Total Force

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twofold. First, it has slowed U. S. weapon develop­ment so that not only has the vast American superiority vanished, but now the Soviets surpass us. Second, it places the U. S. President, if faced with Soviet political aggression backed by the threat of nuclear weapons, with a choice of doing nothing, if not actually backing down, or of initiating what would become for the United States a holocaust.

By 1968 the United States had completed a mod­ern nuclear force with about 2,000 delivery systems consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs, and B-52 bombers. The Soviets had about half that number of systems. Though not generally well known in 1962, this great U. S. nuclear advantage was known well enough at high levels, and was sufficient to deter Soviet action in the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the U. S. ad­vantage was blurred by the general public’s fear of any use of nuclear weapons. The Soviets, who needn’t pay such attention to public attitudes, accelerated their drive toward overcoming the Americans’ nu­clear superiority, as evidenced by subsequent devel­opments.

A clear indicator of that drive was the experience with the first “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks” (SALT I) in 1972. The American negotiators sought to obtain agreement in the two areas that could upset the perception by both sides of nuclear parity. First, if either side had an effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, clearly the other, lacking such a sys­tem, would be at a disadvantage. Second, if either side had the ability to employ “counterforce” weapons (those suitable for destroying the other’s re­taliatory weapons) in a first strike, the other, lacking such a system, would be at a disadvantage. Either condition would unbalance the strategic relationship.

As a result of SALT I, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that prohibits either party from extensive de­ployment of ABM systems. Though we have not kept

"Strategic" nuclear weapons are "the most important military component of total force." Two modem examples of such weapons are the Soviet Navy's SS-N-6 ballistic missile (right), a 1,300-mile weapon carried hy Yankee class submarines, and the U.S. Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile (farther right), which can he launched from submarines, aircraft, surface ships, or the ground. In the SALT negotiations, the Soviets seek to limit both the range of Tomahau k and the platforms from which the weapon can he launched.

our one site ready, the Soviets have kept theirs which, under the treaty, is perfectly legal.

More importantly, the Soviets have continued r° seek, and have achieved, superior counterforce, whether measured in the sizes and numbers of miS' siles, in ICBM warhead sizes and numbers, or in the missile accuracy required to hit protected ICBM silos. They have been successful in negotiating their way into this superior position through U. S. acquiesence in the SALT I Interim Agreement, the Vladivostok Accord, and the recent SALT II negotiations. For ex­ample, the Soviets are planning to maintain an ad­vantage by their success in forcing the United States to agree that their Backfire bomber is not ^a “strategic” weapon. These “non-strategic” bombers will then compensate in reality for their inferior number of acknowledged “strategic” bombers.

The SALT I Interim Agreement limited the United States for five years to only 1,054 ICBMs, a number which the United States had reached long before- The Soviets were permitted to possess 1,618 such missiles. If they chose to give up the oldest 210 ⁰ their 1,618 ICBMs, the Soviets also had the rigb^c under this agreement to have 950 SLBMs to our p^cr' mitted 710. Many of the Soviet missiles are very large, such as the SS-18, which has 7.3 times th^e throw weight of the U. S. Minuteman missile and ^lS approaching the Minuteman in accuracy. (In tests re* ported in August 1978, the Soviets demonstrate⁰

nifi

sub

^Cance of MARV is that it could provide

_t ^rnarfoc-launched ballistic missiles with the coun-

rce accuracy they now lack because of the inac-

^ ^c*es introduced by a moving launch platform.

_th°^{C sat}*sfied with improving their missile accuracies,

•j. ^{e ovie}ts developed some very large new missiles.

⁰ distinguish them from Minuteman-size missiles, ttv

^rnissii_es (MLBM).’

l975°^net^^el^eSS’ ^seek‘ⁿ£ ^{a SALT 11} treaty, in March q ^the United States proposed two alternatives. bu>- ^{WaS t0} '^mpfo^ment the Vladivostok agreement th

2 4?^St<)k hmit of offensive launch vehicles from div ^ ^{C<>                 or even} 1,800; to reduce the Vla-

ev_e^^St°^ ^'^rn'^t °h 1,320 MIRVed missiles to 1,200 or ⁿ 1,100; to introduce a sub-limit of 550 MIRVed

ItBM accuracies of 200 yards at missile ranges ex­uding a quarter of the globe.)

Two years later, in 1974, the Vladivostok Accord established guidelines which would, if converted into ^a SALT ii Treaty, limit the total number of delivery systems each country could have (ICBMs, SLBMs, and °mbers) to 2,400. Of these, 1,320 could be ^e9^uipped with multiple independently targeted re­entry vehicles (MIRV). The MIRV technology, devel- °ped first by the United States, permits each missile contain two or more warheads which can then be ^^Sed on two or more targets. In 1974 the United ^ates was still ahead in this technology, but since ^en the Soviets have rapidly been catching up. (For example, in August 1978 they demonstrated that _ss^eV could deploy seven MIRV warheads from each " ^j-18 submarine-launched missile.)

echnology has continued to advance and produce £^W problems and options for SALT negotiators. It ^lngs into question the value of any arms limitation Steement. The cruise missile, a low-flying, pilotless craft capable of very accurate navigation so as to ^^{lc a} target more than 2,000 nautical miles distant, ^as een developed by the United States. It is being pared for use in sea, air, and ground-launched ^sions. The Soviets’ new bomber, the Backfire, is pa le of reaching European targets with nuclear T°^ns (and, with inflight refueling, targets in the ⁿ*ted States). As the accuracy of missiles has _s ^Wn’ ^so has the vulnerability of ICBM silos. In con- H ence, both sides have developed mobile missile ^Cepts, with the Soviets leading the way. Also, a ^ ^ceP^c ^°^{r maneuver}*ⁿ8 re-entry vehicles (MARV) ^as formulated, permitting a re-entry vehicle to ma­th ^{Cr t0 av}°fo defenses, and to receive and act upon atest target information from satellites. The sig-

^ese new missiles are called “modern large ballistic

^ ^f to defer negotiations on the Backfire bomber and • ^CTUlse missile. The other was to reduce the Via

ICBMs; to include all Soviet missiles with MIRV capa­bility (SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s) within the 550 sub­ceiling; within that number to limit Soviet SS-9 and SS-I8 MLBMs to 150; to permit no MLBMs to the United States at all; to ban both testing and deploy­ment of any new or mobile ICBMs; to limit in-flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs to six per year; and to ban cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2,500 kilo­meters.³

If accepted by the Soviets, the March 1975 offer would have permitted the United States a MIRVed ICBM throw weight of 1.25 million pounds while permitting the Soviets over four times as much—5.2 million pounds. Moreover, the number of Soviet MIRVed ICBM re-entry vehicles would have been more than twice ours and the yield five times the yield of ours. The best that can be said of the March 1975 comprehensive proposals is that, if accepted they would: 1) with present U. S. programs, begin to re­duce somewhat the immense Soviet strategic advan­tage after 1982; and 2) they would not prevent the United States from developing new programs which could reduce the Soviet advantage.⁴

The Soviets greeted the March 1975 proposals in the fashion that worked so well in the SALT I negotia­tions. They expressed fury and rejected them. The United States followed its normal pattern of depart­ing from one position to a weaker one.

In May 1977 a new U. S. proposal offered a negotiating framework consisting of three tiers, the first of which would be an eight-year treaty, presum­ably similar to the first alternative of the March 1975 proposal, but with a longer time frame. The second tier was to be a three-year protocol to the treaty. This would ban the testing and deployment of both new ICBMs and of intermediate-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, but not that of air- launched ones. It would permit the Soviets to have more MIRV missiles. And it would limit production of Backfire and any heavy bombers capable of launch­ing intermediate-range cruise missiles. The third tier would be an agreed set of principles to guide the continuing negotiations to come into effect after the three-year protocol.⁵

The May 1977 proposal would have had the fol­lowing effect:

1) In light of present U. S. programs, they would give back to the Soviets the immense supremacy that might have been reduced somewhat by the March 1975 proposals.

2)The U. S. would give up the right to reduce that supremacy until after 1986 at best.⁶

As the SALT II talks continued into 1977 and 1978, the United States took two actions that dra-

matically weakened its position. These were the can­cellation of the B-l bomber, which guaranteed the obsolescense of our bomber force, and the slowing of the Mobile Minuteman (MX) Missile Program. These actions brought no comparable response from the Soviet Union. Moreover, a U. S. decision to “rely on the cruise missile” has been weakened by internal opposition in Congress and other parts of govern­ment to the large aircraft “cruise missile carrier,” and by continuing SALT II negotiations which, as we have seen, would limit U. S. use of cruise missiles by im­posing restrictions on their range and on their launch platforms. The Soviets seek to limit cruise missile range to that of theater weapons, and to prevent entirely use of such missiles from mobile, hard-to-hit targets such as ships and submarines at sea.

The United States does not offically accept the fact of Soviet nuclear superiority (and, for alliance rela­tionships, cannot afford to acknowledge it), but sup­ports the position that the United States has “suffi­ciency” with respect to deterrence of the Soviets. This is a way of saying that the Soviets may have superior nuclear destructive force, but that U. S. nu­clear force is “sufficient” to deter a Soviet attack on the United States. Even if this were true (which, as 1 have shown, is subject to question), U. S. “suffi­ciency” will be unable to deter Soviet political and military aggression in areas whose acquisition by the Soviets would not constitute a direct threat to the U. S. homeland. Yet, in the long conflict we are in, aggression even in distant places unimportant to the United States could undermine the world’s percep­tion of the United States and tend to subjugate the United States politically to Soviet will.

Over the years, the United States has emphasized the accuracy of its ICBMs while the Soviets have sought higher throw weight, greater yield, and more lethal radioactivity in their nuclear missiles. Their accuracy in currently deployed missiles is still behind that of the United States but, by virtue of their high throw weight and yield, their weapons come close to being able to neutralize those of the United States.⁷ The key to understanding Soviet nuclear superiority is in how this high and growing weight and yield provides an increasing counterforce capability. As Soviet ICBM missile accuracy increases, with 200- yard accuracy already demonstrated, their throw weight advantage is being converted from single very large yield weapons to MIRVed weapons that will have many more warheads than the comparable U. S. weapons carry. A Soviet counterforce capability re­sults from these advances. This is in sharp contrast to the U. S. policy which, for fear of upsetting the strategic balance and accelerating the arms race, has been to refrain from creating a similar counterforce capability.

So the U. S. ICBM force is being neutralized, while the bomber force, still using the aged B-52, cannot be depended on to perform the counterforce mission. The third leg of the American “Triad,” the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, denied the ac­curacy they might have by government opponents of a counterforce doctrine, are basically anti-city, or “countervalue,” weapons. Although its high accuracy and the large number we can afford make it a useful counterforce weapon, the cruise missile is also better identified as a countervalue weapon because of i^ts long, subsonic flight time and the fact that to a de­gree it is vulnerable to defensive weapons.

Currently, the Soviets have more than 300 heavy ICBMs. In order to be sure we can deter the Soviets from launching their missiles and to prevent them using their nuclear weapons as a politically coercive force, the United States must have both nuclear par­ity and counterforce at least equal to that of the Soviets.⁸ That means we must make decisions r° build and deploy the mobile MX ICBM, to build cruise missiles of adequate range, and to increase SI.BM accuracy.

Unfortunately, parity will be difficult to regain for there seems to be little doubt that the Soviets intend to maintain their current superiority in number of missiles, in megatonnage, and in throw weight. On top of all that, they seem intent on gaining parity in number of warheads while each one is more powerful than ours.

There is a basic difference in attitude toward secu­rity between the United States and the Soviet Union- As a result of a desire to protect its deterrent missil^e force, the United States is extremely reluctant to take any steps to develop what could be perceived by the Soviets as a counterforce capability lest it encourage the Soviets to do the same. The Soviets approach se­curity from the viewpoint that they must be capable of attacking first if warranted by the situation, and of overwhelming the potential foe through the early use of great destructive power and of large standing ar­mies. “Strike first as a last resort” is a basic tenet of Soviet military doctrine.

And because the Soviets consider nuclear war a realistic option, they are spending more than one bil­lion dollars annually (as opposed to our few million) on a civil defense program that provides an advantag^e potentially as destabilizing as was the ABM.

Unlike the Soviet Union, in the United State⁸ there is a general tendency to take a short-term, of short-sighted, view of overall strategy. Those in the American arms control community, in particular, >ⁿ

^ Nuclear forces will always have great infh

fo" ^w^^ere> and, indeed, whether conventional

^rces can be used: There are places such as the Euro-

^an central front where, if war breaks out, the thn

conve

^eat °f escalation to nuclear war is so high that

flanks

So-

asho

and

1'kel

D

in view of the danger of escalation, such a war

¹ ely to be short, and Soviet forces thereabouts, ^re and afloat, practice at such a war.⁹ In Africa ^rn°st of Asia, protracted guerilla wars are most

y.

^Unng the last ten years or so, we have witnessed Jtend toward an increasing numerical advantage in ^v,et conventional forces to the point that in addi-

conventional military superiority has been the

■ . ^Slon of the Soviet Navy so that it is now capa-

j. ^e belief that the real long-term achievement is the ■nutation of arms, tend to adopt solutions to prob- ^tns that will help them obtain arms agreements. ^e StJ-viets, in contrast, recognize that arms control ^eg°tiations are a tactic to be used in support of ^trategy. Their long-range goal is not some final ■nutation of arms. It is nuclear superiority. They Perceive ^t^^lat though the launching of nuclear ^eapons now seems unthinkable, the threat that they ^•ght be has a coercive effect, and the day may come ^ ^{en suc}h weapons become launchable if one side ^as sufficient superiority, and if the stakes warrant They intend to be that side.

Conventional Military Force

luence on .. . ^entlonal forces are of value primarily as a nuclear ^j-tipwire. ’ There are other places, such as the east- J Mediterranean, the Norwegian Sea, and the de­ping countries of Africa and Asia, where conven- ^)nal force is more usable. But, even on NATO’s ach* ^{t0 nuc}l^ear tnilitary superiority, they have also be ^leVecl conventional military superiority. This is

co ^Use *ⁿ *^{ast ten} y^{ears or so t}f^{ie s}i^ze °f U. S.

_qu7^nti°^nal military forces has declined, and U. S.

‘ Native leads are less pronounced than in the Past ni mu i t ^r

^ratel Enough numbers do not tell the story accu- [j_er ^y’ ^tl^le overwhelming nature of the Soviet num-

^s tells a great deal. An important step in achiev­

es o

^exPan: ^overcoming the U. S. sea control forces, thus otially splitting the Atlantic allies right down

^ne ocean.

the^^'b^ enough, the Soviets would prefer to use fjj ^t()tal force to achieve their goals without con- _c ^r' naval part of their conventional military b_e P°^nent is particularly applicable because it can dit-^USe<^ *^{n rernote} areas where combat would pose no \r ^{ect t}f*^reat to the homeland. Thus, if the U. S. ^c°nld ^{Were mter}P^osed *ⁿ such a situation, the Soviets ^en8^age in conflict at sea rather than give up the objective to which they believed their superior force entitled them. The advantage to be gained from success in such a conflict would be not only attain­ment of the objective, but political leverage resulting from the demonstration of superior conventional force. For example, had U. S. Navy units been sent to confront those of the Soviet Navy during the 1975 Angolan conflict, this could have led to a conflict at sea using conventional weapons. I will discuss in a later section the types of forces the United States would have needed to deal with such a conflict. If the Soviets could prevail in short conventional con­flicts, or coerce the United States to do nothing while Soviet expansion took place, then they would not need to call on their capability for either an ex­tended conventional war or a nuclear war to achieve their goals.

Political Force

Political force has to do with the leadership and stability of governments and those governments’ abil­ity to carry out plans to successful conclusions, achieving political consensus and operating success­fully in a bureaucratic environment. This is easier to do in an authoritarian than in a democratic system. Yet, among their high level people even the Soviets need to achieve bureaucratic and political consensus.

The communists see our political difficulties of the recent past as the “increasing political instability of bourgeois society.” They see the discrediting and dis­trust of Western institutions to be “intensifying. Certainly the difficulties experienced during the Watergate years would give that impression to any­one, while the traumatic experience of losing the

Four years ago, in 1975, the Congress acted ^t0 prevent the United States from aiding n°ⁿ communist forces in the Angolan revolution. Th^|S was a political failure to recognize the Ion threat of communist expansion. It resulted primari from the debilitating impact of Watergate, and Iron the public’s post-Vietnam “never again” mood. j the Soviets have a base for expansion in a trouble and strategic Southern Africa.

The Soviets have their own political problc”¹¹¹⁵

politically and militarily mismanaged war in Viet­nam added to the feeling of gloom that permeated the United States in the early 1970s. Even now, the doomsayers of U. S. policy continue to echo that gloom. These people, feeling that political consensus to react cannot be obtained among the American people, would have us retreat from world leadership- The Soviets have been politically successful in sell ing the facade of detente, or “relaxation of tensions as they call it. In fact, there has been no such relaxa­tion. On the Soviet side, the cold war has never stopped and the need for “containment” has never been stronger. Moscow’s purpose in fostering the facade is to remove U. S. pressure so that Soviet political, economic, and material might can t>e strengthened for the unending conflict.

Th

^eir means for choosing a successor to the president party chairman are weak and usually result in ong periods of instability while the new leader’s _a°^{Wer ls} being consolidated. Racism and unrest ^rn°ng the many nationalities of the Soviet Union are ^source of worry. The increasing demand for con-

car^^er ®°^0C^^{S amon}£ the people is a problem which only partially be met as long as emphasis on _c ^Itary ^anc^ industrial technology continues. The in­creasingly independent attitude of the Warsaw Pact ₀ ^e^’ ^cb^e restive European communists, and the _0n^en ^ hostile Chinese prevent communist solidarity u         ^lssues- Some of these are problems wrestling

sh ^{Cr 3} banket, ^ar*d some the Soviet government has °^Wn itself capable of suppressing. In any event, ttnally they can obtain more rapid political deci- ^S,0ns than we.

'1~¹i

ca u ^°^v‘^et Union has political strength, and it is not"¹ ^ °h projecting it (albeit sometimes with effects k anticipated) to such places as Angola, Mozam- y l^Ue> Ethiopia, Vietnam, and North Korea. The mted States is currently in irons with regard to its   political power, for it is still questioning

_ner^^esire °^{r a}h‘h^ry ^to d° ^so- In the political compo- fions ^t0ta* ^^orce’ ^{two extr}emely important ques- ^{S must} be tested for political consensus. First, _en^{CS t}h^e United States have the will to devote _0nj^Ugh resources to obtain superior total force? Sec­- assuming there is enough total force, does the to ^lte<^ ^^tates have the leadership, morale, and will _tj_()r^^{Se lt t0} prevent Soviet expansion? These ques- p_r()^ ^are sensitive to our four-year political reelection j_s ^ess’ ^and politicians are wary of raising them. It ^flrm conviction that the American people will cJq ^P°^{rt a} “yes” on both questions. In fact, they must ^unti^<]^{) C}° ^{Cnsure tJle surv}i^val of the United States. But ^bese issues are firmly put forward to the people jj₀j } ^us tested and confirmed, the Soviet Union will Political force superiority.

ldenl°gical Force

socM*^{01 t}*^le ^^ovlet viewpoint, the communist cibip^1St ‘^deolo^y b^as “proved its vitality and invin- Eu        becoming a world system embracing

_Sat °b^>e’ Asia, and now Africa.¹³ The “great Soviet ^{,ces ar|}d ultimate victory over Facism” in World p_e _ ^are seen as the catalyst that caused “victorious _tems ^{e s} revolutions” that overturned capitalist sys- _Co ^ln Europe. These victories were followed by t_larn^rriUnisI: regimes in China, Korea, Cuba, Viet- W_e ^ⁿ8°l^a> and Ethiopia. Communist parties in _Cej_v^^rn Europe, despite the ebb and flow, are per- ^s°cial' ^t0 ^^aVe b^ecome stronger over the years, and *st policies such as the nationalization of indus-

tries have been adopted widely. The “class battle” is seen as continuing, with the Soviet Union as the ideological leader, seeking to spread communist ideology and socialist systems into all the world.

Soviet communism has manipulated Russian na­tionalism to meet its needs, using the “Great Patri­otic War” (World War II) as the vehicle to generate national pride and unity. Fear of the recurrence of the great tragedies of that war, which left twenty million dead in the plains and cities of Russia, gen­erates support for a strong military. With few ex­ceptions, the Soviet people, believing that without an authoritarian government their country could not compete in the modern world, have been willing to accept and support an oppressive ideology and politi­cal system. (Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who was kid­napped and exiled by the KGB, holds that the Soviet people can overcome their oppressive communist dic­tatorship if the United States has the will and the toughness to keep the pressure on. But even he favors an authoritarian form of government for his country.)

To countries facing chaotic economic conditions, and a vacuum of effective leadership, the communist ideology has appeal. To a government it promises that attainable goal, authoritarian control, and to a people it promises that illusory goal, the equal dis­tribution of goods. For these reasons, the Third World, where countries are trying to achieve twen­tieth-century American and European standards of living overnight, sees communist ideology as a strong competitor.

The ideological force of the United States is based primarily on the freedom and recognition of the rights of each individual person. A capitalistic econ­omy and a democratic political system are practiced with varying degrees of success in what has been called the “Free World.” The right to free enterprise is the basis of our capitalism. A government originat­ing from and dependent on the political consensus of the people is a basic right provided by the Western ideology. This has great appeal to newly emerging nations, but they encounter difficulty in implement­ing it because few of them have democratic or capitalistic traditions. Faced as he usually is with enormous problems, the temptation to the ruler to consolidate permanent power is irresistible.

The Soviets have proven to be extremely sensitive to questions relating to how they treat their own citizens. The recent U. S. political attack on Soviet ideology scored heavily in world opinion. However, the United States has not pressed the issue success­fully in the face of threatened Soviet intransigence in SALT II negotiations and accusations of “issue link­age,’ as if such linkage between human rights and

SALT issues were somehow unfair. The 1978 trials and sentencing of Soviet dissidents Ginzberg and Scharansky, and the harrassment of U. S. corre­spondents covering the trials were Soviet demonstra­tions that the United States could not exert its influ­ence in internal Soviet affairs. The U. S. response was a flurry of words, a token restriction on exports to the Soviets, but no hard action.¹⁴

Ideological force is therefore a toss-up between the two superpowers. Each has its strengths and weak­nesses in the modern world. The one that is best supported by political resolution, and most effec­tively linked to the other factors of total force, will probably prevail.

Economic Force

The great strength of the United States lies in economic force, for there the United States has been more successful over the years than any other coun­try. The United States has more capital for invest­ment and more business know-how than any other country. It is these things that do so much to create this country’s influence and world leadership. In con­trast, the Soviet Union has, through its controlled economy, isolated itself from the world s markets; the ruble is of little value in international exchange. Troubled as the dollar has been recently, it is still highly desired. The ruble is not. The Soviet Union’s economic relationships are thus limited primarily to bilateral material arrangements which, because of the political linkages, other countries often find unat­tractive.

Today, however, there are several factors that could weaken U. S. economic force, the most impor­tant of which is the increasing dependence of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan on foreign petroleum sources. Cut off from Mideastern oil, these countries would quickly fall to their knees. Japan would go first, followed by Western Europe, and eventually the United States. Moreover, to maintain petroleum production will not be enough. It will have to be increased to meet the continuing world demand. The availability to the United States of its petroleum imports is sensitive to unpredictable world political, economic, and military factors, such as the always chancy Arab-Israeli situation, the degree to which the OPEC nations control petroleum prices, and the increasing Soviet naval and air threat to sea­borne oil routes. The 1973 Arab oil embargo was a predictable event that demonstrated adequately, if incompletely, the power of petroleum over the indus­trial world. The revolution in Iran provided more re­cent proof. American efforts to become “embargo- proof” will not be successful until alternative energy sources are made economically feasible. Even if "^e survive earlier political threats to our oil, this must occur by the year 2000, for it is predicted that by then world oil production will have peaked and begun to decline. The prospect of huge oil reserves m Mexico and its adjacent waters, if proved, is im­mensely significant to the United States. In the meantime, the maintenance of U. S. economic force as a strong factor in the world will depend on whether our petroleum supply remains unimpeded.

The U. S. economy is also dependent on the im­port of many mineral raw materials. For example- over 75 percent of our requirement for manganese, cobalt, titanium, chromium, aluminum and other essential strategic materials are imported. These im­ports are also subject to political control and could be cut off, damaging the U. S. economy. The Soviet Union is today the most self-sufficient industrial na­tion in the world with respect to petroleum and min­eral resources. Soviet economic force is, though weak in business, management, and technological struc­ture, strong in the secure availability of resources.

Though most American imports depend on ship­ping, the share of them carried in U. S. ships has been decreasing for years. U. S.-flag seagoing met chant ships now number about 550. About 200 arc tankers. Most of the rest are containerships or ol style “break-bulk” freighters. The Merchant Marin¹- Act of 1970 provided some stimulation to the build­ing of new ships, but there has been little effort r° optimize the new ships’ military utility.¹³ Many modern ships are specialized in ways that make them of little use in a military emergency, such as con- tainerships that are unsuitable for carrying vehicles- Those that would be usable, such as roll-on/roll-⁰ (RO-RO) ships, exist in miniscule numbers. In addi­tion, there are some 314 U. S.-owned ships flymlj “flags of convenience,” those of Liberia, Panama, an Honduras, but their availability and utility for ³ U. S. emergency is questionable.

In contrast, to the U. S.-flag fleet, which rank⁵ tenth in the world in number of ships, the Sovi^et merchant marine, with over 2,500 ships (all con trolled by the Soviet Navy), ranks second, right af^tef Liberia, which has over 2,600 ships.¹⁷ Of the Sovi^et ships, 1,650 are modern vessels whose design make⁵ them suitable for support of naval forces.¹⁸ Lik^e others who have served as Chief of Naval Operations- I attempted to obtain some unity of policy be twee¹¹ the U. S. Navy and the merchant marine and suP ported a growth in the strength and reliability of o^llf merchant marine. I am sorry to report that, just a the others, I was frustrated in that attempt by P³ rochial and bureaucratic government agencies. Unl^e5S

^Vlet economic problems include poor perform- in agriculture and the lack of a market for man­y ^ctUred goods outside of the Warsaw Pact. The § ^nited States has, to some degree, alleviated the ^®^Vlets agricultural problem by agreeing to sell ^em wheat. The United States also continues to

substantial improvement is made, the merchant ^ar*ne will continue as a weak link in U. S. eco- ⁿ°ntic force and U. S. sea power.

he Soviets have recognized that in order to be d_e ^^>et*^t*^ve wkh U. S. economic force, they must j ^e^^eb>p a trading relationship with the rest of the ^ustrialized world. In order to obtain the hard cur- ^cy with which to import the technological and ^hsumer goods they need, they have begun to oper- p^te kanks and multinational corporations in Western hfope, the Mideast, and Asia.¹⁹

'T’1

nese businesses include insurance companies, t *pment leasing firms, and maritime agencies. The , Z successful of these have been in shipping, ^lch exploit the capabilities of the Soviet merchant .       • they use it at a loss to gain business in carry-

^8 the goods of the world, including those of the ⁿ*ted States. Not surprisingly, there has been a current general weakening of U. S. and other _sj ^estern shipping firms.²⁰ In 1978 alone, two sub- q ^12ec* U. S. flag lines went bankrupt. Happily, in ctober 1978 President Carter signed into law a bill ^ ^lch should help curb Soviet rate cutting in the ^uierican trades, though not without opposition °ui some American businesses.

Sovi ^ance

ufac

make its technology available to them (including that which has helped them militarily) through di­rect contacts with American industry. Though some linkage between ideological and economic force was used when the United States called off sale of a com­puter to the Soviets following the Soviet conviction of human rights dissidents in 1978, in general link­age between economic matters and other components of total force (such as SALT) have been avoided by the United States. In fact, even this action was quickly diluted by U. S. approval of the sale of an oil- equipment manufacturing plant to the Soviets.

U. S. economic force still prevails, but it is being challenged in an increasingly successful way. We should adopt long-term or, more plainly, “far­sighted” policies that reinforce that strength rather than expedient ones that provide business know-how, technology, and material goods the Soviets need to “bail out” their economy. Linkage between the com­ponents of total force is something to be used, not something to be avoided. If current policies con­tinue, we will merely keep on increasing the strength of the force that will be used against us.

Technological Force

Technological force supports military and eco­nomic force. Advances in technology provide one side or the other with advantages, real or imaginary, that limit the initiative and influence of the other. The United States has led the world technologically for several decades, and has used that lead to sustain a qualitative military advantage that offset Soviet numbers. Now the United States is being challenged by the Soviet Union which has developed the largest research and development manpower base in the world. Soviet scientists and engineers, while not as broadly educated as are their U. S. counterparts, are highly specialized and effective in their jobs. Where the United States remains superior in such things as electronics, computers, space technology, and sub­marine noise suppressants, the Soviet Union shows superiority in high pressure physics, rockets, air de­fense missiles, and anti-ship missiles. The Soviets are closing the gap in ballistic missile accuracy, space sensor systems, and tactical nuclear weapons."¹

With an R&D budget in recent years 50 percent greater than ours, the Soviets when equally efficient, have been able to investigate three programs for every two of ours. The trend of Soviet R&D is toward increasing efficiency. In order to counter it, the United States needs to adopt a strategy for technol­ogy investment that recognizes the long-term nature of the conflict.

The trend of continued technological growth m the Soviet Union in recent years indicates its high priority in Soviet minds, and could seriously reduce the U. S. lead. In this country the pressure is mainly to produce a research product that is usable in the economic world; increasingly effort spent on military needs and pure research are criticized. It is not a question of our ability to have superior technological force, for we do have it, but rather our will to adjust our priorities and use our resources to retain it- However, newspaper reports that applications for patents in this country are declining have an ominous ring.

Social Force

Social force is the substance, morale, and will ⁰¹ the people and the health and ability of their institu­tions to support their security and solve its problems- It is exported and communicated daily through the mass media, through tourism, and through economic as well as social contacts. It is the “image” °^r “make-up” of a nation. The Soviets see in the Unite¹! States a new series of social crisis and contradictions- They see evidence of social decay in the challenge t° institutions such as the school and the church. They see capitalism decaying through monetary crisis and inflation, and they do their bit, as in the 1973 °** crisis and the recent Iranian difficulties, to aid in out decay. The Vietnam and civil rights riots, followed by Watergate, bolstered their confidence in these ob'

, ^eStern Europe still depends on the United States, ^r°^ugh NATO, for security. As long as the Soviets ^esPect our will (which in turn rests significantly on ^Ur possession of adequate conventional and nuclear ^rrned forces), the central front in Germany should ^Uiain secure. Assuming that the United States and k ^e other NATO countries rebuild their forces there to ^eeP up with the long Soviet buildup, Europe will ^err*ain a “static” area.

is a mistake, however, to assume that the mili- threat on the NATO central front is the most ^e y we will face. The northern and southern flanks NATO are more “dynamic” than the central front rnore subject to encroachment by Soviet mili- On E°Etical, and ideological force. In the far north, ^e Norwegian brigade faces two Soviet army divi- ^s and a naval infantry brigade, which in turn are

nervations. The Soviets perceive an increasing likeli- °°d that the “working class people” of Western societies are ready for a “class revolution.” They can­. ^0t understand that what they have seen are the man- estations of a free society adjusting to the realities ^ ^a changing world. They don’t have any way of ^lng such things themselves. Today, it is my opin- ¹⁽⁾n that the social force of the United States, its will ^a°d its vitality, is stronger than ever. However, the Potential of this social force in world affairs remains ^t0 ^pped and used.

The Soviets attempt to portray the strength of ^eir social force through such things as education ^and sports. Their educational institutions are plenti- and well equipped, but the education is politi­^Cally controlled and narrowly oriented. A good ex- ^at*ple of this is found in the Soviet military where young_; supposedly, well-educated officers lack initia- ^{tlVe an}d perform jobs that are done in United States ^Services by petty officers and non-commissioned offi­^Cers- In sports, the Soviet “amateur” teams are in ^reality professionals, and their victories, though im­passive, convey the idea of authoritarian control ^ner than that of an enlightened society.

tpl'miatic Force

^Diplomatic f_{orcej or} “i_nterState relations” as the . ^Vlets term it, is the ability of a nation to carry out ■ . ^strategy without the use of military force. Exam- ⁿⁱⁿg the balance of this force is best done by looking

^C Tf. S. interests in the principal theaters of the World.

Collectively, Western Europe is the third major

^°ⁿ°mic element in world power relationships.

p °wever, of the European economies, those of Italy,

^rance, and Britain are shaky, leaving West Ger-

^^anV ^as Europe’s economic power center. Militarily, Wr backed by six more divisions near Leningrad.²² Soviet submarines, long-range aircraft, and other naval forces exercise control of the adjacent seas, and no U. S. commander has confidence that NATO forces could reinforce this area from the sea. Along NATO’s southern flank, the Soviet Navy controls the Eastern Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet still main­tains control of the Western Mediterranean; however, its presence east of Italy is inferior to that of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron when the latter is supported by submarines and by such home-based aircraft as the naval version of Backfire. Communist land forces would face difficulty in penetrating the natural barriers to Italy and France. However, politi­cal force is being exercised on Western Europe through Eurocommunism (which, though it adver­tises itself as independent from Soviet control, is not sufficiently so).

Western Europe’s stability and security constitute our first line of defense against Soviet total force. We should strive to maintain the static nature of the cen­tral front and increase our force on the northern and southern flanks to achieve the same in those places. I believe that the Soviets’ threat to northern Norway is real, and that if we do not strengthen the region, they will eventually take some of that country’s terri­tory in order to obtain better access to the sea, to demonstrate their superiority, and to accelerate the Finlandization of NATO. On the southern flank, the Soviets will, if military force trends continue, at­tempt to exploit some crisis in order to engage or face down the Sixth Fleet, force its withdrawal, weaken NATO, and provide more leverage for its political and ideological force. Naval force trends have been toward both an improving Soviet Mediter­ranean Squadron and a weakening of the bases and general support of the U. S. Sixth Fleet. In contest­ing crises with the Soviets in this area, support from our allies has varied. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, most of them left us strictly on our own. Other times they have been very helpful. Politically, the U. S. must remain in the Mediterranean. Tacti­cally, the Sixth Fleet is at an increasing disadvan­tage.

The situation in the Middle East took a brief up­turn last fall when it looked as if the Camp David Agreement might bear fruit. However, the stall in implementing those agreements, combined with the revolution in Iran in past months, cast a different shadow on U. S. diplomatic force. The simple fact is, the United States would be incapable of dealing militarily with a possible Soviet instigated crisis in the Persian Gulf. A brief cruise of a Navy carrier in that direction in December 1978 was halted. Some would say that this was a recognition that a display of force was not the proper response. In fact, a dis­play of force would be very useful if credible and intelligently linked to political and economic com­ponents of total force. However, the carrier was not credible for two reasons. First, the Soviet Navy can muster more than enough force in that area to neu­tralize a U. S. carrier, using submarines, surface ships, and long-range land-based aircraft. Second, the carrier could not act as a symbol of U. S. might and will when the United States has lost its strategic nuclear advantage. The Iranian situation, and the lack of U. S. ability to positively influence it, has made Israel more cautious about the Camp David Agreement. A crisis in the Persian Gulf could offer an excuse for the radical Arabs of Iraq and Syria to challange the territorial security Egypt has offered Is­rael. The U. S. ability to intervene if necessary in a Mideast crisis is seriously hampered by lack of adequate arms stockpiles, lack of overflight rights, inadequate sealift, and lack of a credible naval pos­ture.

Primarily because of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the rapproachment between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, with the end of the Vietnam War, the balance of power around the Asian rimland was stabilized. China, sensing a Soviet threat, has for the time being chosen to go with the United States as a balance to Soviet power in Asia, and has been successful in obtaining U. S. recogni­tion. The Sino-Soviet confrontation tends to preserve the status quo and permit Japan to balance itself be­tween China, the United States, and the Soviet Union and to exert great economic influence. Japan’s 1978 peace treaty and trade agreements with China indicate her increasing ability to balance Soviet power against that of China. During a visit to China in 1977, I had the opportunity to talk at length with top Chinese officials, including the foreign minister and the senior vice premier. It became apparent that the Chinese desire to work with the United States as a buffer to Soviet power. It was also clear to me that recognition of Peking could have been achieved without giving up responsibility for Taiwan’s defense with consequent loss of confidence in us by other al­lies.

Many of the smaller rimland countries depend on the United States for security against either a united Vietnam or a belligerent North Korea. China has had differences with her bothersome Vietnamese neigh­bor, and Vietnam has strengthened its ties to the Soviets. When this essay went to press, the Chinese had invaded Vietnam to “punish” them for alleged border violations and the Vietnamese takeover of

Kampuchea (Cambodia) which occurred early ⁱⁿ 1979. The Soviets were poised to intervene to save Hanoi if necessary, and they signaled their intent by diplomatic exchange, by the readying of forces on the Soviet-Chinese border, and by sending a significant naval force into the Gulf of Tonkin. This action, fob lowing closely the U. S. recognition of Peking, demonstrated Chinese willingness to use us to deter the Soviets. It remains to be seen what impact these events will have on U. S. influence in Asia and whether it will result in yet more war or a more sta­ble Asia through deterrence of further Soviet and Vietnamese expansion.

North Korea continuously threatens South Korea, but has shown some tendency to shift its allegiance from the Soviets to China. The squabbles among communist states help the United States to act as the “balancer” in Asian diplomatic relations. If U. S- power were to be removed from Asia, it would quickly be replaced by Soviet power, building on a naval expansion already begun in the Sea of Japan and the Soviet-backed Vietnamese takeover of Kam­puchea. Any serious reduction of U. S. forces m South Korea or a still greater Soviet advantage in sea power over the U. S. Seventh Fleet could force China to seek a Sino-Soviet rapproachment. This would cause a shift of the entire balance of power in Asia m favor of the Soviets and would permit the Soviets to further use their ideological and political force, °^r proxy military forces (such as those of Vietnam °^r North Korea) to hasten their version of social revolu­tion, as they have already begun to do in Kam­puchea. The United States should seek to strengthen its position in Asia and support the Chinese agafos¹ the Soviets, not through appeasement (such as aban­doning Taiwan), but through strength of its total force such as economic cooperation to assist Chinas modernization, and maintenance of adequate military force in the Pacific.

After the recent U. S. recognition of China, '^ve should not linger upon any feelings of accomplish' ment, but rather understand that we have recognized ; a potentially hostile world power who finds it con­venient now to balance Soviet power with our own- The fact is, the decision to recognize China at this , time was born in geopolitical adversity. Our Middl^e | East flank is in trouble. Iran is in chaos. Inflation ha⁵ I put a lid on defense budgets. A SALT II agreement I^s about to further codify Soviet nuclear superiority- I Amidst this, ties with China provide some balant^e K for the West’s outnumbered conventional forces i*¹ jg deterring Soviet power politics.

If Europe and Asia can be made reasonably stable ^ then the threat of further Soviet socialist imperialism

^let confrontation in Western Europe to divert power from their Chinese borders. Not yet

The ^t0 alio

^ill be confined to Africa and the Indian Ocean area. ^e Chinese leaders I met with told me that the ^v*ets are “focusing their energies on Western ^Ur°pe rather than Africa,” and that, so far as China concerned, developments in Africa are “going ^Well. One should bear in mind that it is decidedly

⁰ China’s advantage to have a continuing U. S.- boviet Soviet

^Understanding the immediate vulnerability of free ^orld oil routes to Soviet forces in Africa, the inese would prefer to compete with the Soviets , ^ere without U. S. interference, adopting the role of fiend and leader of the Third World.” In contrast ^t^^le Chinese, who recently have had to cut their ^reign aid severely, I believe that the Soviets see ^°ntrol of Africa as a key step toward winning global gernony without-having to fight in Europe or Asia. Africa is important to the United States because of ^S12e and political impact, because of its geo­graphic position along world trade routes, and be- ^&Use °f its wealth in raw materials. The Soviets have cted that continent as an area for intense exploita- ^{n a}nd have secured, albeit with some ebb and flow •nfluence, positions in Guinea and Angola on the Th^St' ^ant^ Ethiopia and Mozambique on the east, ^rough Libya, they also exercise influence in North ^riCa- Soviet political control of, or at least influ- ,^nce in, these areas will affect adversely United States J!^terests not only in those countries but also in the ^editerranean, in the Persian Gulf, in Rhodesia and*^{0 t0} ^ifnhabwe), South Africa, and Namibia, along the trade routes from the Persian Gulf to ^ufope and America.

newly emerging African states have no desire w the Soviets (or the Americans) to exploit them. Most black African politics revolve around is­sues of anti-colonialism and anti-racism. Closely as­sociated with these issues are those of the sov­ereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the black states. Anti-colonialist attitudes breed a negative reaction toward foreign intervention. How­ever, Soviet and Cuban military intervention have been accepted when they have supported black na­tionalism and independence, giving the Soviets and the Cubans a toehold on the continent. The United States has sought to support black nationalism and, eschewing military intervention, non-military solu­tions to the problems of Africa. This passive ap­proach has led our government to support the black radicals (betting that they will win because of un­checked Soviet and Cuban military assistance) against the majority black moderates.

The employment of Cuban forces in Angola in 1975 was the first Soviet use of proxy military force in Africa. The Cubans are also involved as military advisors in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Tan­zania, and Ethiopia. In the Persian Gulf area, Soviet support of Iraq with new military equipment and

“The Soviet Navy controls the Eastern Mediterranean” and here, in a view taken a few years ago, a Krivak class destroyer, or “guard ship," speeds through that sea. The Krivaks' weaponry forward is believed to he mainly for use against submarines while that aft is intended mainly for use against nearby aircraft. The building rate of this class is reported to be three or four ships per year. The displacement and speed credited to them varies considerably, depending on the source one consults.

bases poses a threat to Iran, to Saudi Arabia, and to the stability of the world’s richest oil area. The Soviet Navy operates in the Indian Ocean and obtains basing support from The People’s Democratic Re­public of Yemen (South Yemen). Soviet influence in India, once strong, has diminished but is not yet eliminated. The KGB instigated coup in Afghanistan in 1978 that produced a pro-Soviet government will probably act to minimize further Soviet influence in India.

Soviet gains in Africa and the Indian Ocean area support the historical Russian ambition to gain a warm-water port to the south. The fall 1978 upris­ings against the Shah in Iran, though probably not communist-inspired, create the sort of chaos that the Soviets could exploit in expanding to the south, and they have done just that. Soviet supported Marxists in Iran helped bring Khomeini to power and are now seeking to manipulate or destroy his government.

Latin America is certainly on the Soviet list for opportunistic exploitation, but it is still beyond the reach of concentrated Soviet force. The Soviets do, however, take time to use political force where they can. For example, in late 1978, they sent Mig-23 fighter aircraft to Cuba, equipped to drop nuclear bombs. Such offensive weapons violate the 1962 agreement following the Cuban missile crisis. By ac­cepting their presence, the United States has not suf­fered a major strategic setback because Soviet ICBM and Backfire forces are now so overwhelming that the Migs add little counterforce at the margin. But we have allowed the Soviets to gain a political modified' tion of the original agreement. This is an excellent example of the incremental threat that can be created through the successful manipulation of total force- Backfires in Cuba should be their next step.

With Europe and Asia tense but basically static at this time, and most of Latin America beyond their immediate reach both geographically and politically- Soviet objectives in Africa and the Indian Ocean will probably be pursued first. These include acquisition of naval bases, creation of the ability to control the oil routes through threat in peacetime and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in war, and the flanking of China. They correctly understand the threat that Soviet control of the African littoral poses to U. S-. European, and Japanese interests.

There are four potentially dangerous situations iⁿ the African-Indian Ocean area. First is the possibility of a renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second is the possibility of a reopening of the Ethiopian-Somalia*¹ War or extension of the Eritrean revolution in the Horn of Africa. Third is the existing situation in' volving the Soviet-supported guerillas and their drive for black rule in Zimbabwe, and later South Africa- Finally, there is the explosive situation in oil-rich Iran that could, through soviet agitation, touch off ³ series of superpower crises and local wars. Control of Saudi Arabia would be the ultimate Soviet objective here. The Soviets can affect the outcome in these areas through their influence in Angola, MozarH' bique, Afghanistan, Iraq, and with the guerrilla forces of the Zimbabwe National Front. We have nothing comparable. In fact, until recently the United States was considering a treaty with the Soviets for disarmament in the Indian Ocean area- This treaty could eliminate our small base on Dieg⁰ Garcia and restrict both U. S. and Soviet naval movements, but these talks have slowed as Soviet Ah' rican expansion has increased and should be abaf>' °ned entirely in view of the situation in Iran. If * ere were such an agreement, the Soviets could still ^ring power to bear by using the always disavowed 'nsurgency forces under their influence in Africa. By overflying one country or another at least nominally ^*^ed to the United States, they could also cover the ⁿdian Ocean with long-range missile-armed naval ^aircraft from the Soviet Union while we cannot.

Thus, in diplomatic or interstate relations, the °viets are gaining leverage. In Europe, the northern ^and southern flanks of NATO are vulnerable to Soviet Political encroachment or limited military action. In Sia, the Soviets wait anxiously to see if the United ^5tates will in fact withdraw from South Korea as ad- ^^errised. If it does, the opportunity exists to bring °^uth Korea into the communist fold, nearly com­P ^edng the flanking movement against China, set- ^tlng the stage for'an end to the Sino-Soviet conflict ⁰¹ forcing Japan to reevaluate its position. In Af- ^r,Ca’ where there is no U. S. power, Soviet power '^creases unopposed. Based on my three-week visit ^ere in 1977 and talking with now Prime Minister °tha, I have no doubt that if pressured too far on ^e question of black majority rule, South Africa will 8ut and will have nuclear weapons with which to ^C°^erce neighboring black states to cease support of knerrilla forces. Such a conflict would bring the ^Vlets into the picture actively. The United States, ^VVlthout a base of power in Africa, would be faced ,^lt^ the choice either of intervening to effect a de- ^Stred political solution or of seeing the Soviets obtain ^c°ntrol.

I see the non-competition for a power base in Af- ^lca to be the factor that will tip the diplomatic ^c'^)rnponent of total force in favor of the Soviets unless ^e United States takes action to stop Soviet im- ^per'ahsm there.

Sea Power

^^ea power plays an important role in every compo- ^net>t of total force. Of the “strategic” forces, ^U Marine-launched ballistic missiles are the most ^|^rvivable. Among conventional forces, those of the ^avy must ensure sea control in order to project any ^others abroad. And, the political interests and com- M'trnents of the United States require the ability to h^r°ject and support large military forces overseas. As farrier of political, ideological, and social ideas to „ ^er parts of the world, the Navy is employed in its Presence” or “show the flag” mission. Econom- ^Ca|*y, not only the United States but also Japan, the °^untries of Western Europe, and many others de- p^e°d on both commercial and naval sea power. °^remost among the latter is the naval strength of

the United States. Technologically, the U. S. Navy must be at the forefront in order to carry out its mis­sion. Diplomatically, the country depends most often on naval forces to influence the outcome of crises.

Clearly, the exercise of U. S. total force is depen­dent on the United States having superior sea power. How well can our Navy function as a reliable con­tributor to our country’s total force in the face of that of the Soviet Union?

In “strategic" weapons, the surest way to neu­tralize Soviet counterforce is to develop and deploy the mobile ICBM, the cruise missile, and—most important—to provide the ballistic missiles borne in our most survivable platform, the nuclear submarine, with the accuracy required to hit a Soviet missile silo. The technology to do this exists and, contrary to our current policy of avoiding the development of counter force weapons, should be incorporated into the Trident missile. The Soviets could only match this by moving their missiles to sea, which they are likely to do anyway. Only a major breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare could vitiate this strategy, and such a breakthrough against distant, deep-diving submarines is unlikely.

In a short conventional war, the odds are that the Soviet Navy can overcome the U. S. Navy through the use of its powerful air, surface, submarine, and land-launched anti-ship missiles. These can be used in coordinated first-strike conventional attacks, as exercises Okean 70 and 75 demonstrated. The United States has yet either to match that capability or to develop a reliable defense against it. We also continue to operate our forces, particularly our air­craft carriers, in ways that are strategically and tacti­cally antiquated. For example, for political reasons, we operate two carriers in the restricted waters of the Mediterranean where they are consistently shadowed by Soviet units and subject on short notice to massive anti-ship missile attack. We make the Soviet target­ing problem simple by allowing the carriers to oper­ate freely in the electronic spectrum with characteris­tic and easily identified emissions. Tactics for carrier operations under strict electronic emission control are feasible and should be more thoroughly developed than they are. In a war fought in a few weeks over a limited objective, the Soviets could prevail by quickly neutralizing most of our aircraft carriers. This would end our only offensive capability, leave our other surface ships without air cover, and leave our submarines vulnerable to air and surface attack. A short conflict would further benefit the Soviets be­cause it would deny the West the opportunity to ex­ploit the Soviets’ limited access to the sea through submarine blockade or the mining of narrow straits.

No matter what the length of a conflict, we would still quickly lose the use of our deployed carriers. Even if the carriers were operated well into ocean waters, Soviet missile-firing submarines and aircraft could mount anti-ship missile attacks that would overwhelm the small number of carriers, no matter how tough, individually, they might be.

If we are to have credible sea power support of the rest of our country’s total force, we must adapt our naval forces, our strategy, and our tactics to meet the threat. Defense against extremely accurate, highly destructive conventional weapons has not caught up with the offense. Even allowing for improvements in defensive capability, dispersal of forces is necessary. This means building more, smaller ships than we now have. We must also disperse our sea-based air power into more platforms than we now have. Further, we should disperse our offensive power into many ships, rather than limiting it only to aircraft carriers.

Following World War II, the U. S. Navy was es­sentially unopposed at sea. In Korea and Vietnam, the projection of power ashore by strike aircraft was honed and emphasized. It was not necessary to estab­lish sea control prior to operating the power projec­tion forces from carriers or amphibious ships. That is no longer so. As I have testified before Congress since 1971, the odds are that the Soviets can deny the U. S. Navy control of the sea. Because of the high accuracy of anti-ship missiles, the large carrier represents too many dollars per ship to be optimal as a combatant in a sea control war. The large carrier is most effective in crises where air power is required and sea control is not contested. Under these condi­tions, which prevailed for so long, the large carrier is the most cost-effective and politically acceptable method of projecting air power.

In order to disperse our air power, I proposed, as CNO, to build a 17,000-ton, 25-knot carrier called a “sea control ship.” This ship was to allow the large carriers to deploy out of the reach of Soviet missiles during times of tension, replacing them with a dis­persed force of low-mix, air-capable ships. This was to be the first step in returning to credible sea con­trol. But the sea control ship did not survive the politics and bureaucracy of Washington, being op­posed primarily by those who would rather see more very large aircraft carriers built, particularly if pro­pelled by nuclear power.

The Navy is now in the process of creating a “CVV” or “mid-range” carrier, a ship of 60,000 tons, rather than of 90,000. This ship will not only carry VSTOL aircraft, but will also have a catapult for con­ventional aircraft. It will be less expensive than a

CVN, and the reduced size of its air wing will also be less expensive than that borne by a CVN. Together, these savings will permit a larger total number of carriers in the force. Moreover, the CVV is the ideal transition carrier to get us from the present genera­tion aircraft to the VSTOL era. It is a ship large enough to handle present aircraft, but cheap enough to permit more carriers. We should build no more large, expensive nuclear carriers. The August 1978 presidential veto on the congressionally-modified budget that included a nuclear carrier was a good one, providing the dollars saved are put back into programs that will provide diversified, offensive sea power in a large number of effective, smaller ships- (Two CVNs for each ocean make sense; a fifth does not provide additional effectiveness and is not worth the additional cost.)

I worry that the existence of a practical VSTOL air­craft today (the Harrier, in its operational A and forthcoming B versions) is being ignored in favor of the long-range development of a “high-performance VSTOL culminating in the 1990s. Even this devel­opment has been slowed by the Defense Department, stating that before further funds are devoted to VSTOL it must be proven superior to conventional aircraft. In my judgment, if it were supported at this time, an effective VSTOL aircraft could be developed as early as 1986. The Soviets are doing it. The U. S- Navy is making the mistake of assuming that a VSTOL aircraft must have the same range and payload capability as a conventional, high-performance j^et aircraft. When one considers the capabilities of cruise missiles, it is plain that this simply is not the case- The cruise missile is a self-propelled payload, and could benefit greatly from the presence of a “target­ing” aircraft to update its guidance en route to either a ship or land target. The medium-performance VSTOL can do this effectively and still be small enough to launch from numerous cruise missile capa' ble ships. Additionally, the VSTOL that is based on current - technology has enough missile, gun, and torpedo payload to add greatly to the AAW and ASVf capabilities of a task group that consists of many ships having a dispersed offensive capability.

This brings up the point of how one Jooks at the capabilities of aircraft. Some experts tend to look at such capabilities with the power projection strike mission or the air defense mission in mind. But, d the aircraft carrier is out of action, these missions become impossible for high-performance aircraft. A<^r defense then falls upon shipboard missile batteries, and power projection falls upon the forces that have been held in reserve pending the outcome of sea con­trol operations. We should measure carefully the

“I worry that the existence of a practical VSTOL aircraft today (the Harrier, in its operational A and forthcoming B versions) is being ignored in favor of the long-range development of a ‘high performance’ VSTOL culminating in the 1990s. Even this development has been slowed by the Defense Department. ” Here we see a Harrier alongside a much larger Corsair II on the flight deck of the Franklin D. Roosevelt in 19 76. Depending on how one values their qualities, either aircraft can outshine the other.

hasvk

anti-ship missiles and the Tomahawk land at-

^trans

"nth

tnit their precise information to ships armed appropriate missiles. The LAMPS helicopter will

^Capabilities required of a sea control aircraft that ^c°uld be operated from dispersed, smaller ships to complement the carrier’s high-performance aircraft.

^"'Performance strike aircraft can be operated in a Power projection role from a large carrier after sea control is secured.-

With the development of the Harpoon and Toma- ^tack missile, every combatant ship, submarine, and ^aifcraft has a potential offensive role, a role previ- °^^sly possessed only by carrier-based strike aircraft.

^ese missiles can strike enemy surface and land ^targets well beyond the radar horizon. But, to do ^c regularly they need to have an over-the-horizon ^reconnaissance and targeting capability that is inde­pendent of aircraft based on the scarce large carriers; ^Us the small-ship-based targeting aircraft.

S°me people look upon the cruise missile as a competitor to aircraft. Rather, the cruise missile complements the aircraft by providing battle group ^C°mmanders with a new weapon. For example, cruise ^^lssiles, such as Tomahawk, could be used as the ^rst wave” against heavily defended enemy task 8^r°ups or land targets, eliminating the foe’s principal . units and thus preparing the way for manned ’■C'ke aircraft. These manned aircraft would them-

^Ves employ cruise missiles to attack at stand-off range.

Satellite reconnaissance, ECM, acoustic sensors, ^and other forms of intelligence all produce localiza- . ^U'n Information that is valuable for targeting. Such °^rmation must be processed, correlated, and ^ransmitted to ships scattered about the world. We ,^{Ust a}lso have aircraft based on those scattered ships at can use this information to pinpoint targets and

L .

P here. Sensor-equipped remotely piloted vehicles tborne drones) need to be developed. The most apability would be obtained by building or modify- ^*8 a ship in the 7,000-10,000-ton range to carry ^{0rn tw}o to four VSTOL targeting aircraft to support

ship-launched cruise missiles. The AV-8B would have sufficient speed and other self-defense characteristics to survive in a hostile environment while providing over-the-horizon targeting information to many missile-armed ships and submarines. The mating of the VSTOL with the ship-borne cruise missile would permit the VSTOL to take off with only a sensor load, maximize its fuel for reconnaissance and targeting time, and use the ship-borne missile for striking targets. The technology exists today to build the ship (let’s call it a sea control cruiser) and the aircraft and have them ready in the mid-1980s.

No matter what the source of the threat is, air, surface, or submarine, our surface ships must operate in dispersed formations. Not only will this confuse the enemy targeters and deny large areas to them, but it will keep the enemy from locating more than a few of our ships at a time. This is important because, with the high accuracy of modern weapons, a surface ship once located and identified has a high probabil­ity of being damaged. We need to build sufficient ships as soon as possible so the large carriers can be used in the less threatened areas until an acceptable degree of sea control is attained. A sea control task group should be made up of several sea control ships which would operate with a dispersed escort. Using its VSTOL aircraft, the sea control ship would provide air defense, ASW, air, and targeting information to those ships. Escorts would contribute to air defense with missile systems, and to ASW with sonars, LAMPS helicopters, and torpedoes. A further dispersal of air power and offensive power would be obtained by operating several sea control cruisers which, though bearing fewer VSTOL aircraft than a sea control ship, would carry better missile and gun weaponry.

We must recognize that the submarine, although quite limited in many roles, is our most survivable platform, and better integrate its operations with the rest of the task group. The attack submarine should provide an outer antisubmarine screen around the task group, with anti-ship missiles available in the torpedo room for use if opportunity arises. In re­stricted waters such as the Mediterranean, we should also consider the contribution that can be made by shore-based anti-ship missile batteries, fast patrol boats with anti-ship missiles (such as the PHM), and long-range shore-based naval aircraft of the patrol type (VP), or even a new jet capable of missions simi­lar to the Backfire’s (possibly an Air Force role). With this variety of force, a sea control task group could employ effective tactics to prepare the way for the large power-projection carriers.

At present budget levels, the “Hi-Low Mix” phi­losophy must be followed in order to obtain enough ships to provide a dispersal of offensive power. We cannot afford to pour our scarce resources into build­ing a few super ships at the expense of sufficient numbers of sufficiently capable ships. In this connec­tion, the 3,000-5,000-ton surface effect ship (SES) is, next to VSTOL, the most important development for the surface navy. If the sea control cruisers (with VSTOL) could be surface effect ships, their high speed would provide a quantum jump in ASW and the abil­ity to operate aircraft. (SES could provide enough speed to allow enough wind over the deck to give conventional aircraft a VSTOL-like capability.) Another new type of surface ship with promise is the small waterplane area twin hull (SWATH) ship that can provide 7,000-10,000-ton ships with great sta­bility for VSTOL operation.

Obviously, the “union issues” in the Navy are sen­sitive and important in building such a fleet. One cannot create a new fleet, a new way of thinking, without breaking some rice bowls. No longer do we have such clearly defined roles for air, surface, and submarine forces as existed in the past. In order to meet the Soviet threat at sea, we must not only oper­ate as one Navy, but also find ways, as the Soviets have done, to build a total force at sea that includes coordination with the merchant marine, the Coast Guard, the Air Force, and the Army in a way similar to our Navy-Marine Corps team concept.

The modern naval officer must find ways to win over the traditionalists who cling to old large carrier platforms and their associated strategies. Officers in high command must deal with all capabilities, evalu­ate the threat, and create an integrated team. The sea control task group which I have described will come about only if those in civilian and military authority get together now and create the forces that will com­pose the task group. It will function well only if “union” interferences are overcome and modern naval strategies and tactics using modern technologies are thought out and employed. I am not so naive as to think that “union” issues will ever totally disappear, and at lower echelons they even aid us through estab­lishing unit pride and constructive debate. However, the “union” politics at the higher planning echelons are totally unacceptable if we are to build and operate a modern Navy equal to the threat.

Total Force

The Soviets use coordinated total force much bet­ter than we. They have achieved strategic nuclear and conventional weapon superiority over us. They can use nuclear superiority as a means to coerce the United States to do nothing when our best interests otherwise would call on us to be active. They have more control over resources of sea power than we do, and can use their Navy today either to face down the U. S. Navy in a short conflict or deny U. S. sea con­trol in an extended one.

Until the United States finds the leadership to tap the political consensus of its people and thus demon­strate that they will support what is necessary to stand up to the Soviets, the Soviet Union will enjoy an advantage in political force. Ideological force, as applied to other countries, is a toss-up between west­ern democracy and communism. Western democracy has the most appeal, but communism is better or­ganized and equipped to deal with the short-range goals of emerging nations. The United States hit the Soviets hard by attacking their human rights policies through support of the dissidents, but lost credibility by backing off in the face of Soviet vituperation and cries of “linkage.”

U. S. economic force is the primary factor in pre­venting Soviet total force from prevailing, but it is being challenged by the Soviets in an increasingly successful way. U. S. technological force is superior to the Soviets, but the lead is dwindling. U. S. so­cial force is superior but lacks the strong leadership at all echelons in government to focus it on the necessity of standing up to the Soviets.

Diplomatic force is a toss-up, with Europe stable but vulnerable on the flanks, Asia stable while U. S- power remains, most of Latin American temporarily beyond Soviet reach, and Africa a void now being exploited by the Soviets. Soviet control of Africa could tip diplomatic and other parts of total force in their favor.

Sea power is necessary in order for the United States to exercise total force successfully. 1° peacetime, the U. S. Navy is nearly always the rele­vant military component of total force brought to bear by the United States in a crisis. In wartime, if the Navy cannot do its job, other conventional mili' ^tary forces are irrelevant. Today, the United States does not exercise complete sea power, lacking the full ^c°ntribution of the merchant marine and coordina- ^t’°ⁿ with the Coast Guard, Army, and Air Force. In fhe face of the Soviet Navy, the United States cannot ^ontrol the seas with its current forces and strategies, oe U. S. Navy must adopt dispersed offensive °rces and a building program based on the “Hi- °^w concept, with emphasis on providing more ^n,Ps at the “low” end of the spectrum, each armed with the offensive capability the cruise missile pro- ^v‘des. One must not, however, lose sight of the ad­vantage provided by the “high” value ships in main­taining the proper “Hi-Low” mix.

Of the eight components of total force, the Soviets ^ave superiority in the top three of nuclear military, conventional military, and political. The United ^atcs has superiority in the economic, technological, ^and social components, but all three are challenged ^Seri°usly. The ideological and diplomatic compo- ⁿ.^ents are a toss-up, and could go either way in any ^Sltuation. Without some changes in national Priorities and leadership in the United States, the ^correlation of forces” will soon favor the Soviets.

^ney> in fact, claim it has already happened.

^ ‘ⁿ rhe long conflict of total force between the ⁿⁱted States and the Soviet Union, the first impor- ^task is to recognize the existence and the nature j ^che conflict. The Soviets have done this; we have ^ne *t only to a limited degree. As battles are then

fought with issues in each component of total force, the winner will be the one who is most successful at linking the issues and maximizing his leverage in those components in which he is strongest. For ex­ample, if the United States is strong in economic force, there should be no hesitation to use that strength intelligently in negotiations concerning ideological force, or human rights. As the battles continue, each side will strive to gain the upper hand in each component of total force. Hard choices are ahead for the United States in allocating resources between those things that enhance the quality of life and those things necessary for national survival.

As we face the menace of modern weapons of great destruction, it is not the suddenness of the nuclear missile war we might get in that is the most threatening, but rather the length of the conflict we are in now. That long conflict is being fought with intelligence and increasing success by the Soviets using “total force.” The job of the U. S. Navy in dealing, in peace and in war, with its share of that Soviet challenge has never been more critical.