; concentrating the nuclear- powered carriers and cruisers in the Pacific for this role might be an even more appealing solution.

(3) Force Positioning. The current practice of the Seventh Fleet is to keep one carrier task group work­ing in the north (where it is homeported ¹⁽¹ Yokosuka) and the other primarily in the south (staged out of Subic Bay). Acceptance of the northern strategy suggests two changes in this pattern, the more evident of which is that the two deployed car­riers would exercise together more frequently and ¹¹¹ more northern environs than nowadays. This would not only provide them with the necessary training ⁱⁿ coordinated operations and help develop procedures for use in strike operations in the north, but would also signal clearly the offensive turn that America!¹ naval strategy had taken in the northern Pacific. The other change would entail a shift in the Fleet’s doc­trine of “battle group integrity,” that is, of keeping a fixed number of escorts with each carrier whether or not she is operating in company with another car­rier. The change being suggested here is that whet¹ the carriers are operating together, one squadron ⁰ escorts might be ample. Moreover, the escorts ¹⁽¹ company should be those better equipped for AA^ (i.e.—the CGs and DDGs). Of no small import is th^e fact that those ships have better sea-keeping qualit^ieS than do frigates, a desirable characteristic in rh^£ north where weather is considerably more severe tha¹¹ elsewhere. Assigning only one group of escorts to th^e two-carrier battle group would maintain the freedoU¹ of the second squadron and the amphibious forc^eS now there to operate in non-northern areas. Th^lS freedom would permit, among other things, AS'¹* concentrations on behalf of selected shipping route^s’ Indian Ocean patrols, direct support of Japan °^r Korea, or amphibious seize-and-hold operations any where in the Pacific.

(4) Threat Consideration. If the Pacific Fleet car­riers are to operate primarily in northern areas, tW will have to do so within the range of Soviet land based strike aircraft. Already the air,threat is forrnid able, even though it consists of older-style, lon?' ranged, Bear and Badger aircraft. When the fasten even longer-ranged Backfire bombers are introduce into the Soviet Pacific Fleet they will increase that ai^f threat. Moreover, if the U.S. Pacific Fleet is strike at Soviet territory, it will also have with the shorter ranged Soviet aircraft such as M*?⁵ and Sukhois. All of this suggests that in war the ai^f threat would clearly emerge as the number on^e danger for American naval striking forces, and tha¹

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siy^S ^^r°^^em will have to be faced in order for offen- of °^^erat'^{ons to} he conducted with any probability success in the northern Pacific. One thing which t_en^ ^{d be}^P ^would be to invest heavily in AAW sys- ^s such as Aegis, to continue the transition to

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>                 Bases. In adopting a northern offensive strat- _e . ^th^e United States could not afford to depend j. ^elY upon Japan for bases. Yet, given the vast _0r)^StanCes *^nv°lved, it is unrealistic to expect forces

ating routinely in the northwest Pacific to be sJT^r5^d from as far away as Hawaii, Guam, or Tv

tio *^{e lS and} *^{n t}h^e Aleutian chain (where fortifica- ^S°^{me sort a}S^a*^nst Soviet takeover in wartime S(. ^ab,y would be a prudent aspect of any Pacific _ti(>ri^eSy)- The other is South Korea. These two op- ^ s ough_{t not to} ^ ^1 ismissed out-of-hand, for they d provide a badly needed measure of insurance nst the uncertainty of Japan’s ultimate decision

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tackers and Soviet defenders would have to be care­fully weighed and then measured against the value of potential targets before committing the Pacific Fleet to a strike on the Soviet homeland. In this regard, however, we can be sure that the Pacific Fleet com­mander is not going to commit the major part of the Fleet to a gallant but futile effort. If the Pacific Fleet adopts an offensive strategy in the north it will have been because close analysis has suggested that it can be done successfully.

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_siv°*^e Problem associated with the northern offen- Ae ₎.^StrateSy is that sea-launched cruise missiles and f's are as yet unfulfilled prophecies in the Ameri- ^naval arsenal. Another is that Japan’s decision to

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^ne actual occasion, although Japan’s coopera- tu_r ^W°^u^ be critical given the present basing struc- g ^e* A third is that establishing new naval bases in _0Ver Korea or Alaska would have strong political ⁿfss °^nes‘ ^^bove all, however, is the fact that bold- ^ln harm’s way is one thing, but recklessness another: Exchange ratios between American at-

Strategy in the South

There remains the question of the Indian Ocean and its littoral states. Would strategically important nations such as Indonesia, Somalia, and the Arab oil producing states be sufficiently impressed by an American strategy designed to impress the Russians, Chinese, and Japanese even though the forces used for that end would not necessarily patrol near their own coasts? Some observers suggest that political leaders regard as most important the worldwide power balance rather than the immediate presence of a few ships offshore. But such observers are likely to

be 'sophisticated and, in consequence, much more impressed by technology, electronics, and quality than are the leaders of states possessing little or no naval power themselves. Quite the contrary, policy makers in many nations around the Indian Ocean seem to have an acute knowledge of Soviet endeavors and American counter moves in such places as Somalia and the Persian Gulf, but little interest in what is taking place outside their own region. Unless some way is found to offset the local perception of Soviet power which is generated by the relative number of naval ships each superpower commits to the Indian Ocean, a strategy which arrays the most visibly impressive American forces in the north Pacific may leave vulnerable our economic interests in the Indian Ocean.

There are several possible solutions. One is to negotiate for some sort of demilitarization or for ar­ranged superpower naval parity in the Indian Ocean. While this would be supported by major actors there, it would have the effect of undoing the very impression the United States would be seeking to achieve elsewhere, i.e., by conceding equality we would in a sense be admitting Soviet Pacific naval forces to be the equal of our own, which is anything but the truth and certainly not the perception we want to convey to the world. Moreover, a prerequi­site for such negotiations would be an evidence of sincere goodwill on the part of both superpowers. Since the Soviets, by their actions on the Horn of Africa and other areas adjacent to the Arabian Sea have not demonstrated that they yet are possessed of such goodwill in the Indian Ocean area, the pros­pects for success at this time are slim indeed. A bet­ter solution would be to supplement the American Middle-East Force already there* with the full re­maining squadron of combatants which would be available for use in the South under the positioning theory described earlier. This would be the squadron primarily geared for ASW operations in support of the southern strategy, and could be reinforced periodi­cally by one of the two northern carriers or elements of the Seventh Fleet amphibious task group. Yet a third possibility would be for the United States to deal with the Indian Ocean through allies, or prox-

One of the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s Yankee class ballistic missile submarines steaming rapidly on the surface 400 miles northeast of Honolulu about eight years ago. Reportedly, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has 32 ballistic missile submarines of which eleven are of the Yankee class and ten are of the more recent Delta class. Most of the remainder are of the diesel-electric Golf class.

ies. In fact, normal French naval presence in the In­dian Ocean averages 20 to 25 ships per month, both the British and American navies already maintain a small permanent presence there, and the assistance there of the navies of Australia and New Zealand would help still more. Working together in support of Indian Ocean shipping, in which they all have a stake, there are more than enough ships to offset the most impressive Soviet force in the Indian Ocean- Cooperation and the calling of attention to our com­bined strength rather than the decrying of the lack or strictly American naval force are required if the southern aspect of the new Pacific strategy advocated here is to be effective.

The Need for Flexible Naval Forces

International relations are dynamic, and several changes which might take place in the Pacific within the next two decades may already be predictable.

Trident, and Soviet Capabilities

One is the imminent introduction of the Ohio cla^sS ballistic missile submarines with their Trident mis­siles capable of flights of over 4,000 miles. It is pos­sible, as some have suggested,²² that the Soviets will seek to apply their fledgling surface ASW capabilities against this threat. This would bring them out o* area, American northern offensive strategy or not- This course would logically result in their allocating increasing numbers of their newer, larger, and mort sophisticated surface ships such as the Kiev-c\&^s CVSGs, Kara-class cruisers, and Krivak-class de­stroyers to open-ocean operations. But hunting SSBN^s in the open ocean at the ranges at which the Obi⁰

^^ass would patrol would necessarily be done outside ⁰ the range of Soviet land-based aircraft. Given that constraint, this author predicts that rather than ex­posing their surface forces in futile efforts to chase tnerican sSBNs, the Soviets will choose to detect ^r quarry by means of long-range sensors and Ptosecute them with nuclear submarines such as the th^Ct°^r~^C*^{aSS        not re}q^{uire a}*^{r cover}- If this is

Case’ ^we should anticipate more ASW-oriented s m the Soviet Pacific Fleet than are there now. ^evertheless, there is no indication that the Soviets ¹ he content with “enough” at any fixed level, and ^ships originally designed for the ASW mission Wever the Soviets may have planned to conduct > will be available to their Pacific Fleet if for no bl ^reason than a “fair-share” basis. It will proba- ^{e e}nlightening to observe where these new units _c ⁶ ^^0rrieported, for that may well be the tip-off con- ^In8 whether they are to be saved for wartime use rou°'^°^V'^{et SSBN}’ ^anti-U. S. SSBN), or employed g ^mely in support of efforts in non-war to expand ^0Vlet influence.

^ere Naval Prospects

the ^eVen ^^reater potential importance in terms of naval balance is the question of China’s inten- ^ns. By _tj_ie 2000, this author believes, the the* s^eSe ^^{ave a} hlue-water navy ample to offset a f[ ^0V|^et Union’s Pacific fleet. Such a navy, even as ob' ^et.~^ln"heing, would achieve several of the main in C'^Ves °f the northern offensive strategy set forth _ter^ ^ls P^aper. Therefore we should review the long- are ^lrnplications of a northern strategy so that we *t°t caught on a dead-end street, k ^hy should China, sharing a 4,000-mile-long _Vej_Q^{er w}ith its chief potential enemy, bother to de- p| °^{p a} navy when one objective of the U. S. Pacific b ^Cet ‘^s Steady to deter the projection of Soviet power _Sll ^naval means? For one thing, as China aspires to P^erpower status it may want to develop a navy sim- ho ^ ^{3 tra}PP*ⁿ8 of sovereignty. More to the point,

^rule ^VCf’ *^{S t}*^le ^^{act c}^^at P^ra8^mati^{sm now seems t0} na’⁶ *ⁿ China. A pragmatic evaluation of Chi-

Ch’ ^Strate8i^c situation would no doubt cause the e*^{nese t0} recognize that the real threat from the ^eeon ^union not to be invasion but the exertion of of ^rniC’ Political, and military pressures by means _th_e^entlrclem^ent. In view of their common border on Vi_e ⁿ°^rt^ and a militarily strong, pro-Soviet ally in _Cej_v ^arT1 to the south, China therefore rightly per- Tjj_e i. ^Itself to be threatened by Soviet encirclement. ^Ith 'ⁿ^ ^^etween the two is the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Sovie(^U^         ^p*^eet operates worldwide to deter

expansionism for political as well as military

reasons, from the Chinese perspective the U. S. Pacific Fleet may not be capable of (or interested in) doing much to thwart the evolution of such an align­ment. Incessant American “NATO-first” rhetoric can­not be wholly satisfactory from China’s viewpoint. Whether or not the U. S. Pacific Fleet adopts a north­ern strategy, it may nonetheless find itself a prisoner of America’s own rhetoric once China develops for itself a blue-water navy with which to oppose Soviet “hegemony” around China’s periphery. At least one pair of analysts have projected a fledgling blue-water capability for the PRC Navy by 1982,²⁴ Vice-Premier Teng has recently made very specific statements to that effect, and Chinese arms deals with supplier- nations such as France, Japan, and others following in the wake of the $2 billion deal to purchase Harrier- type VSTOL aircraft from Britain should not be unex­pected in the future.

To be competitive in the Western Pacific, it would not be necessary for China to build a fleet of a size comparable to that of the Soviet Union. It would only be necessary that it have power equal to those forces which the Soviets could sortie from Vladivos­tok. With ready access to the East China Sea, the Chinese would both enjoy an appreciable geo­strategic advantage locally, and be in a good position to interdict Soviet ships attempting to pass between Vladivostok and Southeast Asia or the Indian Ocean.

Such a Chinese navy would have significant influ­ence on U. S. naval policy in the Pacific. Still, it would remain for American naval strategy to focus on several things in the north, most of which can be handled by being able to oppose Soviet naval forces, both surface and subsurface, staged out of Petropav- lovsk. In a war against the United States, it is prob­ably these forces which would be the Soviet Union’s main arm in the Pacific. While the combined Chinese and Japanese maritime forces wouid proba­bly be able between them to protect shipping along the routes of joint interest, it would fall primarily to the United States to protect most of the ships at­tempting the long passage between the United States and Japan. Assuming the Soviet forces were capable of and vitally interested in interdicting such ships, those based at Petropavlovsk would have more direct access to them than do those operating from Vla­divostok. And, since the unique American commit­ment to support an independent South Korea is un­likely to change, the task of providing deterrence against attack on the Korean peninsula, as well as that of guaranteeing our access to it in war, will al­most certainly continue to fall predominantly to the Pacific Fleet. For the long term, a U. S. fleet config­ured and poised to operate offensively against the

Soviets in the north would probably not be found wanting in terms of the types of capabilities required to accomplish these missions.

The Major Uncertainty: PRC and Japanese Policy Continuity

The great unknowns in the future of the Pacific balance are the political persuasions of the major Pacific nations. For now, Peking appears to have chosen to draw closer to Japan, the United States, and the Western world in general. But China is far from irrevocably launched upon that course, and a falling out with the West (or even, unlikely though it may seem, a new falling-in with the Soviet Union) cannot be ruled out. Perhaps even more devastating, to American interests at least, would be a volte-face by a Japan which suddenly recognized an old an­tagonist in a militarily ascendent China. Scenarios such as these are not problems of naval strategy per se. But neither are they unrelated, for to be successful over the long term a naval strategy must be able to accommodate the dynamic ebb and flow of in­ternational relations.

Conclusions

By their nature, ships tend to have long lives. We are still using ships designed or built in the 1940s, and ships being commissioned right now will pre­sumably still be in service at the end of this century. Flexibility, after all, is the key to the long-term util­ity of any naval force, and no matter how sure we may be of where we stand now, we cannot afford to build naval ships for any fixed set of circumstances. Similarly, flexibility is the key to the long-term applicability of any given strategy. To illustrate how much conditions can change, one only needs to ex­amine the last thirty-odd years. Who would have forecast, in 1945, that in the mid-1970s the United States would be a quasi-ally of a Communist China against a Communist Russia, that the Middle East and not Europe would be the tinderbox of world af­fairs, that the Arab states would have great economic leverage against the industrialized West, and that the Soviet Union would have achieved strategic par­ity with the United States and have a major, modern navy rivaling that of the United States? Can we really expect, then, to project what the Pacific will look like in two more decades? If we cannot, a navy con­strained by its own design and doctrine to do only one thing such as to defend shipping against sub­marines, is eventually going to find itself in a strategic straitjacket. The dynamics of world politics guarantee us only that strategic relationships will be different in the not-too-distant future from what they are today; somehow the naval forces already in ex­istence will have to be folded into a workable strat­egy to defend whatever may be American interests under the new conditions. A review of the utility of American naval force over the three decades since World War II suggests strongly that forces designed for offensive operations are the most adaptable to changing conditions and, compared to other types of force, have a broader range of application across the spectrum of potential uses.

In the last few years America’s strategic interests in the Pacific have polarized around politico-military matters in the north and economic matters in the south. A revitalized American naval strategy in the Pacific centered on offensively-oriented forces in the north and defensive forces in the south will be a big advance over our current vague national concept f°^r the positioning of the fleet.

Naval strategy deals with force, position, geogta- phy, threat, and will.

Naval Strategy deals with force, position, geogta' phy, threat, and will. The distances in the Pacif>^c make geography and position especially important considerations in strategic decisions there. Until one solves the distance problem, be it by advanced bases- allies, or a long logistics train, any thought of sus­tained forward action is unrealistic. The United States is fortunate to have not only well-positioned allies in Japan and the Republic of the Philippi^neS which provide the advanced bases, but also other bases in Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska. It is fortunate also in having developed a naval doctrine which, cen­tered on the flexible, powerful aircraft carrier, has proven to be particularly well suited to the Pacific-

One considers next the threat. While it never hurts to keep a wary eye out in all directions, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union poses the sole significant threat to American interests in the Pacific. Our understanding of that threat should p^r°' ceed along two roughly parallel lines. One is an ^un' derstanding that the Russian is essentially defensive in his thinking and will go virtually to any length ^[0 defend himself against all threats by any means avail' able. The other is an appreciation of the reality ⁰ Soviet capabilities. There is after all probably very little we can do to cause the Soviets to build l^eSS military hardware than they do. But we may be able to affect what they build, where they deploy it, and how they plan to use it. In the Pacific, America^[1] planning for purposeful offensive action against the Soviet fleet and the bases of its support offers ³

strong motivation for the Soviets to do precisely what f °f their history and instincts tell them to do: To ^Ul d defensive systems and to keep them at home. The Navy is clearly America’s dominant military ^rce *ⁿ the Pacific. But in wartime, influence must timately be exercised by control of territory. Thus, ^ln war, navies primarily are used to support and erwise further one’s interests on the ground. Lack- '^8 substantial armies and ground-based air forces in ^e Pacific, America must depend upon its navy to ^exert political influence, to control and contain ^Cnses, to apply pressure where necessary, and to ^T^ect power if required. Hence offensive power— _fo^{e a}bility to do something effective—is the sine qua non °^r American naval power in the Pacific. In the north ^at means primarily aviation to strike against the ^0re, and amphibious capability to seize and control

territory. In the south, it is manifested by sea control capabilities exercised by surface combatants which specialize in ASW.

The final ingredient is that of will. The country must be willing for the U. S. Pacific Fleet to operate in harm’s way, to take the initiative and control events if necessary both in wartime and in peacetime. The concept of offensive naval power, designed to take the initiative, and thereby to control the strategic situation in the Pacific and Indian oceans, warrants the earnest consideration of those who would have the Pacific Fleet maintain its reputation as the operating fleet that makes things happen.

^th«Sovi_. *^Amphib, ^same

' most

‘mportant of all the documents I ever wrote.” at H ^ ^^ecame the over-arching conceptual framework which incorpo-

^fhe vV^nterest‘ⁿ8 ^to note the subtle shift between previous policies and *ⁿg ^X°ⁿ ^°^Ctr‘^ne concerning just what it was that America was resist- been          Truman, and, especially, Eisenhower, "Containment” had

p_ro^ ^roadened to include all of the Communist countries. But, with the nncement of the Shanghai Communique, the Nixon Doctrine made ^Iet Union the sole object of our opposition.

¹ *ous landing forces and Marines would continue to have the _n_ l ^r°*^e 'ⁿ ^^eet operations as they do today in either a southern or a

*w^strategy-

a ‘odle-East Force currently consists of one permanently stationed _rot ^{p an}^ two smaller combatants (destroyers or frigates) which are from among the ships of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

^osc ^C°^m^^{ete text} °f the "Telegraphic Message” sent by Kennan from zV|_e . ⁰ⁿ 22 February 1946, can be found in Georgs F. Kennan, Pp *^^25-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1967), Annex C, _t^_e '559. Kennan himself considered this “in its implications . . .

^rated A_m -

_ters j. ^er*can policy up to 1950 into the establishment of key parame- Part °^F ^^UtUre P°frcy. It was co-drafted by Department of State and De- p₀,^ment Defense planners under the direction of Paul Nitze and the th_at ^y inning Staff. Its major contributions to U.S. foreign policy were _artlj^. * ^^efr°ed the world as a bi-polar arrangement, attributed subversive _ti_0n^{ltlOns 0n a} global scale to the Kremlin leaders, called for mobiliza- f_r     ^energ*^es and resources of the free world . . . which will

•*_a ^e the Kremlin design for world domination,” and recommended b_0tJ^^{UCl1 more} rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of ^c United States and the other nations of the free world.” Dean a _ ⁿ ^^escribed NSC-68 as one of the most important documents of a_A^m_d^eriCan history.

J_u< ^lfa* Maurice Weisner, U.S. Navy, "Command,” Vol. I, No. 1;

Uv.⁹⁷⁸’          ⁹­

. ^r fry^water, Seapower in the Pacific, (Boston and New York: Houghton *r.-            ’ ^21; reprint ed.. New York: Arno Press and the New York

>970), _p.₂₇₁.

i\.en R i_

^oth» Navies and Foreign Policy, (New York: Crane and Russak, ⁷Ad ■ ^P* ¹⁷³‘

⁸R_arr'^fa* Weisner, "Command,” p. 5.

P_0//,.^{y B} Lehman and Stephen Kaplan, The Uses of the Armed Forces as a ^Br₀okj^{,/ lmtrument}' ^ARPA No. 2820, Amend 2 (Washington: The ⁿg- Institution, 1976), pp. 1-61.